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This thesis sets out to understand the consequences of prejudice against German Jews 
in the Weimar Republic, and British Muslims in contemporary England. I am 
interested in the responses of targets of these prejudices, and the social and political 
dynamics underpinning these responses, as well as how the collective self-esteem of 
targets relates with their responses. Discourses of self-esteem have been well 
documented in psychological literature, however, there is little research on the 
mechanisms connecting stressors of prejudice, collective self-esteem and coping with 
Islamophobia and Antisemitism in particular. The primary contribution of this piece 
of work is its attempt to devise a typology of coping strategies and use them to offer 
insight into the processes of Antisemitism and Islamophobia. I explore the lived 
experiences of Jews in the Weimar Republic and British Muslims in contemporary, 
post-9/11 England. Through an exploration of their responses to Anti-Semitic and 
Islamophobic prejudices, ranging from assimilation to withdrawal from society, I put 
forward the ‘third way’ response of accommodation. I study their choice of coping 
strategies against these prejudice through a combination approach using semi-
structured interviews, questionnaires, and an analysis of memoirs, diaries and 
autobiographies. The thesis also evaluates how the collective self-esteem of 
individuals in both cases is affected by the prejudices they face, and it seeks to 
establish a link between collective self-esteem and coping strategies of the targets of 
prejudice. I hope that by studying these two cases in parallel, I can bring to 
prominence a more contextualised understanding of responses towards religious 
prejudice through the target’s lens, as well as a nuanced perspective into the dynamics 
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Aaliyah or Aliyah - Migration to Palestine  
Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (CV)- Central Association 
of German Strasburgers of the Jewish belief  
Da’wah - Missionary work 
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Deutschtum - German 
Entwurzelung - Uprooting 
Erlebnis - Community ‘we’ feeling 
Fatwa- Religious edict 
Galuth - Forced exile of Jews 
Glaubensgemeinschaft - Faith community 
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Kulturjuden - Jewish culture  
Kulturgemeinschaften - Culturally German 
Östjuden - Eastern Jews  
Shariah - Islamic law based on religious jurisprudence  
Shalwar kameez - Traditional South Asian attire consisting of a tunic and trousers 
Trotzjuden - Defiant Jews 
Ummah - Muslim brotherhood 
Ummahti - Muslim brethren 
Volk - People  
Volksgemeinschaft - Socio-political community 
Wanderwogel - Jewish German youth camp 
Weltanschauung – Worldview 
Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland (ZVfD) - Zionist Federation of Germany  




Chapter One. Introduction   
 
 
1. Research Problémaqitue  
‘I was a bit nervous that people would look at me, a Muslim in a headscarf, and 
wonder if I could bake. But I hope that people have realised that I can bake – and just 
because I’m not a stereotypical British person, it doesn’t mean that I am not into 
bunting, cake and tea. I’m just as British as anyone else, and I hope I have proved 
that.’ 
-Nadiya Hussain, Great British Bake-Off Winner 2015 (Daily Mail 2015a) 
 
In 2015 Nadiya Hussain became the first British Muslim to win the Great British 
Bake-Off, one of the UK’s most popular TV shows in recent times. Through the course 
of the show, Nadiya grew to become an unexpected favourite and the nation’s 
sweetheart, winning not only the title of Britain’s baking champion, but capturing the 
hearts of millions across the country. Nadiya’s victory signifies more than the triumph 
of the underdog, it is symbolic of the ways in which British Muslims adapt themselves 
in a post-9/11  world,1 against the backdrop of the ‘Muslim Question’ in media and 
public discourses that challenge the extent to which Muslims can be trusted citizens 
of the state. It illustrates the complex identities and behaviours of Muslims when they 
are faced with numerous negative stereotypes that force them to question their 
selfhood. 
Nadiya’s desire to ‘prove’ her Britishness by means of her competence as a baker is 
a very ‘British’ accomplishment. This suggests that for some British Muslims, a 
positive sense of selfhood is highly dependent not just on internal feelings of self-
worth, but also recognition by wider society. The level of prominence and social 
acclaim achieved by Nadiya, a hijab-clad, Muslim woman of colour, confident in her 
Britishness, serves to project new light on the diversity of British Muslims. Nadiya 
acknowledges that in spite of her victory, ensuing fandom and acceptance within 
wider society, stigmatisation is inevitable:  
 
‘Racism’s become part of my life now. I expect to be shoved or pushed or verbally 
abused, because it happens. It’s happened for years,’ (Guardian 2016a).  
 
                                                
1 9/11 refers to the September 11th 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City, USA. 
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Despite her acknowledgement of the prevalence of racial hatred, Nadiya reassures 
that:  
 
‘I love being British and I love living here, this is my home and it always will be 
regardless of all the other things that define me…I want my kids to be proud of that 
and I don't want them to grow up with a chip on their shoulder, so I live as positively 
as I can,’ (Guardian 2016a).  
 
Nadiya’s resolve resonates with the overwhelming majority of modern-day British 
Muslims who – in the face of prejudices – self-identify as neither assimilated within, 
nor isolated from, wider society. Her response to anti-Muslim prejudice, or 
Islamophobia, forces us to re-think our understanding of the ways in which targets of 
prejudice self-fashion their reactions. We are forced to look beyond a binary of two 
extremes; Muslims who give up their original heritage and rituals to dissolve 
completely within wider society or at the other end of the spectrum, Muslims who are 
so far detached from all elements of wider British society. Much like Nadiya, most 
British Muslims are negotiating their identities, by balancing their Britishness and 
their Muslimness. This takes the shape of a ‘third way’ in which their self-esteem goes 
relatively unhindered, a space where they are not forced to compromise one aspect of 
their identity in favour of another, in the face of prejudices and the resulting stigma 
of being a minority.  
Religious collective identity of minorities has always been a contested topic, 
particularly when they are targets of prejudice. As history shows us, when Jews were 
faced with Antisemitism in 20th century Germany, their ‘Jewishness’ and 
‘Germanness’ were constantly called into question, and they continually negotiated 
these two aspects of their identity. The Weimar era (1918-1933), for instance, saw the 
development of the ‘Jewish Question’ made popular by right-wing German press of 
the time, debating whether or not a Jew could truly belong to the German ‘volk’ 
(people) (Aschheim 1982). In response to rapidly rising Antisemitic sentiments in 
wider Weimar society, many German Jews either assimilated into wider society, or 
completely isolated from it. In the middle of these two extreme responses were what 
Max Naumann refers to as ‘in-betweeners’ (Zwischenschichtler) or ‘fifty-percenters,’ 
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(Naumann 1920: 3-22); (Niewyk 1980: 167)2 those who tread a ‘middle path,’ and 
balanced their Germanness and their Jewishness in order to protect their self-esteem 
when faced with Antisemitism.  
For this reason, alongside Islamophobia in contemporary England, I decided to 
examine the case of Antisemitism against Jews in Weimar era Germany (1918-1933), 
simultaneously. I chose the Weimar era as opposed to the proceeding periods of the 
Reich and the Holocaust, because the rise of anti-Jewish hatred in 1920s Germany 
was less severe than the Nazi era that followed (Meyer 1998). Wider society’s 
sentiments regarding Jews during the Holocaust were indeed too deadly and grim, 
considering the ethnic cleansing that it led to. While Weimar Antisemitism is in a 
different spatial and temporal setting, with prejudice being directed against Jews as 
opposed to Muslims, however, the case of present-day Islamophobia in England is not 
entirely miles apart from 20th century Antisemitism in Weimar Germany. Both are 
forms of religious and racial hatred against ‘Europe’s other’ and the two eras signify 
the build-up of hatred against the minority groups in their respective timeframes (Klug 
2003).  
In my study, I aim to explore in tandem the responses of targets of Islamophobia in 
contemporary England and Antisemitism in Weimar Germany, despite both forms of 
religious prejudice being distinct in their own right. A historical contextualisation 
providing a background for both cases is given in Chapter Two. 
 
2. Research Purpose & Questions 
The broad purpose of my research is to understand the consequences of prejudice by 
exploring the dynamics of Antisemitism and Islamophobia through the target’s lens. 
I will study nuances of the responses that German Jews in the Weimar era and British 
Muslims of contemporary England exude in fending off the prejudices of wider 
society. My study emphasises the pivotal role of individual agency of targets of 
prejudice to show how they respond to prejudice in order to protect their self-esteem, 
and how it affects their relationship with wider society. Prior studies into prejudice 
have, for the most part, fixated on either identifying the causes of bigotry, or the 
mechanisms of prejudice, i.e. physical or rhetorical violence in which this bigotry is 
                                                
2 The English language scarcely does justice to this word, which suggests wandering in no-man’s-land 
between two well-established groups, lacking firm roots in either. For a more detailed examination of 
Naumann’s ideology, see Rheins, “German Jewish Patriotism,” 58-101. 
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manifest. My thesis explores how prejudice affects collective self-esteem of targets 
of Islamophobia and Antisemitism, and how they respond towards it. I argue that 
targets of Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudice employ various means to cope 
and protect their collective self-esteem. For this reason, it is necessary to examine 
coping strategies towards these prejudices and their relationship with collective self-
esteem. This is a very novel approach particularly in the study of religious prejudices 
of Antisemitism and Islamophobia, considering that much of the existing literature in 
both cases focuses on the nature and meaning of Antisemitism and Islamophobia, 
rarely explaining individual responses in terms of how stigma resulting from prejudice 
is managed by targeted individuals (Kunst et al. 2012); (Meyer 1998).  
My thesis is not an attempt to define the terms Antisemitism and Islamophobia. 
Although they are both forms of prejudice – Antisemitism being prejudice against 
Jews, and Islamophobia, prejudice against Muslims – I acknowledge that the terms 
serve as causes of disagreement in and of themselves. Furthermore, the purpose of my 
work is not to equate Antisemitism with Islamophobia, as both are caused by 
seemingly different socially and historically subjective factors. Rather, my thesis sets 
out to explore the responses of targeted individuals in both cases, simultaneously, and 
tries to understand one through the analogy of the other. Thus, I begin my study with 
the aim to address the following research questions:  
 
- How do targets of prejudice respond and how does prejudice affect their 
collective self-esteem? 
- How can we explain the nuances of responses towards prejudice? 
- Is there a typology of coping strategies against Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia that we can derive from the responses of targets of prejudice?  
- How and why do targets of Antisemitism and Islamophobia choose their 
coping strategies?  
- How do the coping strategies of targets of Antisemitism and Islamophobia 
relate with their collective self-esteem?  
 
Crucial to note, however, is that the answers to these questions cannot be found in one 
field of knowledge alone. This is because, here the subject matter of enquiry is not 
rigidly demarcated into a fixed academic field of knowledge (see (Sherif 1969: 3); 
Freeman 2010: 5)). For instance, one cannot fully understand the nuances of responses 
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towards prejudice simply through engaging with social identity theory. In the words 
of Stanley Milgram:  
 
‘sometimes an investigator working solely within the traditions of one discipline 
comes across a fact that cannot be explained with the concepts available to him, and 
he must search in a neighbouring field for the needed explanatory principle’ (Milgram 
1969: 103).  
 
This, in essence, is what it means to take an interdisciplinary approach to study; in my 
quest for richer, more comprehensive knowledge, I would need to conduct 
interdisciplinary research by venturing into other academic fields, like psychology 
and sociology. Thus, the main objective of my interdisciplinary approach is to 
synthesise a variety of concepts, theories and models from numerous fields of 
knowledge and disciplines, in order to formulate a new perspective of understanding 
the nuances of responses towards prejudice, and devise a typology of coping strategies 
towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively.  
In order to address the first three questions, I will develop a robust theoretical 
groundwork, to put forward a prejudice coping model and devise a typology of coping 
strategies that targets of Islamophobia and Antisemitism use so as to protect their 
collective self-esteem. Whereas, for the latter two research questions, I employ a 
mixed methods approach of convergent design using both qualitative and quantitative 
data. Firstly, in the qualitative aspect of the study, I explore the various expressions 
of coping responses of targets of Antisemitism and Islamophobia, with respect to the 
intergroup relations between their faith in-group and wider society. Secondly, in terms 
of the quantitative side of my analysis, I will explore how these coping expressions 
are psychologically mediated by, and related with, targets’ collective self-esteem.  
 
3. Theoretical Groundwork  
Current research into Antisemitism and Islamophobia have not taken into account 
how targeted individuals cope with the prejudices they face as Jews and Muslims, 
respectively. As such, I must examine literature on prejudice quite generally to 
establish groundwork upon which I could then contextualise my cases. In order to 
understand prejudice, I must explore its mechanisms and dig deeper into the concepts 
of stigma, self-esteem and collective self-esteem, by engaging with the work of 
Allport (1954), Goffman (1963), Mead (1934), and Crocker et al. (1994) amongst 
others. In order to understand how targeted individuals cope with prejudice and how 
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it affects their relationship with the in-group and out-group (wider society), I employ 
psychological and sociological frameworks. In the psychological framework, I 
examine responses using an adapted version of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) 
Transactional Model of Stress and Coping, as proposed by Major et al. (2003), which 
sees prejudice as a source of stress that leads to a threat against targeted individuals. 
I focus on symbolic threats (to religious identity) in order to see how targets 
internalise, appraise and cope with prejudice in terms of both emotion-focused and 
problem-focused responses to protect their collective self-esteem. Through the 
sociological framework of analysis, I employ Brewer’s (1991) Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory, which acknowledges that each individual will have a unique 
optimum level of desired distinctiveness from their in-group and out-group.  
By combining both frameworks, I put forward a model of coping with prejudice that 
takes into account the various nuances in responses, and is an adequate means to 
address why people in similar circumstances can have very different responses, and 
people experiencing different circumstances can have very similar responses, towards 
prejudice. I then group the multitude of responses into broad categories using a Du 
Boisian approach and position it as a starting point to devise my own typology of 
coping strategies specific to the study of Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudices. 
My typology consists of three overarching coping strategies, namely: assimilation, 
withdrawal and accommodation.  
 
4. Mixed Methods Design 
I conduct the practical aspects of my research by employing a mixed methods 
approach of convergent design. Wisdom and Creswell (2013) state that a convergent 
design involves simultaneous collection of two or more types of data to:  
 
‘assess information using parallel constructs for both types of data; analyzing both 
types of data; and comparing results through procedures such as a side-by-side 
comparison in a discussion’ (Wisdom & Creswell 2013).  
 
In the qualitative study, I collect responses of participants by using semi-structured 
interviews of British Muslim (aged 20 years-old and over), and I gather first-hand 
accounts from diaries and memoirs of prolific as well as ordinary Weimar era Jews 
that I found in numerous archival sources. I use my typology of coping strategies 
(devised through theoretical groundwork) to generate codes, and employ these codes 
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to conduct thematic analysis of data from interviews of contemporary British Muslims 
and archival accounts of Weimar era Jews, respectively. 
The quantitative element of my study pertains to measuring collective self-esteem of 
targets of Islamophobia through questionnaires with the same people whom I 
interviewed. I measure how targets’ chosen responses relate with their collective self-
esteem by using an adapted version of the Luhtanen and Crocker’s Collective Self-
Esteem (CSE) Scale (1992). With regards to measuring collective self-esteem in the 
case of Antisemitism in the Weimar era, however, I can only employ a qualitative 
approach for practical reasons; most, if not all, potential candidates for interview are 
deceased. I work around this issue by conducting discursive analysis of the same data 
set from archival sources to see the potential link between Weimar German Jews’ 
collective self-esteem and their chosen coping strategy.  
 
5. Chapter Structure  
My thesis is divided into nine chapters. Immediately following on from this 
introductory chapter, is Chapter Two. Historical Context of Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia. In this chapter I engage with the terms of Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia; define, analyse and evaluate both concepts as forms of religious 
prejudice against collective identities in their spatially and temporally specific 
settings. I also review existing literature on Antisemitism in Weimar era Germany and 
Islamophobia in contemporary England on the basis of state, citizenship and cultural 
environment to highlight what is crucially missing from the prior research pertaining 
to both concepts, and explain how my approach is novel and informative in that it puts 
individual agency, i.e. choices of coping strategies to respond to prejudice, at the very 
forefront of analysis.  
In Chapter Three. Theories & Methods, in order to understand the mechanisms of 
prejudice, I analyse theories grounded in sociology and psychology, and put forward 
a prejudice coping model. I then devise a typology of coping strategies that targets of 
Islamophobia and Antisemitism use so as to protect their collective self-esteem. 
Finally, I give a brief overview of my study type and research design. In addition, I 
discuss the methods of controlling biases and practical issues, as well as challenges to 
the study and how I tackle them.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six detail the three umbrella coping strategies that I have 
decided to explore based on my typology: assimilation, withdrawal and 
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accommodation, with one chapter dedicated to each. Chapter Four looks into coping 
with prejudice through assimilation. Here, I describe, analyse, and evaluate the 
responses to Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudices that are assimilationist in 
nature. This chapter seeks to explore the ways in which assimilation affects the self-
concept of targeted Jewish and Muslim individuals, and their relationship with wider 
society. Chapters Five and Six explore similar questions and dynamics, but with 
respect to the coping strategies of withdrawal and accommodation, respectively.  
The results and findings are found in Chapters Seven and Eight. Chapter Seven gives 
both qualitative findings and quantitative analysis of the case of British Muslims in 
contemporary England. It also examines the relationship between their collective self-
esteem and chosen coping strategies, as well as how far my quantitative results 
validate my qualitative findings. Whereas, Chapter Eight gives discursive, secondary 
analysis of the Weimar Jewish case with relation to the potential congruence between 
targets’ collective self-esteem and choice of coping strategy. The ninth and final 
chapter rounds up with concluding remarks on what has been uncovered: the value of 
the ‘third way’ of coping (accommodation); implications to the study of prejudice; 
how policy can be informed in light of my research findings; and what suggested 
changes, if any, I would make in order to take the study further.  
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Chapter Two. Antisemitism & Islamophobia: Historical 




In this chapter I engage with the terms of Antisemitism and Islamophobia; I define, 
analyse and evaluate both concepts as forms of religious prejudice against their 
collective identities. I specially focus on the historically contingent aspects of 
Antisemitism in Weimar era Germany and Islamophobia in contemporary England by 
discussing the temporal and spatial settings of both case studies. I then explain how 
the different accusations levelled against Jews in the Weimar era and British Muslims 
in contemporary England might have a bearing on their responses towards 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia. I also analyse the extent to which religion informs 
and shapes their identities. I end the chapter by reviewing existing literature on 
Antisemitism in Weimar era Germany and Islamophobia in contemporary England on 
the basis of state, citizenship and cultural environment to highlight what is crucially 
missing from the prior research pertaining to both processes, and explain how my 
approach is novel and informative in that it puts individual agency, i.e. choices of 
coping strategies to respond to prejudice, at the very forefront of analysis.  
 
2. Antisemitism & Islamophobia: Concepts and Definitions 
2.1. Antisemitism  
The concept of Antisemitism can be traced back many centuries, however, the first 
recorded use of the term ‘Antisemitism’ dates back to 1879 in Imperial Germany when 
political agitator, Wilhelm Marr, used it to demarcate the ongoing campaigns against 
Jews throughout Europe. Historians believe that Marr was aggravated by the failure 
of the 1848-49 German Revolution, and as a result, he fueled his rage into malice 
against Jews, whom he blamed for Germany’s misfortunes. In a pamphlet dated 1879 
Der Sieg des Judentums ueber das Germanentum (The Victory of Jews over 
Germany) Marr stoked fear against Jews for being a dominant force threatening 
Western civilization. As such, his usage of the term ‘Antisemitismus’ or 
‘antisemitism’ was in a negative connotation. It derived from a binary of identity from 
18th century linguistics, which upheld that Jews were ‘non-Aryan,’ and thus, they ‘did 
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not belong to Europe,’ but were Semites, hailing from the East (Jewish Virtual Library 
Project 2016).  
According to Weimar era historians, Antisemitism is a ‘hostility against’ or ‘fear of’ 
Jews (Neiwyk 1980); (Aschheim 1982); (Meyer 1998). Others define it as ‘any 
expression, verbal or behavioral, mild or violent, against the Jews as a group, or 
against an individual Jew because of his belonging to the group’ (Ackermann & 
Jahoda 1950: 19). Kennedy and Nichols define Antisemitism as ‘a doctrine which 
attributes to the Jews an exceptional position among all other civilizations, defames 
them as an inferior group, denies their being part of the nation and categorically 
refuses them any symbiosis’ (Kennedy & Nichols 1981: 89). In addition, Lindemann 
considers Antisemitism to be ‘conceptualized as hatred/fear of Jews that includes a 
key element of emotionally fraught fantasy’ that is ‘hostile’ in nature (Lindemann 
2000:10). As my study entails understanding the dynamics of Antisemitism through 
the concept of prejudice, I would prefer to use the following definitions of 
Antisemitism: 
 
‘a persisting structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a collectivity’ [emphasis 
added in original], (Fein 1987: 67). The ‘continuous reinforcement of such negativity 
causes stigma associated with Jewish identity’ (Khazzoom 2003). 
 
2.2. Islamophobia  
The term Islamophobia derives from the French word ‘Islamophobie’ found in Alain 
Quellien’s 1910 book, La politique musulmane dans l’Afrique Occidentale Française 
(Ezzerhouni 2010). In it, the author uses the term as a form of criticism of France’s 
treatment of Muslim colonies in Africa, and it can be translated to mean ‘inimical 
feelings towards Islam’ (Vakil 2008); (Robinson 2015). The first mention of the word 
in the English language according to Robinson’s extensive historical study of the term 
came about in Edward Said’s work from 1985, in which he defines it as ‘hostility to 
Islam in the modern Christian West’ (Said 1985: 8-9); (Robinson 2015).  
In the British context, Islamophobia was only defined properly in 1997 by the 
Runnymede Trust Report, Islamophobia A Challenge for Us All, in which the report’s 
authors recognise that ‘the word is not ideal’ but for lack of a better term, and the 
heightening of anti-Muslim prejudice to such an extent, that it became necessary to 
develop a new term ‘so that it can be identified and acted against’ (Runnymede 1997: 
3-4). The Report defines Islamophobia as:  
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‘unfounded hostility towards Islam. It refers also to the practical consequences of such 
hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to 
the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs,’ (Runnymede 
1997: 4). 
 
According to some scholars, like the late Fred Halliday, a definition of anti-Muslim 
sentiments must exist in which we can distinguish between ‘anti-Muslimness’ and 
critique of the ideology of Islam (1999). The former, he argues, is unacceptable 
prejudice, whereas the latter is not to be suppressed, as it is legitimate under freedom 
of speech. In light of Halliday’s distinction, Meer and Modood, argue that 
‘Muslimness’ and Islam are near impossible to detach, as ‘targeting their religion 
targets the set of cultural practices springing from their adherence to the faith,’ and 
can be seen as a form of ‘cultural racism’ (Meer and Modood 2009, 2011); (Vakil & 
Sayyid 2011). 
As my study entails understanding the dynamics of Islamophobia through the concept 
of prejudice, I would prefer to use the following definitions of Islamophobia: 
 
‘a social anxiety towards Islam and Muslim cultures,’ which leads to ‘normalised 
prejudice and unjustified discrimination’ of Muslims (Gottschalk & Greenberg 2008: 
5, 11). According to Samari, Islamophobia manifests as ‘a hatred of Islam or a 
stigmatization, fear or dislike of Muslims,’ (Samari 2016: 1920); (Bleich 2011).  
 
3. Historical Contingencies in Both Case Studies 
Considering that Islamophobia and Antisemitism are both forms of religious prejudice 
that are distinct in their own right, it becomes essential for me to explore the historical 
contingencies in both case studies through their specific temporal and spatial settings 
that factor in shaping the stressors of prejudice, as well as the individuals’ responses 
towards it. I look into different accusations levelled against Jews during the Weimar 
era and British Muslims in contemporary England, and I explore the extent to which 
religious practices shape their identities.  
 
3.1. Temporal & Spatial Settings 
During the Weimar era (1918-1933), Jews comprised just over 0.9% of the population 
of Germany; in 1925 the population of Jews in the nation was 564,379 (ICPSR 1999). 
The majority of Weimar Jews resided in major cities, like Berlin from where over one 
third of the entire German Jewish population hailed (180,000) (ICPSR 1999). Other 
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cities with relatively high Jewish populations (~90,000 in total) included Hamburg, 
Frankfurt, Cologne and Leipzig (ICPSR 1999). Just over 17% of the Jews in Germany 
(~97,000) were dispersed in the smaller towns and villages across the country (ICPSR 
1999). While more Jews resided in towns as opposed to rural areas, most of the Jews 
belonged to the middle class (Meyer 1998). There was great religious diversity 
amongst the Jews; many Jews were liberal or secular, and there was also a significant 
Orthodox minority. 
The Weimar Republic was established in the 1919 aftermath of World War I, which 
Germany lost. The Republic was an attempt to create a functioning democracy, one 
in which all citizens, especially minorities like the Jews, were expected to assimilate 
wholeheartedly within all segments of German life (see: (Aschheim 1982)). In fact, 
over half of the Nobel Prize winners of the Weimar Republic were Jewish, and many 
Jews of the time were accomplished musicians, artists and intellectuals who enriched 
German society and culture.3 Moreover, in the initial days of the Weimar, many Jews 
served in high-ranking positions within the government, the most prominent of all 
being Walter Rathenau, who was appointed Foreign Minister in 1922.4  
Despite this, Antisemitism in the Weimar Republic emerged, and it did so at a moment 
in history when the morale of the German nation was at an all-time low, following a 
miserable defeat at the hands of the allied forces. Coupled with a global scale 
economic downturn, this created space for the emergence of a more fervent form of 
German nationalism (Meyer 1998). Of course, this is not to say that strong nationalism 
was lying latent during the time of the war, but rather, that losing the war gave way 
to the rise of a more aggressive form of German nationalism, one that became even 
more exclusionary in nature. Hence, post-War German nationalism found a scape-
goat in the already disliked German Jewry. This means that German Jews faced a 
double brunt as a result; not only were they, like all other Germans, affected by the 
sinking economy, they also had to contend with a sharp increase in anti-Jewish hatred; 
the Jewish aspect of their identity being scrutinised and seen as a threat by wider 
German society (Weitz 2013: 340); (Levy 2005: 761).  
                                                
3 Five of the Nine Nobel Prizes awarded to German citizens at the time were given to Jews. 
4 Rathenau was assassinated a few months into his service, and Antisemitism is regarded as the 
primary factor in his murder (Jones 2013).  
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In the contemporary case, British Muslims are a hugely diverse group, and unlike any 
of the monolithic caricatures as showcased in the mainstream media. There are 2.6 
million Muslims in England, which has a total population of 53 million (Office for 
National Statistics 2011).5  Higher Muslim populations have congregated around 
major cities, and as a result of early immigration, many still reside in former factory 
towns, mainly in the North of England (Meer 2009). Muslims in Britain belong to 
different sects and ethnic groups, but the main sects are Sunni and Shia Muslims 
belonging to various schools of thought. In terms, of ethnicity, the dominant group is 
of Pakistani origin, with Arab, Indian and Bangladeshi, and growing East African 
populations. 
The contemporary British state is a democracy, functioning on the principles of 
inclusivity, equality and justice for all; on the surface it is a state whose citizenry, 
including a substantial Muslim minority, are encouraged to express their unique 
heritages to the enrichment of a ‘multi-cultural’ British nation, regardless of which 
political party is in power (see (Modood 2010); (Taras 2012)). Thus, Muslims within 
British society are not coerced into complete assimilation, but rather their diversity is 
quite often celebrated. British Muslims are thriving in all walks of life, and many are 
renowned artists, media personalities and athletes. In addition, Muslims of different 
political alignments hold top-ranking government positions. To name but a few, they 
include: the current Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, who is a left-wing, British 
Muslim; former Foreign Minister, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, who is a Conservative 
Peer in the House of Lords; and Sajid Javid, the current Shadow Secretary of State for 
Communities.  
In the midst of this, Islamophobia still exists and it is, to a large extent, a reflection of 
the time and place in which it is occurring.  Modern day Islamophobia emerged out 
of the ‘War on Terror’ and is increased in a backlash against terrorist atrocities carried 
out by self-styled, standard-bearers of Islam, who proclaim that their actions are to 
preserve the ‘honour’ of the faith (Taras 2012); (Zempi & Awan 2016: 3). Although 
Islamophobia against British Muslims predates both 9/11 and 7/7, in the aftermath of 
these atrocities there has been an exponential rise in hostile feelings as well as physical 
and verbal abuse of Muslims (Tell MAMA 2016). Much like in the years after WWI 
saw an economic downturn, we are currently experiencing a financial crisis in our 
                                                
5 This means Muslims account for ~5% of the total population of England. 
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midst. This, along with the unending War on Terror, has created fertile ground for the 
rise in far-right nationalism (Taras 2012). The most recent illustration of this has been 
the rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes following Britain’s decision to leave the EU, 
which saw the unprecedented support for campaigns to uphold a stronger ‘British’ 
identity. This rise in collective identity based on national lines was further stoked with 
calls for Scottish independence, and Northern Irish secession, which shows the 
multiple layers upon which identity fragments, with minorities feeling the worst of 
the brunt. Hence, the context in which Islamophobia in present-day England exists is 
vital in understanding responses towards it, as they are a product of this time and 
space, not abstract issues functioning in a vacuum. A final noteworthy point regarding 
present-day Islamophobia is that it is a global phenomenon, shaped by world events, 
some of which have led to the global securitisation of Muslim identity (Sayyid 2014). 
As a result, the responses towards it will also be multidimensional and not restricted 
to the occurrences in a specific geographical setting (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012).  
 
3.2. Accusations against Jews and Muslims 
Weimar era Jews, on the whole, were more likely accused of being too assimilated, 
infiltrators, and ‘capitalist corrupters’ of the society (Lee 1996: 22). According to 
many of the Weimar era Jewish memoirs I have read, there was hostility against Jews 
for their supposed involvement in a Jewish conspiracy. The Anti-Semite feared that 
the: 
 
‘Jew would never hurt another Jew, that they always stuck together, working to each 
other’s advantage and to detriment of the Gentile…to the Anti-Semitic firebrand it 
was always the Jew who was the enemy, the ruthless exploiter of the simple trusting 
peasant’ (Bauxbaum 125). 
 
Following the translation of the Protocol of the Elders of Zion (1905) from Russian 
to German many Anti-Semites used it as the basis of their propaganda against Jews. 
The Elders of Zion was a fabricated document that claimed there was a Jewish 
conspiracy to take over the world and establish a Jewish global order (Ben-Itto 1998). 
Despite the countless accusations against Jews in the Weimar era, some of them were 
able to successfully ‘blend in’ and go under the radar, thanks to exceptionalism shown 
by some Gentiles in their midst (Bergmann et al. 2012: 200). These Jews were labelled 
‘honorary Aryans’ who experienced tokenism, and were often fetishized by non-
 26 
Jewish Germans. In his memoir, Hanan Waizerman speaks of how, during his youth, 
he was sometimes considered ‘not of his kind’, with friends and acquaintances often 
remarking: ‘Oh if only [all Jews] were like you.’6 Pierre Ferrand tries to explain the 
logic behind this exceptionalism in his memoir7:  
 
‘I have since realized that the attitudes of [such people] were in the characteristic 
pattern of individual acceptance, combined with general intolerance of the outsider, 
which is one of the stages of xenophobia well-known,’ (Ferrand 1988: 32).  
 
The conspiracies against Muslims in contemporary England are distinct from those 
levelled against Weimar Jews, in terms of the supposed purpose and ill-intentions of 
British Muslims. According to Islamophobic rhetoric, Muslims stick together but do 
so through withdrawing from wider society, ‘sneakily’ isolating from, and covertly 
‘plotting attacks’ against, society in hiding (Allen 2013); (Ramberg 2015). And even 
the ‘few assimilated Muslims are lying’ according to far-right groups such as the 
English Defence League (EDL) and the British National Party (BNP), who accuse 
Muslims of lying and deceit.8 Such fearmongering against Muslims asserts that all 
Muslims are part of a transnational Ummah (Muslim brotherhood) that seeks to 
subvert Western democracy by gaining ‘world domination’ in a plot against ‘British 
values of freedom and liberty,’ and to ‘replace it with Shariah law’ (Robinson 2015: 
225). Even the current mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, was wrongfully accused of 
‘giving cover to extremists’ by his opponent during his election campaign (Guardian 
2016b).  
Furthermore, they are either accused of being immigrants draining the benefits 
system, newly migrated and reluctant to be part of wider society, self-ghettoising, 
unwilling to ‘become British,’ and take on ‘British values,’ or the terrorist trope; post-
9/11 Muslims are seen as violently threatening (Abbas 2015); (Malik 2013). 
Caricatures of the Muslim stereotype is framed in media portrayals as the terrorist 
who is an extreme threat to ‘Western civilised way of life’ (Morey & Yaqin 2011).  
                                                
6 Waizner, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). Middle Name Israel. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York, p.2. 
7 Ferrand, P. (1988). Unbidden Guest: [A Memoir of an Odyssey to Ellis Island]. Leo Baeck Institute. 
Center for Jewish History. New York, New York. 
8 Both the EDL and BNP were allegedly established in response to increased immigration from non-
Western countries. They were primarily political groups that campaigned against foreigners entering 
the UK.  
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In sum, the underlying point is that British Muslims are targeted for supposedly 
refusing to compromise their foreignness (Meer 2009), whereas Jews in Weimar era 
Germany were accused of being ‘too assimilated’ and conspiring to overtake the 
system. Both sets of specific kinds of accusations levelled against Jews and Muslims 
by Germans and Britons can potentially influence their responses towards prejudice 
they face.  
 
3.3. Jewish & Muslim Identities: Influence of Religion 
At the cornerstone of the responses to both Antisemitism and Islamophobia is the 
understanding of what religion – or being part of a faith community – means to the 
targets on a personal level. Essentially, how targets view the role of religion in 
formulating their identity may be a factor in shaping their respective responses. This 
is where both cases can differ substantially from one another.  
There was quite a divide amongst liberal Jews for whom the faith group was bound 
by ethnic similarities, and orthodox Jews, who felt the unity between Jews was found 
in common rituals and religious practices. The majority of Weimar era Jews had 
formulated an identity based on their ethnic Jewish heritage, which in some cases 
developed into a strong sense of Jewish nationalism. This is because, for many 
Weimar Jews, the role of religion – in both spiritual and ritualistic contexts – was 
slowly being replaced by more secular frames of understanding. Over time, many 
Jews had disbanded with ritualistic practices, and their Jewish selfhood and belonging 
was encapsulated by their affiliation with other Jews through a shared ethnic heritage. 
As found in Jenny Bornstein’s foreword to her memoir9:  
 
‘In many cases, an ethic of work, education and culture (Bildung) came to fill the role 
previously played by [Judaism]. At the same time, the customs and symbols of the 
larger German society were adopted and displayed’ (Bornstein 2010: 12).  
 
Many of these Jews who rid themselves of religious beliefs inevitably included those 
who assimilated and found that faith was a reason for Antisemitism. For instance, 
Weimar Jews who adhered to the ideology of Zionism overwhelmingly believed that 
religious dogma was a divisive force rather than a unifying tool (Pierson 1971: 222). 
                                                
9 Bornstein, J., B. Memoirs. (2010). A Jewish Girlhood in Berlin: A Memoir by Jenny Barth 
Bornstein, M.D. Jenny Barth Bornstein Collection. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York. 
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They frowned upon overt expressions of religiosity in the public sphere, as a central 
premise of Zionist philosophy at the time maintained a rejection of authoritarianism 
stemming from religious practices, which they believed would inevitably subvert the 
Jewish nationalist cause (Niewyk 1982: 154). 
While secular Jews made up the majority of Jews in the Weimar Republic, a small 
portion of Jews still valued Judaism as a religious doctrine in conceptualising and 
maintaining German Jewish identity, and in turn responses toward Antisemitism. For 
example, according to Rabbi Felix Goldman, one of the most prominent 
spokespersons for liberal Judaism, the Jewish religion was at the centre of Jewish 
unity:  
 
‘There is perhaps no better proof that the unifying element of Judaism is definitely 
religion, than the fact that no baptized Jew nor even group of them has ever been able 
to preserve a vital and fruitful relationship to Judaism or Jewry!’ (Goldman, 1930: 
129).  
 
Although the number of such Jews was very small, it is still worth noting so as to get 
a fuller understanding of the different ways in which religion influenced German-
Jewish identity in the Weimar era. 
The case for contemporary British Muslims is rather different from their historical 
Jewish German counterparts. For many British Muslims, work ethic and faith, or 
adherence to religious practices, are almost inseparable. That being said, there are 
definitely some variations amongst British Muslims in terms of what they wish to 
follow. For instance, according to a recent attitudes survey conducted by Policy 
Exchange Think Tank, almost all of the 3,000 respondents considered themselves 
practicing to some degree, and 91% of British Muslims believe that they can freely 
practice their faith in Britain i.e. they pray five times a day and follow the five pillars 
of Islam, which include belief in Oneness of God, giving charity, praying and so forth 
(Policy Exchange 2016: 8).  
However, observing each and every ritualistic element of their faith is not favoured 
by many modern-day British Muslims attempting to negotiate both aspects of their 
identity. The significant portion reject socially conservative elements of Islamic 
traditions, reinforcing the idea that Muslims in Britain are not a religious monolith 
(Kazi 2012). For instance, Policy Exchange’s survey of ‘British Muslim Belonging’ 
found that many of their respondents did not feel ‘represented’ by self-described 
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‘national’ Muslim groups, like the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim 
Association of Britain (MAB) (Policy Exchange 2016: 84). Most interestingly, 
outside of London, an overwhelming majority of respondents felt ‘no attachment to 
these groups (and have mostly never heard of such groups)’ and they are “sceptical of 
‘community leaders’” (Policy Exchange 2016: 84, 85).  
This sense of individual connection with faith, bypassing organised religious groups 
has led to the mushrooming of Sufi Muslim spiritualist orders in Britain, of which 
many are also at the forefront of stamping out religious extremism, as well as social 
isolation from wider society. For example, groups like ‘Rumi’s Cave’ and the ‘Radical 
Middle Way Project,’ which is a community-based diversity campaign funded by the 
government, are run by self-described, ‘middle path’ Muslims who encourage others 
to hold on to their faith, whilst ‘respecting the laws of the land’ (Telegraph 2009). 
However, on the opposite end of the spectrum, there are still certain pockets within 
the British Muslim community that believe Sharia Law is the correct solution to all of 
society’s ills, with a recent Channel 4 survey of Muslim attitudes showing that 7% of 
1,000 British Muslim respondents ‘strongly support’ the introduction of Sharia Law 
in Britain (Channel 4 2016).  
In sum, British Muslims on the whole are quite practising, and faith for them is much 
bigger than an identity marker, as many of them believe that Islam is ‘more’ than just 
a religion, it is ‘a way of life’ (Sardar 2010).  
 
4. Literature Review 
4.1. Antisemitism 
In the case of Weimar Jews, the entirety of scholarship that I review on this topic is 
documented in historical studies. Much scholarship of Jews in 19th and 20th century 
Germany discusses the emancipation of German Jews, which occurred in 1848, many 
decades after the first short-lasting emancipation of Jews in Prussia in 1805. 
‘Emancipation’ involved being granted equal citizen rights along with 
responsibilities. However, the long, hard battle for complete (and lasting) equal 
citizenship for German Jews was only established and retained in 1869. This granted 
Jews the right to vote, own property and enter most occupations. Furthermore, in 
1919, during the Weimar era, Jews were also granted freedom of religious beliefs. 
While Jews now had almost complete formal equality, the work of some historians of 
Imperial and Weimar era Germany, like Poppel (1976), Aschheim (1982) and Meyer 
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(1998), underscore the existence of several social restrictions placed upon Jews. 
Although technically speaking Jews had been granted a decent position under laws, 
they were still deemed ‘second-class’ citizens, at the hands of church doctrines that 
resulted in unsaid social and political policies that vilified Jews for being ‘deniers of 
Christ’ (Poppel 1976: 5). As such, Jews in Weimar German society were regarded as 
forever foreign, aliens.  
Prior to any formal emancipation, in 1838, the ‘Jewish Question’ or ‘die jüdische 
Frage’ appeared in German public discourses (Pulzer 1992: 28). It interrogated the 
very being of the German Jew; whether or not Jews were a race; what role did Jews 
play in German society (Pulzer 1992: 29). It questioned how far Jews could shed the 
vestiges of their Jewish selfhood and fully embrace their Germanness and become one 
with their fellow Germans. Closer to end of the 19th century, the Jewish Question had 
evolved and made an explosive re-appearance in German affairs, following a speech 
in Berlin by leading members of the German Conservative Party in December 1892, 
in which they declared that they were becoming increasingly concerned and ready to 
‘combat the festering Jewish influence on popular German life’ (Treue 1968, 88); 
(Pulzer 1992: 2). This was the first of many instances that led ordinary German Jews 
to begin questioning their ability to assimilate within wider society. For example, 
shortly proceeding this speech, saw the establishment of the Staatsbürger jüdischen 
Glaubens (German citizens of the Jewish faith), a group of Jewish intellectuals, public 
personalities and academics who tried to prove their resolute loyalty to the German 
Fatherland above all else. In other spheres, the followers of the Haskalah movement 
consisting of German Jewish scholars emerging from Reform Judaism following the 
Enlightenment, were convinced that Jews must secularise and become integrated 
within wider German society. Despite their many attempts to ‘blend in’ or ‘go under 
the radar,’ historians such as Aschheim (1982) and Niewyk (2000) explain that Jews 
were still vilified in media portrayals as bogeymen, maligned for their facial features 
and ethnic heritage.  
As much of the literature shows, another manner in which Weimar German Jews were 
consistently mocked and abused was through derogatory remarks made to insult them 
by associating them with Ostjuden (Eastern Jews who had fled the Russian pogroms 
in the latter half of the 19th century). Most Eastern Jews were refugees who had come 
to reside in the ghettos of Berlin, isolating themselves from wider society. They were 
looked upon unfavourably by most Germans and even the majority of Western Jews, 
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who considered any association with ghetto-dwellers to be a grave insult to them 
(Meyer 1998). In a push against this association with ‘degraded’ Eastern Jews, many 
Western German Jews chose to assimilate by immersing within German culture. 
However, as Puzler (1992) and Poppel (1974) argue, this was by no means a 
spontaneous move, and instead it was a direct response to Antisemitism, and so at 
times it felt inorganic and forced (Pulzer 1992: 13). Essentially, Jews were expected 
to abandon all aspects of their separate culture in order to demand equality from wider 
society. Near the end of the Weimar most German Jews found this too hard to bear, 
which led to the growth in popularity of second-wave Zionism, Jewish nationalism, 
premised on the need for Jewish statehood (Meyer 1998). As such, there was no single 
unified Jewish identity, and all Jews– whether Western or Easterner– were affected 
by Antisemitism and expressed it differently (Reinharz 1984: 1).  
To this end, scholarship into Weimar Antisemitism as a form of prejudice is quite 
generic, rooted in historical analysis. Academics of historical Antisemitism are 
fascinated by the causes and reasons behind Antisemitism of that time (see Spicer 
(2007); Brustein (2003); Arendt (1963)). Their accounts explore Jewish experiences 
of Weimar era Antisemitism by describing the ways in which Jews faced 
discriminatory rules and laws, and general feelings of hostility that had heightened 
post-World War I (Lindemann 2000); (Seymour 2007); (Aschheim 1982); (Niewyk 
1980). Moreover, such literature seems to place heavy emphasis on describing the 
radical, extreme response of second-wave Zionism, the belief in Jewish nationalism, 
premised on the desire to build a Jewish homeland, based on Theodore Herzl’s Der 
Judenstaadt (1896); (Katz 1993); (Lichtestein 2016); (McElligott 2009). However, 
Zionism was but one reaction toward Weimar era Antisemitism, and other responses 
must not be overlooked. Some scholars have documented the daily acculturation of 
Jews in the Weimar era to show the multitude of ways in which Weimar era Jews 
lived their lives (Niewyk 1980); (Meyer 1998); (Aschheim 1982). These studies, 
while helpful in terms of background work in understanding Weimar era German 
Jewish life, give little to no explanation as to whether their actions were in direct 
response to Antisemitism they faced. Hence, as of yet, there has been no substantive 
study into the ways in which Weimar era Jews directly responded to the Antisemitic 




4.2. Islamophobia  
Much of the literature on Islamophobia in contemporary Britain focuses on the role 
played by the British state. Scholarship into what some academics regard as ‘state-
sanctioned Islamophobia,’ entails pinning blame on the state for its supposed lack of 
support for Muslim minorities (Taras 2012); (Vakil & Sayyid 2011); (Malik 2015); 
(Massoumi et al. 2017). In their view, not only is the state failing to protect Muslims 
against Islamophobia or limiting bigotry against Muslims, some scholars go as far as 
suggesting that certain British government policies have led to further hatred being 
perpetuated against Muslims. Massoumi et al. (2017: 5, 8) discuss ‘the Islamophobia 
state,’ in which they regard certain ‘counter-terror’ measures, such as policies to 
prevent terrorism, to be ‘absolutely central to the production of contemporary 
Islamophobia.’ To begin with, according to this body of scholarship, the terminology 
used by the British state and government apparatus is poorly defined, with terms like 
‘radical’ and ‘potential extremist’ reservedly being used to refer to terrorists of 
Muslim background, which they say serves to perpetuate stigmatisation of British 
Muslims (see: (Sayyid & Vakil 2011); (Massoumi et al. 2017)).  Kundnani (2006) 
asserts that this ‘state-level’ vilification of Muslims is a result of the Blair era War on 
Terror and ensuing policies such as the Terrorism Act 2000, section 44, which gave 
way to the ‘Stop and Search laws’.  
Much scholarship evaluating these so-called ‘stop and search laws’ have concluded 
that they disproportionately target Black and minority ethnic people in Britain- 
especially those who are Muslim or appear to be Muslim, with several not going on 
to be prosecuted for a single terror-related charge (Quinlan & Derfoufi 2015: 136); 
(EUHRC Stop and Think 2010); (Chowdhury 2016); (Awan 2014). In similar vein, 
scholars such as Awan (2014), Abbas (2015) and Allen (2015) amongst others, have 
critiqued the British Government’s counter-terrorism strategy of CONTEST, which 
was introduced in 2003 and revised in 2011, gearing their objections against the 
Prevent (against extremism) policy. Current academic critique of Prevent from Allen 
(2015) suggests that the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which makes it a 
‘statutory duty’ for a range of public bodies to engage with Prevent, ‘muddies the 
waters’ of freedom of speech, especially of young British Muslims at universities. 
Academics such as Massoumi et al. (2017) argue that enforcement of Prevent 
disproportionately targets British Muslims, using official British Government’s 
Prevent policy statistics (March 2013) to show that of all the referrals made to 
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Channel, 78% were Muslims, while Muslims only make up 4.8% of population of 
England and Wales.  
Similarly, in everyday representations of British Muslims in the social realm, we see 
the emergence of the ‘Muslim Question’ which some scholars suggest is used to 
further interrogate Muslims by questioning how far Muslims can truly fit into wider 
British society, in other words, how far are they capable of integrating (Sayyid & 
Vakil 2011); (Taras 2012). According to Morey and Yaqin (2011) negative 
stereotyping of British Muslims is commonplace, they are not considered ‘real 
Britons,’ and instead they are ‘framed’ as forever immigrants, because they might 
wear a hijab (Muslim headscarf) that has come to being associated with religious 
fundamentalism and political Islamism on account of media portrayals. Recently, 
scholars of Islamophobia have begun critiquing how liberal academia views Muslims 
in such discourses. Massoumi et al. (2017: 12) argue that liberal accounts have stayed 
clear of tackling racism and prejudices head on, instead discussing ways in which the 
state and citizenry should respond to ‘the challenge of cultural and religious diversity,’ 
(Cesari, 2004, 2013). Multiculturalism theories attempt to subvert such liberal 
discourses, as for them they frame Muslims as ‘the problem.’ For instance, in the 
ground-breaking Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, chaired by 
prominent multiculturalist thinker Bikhu Parekh (1998-200), findings suggest that 
anti-Muslim sentiments are a result of a combination of factors, including an 
amalgamation of globalisation and neo-liberal policies, and a subsequent waning of 
nationalism, that sparked outrage amongst many on the political right, who thus found 
a fitting scapegoat for social malaise in the form of Muslim minorities (Robinson 
2015: 8); (Fekte 2009).  
In order to address Parekh’s suggestions from the 1999-2000 Report to foster harmony 
amongst Britons of all walks of life, in 2003, the UK race relations legislation was 
amended, to build upon the 1976 Race Relations Act, that recognised ‘racial equality’, 
and put forward anti-discrimination measures to protect individuals targeted on the 
grounds of their ‘race, colour or national origins’ (Race Relations Act 1976). Until 
2003, Muslims were not legally protected against such discrimination in the same way 
as British Jews and Sikhs were (Meer and Modood, 2011b: 65). As such, it was 
possible for Muslims to be denied jobs for merely wearing the hijab (Muslim 
headscarf). To this end, multiculturalist theorists explore new ways in which the state 
can oppose prejudice by promoting cultural diversity (see Meer & Modood 2009, 
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2011a) as a means to disrupt the normalisation of prejudice against British Muslims, 
intolerance against Muslim identity, and microaggressions that serve to hamper 
Muslim self-esteem. In their view, it is the British government’s role to push for 
cultural pluralism so that it is accepted ubiquitously.  
In sum, scholarship into Islamophobia can be quite one-dimensional, in that it focuses 
on the causes of Islamophobia, and reasons for bigotry, violence and hate crimes 
(Allen 2013); (Carr 2015); (Awan 2016). Moreover, studies that seek to analyse the 
phenomenon, by incorporating the targeted individual’s experience, fail to fully 
understand the individual’s response, and instead they situate Islamophobia in the 
wider framework of multicultural discourses in order to give mainly observational 
accounts of Muslim lived experiences, which show how these minorities acculturate 
within dominant non-Muslim cultures, completely stripping the individual of any 
agency (see Akhtar (2010); Ali (2012); Locke & Bailey (2014); Esposito & Kalin 
(2011)). In similar vein, other scholars explore the experiences of discrimination 
caused by Islamophobia and its effects on Muslim day-to-day life (Meer 2014); 
(Modood 2010); (Rezq 2014); (Taras 2012); (Malik 2013); (Bayoumi 2015). Very 
little if any work engages with the questions about how and why individuals respond 
and react to the stigma of Islamophobia directly. Recently, however, scholars are 
beginning to assert the need for assessment of coping responses towards Islamophobia 
by speaking directly to Muslims to see their forms of ‘resilience’ against it 
(Hargreaves 2016).  
Furthermore, research within the realm of psychology has begun investigating 
Muslim perceptions of Islamophobia (Kunst 2012); (Kunst et al. 2015). However, 
such studies focus on the connection between perception of discrimination caused by 
Islamophobia and national identity. In addition, their approach to study is purely 
psychological, with the aim of connecting degree of national identity with social well-
being as opposed to their personal and collective self-esteem. No studies focus 
specifically on the effects of Islamophobia upon self-esteem and coping responses of 
Muslims, yet it is certainly something that scholars feel is worth exploring (Nadal et 
al. 2012).  
*** 
 
As I have shown in the literature review for both case studies, scholarship into 
Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices focuses on how bigotry and discrimination 
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are manifest, and how they put onus on the state or civil society to ensure that 
prejudice is curtailed through policies and legislations. While these are necessary and 
fruitful scholarly endeavours in their own right, they neglect a lot of deeper issues 
pertaining to religious prejudice. For instance, it is important to not only include the 
perspectives and experiences of targets of prejudice, but rather to understand the 
mechanisms of prejudice through the targets’ lens by seeing how the individual reacts 
towards it. Essentially, it is crucial to include the agency of targeted individuals by 
exploring how they respond to prejudice, and cope with its effects upon their 
collective self-esteem. For this purpose, I am particularly interested in understanding 
the responses that Weimar era Jews and contemporary British Muslims exude in 
fending off Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices, and their choice of coping 
strategy to protect their self-esteem.  
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This chapter is divided into two parts, Part A and Part B. Part A begins with an 
extensive analysis of theories grounded in psychology, sociology and identity studies 
so as to address the three initial research questions, which are: ‘How do targets of 
prejudice respond and how does prejudice affect their collective self-esteem?’ ‘How 
can we explain the nuances of responses towards prejudice?’ ‘Is there a typology of 
coping strategies against Antisemitism and Islamophobia that we can derive from the 
responses of targets of prejudice?’ In order to understand the processes of prejudice 
and the mechanisms of targets’ responses towards it, I employ both psychological and 
sociological frameworks. Following a critical evaluation of psychological concepts 
and psycho-social theories of intergroup interactions, I put forward a Prejudice 
Coping Model by combining Lazarus and Folkman’s Transactional Model of Stress 
and Coping (1984) and Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (1991). I use this 
Prejudice Coping Model to understand the nuances of coping responses. The most 
important task then is to group the wide spectrum of responses into broad categories 
by devising a typology of coping strategies specific to my chosen case studies of 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia. This typology is my main intended contribution to 
the study of responses towards prejudice, and it consists of three types namely, 
assimilation, withdrawal and accommodation. I later use these coping strategies in the 
practical aspects of my research by applying them to my case studies.  
In Part B, I describe and explain the thesis research design. I begin by introducing the 
study techniques, study type and instruments that I use in this research. I then give an 
overview of my study sample and sources, as well the selection processes and means 
of approaching participants. Finally, I describe how I display my findings and discuss 
the methods of controlling biases, practical issues and challenges to the study, and 






Part A. Theories 
2. Prejudice & Stigma: The Target’s Perspective  
Prejudice is defined as a ‘preconceived judgment or opinion, often based on limited 
information’ (Katz & Zalk 1978: 450). It entails ‘an organized predisposition to 
respond in an unfavourable manner toward [a group of] people’ because of their 
affiliation with a particular group (Aboud 1988: 4). Crandall and Eshleman define 
prejudice as ‘an evaluation of a social group or an individual that is significantly based 
on the individual’s group membership’ (Crandall & Eshleman 2003: 414). 
Understanding the concept of prejudice through the target’s perspective cannot be 
done without discussing the linkages between prejudice and stigma, considering that 
both concepts intersect and, to a certain degree, coalesce. Phelan et al. (2008) posit 
that the nature of both concepts can be understood by exploring various ‘schemes’ 
and seminal conceptual models of both prejudice and stigma, which they assessed 
chronologically. With regards to prejudice, Phelan et al. (2008) found that classic 
models of prejudice, stemming from the work of Allport (1954), place heavy emphasis 
on processes in perpetrators (agents of prejudice), along with the causes of this 
discriminatory behaviour. Whereas, stigma models, building on research by the likes 
of Goffman (1963), focus on the feelings of targets regarding the negative behaviour 
they face, their identity and emotions, their experiences of ‘stigmatization’.  
In his seminal work, The Nature of Prejudice, Gordon Allport asserts: 
 
‘ethnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It 
may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an 
individual because he is a member of that group,’ (Allport 1954: 9). 
 
While Allport might be considered the pioneer in the study of prejudice, Erving 
Goffman is the forefather of studies into stigma. In his 1963 book, Stigma: Notes on 
the Management of a Spoilt Identity, Goffman refers to stigma as: ‘the situation of the 
individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance,’ (Goffman 1963: preface).  
Goffman continues, by describing a stigmatised individual as one who is:  
 
‘reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted 
one…discredited as a result of discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity,’ 
(Goffman 1963: 3, 12).  
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Normally, research into prejudice is concerned with processes of social relationships 
that are based upon discrimination and domination of a particular group, while stigma 
research pertains to the exploration of processes characterized by enforcement of 
norms and avoidance of targeted individuals on health grounds (Phelan et al. 2008: 
12). Moreover, according to Dovidio et al. (2000), ‘stigma’ as a term refers to a broad 
set of processes, while prejudice is considered the ‘attitudinal’ aspect of such 
processes (Phelan et al. 2008: 12). Furthermore, while much research exploring 
stigma is fixated on describing negative effects of stigma on persons labelled with a 
stigmatized attribute, it still explains stigma through the lens of the stigmatizer (the 
one who perceives the stigmatizing ‘mark’), in terms of how they attach the stigma 
marker on targeted individuals and perpetuate a certain prejudice against them (Link 
& Phelan 2001); (Major & O’Brien 005).  By Stangor and Crandall’s (2000) 
standpoint, stigmatization from this ‘mark’ is embedded within ‘a perceived threat to 
the individual or culture, including intergroup conflict.’ To this end, Pescosoido 
(2015: 91) gives an apt summation clarifying any ambiguities of the term stigma and 
the ensuing process of stigmatization:  
 
Stigma is the mark, the condition, or status that is subject to devaluation (Goffman 
1963, Hinshaw 2006, Sartorius 2007). Stigmatization is the social process by which 
the mark affects the lives of all those touched by it…Stigma requires (a) 
distinguishing and labeling differences, (b) associating human differences with 
negative attributions or stereotypes, (c) separating “us” from “them,” and (d) 
experiencing status loss and discrimination.’ 
 
Despite the fact that the two concepts of prejudice and stigma have, for the most part, 
evolved distinctly from one another, and they have certain distinguishing elements, 
there are overlapping areas of inquiry that unite scholarship into both concepts and 
benefit our understanding of both terms. For instance, scholars often classify stigma 
as a stressor because it tends to refer to the processes of anticipation and 
internalisation of wider society’s negative attitudes (see Link et al. 1987); (Stuber & 
Schlesinger 2006). Stress in this context is ‘any event in which environmental 
demands, internal demands, or both, tax or exceed the adaptive resources of an 
individual, social system or tissue system’ (Monat & Lazarus 1991: 3). The two 
concepts of prejudice and stigma are interlinked in that the stress stemming from 
stigma arises when the negative prejudicial attitudes from wider society are 
internalised by the targeted individual. However, a pitfall occurs because often 
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researchers of prejudice investigating different types of discrimination disregard the 
importance of ‘stigma-related stress’ processes (Phelan et al. 2008). Vice versa, when 
stigma researchers focus on the targeted individual’s internalization processes, they 
tend to do so while neglecting any discussions surrounding the interpersonal 
relationships and structural forms of prejudice.  
For a more effective and efficient understanding of prejudice and stigma processes, 
Stuber et al. (2008: 352) posit a merging of prejudice and stigma research so that we 
could potentially ‘enhance existing models that conceptualise stigma and prejudice as 
[forms of] psychosocial stress in the lives of marginalised groups.’ Considering this 
internalisation of hostile feelings directed towards one’s in-group as a source of stress 
impacting one’s participation in wider society is something that most research into 
prejudice seemingly neglects (Stuber et al. 2008: 354). However, incorporation of 
stigma stressor analysis has gradually begun making its way into the study of 
prejudice to propose alternative, more nuanced ways to interpret the effects of stigma 
on self-esteem (see: Crocker & Major (1989)).  
According to Crocker et al. (1998: 505) one is stigmatised when ‘some attributes or 
characteristics convey a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context.’ 
Thus, stigma ‘marks’ targets out as different from the norm of wider society on the 
basis of ‘discrediting dispositions,’ which manifest in the form of prejudice, ensuing 
discrimination on the basis of negative stereotypes (Jones et al. 1984). These 
stereotypes are a ‘set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people’ 
(Duckitt 1992: 14), (Dovidio 2006: 1-15), and they serve as the basis for excluding 
and isolating stigmatised individuals in everyday life (Major & Eccleston 2004) 
(Stuber et al. 2008). On part of the target, awareness of negative stereotypes associated 
with one’s group can produce a particular vulnerability that Steele & Aronson (1995) 
and Steele (1997) have identified as ‘stereotype threat.’ This threat can be either 
realistic (i.e. to power resources, socio-economic status, wellbeing) or symbolic (i.e. 
challenge the very meaning of the target’s identity) (Stephan et al. 2008). In the case 
of my study of Islamophobia and Antisemitism, I will focus solely on the symbolic 
threats posed by stigma stressors arising from both forms of religious prejudice. 
 
3. Mechanisms of Responses towards Prejudice 
In the social realm, individuals must contend with the symbolic threat of stigma 
stressors on multiple fronts: threats can be directed towards their systems of belief, 
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ideologies and philosophies. Such stressors can affect the targeted individual’s 
biology, physiology, psychology and social identity (Stephan et al. 2009). For the 
purpose of my thesis, I will focus on the negative effects of threats on the target’s 
psychology (collective self-esteem) and social identity.10 The psychological impact 
of stigma on an individual can be understood through the lens of psychology (Freud 
1915); (Adorno et al. 1950), while its effects on social identity are visible using a 
sociological framework (Tajfel & Turner 1979); (Stephan et al. 2009); (Hewstone et 
al. 2002); (Cinnirella 2014). At present, no overarching framework exists that would 
allow us to investigate both the psychological and sociological implications, 
simultaneously. According Aviram (2007) we must:  
 
‘take into account both the socio-cultural and psychodynamic determinants of 
prejudice…[and] ask how these subdisciplines can combine efforts to address 
prejudice. The task to study the dynamics of prejudice requires consideration of the 
interrelationship between the individual and the group, and the positive identification 
with the in-group in relation to an out-group,’ (Aviram 2007: 5). 
 
In order to understand the mechanisms of responses towards prejudice and their 
complexities from both psychological and sociological angles, henceforth, I will 
divide my theoretical analysis into two areas: firstly, I discuss the responses towards 
prejudice through a psychological framework by critically evaluating various 
concepts in which the negative effects of prejudice upon self-esteem is understood. 
Secondly, I explore the social interactions of targets of prejudice using a sociological 
framework by critically evaluating various theories of social identity to see which best 
fits my case studies.  
 
3.1. Psychological Framework  
According to Miller and Major, individuals respond to prejudice by ‘minimiz[ing] 
negative affect and protect[ing] self-esteem from stigma-related stressors of 
prejudice’ (Miller & Major 2003: 250). Now, I critically evaluate various concepts 
regarding the negative impact of prejudice on collective self-esteem and its role in 
shaping the responses of targets of prejudice through a psychological lens. Before 
                                                
10 I use Kwame Anthony Appiah’s definition of social identites as ‘narratives that people can use in 
shaping their projects and telling their life stories’ (2005: 22).  
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discussing this in detail, it is important to fully understand the concepts of self-esteem 
and collective self-esteem. 
 
3.1.1. Understanding Self-Esteem & Collective Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem is quite simply ‘how one evaluates the self’ (Porter and Washington 1993: 
140). It entails ‘feelings of self-liking, self-worth, respect, and acceptance’ (Kernis 
2003: 2). Most modern scholarly work pertaining to prejudice – from social 
psychology to identity politics – overlook the importance of the spirit (thumos). As 
classic philosophical texts such as Plato’s The Republic suggest, the spirit is motivated 
by different desires, such as appetite and reason. Distinct from these two, yet just as 
innate, is the competitive desire for positive self-esteem. It is something that all human 
beings strive toward attaining, and it is found in ‘the quest for honor and standing’ 
(Lebow 2008). In Lebow’s A Cultural Theory of International Relations, he points 
out that when evaluating the self, an individual’s view of themself is a reflection of 
what others perceive them to be (Lebow 2008). Classical texts, like Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807), assert that forming a sense of self is dependent 
upon other’s recognition of it. According to James, recognition by others is so vital to 
an individual’s self-understanding that a person can have ‘as many social selves as 
there are individuals who recognize him’ (James 1890: 294).  
The ideas of socialisation and recognition serve as the fundamental bases for theories 
of symbolic interactionism which stress the role of another person’s perceptions in 
influencing the individual’s internal narratives of selfhood and how they evaluate their 
self (Mead 1934; Cooley 1902; Allport 1954). George Herbert Mead’s Mind, Self and 
Society aptly explains this phenomenon using the concept of the ‘Two Halves of the 
Self’ in which he describes the ‘I,’ as the internalisation element, and ‘me,’ as the 
socialisation element of this relationship, respectively. The ‘me’ can be seen as the 
individual’s ‘social self’, and the ‘I’ is the “part of the individual composed of 
narratives, which is in dialogue with the ‘me’” (Mead 1967: 178). As posited by Mead, 
“the ‘me’ is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the ‘I’ is the 
organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes” (Mead 1967: 175). 
From this we understand that the self is involved in a “process through which social 
experiences are permanently being incorporated into the self (through the ‘me’) and 
reconstructed by the ‘I’” (Carreira da Silva 2007: 6). This dialogical process between 
socialisation and internalisation is the means through which the individual encounters 
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and takes in the views of wider society (or, the ‘generalized other’, as Mead would 
have it). The individual cannot ‘be the very self he is trying to be’ if wider society 
fails to recognise it (Mead 1964: 278).  
Theories which see the origins of self-esteem primarily as a result of socialisation and 
relationships (such as Cooley 1922; Harter 1999) stress the key role of significant 
others. Others function as a social mirror, which assists in determining the target’s 
views about themselves – their internal narratives – so to speak. In his theory of the 
Looking-Glass Self, Cooley explains the importance of the other in moulding internal 
narratives of the self:  
 
‘We imagine our appearance to another person…we imagine the other person’s 
judgment of that appearance, and…we experience a feeling such as pride or 
humiliation about the other’s judgment of ourselves,’ (Cooley 1922: 178).  
 
Perceived social definition is not equivalent to self-definition and the individual’s 
attempt to balance both is exhibited in their response to negative socialisation (Heiss 
1981: 120). Self-awareness and reflection about our behavioural routines – and how 
others respond to them and to us – are critical. They inform our understanding of 
ourselves, and also give ‘recognition of how we are both free and constrained’ by 
these social relationships (Lebow 2016: 8); (Foucault 1987: 66). Targets of prejudice 
may have a negative view of self because the definition of their self is mutually 
dependent on the labelling and interactions with others (Erikson 1963). Yet, as Strauss 
(1969) points out, the self is not simply a mirror image of the evaluations and 
definitions of other people. Instead, the self is a multifaceted social object arising out 
of interactions and interpersonal relationships with others, i.e. the end result of the 
self is understood with the evaluation of how much and to what extent the target takes 
in the social encounter (see: (Tajfel & Turner 1979); (Crocker et al. 1994)). In their 
theory of social identity Tajfel and Turner (1979) define self-concept as a combination 
of personal identity and social or collective identity. While personal self-esteem is the 
evaluation of personal identity, which is based on personal attributes (Rosenberg et 
al. 1989), collective self-esteem refers to the individual’s collective identity i.e. their 
group affiliations (Crocker 1990). My thesis acknowledges the importance of personal 
self-esteem, but it exclusively examines social or collective self-esteem by exploring 
self-esteem at the group or collective level. This is because my research is about 
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Islamophobia and Antisemitism, which are prejudices against group membership and 
collective identity.  
A significant emotional attachment to the in-group is critically important for the self-
worth of individuals, and thus, their collective self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner 1979); 
(Tajfel 1982); (Turner 1982). Robinson refers to collective self-esteem as ‘self-esteem 
with respect to one’s group's standing in society’ (Robinson 2008: 1142). Hence, 
collective self-esteem is a type of an individual’s self-esteem ‘which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership’ (Tajfel 1981: 255).  
 
3.1.2. Prejudice & its Effects on Collective Self-Esteem 
Early scholarly work pertaining to the relationship between prejudice and self-esteem 
function under the often implicit assumption that the stimulus of prejudice causes a 
direct and immediate lowering of self-esteem (Allport 1954); (Allison 1998). In this 
case, as Allport (1954: 142) asserts, prejudice would inevitably have a direct, negative 
effect upon the target: ‘one’s reputation, whether true or false, cannot be hammered, 
hammered, hammered, into one’s head without doing something to one’s character.’  
If this claim were true and prejudice had a direct, negative impact on the self-esteem 
of targets, then there would be evidence in literature to back up this claim, i.e. as 
Major et al. (2003: 80) suggest, groups of individuals that are ‘exposed to repeated, 
pervasive, and severe discrimination’ would have a lower collective self-esteem than 
those individuals who belong to a more valued social group. However, studies 
comparing the differences in collective self-esteem of stigmatised and non-
stigmatised groups show that in some cases individuals belonging to ‘devalued’ 
groups possess higher collective self-esteem levels than those in more valued, non-
stigmatised groups (see: (Crocker & Major 1989); (Porter & Washington 1979)). As 
such, taking the relationship between prejudice and collective self-esteem as one of a 
linear cause and effect fails to acknowledge that self-esteem is not always directly 
impacted by prejudice. In addition, it does not take into account the subjective 
phenomenon of perceiving prejudice (on the part of targets) that would allow us to 
acknowledge variations in responses.  
If we broaden our understanding to consider the target of prejudice to be a subjective, 
perceptive being, we acknowledge that the individual’s perception of prejudice 
against their in-group might not directly parallel the actual prejudice they face. This 
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line of thinking is premised on the idea that ‘perception of prejudice regulates the 
effects of prejudice on self-esteem’ (Major et al. 2003: 80), which explains the 
variability in responses towards prejudice because some individuals are more 
perceptive and sensitive about the prejudice against their in-group than others. 
Regardless of this explanation of response variability, simply including the concept 
of perception of prejudice does not negate the idea that prejudice has a direct, negative 
influence on the individual’s collective self-esteem. This is because the concept of 
perception of prejudice is predicated on the theory of symbolic interactionism, which 
postulates that an individual’s evaluation of their self is a direct reflection of others’ 
perception of them. In reality, there is little evidence to confirm that it is in fact 
prejudice that causes a direct lowering of self-esteem, as there are multiple moderating 
(situational and environmental) factors that influence the relationship between self-
esteem and perception of prejudice (Major et al. 2002). 
In sum, the relationship between prejudice and self-esteem/ collective self-esteem is 
far more complex than a linear cause and effect, also it is not enough to merely 
consider the subjective phenomenon of targets perceiving prejudice. Moreover, while 
collective self-esteem might be lowered as a result of prejudice towards the target’s 
in-group, we must explain the entire process by which prejudice threatens targets’ 
collective self-esteem in order to fully understand the nuances of responses. This, I 
propose, can be explained using Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Transactional Model 
of Stress and Coping, which Major et al. (2003) adapted to explain the phenomenon 
of prejudice. This model views the target as an emotive being and asserts that 
individuals do not respond uniformly, and it highlights the important role played by 
cognitive appraisal and coping with prejudice to preserve or enhance self-esteem 
(Major et al. 2003). I now explain Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Transactional Model 
of Stress & Coping model and its processes in detail. 
 
3.1.3. Transactional Model of Stress & Coping 
The most appropriate way to explain variability in responses to prejudice can be found 
in the Transactional Model of Stress and Coping Theory originally developed by 
Lazarus (1966), and Lazarus and Folkman (1984). The framework of this model 
places emphasis on the mechanism of appraisal by which individuals evaluate harm, 
threat and challenges, in order to cope to protect or preserve self-esteem when faced 
with stress (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The model was ‘designed to 
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explain significant variability across individuals in adaptation and response to 
stressful events (Allison, 1998; Clark et al., 1999; Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Miller & 
Major, 2000),’ (Major et al. 2003). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) take the individual 
as an emotional being with an orientation and awareness of their surrounding 
environment, and a subjective cognitive ability to comprehend and confront the 
stigma stressors that threaten their self-esteem.  
When applied to incidences of prejudice, the model illustrates how targets appraise 
and respond to stigma stressors, and it acknowledges that responses to prejudice are 
not uniform because having perceived prejudice, each individual has to appraise 
before they respond. This key component of appraisal asserts that responses are a 
function of how one appraises or judges the stressor of prejudice; why it is relevant to 
the target; whether or not it is threatening to their collective self-esteem; and how they 
choose to preserve and protect their self-esteem. Thus, not only do individuals 
perceive prejudice differently, they appraise it on their own terms and an incident is 
deemed stressful by the individual when the internal or external demands are too 
burdensome upon the individual such that the pressure outweighs the capacity or 
resources that the individual possesses to deal with the demands (Lazarus & Folkman 
1984).  
Moreover, each individual confronted with prejudice goes through two stages of 
cognitive appraisal. Cognitive appraisal is the ‘process of categorizing an encounter, 
and its various facets, with respect to its significance for well-being’ (Lazarus & 
Folkman 1984: 31). In the first stage, that of primary appraisal, the individual 
determines whether or not an incident or event poses a potential threat to their 
collective selfhood (collective self-esteem), i.e. whether or not the incident or 
encounter is threatening enough to cause the individual stress for their in-group 
identity. Secondary appraisal involves the individual assessing to what extent they are 
capable of alleviating the stress caused by the stressor or prejudice to protect collective 
self-esteem. Once prejudice has been appraised, the individual copes by responding 
to it. Coping is a means by which the targeted individual calibrates their emotions and 
behaviour in response to the stressor to protect their self-esteem (Compas et al. 2001); 
(Major et al. 2003: 87). The process of coping denotes a ‘variety of cognitive and 
behavioural strategies individuals use to manage their stress (Folkman & Moskowitz, 
2004),’ (Litman 2006: 274). Lazarus and Folkman (1984) distinguish between two 
types of coping: emotion-focused and problem-focused coping. Emotion-focused 
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coping entails dealing with feelings regarding the stressor, while problem-focused 
coping refers to tackling the source of the stress.  
It is very important to note that the perception, appraisal and approach to coping are 
all moderated by situational (severity of stress; imminence; relevance), personal 
(individual optimism; age; gender; general self-esteem) as well as structural factors 
(social status, social-political conditions and choices of others) (Major et al. 1998); 
(Taylor 1989); (1999); (Major et al. 2003: 87). Such factors ‘moderate’ the 
relationship between the stressor of prejudice and the response outcome by way in 
which they affect the appraisal and coping of the targeted individual (Major et al. 
2003: 87). Thus, the Transactional Model not only acknowledges that the individual’s 
perception of the stressor of prejudice can differ from the actual prejudice directed 
towards them, but also that the effect of the prejudice upon collective self-esteem is 
not direct nor is it uniform. For this reason, the Transactional Model can aptly address 
why prejudice is threatening to the target’s collective self-esteem and how they can 
deal with it in order to protect their collective self-esteem.  
 
Figure 1 (below) illustrates the mechanisms of the transactional coping process. 
 
Figure 1. Transactional Model of Coping with Prejudice. 
 
Although Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) model introduces concepts of emotion and 
problem-focused coping, it does not describe them in such detail that they would 
prove useful when applied to responses towards prejudice. On further exploration of 
literature, I found that emotion-focused coping ‘reflects attempts to handle thoughts 
and feelings associated with the stressor,’ (Litman 2006: 74). Strategies of emotion-
focused coping attempt to alleviate the psychological impact of stigma and its 
resulting consequences (Holloway 2009: 122). In the face of stigma, some targets 
display defensive attitudes through ‘emotions of anxiety (i.e. anxious expectations) or 
anger (i.e. angry expectations) that prepare the individual to defend the self against 
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subsequent rejection [from society]’ (Nesdale 2007: 14). Miller and Major (2003) 
state, ‘in the domain of stigma, emotion-focused strategies seek especially to 
minimize negative affect and protect self-esteem from stigma-related stressors such 
as prejudice,’ (Miller & Major 2003: 156). Furthermore, Zautra, Cofresi and Bachrach 
(1987) classify three forms of emotion-focused coping strategies: wishful thinking; 
minimising threat; and cognitive reappraisal. In addition, according to Carver et al.’s 
(1989) scale of COPE inventory (cited in Litman 2006: 275), emotion-focused coping 
entails the following: ‘positive reinterpretation; acceptance; denial; turning to 
religion; and emotional social support.’ 
On the other hand, problem-focused coping strategies related to prejudice are those 
that attempt to alter the targeted individual’s relationships with their in-group and out-
group, respectively. For this reason, it becomes important for me to employ a 
sociological framework to understand problem-focused coping in detail.  
 
3.2. Sociological Framework 
I now critically evaluate four dominant intergroup theories to explore the coping 
mechanisms that targeted individuals exhibit in order to counter the effects of 
prejudice on intergroup relations and preserve collective self-esteem. In doing so, I 
will show which theories best describe the dynamics of responses towards 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia. 
 
3.2.1. Intergroup Bias & Social Identity Theory  
Most studies of responses towards prejudice suggest that targets of prejudice respond 
in a way that upholds their intrinsic intergroup bias, i.e. favour their in-group over 
their out-group (Mackie & Smith 1998); (Hewstone et al. 2002). By this logic, 
individuals faced with prejudice will attempt to become closer and similar to other 
members of their in-group (Turner & Reynolds 2001); (Hewstone et al. 2002: 578). 
Social Identity Theory, as proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) posits that intergroup 
biases serve the purpose of protecting a sense of positive social identity and satiating 
the individual’s need for ‘positive self-esteem’ (Hewstone et al. 2002: 580). 
According to Hogg and Abrams (1990) when an individual perceives a threat to their 
collective self-esteem it prompts them to adopt intergroup bias and favour their in-
group against the out-group. In extreme cases, this can also lead to derogation of the 
out-group (Tajfel & Turner 1979). This theory is rather reductionist as it does not take 
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into account the variation in responses amongst individuals by suggesting a 
uniformity in responses towards protecting self-esteem. There is also no scope for 
assessing individual appraisal or various forms of coping and the majority of these 
theories are premised on the idea that targeted individuals are motivated to favour the 
in-group and derogate the out-group. 
 
3.2.2. Intergroup Threat Theory 
This theory focuses quite heavily on the composition of the threat itself, i.e. whether 
the threat can cause physical harm (realistic threat) or cause existential harm to the 
meaning of the in-group (symbolic threat). However, unlike Social Identity Theory, 
this theory acknowledges that targeted individuals may exhibit ‘non-hostile 
behavioural responses (e.g., negotiating, compromise, deterrence), and the cognitive 
and affective responses to threat are [still] likely to be negative’ (Stephan et al. 2009). 
Crucially, this suggests that even if individuals may perceive threats differently, there 
is no difference in terms of appraisal of prejudice. Intergroup Threat Theory suggests 
that on the whole, targets of prejudice will respond negatively towards any perceived 
threats to their in-group and this most likely will mean that, when individuals perceive 
a threat, they will distance themselves from the out-group and affiliate more with their 
fellow in-group members (Cinnirella 2014: 259). This theory also predicts that the 
strength of the response is dependent upon the strength of the individual’s connection 
with their in-group and perception of the threat (Tajfel and Turner 1986); 
(Branscombe et al. 1999). However, this theory does not fully explain the mechanisms 
of responses as it posits that individuals, no matter how little they associate with their 
collective, will always favour their in-group. 
 
3.2.3. System-Justification Theory  
In the case of system-justification theory, targeted individuals might cope with the 
stress of prejudice by distancing themselves from the in-group, and instead favouring 
the out-group, and rationalising the threat (Jost 2001). By this logic, individuals whose 
in-group identity has been stigmatised consider prejudice directed towards them by 
the out-group as legitimate (Turner & Brown 1978), and they do not agree with any 
proposed ‘cognitive alternatives,’ i.e. challenges to the established framework of 
order in which the out-group dominates (Jost 2001: 93).  But this theory is still 
underdeveloped in comparison to the classical theories of social identity. Moreover, 
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Jost asserts that the theory lacks in giving details regarding when and why targets 
perceive and appraise the stigma against their in-group as valid and legitimate (Jost 
2001: 94). For this reason, he suggests that the theory needs to acknowledge 
‘exceptions to the rule by explaining when and why’ targets ‘fail to provide 
ideological support’ for the out-group’s claims (Jost 2001: 101). 
 
3.2.4. Identity Process Theory  
All aforementioned theories might be lacking in that they do not sufficiently discuss 
the ‘role of self and motivation’ (Cinnirella 2014: 259). In other words, they neglect 
the process of appraisal unique to each targeted individual. In light of this, Cinnirella 
(2014) proposes the Identity Process Theory to assess Islamophobia, which ‘focuses 
on the role of identity principles and how individuals will respond to threats to these 
principles by seeking to remove the threat or develop a coping mechanism’ (Cinnirella 
2014: 259). In this theory, one of the factors motivating the targeted individual is a 
desire to preserve their self-esteem. When referring to incidences of prejudice, it is 
one’s group membership identity (in-group) that is threatened, which will cause the 
targeted individual to re-evaluate the centrality of their in-group identity to their 
selfhood. This re-evaluation has given the individual a choice between two extreme 
outcomes with relation to attachment to their in-group identity. Identity Process 
Theory points in the right direction, as, firstly, it acknowledges that not all responses 
to prejudice are uniform in nature. Secondly, it begins to incorporate the importance 
of the process of appraisal of threats on part of the targeted individual to protect self-
esteem. However, it does not manage to fully explain the processes of appraisal and 
coping. In order to address this, I propose using Marilynn Brewer’s (1991) theory of 
Optimal Distinctiveness, which I discuss, below.  
 
3.2.5. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory  
The Optimal Distinctiveness Theory is the most effective of social identity theories to 
make sense of the variety of responses towards prejudice by incorporating the 
processes of appraisal and coping. I apply this theory to see how individuals appraise 
a threat and choose a certain level of affiliation with the in-group and the out-group 
when faced with prejudice to protect collective self-esteem. This theory suggests that 
all individuals strive towards ‘social identities that reconcile their opposing needs for 
 50 
assimilation to and differentiation from others’ (Brewer 1991). By this logic, 
individuals are: 
 
‘balancing two opposing desires: for assimilation and inclusion, which is a need for 
belonging that makes them wish to become immersed in a social group; and a desire 
to distinguish or differentiate themselves from others that operate against their need 
for in-group immersion,’ (Leonardelli et al. 2010: 66).  
 
This acknowledges that individuals identify with numerous groups simultaneously, 
and ensures that their desire to remain part of these groups is maintained, and that too 
at the individual’s personal optimum level of affiliation with their in-group and out-
group. Thus, coping with prejudice is premised on a trade-off between ‘optimal level 
of group inclusiveness and individual distinctiveness’ (Brewer 1991). By Brewers’ 
explanation, collective self-esteem is protected in this process of reconciling both 
‘inclusiveness and distinctiveness needs’ (Brewer 1991); (Biernat et al. 1996: 1195).  
For an individual to feel that their identity is ‘optimal’ means that, to their mind, it 
achieves their personal desired level to be included within their in-group, and 
simultaneously it satisfies their desired level of distinctiveness between their in-group 
and out-group, and ultimately gives them a positive self-concept and collective self-
esteem (Brewer 1991). This is specific to each individual and can vary depending 
upon the ‘social context,’ and recent experiences (Brewer 2003); (Leonardelli et al. 
2010: 70). Leonardelli et al. (2011) expand Brewer’s original (1991) theory to 
incorporate the idea of ‘nested categorization’ in which the individual balances the 
needs of assimilation and distinctiveness between two, potentially conflicting 
identities, that are salient, and specifically in the case where one identity is a subgroup 
of the other, i.e. when the in-group is a subgroup of wider society (out-group). They 
explain this theory through Berry’s (1998) model of acculturation, illustrating how 
the Optimal Distinctiveness Model can be used in the case of immigrants (subgroup 
or subordinate group) and wider society (superordinate group). Taking the examples 
of my case studies of Islamophobia and Antisemitism, the in-group (subgroup) would 
be Muslim or Jewish and the out-group (superordinate group) would be British or 
German, respectively.  
Crucially, the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory differs from other theories of social 
identity in two ways. Firstly, as Aviram (2008: 2) points out, Brewer’s model (2007) 
does not focus on self-esteem enhancement, but rather it is primarily concerned with 
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the idea of survival and in the face of prejudice, this means a focus on security of 
identity and protection of collective self-esteem. Secondly, it acknowledges that each 
individual has a personal optimum level of identity and thus, there is variability in 
coping with prejudice. If the individual’s desired level of identity is offset as a result 
of a negative experience with prejudice – their optimum level is disturbed – the 
individual will seek to restore the optimum balance or equilibrium of their identities.  
For instance, in the case of individuals who find the out-group is too broad and 
requires them to do more to fit in and immerse themselves, this is not optimal in their 
eyes (Leonardelli et al. 2011: 24). For such individuals, the in-group provides an 
optimal level of distinctiveness so they reject the out-group in favour of the in-group. 
In contrast, other individuals might find that their in-group is too exclusive, and the 
out-group offers them optimal distinctiveness of identity. Hence, when faced with 
prejudice, such individuals move away from the in-group, and associate more with 
the out-group. Individuals who do not fit into either of the two categories I describe 
might not feel that the stigma of prejudice warrants a change in their distinctiveness 
from either in-group or out-group, as their identity is currently at their desired 
equilibrium.  
 
Figure 2 (below) illustrates Brewer’s original Optimal Distinctiveness Theoretical 
Model to make sense of my explanation.  
 
Figure 2. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory: Opposing process model. Reprinted with 
permission from Brewer (1991). Copyright, Sage/Society of Personality and Social 
                        Psychology.  
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From the above it is clear that the Optimal Distinctiveness Model not only 
acknowledges the variety of coping responses when collective identity is threatened, 
but crucially, it allows for due consideration to be given to the individual’s 
internalisation, appraisal and expressions in coping with prejudice to protect 
collective self-esteem. Thus, the theory of Optimal Distinctiveness accurately 
describes problem-focused coping and fits neatly with the Transactional Model I 
described earlier.  
 
4. Prejudice Coping Model 
By combining the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT) and the Transactional 
Coping Model I put forward a Prejudice Coping Model, which furthers Aviram’s 
(2008) proposition for: 
 
‘A model [of prejudice] that seeks convergence between a relational psychoanalysis 
and social cognitive psychology. In the past fifty years the two disciplines have 
separated their efforts to address prejudice. One approach is primarily interpersonal 
and values the intrapsychic space that both are shaped by and affects the environment. 
The other approach recognizes that individuals always function within groups, both 
physically and psychologically,’ Aviram (2008: 15).  
 
Figure 3 (below) is an illustration of my Prejudice Coping Model. The top two boxes 
(A. and B.) adapt Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Transactional Model. Box A. shows 
personal, structural and situational factors that moderate the entire coping process. As 
shown in box B., prejudice is perceived by the target as a symbolic threat to their 
collective self-esteem. Following primary and secondary appraisal, the target copes 
with the threat through problem-focused (social relationships) and emotion-focused 
coping. Box C., shown on the bottom right-hand side, illustrates the wide spectrum of 
emotion-focused coping strategies. While, box D., displayed on the bottom left-hand 
side, represents Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (1991), which explains the 





Figure 3. Prejudice Coping Model. 
 
Furthermore, one must remember that all components of this model are functioning 
simultaneously within a wide system of emotions, and must be considered in order to 
fully understand coping with prejudice in its entirety. One must also note that some 
targeted individuals combine emotion and problem-focused coping, whereas others 
might just express themselves solely through emotions due to a lack of resources 
available to respond in a problem-focused manner (social relationships) in the realm 







Essentially, this Prejudice Coping Model is a useful tool in explaining the nuances of 
the coping process. Each individual has a unique equilibrium identity based on their 
own desired optimal level of distinctiveness from the in-group and out-group, and 
there is a multitude of responses toward prejudice in protecting collective self-esteem 
to gain their optimal level of collective identity. Considering the vast array of 
responses, it becomes necessary to categorise them into broad groups, as I shall do in 
the proceeding section.  
 
5. Categorisation of Coping Responses  
Here, I analyse the approaches taken by key theorists of prejudice, stigma and 
discrimination in order to categorise coping responses. I begin by briefly explaining 
Gordon Allport’s (1954) binary of responses and Erving Goffman’s (1963) approach 
to describe responses to stigma with respect to one’s intergroup relations. Finally, I 
turn to W. E. B. Du Bois’ narrations of lived experiences of racial prejudice in the US 
during the twentieth century, and the resulting responses of stigmatised Black 
Americans. I use Du Bois’ work as the starting point of my own typology.  
 
5.1. Allport’s Binary of Responses 
Allport’s study of prejudice is a substantive study into the concept, and to this day, it 
is heralded as perhaps the most influential work into the study of prejudice. However, 
as I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the bulk of Allport’s work focuses almost 
exclusively on the causes and expressions of prejudice, discrimination and bigotry. 
For the purpose of my thesis, I have attempted to understand Allport’s brief reflections 
on prejudice through the target’s lens, i.e. the ways in which those at the receiving 
end of prejudice react. According to Jones (2005), Allport’s theory of responses 
towards prejudice includes the following components:  
 
‘focus on the self (e.g., obsessive concern), avoidant reactions, (e.g., denial of 
membership, withdrawal), conforming or compliant responses (e.g., clowning, self-
hate), enhanced in-group solidarity (e.g., strengthening in-group ties, militancy), and 
negative orientations toward the majority group (e.g., prejudice against the out-
group), and social action (e.g., enhanced status striving),’ (Jones 2005: 155-172).  
 
Allport categorises these coping responses of targets of prejudice as broadly falling 
into two groups: ‘intropunitive’ (blaming the self or in-group) or ‘extrapunitive’ 
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(blaming others, or the out-group) (1954/1979: 65). Despite this, Allport’s 
categorisation is not completely rigid, and he does acknowledge that targets can 
sometimes deploy a combination of intropunitive and extrapunitive mechanisms to 
cope with prejudice. Individuals who take a combination approach to coping, Allport 
posits:  
 
‘react with dignity and broad understanding… There develops an intelligent pursuit 
of one’s goals, including efforts to reduce discrimination in society…In short, 
sympathy, courage, persistence, and dignity mark such a personality… a fully 
developed personality is one that can handle its suffering without inflicting suffering 
in return,’ (Allport 1954/1979: 161). 
 
Allport did not expand on this alternative approach, however, Jones (2005: 158) 
interprets this to mean a form of ‘self-enhancement.’ To this end, this approach goes 
above and beyond the self-protection that is found in intropunitive and extrapunitive 
responses. Furthermore, Jones concludes his analysis by suggesting that this 
combination approach is perhaps the best (third) way to ensure maintenance of 
positive self-esteem (Jones 2005: 167).  
 
5.2. Goffman’s Approach to Responses 
In Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, Goffman (1963) details the 
various ways in which stigmatized individuals cope with wider society’s derogation 
of an aspect of their identity. According to Goffman’s work, wider society perceives 
stigmatised individuals as ‘less than human’ or ‘abnormal,’ whereas, those who are 
perceived as untainted by stigma are deemed ‘normals’ (1963). While Goffman’s 
analysis (1963) is based on numerous autobiographical accounts and personal 
anecdotes, these are mainly taken from individuals who happen to be stigmatised on 
the basis of a physical impairment or disability. However, on some occasions, 
Goffman does make reference to the reactions of those who feel the effects of 
stigmatization as a result of their social group membership, and on a few occasions, 
Goffman mentions the response of targets of religious prejudice.  
Goffman (1963: 137) suggests that the reaction of the stigmatized individual is 
influenced by their level of ‘group alignment’ with their in-group, which in turn is 
determined by that individual’s perception of ‘the place of his kind in the social 
structure.’ Interestingly, Goffman does not offer a typology or set manner in which 
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stigmatized individuals respond to their situation, and instead he makes reference to 
a large variety of responses throughout his book. For instance, responses might entail 
any of the following: ‘transformation of self from someone with a particular blemish 
into someone with a record of having corrected a particular blemish’ (Goffman 1963: 
20); ‘correcting conditions, by devoting private effort to the mastery of areas of 
activity ordinarily felt to be closed on incidental and physical grounds to one with his 
shortcomings’; ‘employ[ing] an unconventional interpretation of the character of his 
social identity’; ‘isolating from contact between normals and stigmatized’; 
‘responding by defensive cowering’; ‘approach[ing] mixed contact with hostile 
bravado’ etc. (Goffman 1963).  
Although Goffman did not explicitly group responses to stigma into categories, I 
could infer from his work that he broadly discusses stigmatised individuals’ ways of 
coping with relation to their affiliation with their stigmatised group identity. For 
instance, in Goffman’s work it is apparent that the stigmatised individual may feel 
ambivalence towards himself and his in-group as a result of the prejudice he faces for 
his perceived group affiliation. This feeling of dislike or disgust towards their in-
group identity can manifest when one sees ‘his own kind behaving in a stereotyped 
way…acting out the negative attributes imputed to them’ (Goffman 1963: 130). This, 
Goffman explains, occurs because ‘he [the stigmatized] supports the norms of wider 
society,’ and the behaviour of his in-group fellows causes him to feel repulsed and 
‘ashamed.’ As such, the stigmatised can favour the out-group over the in-group, and 
attempt to ‘pass as normals’ in wider society (Goffman 1963: 44). They may 
experience a ‘moral career’ in learning more about those who are perceived to be 
‘normals’ in the eyes of wider society, and acquire enough knowledge to eventually 
adapt and become just like them (Goffman 1963).  
On the other hand, Goffman gives the example of stigmatised individuals who ‘flaunt 
stereotypical attributes,’ for instance, he refers to ‘second generation Jews’ who 
would defiantly incorporate ‘Jewish idioms and slangs’ into their everyday speech, so 
as to prove their commitment to the maligned and stigmatized element of their identity 
(1963: 138). In so doing, Goffman suggests that these individuals may also stick to 
their ‘own kind’ and form organisations and projects focused on their maligned 
identity. In this way, they can establish ‘exemplary moral tales’ and uplift their 
positive self-image and collective self-esteem (Goffman 1963: 37). Goffman suggests 
that such individuals may also question wider society’s maltreatment of their 
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stigmatized collective. Some of these individuals, Goffman asserts, go as far as 
challenging and trying to remove the stigma that marks them out as different from 
those whom wider society perceives to be ‘normals’ (Goffman 1963: 141).  
Despite the fact that stigmatized individuals are often cautioned by wider society 
against trying to ‘pass’ as complete ‘normals,’ Goffman asserts that they are 
sometimes also wary of passively, and wholly, accepting wider society’s negative 
attributions regarding their stigmatised identity (Goffman 1963: 132). As a result, in 
Goffman’s work we can infer a third option, or ‘good adjustment,’ that the targeted 
individual can express without succumbing to the pitfalls of the two responses 
mentioned above. In Goffman’s words: 
 
‘Since his affliction [stigma] is nothing in itself, he should not be ashamed of it or of 
others who have it; nor should he compromise himself by trying to conceal it. On the 
other hand, by hard-work and persistent self-training he should fulfil ordinary 
standards as fully as he can, stopping short only when the issue of normification that 
he is trying to deny his efforts might give the impression that he is trying to deny his 
differentness…normals have their troubles, too, the stigmatized individual should not 
feel bitter, resentful, or self-pitying. A cheerful, outgoing manner should be 
cultivated,’ (Goffman 1963: 140). 
 
Thus, in addition to ‘passing as normals’ or ‘sticking to one’s own kind,’ Goffman 
(1963) suggests that the target might feel a sense of attachment to their stigmatised 
in-group members whilst simultaneously understanding the qualms of wider society 
(especially those perceived as ‘normals’). Such individuals can be critical of the 
actions of their fellow in-group members without trying to appease wider society by 
attempting to ‘pass’ as being ‘normal,’ i.e. completely disbanding with their in-group 
(stigmatized) identity. These individuals will confer with the ‘wise,’ those members 
of wider society (‘normals’) who are understanding of the plight of the stigmatized, 
and engage with them to form cross-group alliances (Goffman 1963). This, we can 
interpret as Goffman’s middle ground, almost akin to a ‘third way.’  
 
5.3. Du Bois’ Categorisation of Responses  
Prolific and distinguished African American scholar and activist, W. E. B. Du Bois, 
is noted for his influential works on the historical sociology, and experiences of ‘race’ 
and Blackness in early 20th century America. Du Bois is perhaps most renowned for 
his theorisation on the concept of ‘double consciousness,’ a self-regulating 
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mechanism through which African Americans calibrate their personal perceptions of 
their status within wider society by ‘look[ing] at one's self through the eyes of others 
[wider society],’ negating their own ability ‘to attain self-conscious manhood.’ As Du 
Bois explains in The Souls of Black Folk (Souls): 
 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness… measuring one's soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-
ness: an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two un-reconciled strivings; two 
warring ideals in one dark body whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn 
asunder’ (Du Bois 1903: 25).   
 
He narrates the lived experiences and responses of Black Americans in the early 20th 
century towards ethnic prejudices pitted against them, and he groups responses into 
three broad categories: 
 
‘a feeling of revolt and revenge, and an attempt to adjust all thought and action to the 
will of the greater group or, finally, a determined effort at self-realization and self-
development despite environing opinion,’ (Du Bois 1903: 30).  
 
Du Bois elaborates these three responses against the challenge of ethnic prejudice in 
detail in his work, Dusk of Dawn (1940), when analysing the responses specifically 
of educated young Black men. Blacks who ‘attempt to adjust all thought and action 
to the will of the greater group’ are those who shun any association with his fellow 
Blacks, and instead make ‘attempt to join the world of Whites – an attempt at 
assimilation’ (Itzigsohn & Brown 2015: 10). They fervently ‘avoid every appearance 
of segregation’ (Du Bois 1940: 186). One could say that for these individuals, 
distancing themselves from their in-group (the world of Blacks) and becoming more 
like the out-group (Whites) is a means by which these individuals cope with prejudice 
and attain their optimal identity. In contrast, those who respond with a ‘feeling of 
revolt and revenge’ are Blacks who ‘pride’ themselves on living amongst their own 
kind and withdrawing from the world of the Whites (Du Bois 1940: 187). For such 
individuals, their optimal identity was vested in staying closer to their in-group and 
away from the out-group.  
In Du Bois’ opinion both responses are extreme and pursuing them does not allow 
Blacks to achieve complete self-consciousness internally, and acceptance from wider 
society. As such, the final of Du Bois’ three responses – the third way – most aptly 
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describes how a targeted individual attempts to negotiate ‘two warring ideals’ or 
identities found within them, i.e. African and American (Du Bois 1903: 9). An 
individual who responds to prejudice with a ‘determined effort at self-realization and 
self-development’ according to Du Bois is the person who is able to find that balance 
between his ‘two-ness,’ and has managed to successfully ‘merge his double self into 
a better and truer self’ (Du Bois 1903: 9).  
Having discussed the ways Allport, Goffman and Du Bois categorise responses 
towards prejudice, I find that the trajectory of my research aligns best with the work 
of Du Bois, particularly his concept of ‘two-ness’ of identity and how individuals can 
balance this in the form of a third way response.  
Du Bois’ contribution to African American studies has undoubtedly been incredibly 
influential in directing the discourse of ‘race’ and coloured or biological racisms 
particularly in a segregated United States. I am aware how difficult it is to just simply 
borrow from Du Bois’ eminent work, steeped in historical tradition and experience of 
racism along colour lines, in a spatially and temporally specific setting. Here I take 
heed of Hatem Bazian’s recent intellectual endeavour in which he maintains that Du 
Bois’ conceptualisation of ‘double consciousness’ can, and should, be applied to 
understand the afflictions of all minority inhabitants of a ‘modern Eurocentric world,’ 
be it ‘Blacks, Muslims, and every shade in between’ (Bazian 2013). This concept is 
fundamental to my study, and so on the basis of Du Bois’ categorisation of three 
responses, I now devise my own typology of coping strategies specific to my cases 
studies. 
 
6. Typology of Coping Strategies towards Antisemitism & Islamophobia 
Keeping in mind Du Bois’ categorisation of responses towards racism, I attempt to 
draw three parallel responses that Weimar Jews and contemporary British Muslims 
have towards coping with Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively. The idea of 
adjusting ‘all thought and action to the will of the greater group’ can be equated with 
the idea of assimilation. Whereas, the ‘feeling of revolt or revenge’ can be exhibited 
when targets of prejudice withdraw from wider society. The final response suggested 
by Du Bois – that of ‘self-realisation and self-development’ – can be described as an 
active effort by the target to a negotiate both prior responses (1903: 9). I dub this ‘third 
way,’ or middle path response, accommodation. In this response, the target ‘wishes 
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neither of the older selves to be lost’ (Du Bois 1903: 9).11 In the case of 
accommodation, a target of Antisemitism will make every effort to balance their ‘two-
ness’ of Germanness and Jewishness, while the target of Islamophobia will negotiate 
their ‘two-ness’ of Britishness and Muslimness.  
After the above categorisation, I can say that coping responses of Weimar era Jews 
and British Muslims towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively, can 
broadly be classified under three main coping strategies, namely: assimilation, 
withdrawal and accommodation. I now describe all three coping strategies in detail, 
separately.  
 
6.1. Assimilation  
The first coping strategy I explore is that of assimilation. Assimilation can include a 
wide spectrum of responses; from people who reason their complete submersion 
within society through self-hatred of their expected in-group, to others who feel 
assimilation is a healthy part of their integration within society. One definition of 
assimilation sees it as a ‘process through which all distinctions’ between a minority 
in-group, or individual belonging to a minority, and wider community is ‘lost’ 
(Horobin 1957: 241). This is quite a restrictive definition of assimilation; what Max 
Weber might call an ideal type. In Bhikhu Parekh’s understanding, in order to 
assimilate an individual is required to ‘shed all vestiges of their separate cultures,’ 
(Parekh, 2000: 197). Over time, as suggested by Rogers Brubaker (2001), the image 
of the term has been smeared as it is conflated with ‘anglo-conformity.’ However, I 
explore the less radical, and instead more multi-dynamic understandings of the term 
as: 
 
                                                
11 I realise that many scholars would argue that in The Souls of Black Folk Du Bois takes an ‘anti-
accommodationist’ approach, as he criticises Booker T. Washington for his ‘policy of accommodation,’ 
which was based on mutual progress, by way of forming cross-race alliances, and self-improvement in 
the social and economic spheres (1903: xii). However, one must remember that even Du Bois was 
criticised, early in his career, for ‘conciliation, accommodation and cooperation with superior whites’ 
(Wolters 2003: 2). My typology of accommodation differs from Du Bois’ understanding of the term, 
as in my view, accommodation does not preclude political participation based on cross-group alliances. 
To this end, my coping strategy of accommodation is a means to self-improvement that is a half-way 
house between Washington’s appeasement of wider society and Du Bois’ agitation of it. In the political 
sense, accommodation entails working within the established political system in attempts to bring 
change it so that is it more accepting of one’s in-group particularities, and to better oneself and the in-
group in the process. 
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‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the 
memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their 
experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life,’ (Park 
& Burgess, 1921: 735).  
 
By some definitions ‘erasure of all signs of ethnic origins’ is not a prerequisite for 
assimilation (Alba and Nee, 2009: 19). As such, it is increasingly difficult to conjure 
an all-encompassing definition for the term.  
According to Aschheim (1982: 218), the underlying assumption of Weimar era 
assimilation required Jews to be ‘inconspicuous’ and adopt the ‘mould’ of the Gentile 
Germans. For assimilation to be a success, Jews were expected to ‘be rooted within 
the home [German] culture’ (Aschheim 1982: 42). In the case of Muslims in 
contemporary England, assimilationist attitudes are quite similar. Modood points to 
assimilation across the United Kingdom as a very one-sided process, dependent on 
minorities doing ‘little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much 
like their new compatriots as possible’ (Modood 2007: 44). One reason why those 
experiencing Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudices, either personally or 
indirectly, might choose to assimilate within wider society is to ‘fit in.’  
Most literature on the concept of assimilation examines it in a general sense, i.e. what 
minorities do to learn and adopt the dominant language, cultures and customs of wider 
society. Few scholars have examined the process as reaction to prejudice. This thesis 
seeks to examine the processes by which assimilation is used by targets as a coping 
strategy to protect their collective self-esteem. Interesting to note is that not all 
assimilationists express themselves in the same manner, and some expressions of 
assimilation as a response to prejudice can be more fervent than others. Similar to the 
other two coping strategies, assimilation exists along a spectrum of expressions. For 
example, staunch assimilation would see a target stripping themselves of any obvious 
associations with their maligned in-group. For these people assimilation is not just 
about completely immersing themselves within wider society, but just as much about 
distinguishing themselves from the undesired elements associated with their faith in-
group. 
Not all assimilationists are as extreme in their choice of expression. Some might 
encourage their fellow in-group members to ‘change their ways’ and assimilate. They 
would be vocal proponents of a clear public-private divide within society and actively 
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work to end minority-centred lifestyles.12 Furthermore, expressions of assimilation 
are not always overt. Some assimilationists might believe in the superiority of wider 
society’s norms over those of the faith in-group, but they might not agree with 
enforcing their views on the more withdrawn members of their faith in-group. These 
are just some of the complexities and intricacies of the coping strategy of assimilation 
that I will discuss in depth in Chapter Four, while exploring how and why Weimar era 
Jews and British Muslims choose the assimilation strategy to cope with Antisemitism 
and Islamophobia, respectively.  
 
6.2. Withdrawal  
The second coping strategy – that of withdrawal – involves removing oneself from 
the folds of wider society. The withdrawal strategy is considered by far the most 
negative and counter-intuitive response of all three coping strategies explored in this 
thesis. This is partly because it requires the individual to choose between belonging 
to the in-group over pledging full allegiance to wider society, and it negates all notions 
of balancing multiple schemas of identity. The act of withdrawal can be a form of 
existence, regardless of prejudice i.e. people can just happen to be withdrawn from 
society due to their living conditions, economic status or personal choice. This thesis, 
however, is specifically interested in the concept of withdrawal as a reaction to 
prejudice. Most understandings of the concept wrongly equate the act of withdrawal 
with ghettoisation, even though one can withdraw their participation from wider 
society without becoming a member of a ghetto. According to Richman and Leary, 
some people who are facing prejudice might ‘avoid further rejection and its 
accompanying hurt’ to their collective self-esteem by ‘withdrawing from social 
contact, not only with those who have rejected them but sometimes from others whose 
acceptance they doubt’ (Richman & Leary 2009: 368).  
With relation to Antisemitism and Islamophobia, equilibrium in the case of 
withdrawal is achieved – and identities are reconciled – only by way of choosing 
Jewishness over Germanness, and Muslimness over Britishness, respectively. Those 
in the withdrawal group are disillusioned by wider society; the only way to claim 
one’s ‘true identity’ in their eyes is to remove themselves entirely from wider society. 
This, they see as a means to protect their collective self-esteem in the face of prejudice. 
                                                
12 Not just outright ghettos, but any community group that fails to engage with wider society.  
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In the view of most withdrawn targets, prejudice is ever-present within wider society, 
even if it is latent most of the time. Withdrawn targets overwhelmingly believe that 
one should not succumb to changing themselves in order to appease the demands of 
‘fitting into’ society at large. Instead, their aim is to uphold and embrace the identity 
of the in-group.  
The underlying goal of this coping strategy, similar to the other two strategies of 
assimilation and accommodation, is to restore self-respect, and protect one’s self-
esteem. This can be manifest in numerous different expressions. An expression of 
withdrawal in one sense could entail consciously removing oneself from wider society 
in an effort to dedicate themselves to fostering the social, political and cultural growth 
of their in-group. (Dovidio et al. 2010: 417).  This revival of in-group attributes could 
then be used as ‘tools to cultivate one’s own true identity and regain self-respect’ 
(Goldstein 1912: 281-94); (Niewyk 1980: 126). This is perhaps a response that could 
potentially be common to Zionist Jews during the Weimar era and Islamist radicals in 
contemporary England, as both are actively anti-establishment organisations premised 
on a strong sense of in-group solidarity. Hence, for some, withdrawal in the face of 
prejudice might manifest in them resisting wider society’s negative stereotypes about 
their in-group, as well as any expectations of them (Pickett 1996: 458).  
Whilst some targets who choose to withdraw might take a very stern and robust stance 
through boycotting, other forms of withdrawal might be expressed in subtler ways. 
For example, experiences of prejudice might cause self-questioning on part of the 
target and realisation of difference might cause the individual to feel vulnerable, and 
thus choose to retreat inwardly. Other withdrawn targets of prejudice might not be 
very approachable or as vocal about their choice to withdraw. In Chapter Five, I 
provide an in-depth analysis of the withdrawal coping strategy, where I explore how 
and why Weimar era Jews and British Muslims in contemporary England choose this 
strategy to cope with Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively.  
 
6.3. Accommodation 
Accommodation can be seen as one of the many ‘responses of a minority group to 
situations of racial conflict and inequality’ (Gibson 1988: 25). Exploring this coping 
strategy is incredibly important, as current literature only evaluates the binary choice 
of complete assimilation in, or total withdrawal from, wider society. The 
accommodationist coping strategy entails adapting within the parameters of an 
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external environment, whilst simultaneously retaining elements of one’s targeted in-
group identity. It is a means of balancing both the internal aspect of that particular, 
targeted in-group identity with the external world of society. It occupies the middle 
ground between the assimilationists and withdrawn in their responses towards 
negative stereotyping, stigma and scapegoating. It entails the adaptation of both the 
in-group and the out-group in attempt to create a sort of balance between both aspects 
of one’s selfhood; moulding the self to fit within the out-group of wider society, whilst 
simultaneously creating a sense of acceptance within wider society for certain in-
group particularities. In prior theories, accommodation is defined as a form of mutual 
adaptation between individuals and wider society ‘for the purpose of reducing conflict 
and allowing group identities and cultures to be maintained’ (Berry 1980). However, 
my thesis explores this phenomenon by focusing specifically on the individual’s 
adaptation, vis-à-vis their collective identity when faced with prejudice. In this light, 
accommodation tells us more about the ‘balancing acts’ people engage in; how far 
they are willing to internalise the stigma attached to being part of an in-group, whilst 
simultaneously negotiating with the out-group (wider society) so that it begins to 
accept their internal self. For this reason, accommodation is akin to Du Bois’ third 
response of ‘determined effort at self-realisation and self-development’ (Du Bois 
1903: 9).  
The response of targeted individuals pursuing accommodationist strategies often 
involves tackling prejudice and injustice on a greater scale. Instead of speaking out 
against intolerance towards their particular in-group, it is highly likely for these 
individuals to join an over-arching cause. By tackling the issue of prejudice on a larger 
scale than simply fighting for the specific cause of their in-group, many targeted 
individuals have found an effective means of channelling their grievances, and as a 
result they can protect collective self-esteem not just by being part of the targeted in-
group, but also through solidarity with others in the same boat.  
Accommodationist strategies need not always be as overt or robust as explicitly 
joining anti-bigotry movements. In a more mundane form targeted individuals can 
interact and participate on a local or societal level in order to challenge policies, or 
just as easily by engaging in dialogue with other citizens in order to dispel myths or 
misconceptions that have led to the creation of negative stereotypes directed at their 
in-group. The fundamental point of difference between accommodationist and the two 
other coping strategies is that accommodation causes the targeted individual to 
 65 
acknowledge their social surroundings (which is missing in the withdrawal strategy) 
whilst at the same time the individual feels comfortable and determined to uphold 
aspects of their in-group identity within mainstream society (something 
assimilationist strategies would on the whole discourage).  
In Chapter Six, I provide an in-depth analysis of the accommodation coping strategy, 
and I explore how and why Weimar era Jews and contemporary British Muslims 
choose this strategy to cope with Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively.  
 
After devising the above framework of typologies in the form of the three coping 
strategies, I now concisely articulate them in the form of three overarching themes to 
analyse and evaluate the responses of Weimar era Jews and contemporary British 
Muslims towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively. The overarching 
themes for the coping strategies of assimilation, withdrawal and accommodation are 
as follows: 
 
1. Assimilationists acknowledge wider society’s prejudices against their in-
group and agree with wider society’s negative perceptions regarding their in-
group; reject the in-group characteristics; and adopt wider society’s views. 
 
2. Withdrawn individuals acknowledge prejudices against their in-group yet 
reject wider society’s negative perceptions regarding their in-group; reaffirm 
and reclaim their in-group identity; and dissociate from wider society.  
 
3. Accommodationists acknowledge wider society’s prejudices regarding their 
in-group without accepting them as a true reflection of the group, and realising 
that the in-group has its flaws. They clearly distinguish and negotiate between 
wider society’s negative perceptions of their in-group and their own personal 
evaluation of the group. 
 
Part B. Research Methods  
Having established what my research is interested in investigating, I now discuss the 
research methods and practical elements of my thesis to answer the proposed research 
questions and reasons why I chose these methods and techniques. I conclude this 
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section by assessing the foreseeable challenges that I think I might encounter in my 
study, and how I propose to go about resolving them.  
 
7. Chosen Techniques  
Early studies interested in prejudices and their effects on self-esteem and selfhood 
mainly conducted either quantitative (Major et al. 1994), (Hull et al. 1998) or 
qualitative research (Shnittker et al. 2004). Studies that take a mixed methods 
approach have mainly explored the choices made by targets of racism and its 
relationship with their self-esteem. For example, experiences of African-Americans 
and young children of Mexican and South-East Asian immigrant parents in the United 
States, studied by Zhou (1997) and Hewstone et al. (2002), respectively, used both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches.13 For my study, I also followed a mixed 
methods approach for the case of Islamophobia in contemporary England, and a solely 
qualitative approach for the case of Antisemitism in Weimar era Germany.  
Considering that both case studies in my research are in temporally different settings, 
I have decided to describe the study design of each case study separately.  
 
8. Research Design of Historical Case  
8.1. Study Type & Resources  
I employed a solely qualitative approach for the case of Weimar Jews, as most, if not 
all, potential candidates for interviews are deceased. Numerous archival sources 
documenting the lives of Jews in the Weimar era, and more generally pre-war 
Germany, have been kept in exceptional condition. Memoirs and diaries of both 
prominent and ordinary German Jews have been restored and translated from German 
to English. The Leo Baeck Institute, Centre for Jewish History: American Jewish 
Historical Society, American Sephardi Federation, Yeshiva University Museum, and 
the Yivo Institute for Jewish Research are just some of the institutions that have 
catalogued many of these resources for online access. In addition, the Wiener Library, 
London, is home to one of the world’s oldest collections of 1900s Jewish German life. 
I was able to access quite a few notable memoirs and even news media pieces of the 
                                                
13 Tests such as the ‘Rosenberg self-esteem test’, which uses a Likert scale to relate self-esteem with 
the target’s experiences of intolerance and hate. 
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time through the Wiener Library. The archival catalogue of this literature is 
remarkably large, so I endeavoured to analyse many of these archives. 
 
8.2. Sample Size 
During the Weimar era (1918-1933), Jews comprised just over 0.9% of the population 
of Germany; in 1925 the population of Jews in the nation was 564,379 (ICPSR 1999). 
The majority of Weimar Jews resided in major cities, like Berlin from where over one 
third of the entire German Jewish population hailed (ICPSR 1999). Other cities with 
relatively high Jewish populations included Hamburg, Frankfurt, Cologne and 
Leipzig (ICPSR 1999). Just over 17% of the Jews in Germany (~97,000) were 
dispersed in the smaller towns and villages across the country (ICPSR 1999). While 
more Jews resided in towns as opposed to rural areas, most of the Jews belonged to 
the middle class (Meyer 1998). There was great religious diversity amongst the Jews; 
many Jews were liberal or secular, and there was also a significant Orthodox minority. 
As it was near impossible to find a representative sample in archival sources, I had to 
make do with whatever useful material I could find. I did make effort to find an even 
spread of accounts from Weimar Jews of all walks of life. However, there was no set 
limit to the number of memoirs, diaries, journals and other archival sources I delved 
into for data collection.  
 
8.3. Selection Process  
I tried to read as much useful material and collections as I could, of which most were 
readily available to me in the English translation, uploaded online on the Centre for 
Jewish History website. The main collections from which I found material were in 
300-plus archives that I read and annotated. The issue for my work was finding 
specific and relevant material. This entailed much sifting through material. However, 
I was fortunate enough to gain access to specific archives such as the Neumann 
Collection (1888-1934), found by registering online with the Centre for Jewish 
History in New York.14 Any collections or resources that were not available online, I 
sought permission from the librarians at the Centre for Jewish History to gain access, 
and they were kind enough to send copies to me. I was lucky enough to access 
numerous sources through the Wiener Library catalogue in London. Here, in 
                                                
14 http://access.cjh.org/ 
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particular, I had access to the Centralverein: Association of German Citizens of 
Jewish Faith Archive.  
There were no set number or age groups that I could divide my research to focus on, 
as again, it cannot be stressed how difficult it is to find relevant material. For this 
reason, my sample was a select sample and cannot be used to make generalized claims 
regarding German Jews from 1918- 1933. Instead, the aim is to provide a snapshot of 
Weimar era Jewish experiences towards Antisemitism.  
 
8.4. Approaching Resources  
In collecting archival material, I ensured that the memoirs and diaries I was analysing 
were of the right era (between 1918- 1933). Fortunately, most memoir collections and 
autobiographies have been translated into English and have been digitised and made 
accessible online. The collections I found in German I attempted to translate with the 
help of my native German friends. Sometimes I encountered memoir excerpts in 
books. These had already been translated by the scholars and in such cases I made use 
of the scholars’ translations. 
 
8.5. Data Analysis & Displaying Results 
I used thematic analysis driven by a grounded theory approach at the stage of data 
analysis in order to explore responses towards Antisemitism found in the memoirs, 
journals and diaries of Weimar era Jews. I began this by annotating archival sources, 
taking preliminary notes, and collecting and recording all relevant findings from 
archival accounts in a grand logbook. Thematic analysis involves generating codes to 
anticipate certain themes from the archival accounts. Initially, I used predetermined, 
theory-driven codes deduced from my typology of coping strategies, which are: 
adopting wider society’s views (assimilation); rejecting wider society’s views 
(withdrawal); negotiating and balancing in-group and out-group identities 
(accommodation). These codes formed the basis of my anticipated themes that were 
primarily evident in all accounts of Weimar era Jews regarding how and why they 
chose to respond towards Antisemitism.  
By collating different anticipated themes, I segregated all accounts into one of the 
three broad coping strategies (assimilation, withdrawal and accommodation). 
Following this, I conducted an in-depth review of all accounts grouped under each 
strategy, separately and searched for further themes that emerged when I analysed the 
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accounts to seek out how targets address the research questions regarding the manner 
in which they cope with different Anti-Semitic incidences in each strategy. Through 
inductive analysis, I generated a map of these emerging themes, which formed the 
basis of different modes specific to each coping strategy. On further analysis and 
refining the emergent themes map, I categorised each theme into different subthemes 
by grouping various forms of expressions, and then I labelled each subtheme 
according to their expressions. Finally, I selected examples of compelling extracts 
from each form of expression in order to use them in displaying data in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five.  
Following this, I conducted my secondary analysis, which is a discursive analysis of 
the same data set (Heaton 1998), in order to establish a link between choice of coping 
strategy and collective self-esteem (see Chapter Seven). I did this by picking out the 
psychological themes apparent in the narratives of the individuals in each coping 
strategy, through assessment of their emotive language, or ‘triggers words’ that they 
might use to express themselves regarding their position as Jews facing Antisemitism 
in Weimar era Germany (Frevert et al. 2010).  
 
9. Research Design of Contemporary Case  
I employed a mixed methods approach, using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods for my case of British Muslims experiencing Islamophobia in contemporary 
England. In order to ensure credibility of my research, I based this on a convergent 
design. Wisdom and Creswell (2013) state that a convergent design involves: 
 
‘collecting both types of data at roughly the same time; assessing information using 
parallel constructs for both types of data; separately analyzing both types of data; and 
comparing results through procedures such as a side-by-side comparison in a 
discussion, transforming the qualitative data set into quantitative scores, or jointly 
displaying both forms of data’ (Wisdom & Creswell 2013). 
 
9.1. Qualitative Approach: Contemporary Case  
9.1.1. Study Instrument (Semi-structured Interviews) 
In order to construct a narrative of coping strategies, I gathered qualitative data of my 
contemporary case study by conducting semi-structured interviews. I titled my 
interview Social Attitudes of British Muslims Towards Their Experiences within 
British Society (see Appendix 2.). My interview was categorised as high-risk and it 
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was granted official (high-risk) ethical approval from the King’s College Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix 1.). 
Devising the interview questions entailed conducting a pilot case and serendipitous 
chat with more experienced students of psychology, international relations and 
theology. After these pilot interviews, on the basis of their constructive criticism and 
invaluable feedback, I made certain adjustments to my procedure of conducting 
interviews, i.e. I altered the phrasing and manner in which I asked some of the 
questions. The interview consists of eleven questions. As with most interviews of a 
seemingly sensitive nature it was essential for me to make the interviewee feel relaxed 
in order to open up about themselves. I began with a very casual and informal question 
asking the interviewee to tell me more about themselves (follow up areas of interest: 
family, friends and community). Slowly, I built up to questions inquiring about the 
participant’s views regarding what ‘being a Muslim entails for them on a personal and 
societal level;’ how they associate with a ‘wider Muslim society;’ what they think is 
‘wider society’s perception of them as individuals, and how this is similar to or 
different from their own affiliations with their faith-group identity; whether they feel 
‘other people’s perceptions of you have a bearing on your encounters/interactions 
with them.’ Near the end, participants were asked to recall and share examples of 
negative experiences with wider society (prejudice); whether they have experienced 
such negative experiences; how they ‘responded to such experiences,’ and how have 
such negative experiences affected their interactions with other people, particularly 
non-Muslims. The interview questions can be found in Appendix 2.  
 
9.1.2. Sample Size 
There are 2.6 million Muslims in England, which has a total population of 53 million 
(Office for National Statistics 2011).15 It required quite a large, randomly chosen 
sample to be representative of this population, in order to gain statistically significant 
results. This was not feasible due to time and monetary constraints. Instead I chose to 
interview a select sample of 90 people. Though, I am aware that 90 people is not an 
entirely representative sample to make generalizable claims, I tried my best to ensure 
a diverse sample (participants belonging to various socio-economic backgrounds, age 
groups etc.) that is also accessible within the time-span of the study. My chosen 
                                                
15 This means Muslims account for ~5% of the total population of England. 
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sample is divided according to age group categories to ensure this diversity. In order 
to see the generational gaps, I divided my sample into three age groups: 20-34 years-
old, 35-49 years-old, 50 years-old and over, with an equal number of men and women 
in each group. In addition, interview participants hailed from three different cities – 
London, Birmingham and Gloucester (30 people from each city) – with an equal 
number of men and women. The population of British Muslims in London, 
Birmingham and Gloucester is 1.1million (12.5%), 240,000 (21.8%) and 3,850 
(3.2%), respectively (Office for National Statistics 2011).  
To aid me in understanding my case, I also referred to a few pieces of written material, 
such as autobiographies and first-hand non-fiction accounts of individuals, as well as 
journalistic accounts from British Muslims regarding Islamophobia. 
 
9.1.3. Selection Process 
I chose the cities of London, Birmingham and Gloucester to give a wide spread of 
regions of England inhabited by Muslims of a multitude of ethnic and sectarian 
backgrounds, and to see a more diverse range of opinions. Moreover, I chose to reach 
three different ‘corners’ of England where Muslims make up a considerable 
population of the minority. I decided to base my study in three rather large cities, as 
on conducting a pilot study in towns and villages on the outskirts of Cambridge and 
Oxford, as well as Coventry, I found it quite difficult to even gain access to 
participants, due to the number of Muslim inhabitants being relatively low. I restricted 
my study to England as I was unable to venture out to Scottish and Welsh cities due 
to logistics and time constraints. For this reason, my findings will not address Muslims 
across the UK, and instead focus on the experiences of contemporary Muslims in 
England. However, I am interested in notions of ‘Britishness’ and British identity, as 
such I refer to my participants as British Muslims in England.  
The age limit of participants was also of concern. Ultimately, I chose the lower age 
limit to be 20 years-old, as I wanted participants to have been old enough to remember 
the events of 9/11 and 7/7 to see the effects this might have on their interactions with 
the wider British population.16 Also, the topics of identity and selfhood being explored 
are quite mature concepts, so the lower limit being set at 20 years-old was an attempt 
to ensure that participants were able to engage in a thoughtful manner.  
                                                
16 7/7 refers to the London Bombings atrocity of July 7th 2005. 
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Participants who self-identify as ‘Muslim’ were asked to partake in my study. I 
purposefully kept the category of ‘Muslim’ as broad and open to interpretation of the 
individual participants, as I did not want to confine my study to a particular 
understanding of Islam, or sectarian or ethnic group. I only interviewed participants 
who have been brought up or lived most of their lives in England, and their English 
language proficiency is assumed to be at least basic. As I was the same person to 
interview all 90 interview participants, it was an advantage as I knew which factors 
were to be controlled (mental health stability, physical and mental soundness etc.) and 
how to do so. I did this to minimise the skew of results, as personal factor biases, in 
particular anxiety and healthy issues of participants, could hamper the results and they 
were better dealt with in this way.  
 
9.1.4. Approaching Participants  
I advertised my call for interviews on social media platforms and I emailed major 
charity and youth organisations, as well as friends and acquaintances, and I hoped for 
a snowballing effect to occur. I also posted my recruitment notice in various places: 
emails calling for research volunteers circulated through KCL research groups; 
circulating emails containing recruitment sheets through interfaith groups, such as the 
Three Faiths Forum and Christian Muslim Forum, and Muslim city networks; and 
following permission from gatekeeper organisations (interfaith groups, mosques and 
community centres), I also posted recruitment notices in their vicinities. Had 
community leaders from the gatekeeper organisations suggested a list of possible 
participants, I contacted a few from this list, whilst ensuring that the gatekeeper was 
unaware of who I had chosen to contact for the purpose of anonymity.  
Participants were informed of the selection criteria in the recruitment material. They 
contacted me to show interest, at which point I ensured that they fit the criteria. Once 
I was in touch with a potential participant, I identified whether or not this participant 
was appropriate for my data by confirming with them that they fit the selection criteria 
I had devised. After I had verified the participant, I sent them (most likely via email) 
an information sheet, consent form, and interview topic guide. Once the participant 
agreed to move forward, I arranged a suitable time and venue to meet with the 
participant to conduct the research. On meeting the participant, I provided them with 
the consent form and info sheet once again, and they were asked to sign the consent 
form in person, before proceeding. I conducted the interviews in quiet places, like 
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community centres and university campuses, so that I could audio-record the 
interviews. Later, I transcribed the interview recordings for analysis, and I gave each 
participant an alias in order to ensure anonymity. 
 
9.1.5. Data Analysis & Displaying Findings 
I used thematic analysis driven by a grounded theory approach at the stage of data 
analysis in order to explore responses towards Islamophobia found in my interviews 
of British Muslims. I began this by transcribing all recorded interviews and matching 
these scripts with preliminary notes that I made while conducting interviews. To 
maintain accuracy, I also shared some interview script with participant for them to 
verify. Thematic analysis involves generating codes to anticipate certain themes from 
interviews. Initially, I used predetermined, theory-driven codes deduced from my 
typology of coping strategies, which are: adopting wider society’s views 
(assimilation); rejecting wider society’s views (withdrawal); negotiating and 
balancing in-group and out-group identities (accommodation). These codes formed 
the basis of my anticipated themes that were primarily evident in all interview 
participants’ answers to questions regarding how and why they choose to react and 
respond in the way they do when faced with Islamophobia.  
By collating different anticipated themes, I segregated all transcripts into one of the 
three broad coping strategies (assimilation, withdrawal and accommodation). Then, I 
conducted an in-depth review of all interview scripts grouped under each strategy, 
separately and searched for further themes that emerged when participants elaborated 
in detail the manner in which they cope with different Islamophobic incidences in 
each strategy. Through inductive analysis and using NVivo software, I generated a 
map of these emerging themes, which formed the basis of different modes specific to 
each coping strategy. On further analysis and refining the emergent themes map, I 
categorised each theme into different subthemes by grouping various forms of 
expressions, and then I labelled each subtheme according to their expressions. Finally, 
I selected examples of compelling extracts from each form of expression in order to 
use them in displaying data in Chapters Three, Four and Five. 
 
9.2. Quantitative Approach: Contemporary Case  
9.2.1. Study Scale  
 74 
In the quantitative approach, one is required to use a measurement scale to compose 
a questionnaire. In the case of my questionnaire, the scale I used17 was based on the 
collective self-esteem scale (CSE) developed by Luthanean and Crocker (1992) (see 
Appendix 4.). Their scale is an attempt to find ‘a single global measure to predict 
responses to a threat to a social identity’ (collective self-esteem) (Luhtanen & Crocker 
1992: 306). There were numerous other measures I could have chosen, such as the 
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale18 and the Implicit Association Test (IAT), or the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Test (Rosenberg 1965). However, in all of these cases, there 
was either an element missing, or it was not specifically addressing the measure of 
self-esteem in the manner I have defined, i.e. all tests mentioned here measured 
personal or individual as opposed to collective self-esteem.  
 
9.2.2. Study Instrument: Questionnaire 
My questionnaire is based on the CSE scale mentioned above. It consists of 16 
statements specific to the participant’s faith in-group. On a 7-point Likert-type scale 
the participant was expected to state their level of agreement with each statement, 
from a choice of 7 options on a varying degree of agreement. The participant had the 
choice to either: strongly disagree (1); disagree (2); disagree somewhat (3); neutral 
(4); agree somewhat (5); agree (6); or strongly agree (7). The questionnaire statements 
were formulated to measure one’s personal feelings regarding their faith in-group, and 
how they believe others perceive the group. Example statements include: ‘Overall, 
my faith group is considered good by others.’ ‘I feel good about the faith group I 
belong to.’ ‘In general, others respect the faith group that I am a member of.’ My 
questionnaire was granted official (high-risk) ethical approval from the King’s 
College Ethics Committee (Appendix 1.). For more information regarding my 
questionnaire see Appendix 3.  
 
9.2.3. Sample Size & Selection Process  
Here, I used the same sample that I selected for my qualitative study. All 90 interview 
participants were asked (prior to the interview taking place) to complete the 
questionnaire. I advertised for the questionnaire alongside the interviews. In fact, 
                                                
17 For my measurement scale see Appendix 4. 
18 See Mecca, Smelser and Vasconcellos (1989): 11 
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anyone who was interviewed was required to complete the questionnaire beforehand. 
This was administered first so as to avoid any potential leading thoughts or buzzwords 
that would feature in the theme of the interview questions, and hence, could have 
potentially influenced the answers in the person’s questionnaire.  
 
9.2.4. Data Analysis & Displaying Results 
As I mentioned in the previous section, 90 people completed the questionnaire and I 
classified them into one of the three coping strategies based on their qualitative 
findings. Later I calculated the mean Public and Private Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) 
scores for each coping strategy by using an adapted version of Luthanen and Crocker’s 
(1992) CSE scale (mentioned earlier). I then calculated the correlation between the 
Public and Private CSE values for each of the three coping strategies using Spotfire 
Analysis Software with the help of a statistician. I display and analyse these results in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
10. Challenges  
10.1. Ethical Limitations 
As anonymity of participants is a major concern, the details of participants are 
accessible to my supervisor and me alone. These details are stored safely. Once an 
individual agreed to participate, their data sheets never contained their real name, but 
an alias for their interview and questionnaire. In the case that potential participants 
were recommended through gatekeepers’ lists, I made sure that no third parties were 
made aware of the individual’s participation.  
The participants were completely and entirely aware of the study and were only 
allowed to participate with prior formal written consent. Whilst there is no overt 
deception, I purposefully did not mention the terms and buzzwords (in the information 
and consent and recruitment sheets) such as ‘racism’ or ‘Islamophobia’ etc. as I fear 
these can be leading and create a bias by encouraging the participant to think in a 
particular frame of mind. They were fully aware that I was investigating positive and 
negative experiences within society, but I did not label them. 
As my research entails discussing negative encounters relating to a participant’s 
religion and beliefs, there was potentially an issue of the questionnaire and/ or 
interview inducing stress or anxiety in participants if they had experienced negative 
encounters of this kind in a traumatic form in the past. However unlikely such an 
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incident might be, I ensured that there was no undue stress or anxiety given to 
participants, by approaching the topics of discussion in the most sensitive manner, 
and reassuring the participant of their right to withdraw at any point during (or after) 
the study, and the right to take as many short breaks should they wish. In case of such 
an emergency, I made sure the details of helplines were on hand. Support group help-
lines of the following two organizations were available: Tell MAMA (Measuring 
Anti-Muslim Attacks) and (IHRC) Islamic Human Rights Commission, as both 
groups work to tackle anti-Muslim hatred.  
On two occasions, participants were withdrawn from the study. Firstly, a man in his 
thirties from London, having completed the interview, asked for his participation to 
be withdrawn. I respected this and disregarded his data. The second participant whose 
data I did not use was a 52 year-old woman from London, and this was due to mental 
health issues. During the course of the interview, I noticed that the participant’s mental 
wellbeing did not fit the criteria I had set. The participant seemed to be depressed and 
at one point mentioned an unrelated family problem.  
 
10.2. Researcher Bias 
In the historical case, an advantage of collecting data through archival sources is that 
there are no leading questions, as is the fear in the case of interviews. However, 
archives are also a non-neutral space. As such, drawing inferences is an important task 
and I had to make sure to use professional judgement to ascertain what the writer of 
the source was attempting to convey, and make every effort not to distort their words 
or intent (Frevert et al. 2010). Moreover, archival sources are also fragmented in 
nature and are not to be relied on as means of gauging some ‘hidden truth.’ Thus, as 
a researcher I had to refrain from over-analysing and simplifying the sources in order 
to fit my desired understanding (Heaton 1998). 
In terms of my contemporary case, being seemingly someone from ‘within’ the same 
community that one is attempting to research has its pros and cons. While it might 
seem easier to ask questions, as one is knowledgeable of the language and aware of 
cultural particularities, there is perhaps a slight sense of suspicion sometimes amongst 
communities, especially British Muslims, as they might see the researcher as a 
government informant or ‘stooge.’ Sometimes it feels intrusive to certain 
communities as to why they needed to be a ‘case study.’ This was a difficulty for me 
when trying to reach potential participants from the ‘withdrawn’ category of analysis. 
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As such, this is something I had to keep in mind. Moreover, researchers from within 
a certain community might have their own biases that need to be countered, 
particularly when interpreting certain pieces of information in order to give a non-
normative and neutral analysis (Johnson 1997). Clearly these are some of the issues 
that I, as a researcher, had to be aware of and try to limit as much as possible 
throughout my study.  
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Chapter Four. Assimilation  
 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I explore assimilation, the first of the three coping strategies, in order 
to engage with my third research question: ‘How and why do targets of Antisemitism 
and Islamophobia choose their coping strategies?’ I begin the chapter by reiterating 
the meaning of assimilation, generally and specifically as a response towards 
prejudice. I then consider the anticipated themes, as well as the emergent themes that 
form the basis of three different modes of assimilation, namely: integrative, extreme 
and banal assimilation. Later, I analyse these modes of assimilation in detail to 
illustrate their particularities using expressions and examples found in both historical 
Antisemitism and contemporary Islamophobia case studies. Following an extensive 
exploration of the three modes of assimilation, I discuss various other underlying 
factors to explain the spectrum of behaviours that assimilationists display. I then 
provide an explanation for issues of causality to show that the choice of assimilation 
is in response to Antisemitism and Islamophobia rather than normal acculturation. 
The chapter concludes with a brief comment regarding the role of subjective 
moderating factors, such as age and gender, in influencing the choice of assimilation 
as a coping strategy.  
 
2. Assimilation as a Coping Strategy   
Assimilation is ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups 
acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by 
sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural 
life’ (Park & Burgess, 1969: 735). In Bhikhu Parekh’s understanding, in order to 
assimilate an individual is required to ‘shed all vestiges of their separate cultures’ 
(Parekh 2000: 197). Tariq Modood points to assimilation across the United Kingdom 
as a very one-sided process, dependent on minorities doing ‘little to disturb the society 
they are settling in and becom[ing] as much like their compatriots as possible’ 
(Modood 2013: 44). According to Alba and Nee, the ‘erasure of all signs of ethnic 
origins’ is not a prerequisite for assimilation (Alba and Nee, 2003: 19).  
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In my thesis, I treat the concept of assimilation as ‘not simply a passive reaction but 
rather a deliberate and calculated strategy’ against prejudice (Gibson 1988: 83). Here 
it is crucial for me to reaffirm the role of prejudice as the stressor that causes an 
individual’s choice to assimilate as a means to cope with it. Taking this logic, in my 
research I refer to assimilation as a ‘response shaped by experience of prejudice’ (ibid. 
1988: 67). It requires effort on part of the individual to reject in-group particularities 
and instead affirm the out-group’s (wider society’s) characteristics. In the case of 
assimilation, individuals respond in numerous ways and the degree to which they 
choose to assimilate varies. For example, staunch assimilation would see targets 
stripping themselves of every association with their stigmatised in-group. For others, 
assimilation might not always be as overt. Some assimilationists might believe in the 
superiority of wider society’s norms over those of their in-group, but they might not 
agree with forcing their views on other members of their in-group. So, assimilation is 
not a singular process positioned on a ‘straight-line account,’ but rather there are 
different reasons for, and trajectories leading towards, it (Joppke & Morawska 2002: 
50-52).  
In sum, having discussed the above, I find that assimilation shows a wide spectrum of 
responses from people who reason their complete submersion within wider society 
through self-hatred of their expected in-group, to others who feel that assimilation is 
a healthy part of their integration within wider society (Anderson 2016: 10). However, 
what is common to all responses towards prejudice in this coping strategy is that 
assimilationists use them to preserve or enhance their self-esteem, and they are based 
on the following anticipated themes: acknowledging wider society’s prejudices 
against their in-group and agreeing with wider society’s negative perceptions 
regarding their in-group; rejecting the in-group characteristics; and adopting wider 
society’s views. These ‘anticipated themes,’ formed the basis on which I segregated 
assimilationist responses from the rest of the data. On further analysis of these 
assimilationist responses, using NVivo qualitative data analysis software, and 
exploring archival sources in detail, certain other themes emerged, which are: 
integrating into wider society whilst distancing from the in-group collective; severing 
all ties with the in-group whilst immersing completely into wider society; believing 
in individual liberties above their collective identity. These emergent themes formed 
the basis of the three different modes of assimilation, namely: integrative assimilation, 
extreme assimilation and banal assimilation.  
 80 
3. Modes of Assimilation 
In this section, I illustrate the spectrum of responses towards Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia in each of the three modes of assimilation. Integrative assimilation 
involves the individual integrating within wider society by finding commonalities or 
shared values, and rebuking and distancing themselves from their in-group identity, 
which wider society might look upon unfavourably. The archetypal example of 
integrative assimilationists amongst Weimar Jews is the Centralverein deutscher 
Staatsbürger jüdischen (CV), a group consisting of Jewish intellectuals, which was 
established in the late 1800s, and it strongly promoted the values of secularity and 
public-private divide. In the contemporary case, British Muslims who choose to be 
integrative assimilationists include members of British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy (BMSD) and other such justice-driven organizations.19 Crucially, 
integrative assimilationists believe that internal change is possible and they make an 
attempt to engage with the in-group in order to redress this, by mobilising members 
of the in-group, persuading them to act differently, to change their ways and to ‘do 
more’ to immerse themselves within wider society. Assimilation for them is a logical 
means to live a ‘normal’ life without fear of persecution.  
Extreme assimilation entails targets of prejudice completely immersing themselves 
into wider society by detaching themselves from the in-group, laying blame for 
prejudice on their collective, and severing all ties from it in order to repair their 
bruised self-esteem. Unlike integrative assimilation, it does not involve the targeted 
individual expressing a desire for internal change. This might be because they do not 
believe it is achievable, as they feel their fellow in-group members are too rigid in 
their ways and will resist change. In the historical case, extreme assimilationist 
Weimar Jews laid blame on fervent interpretations of faith or backward culture 
amongst the ghettoised and Östjuden (Eastern Jews), and Jewish nationalism in the 
form of Zionism. Similarly, extreme assimilationist British Muslims point fingers at 
their socially withdrawn brethren who they feel make no effort to break from 
traditions that clash with the norms of wider society. According to extreme 
assimilationists, prejudice is a product of their in-group’s failure to become part of 
                                                
19 Other similar organisations include Quilliam and v-Inspired. Both groups primarily work towards 
countering religious extremism within British Muslim communities, and promoting assimilation of 
Muslim minorities within wider society.   
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wider society. Those clinging to in-group particularities are seen as a ‘lost cause’ and 
a just reason for assimilated targets to feel self-hate and self-denial. 
The final mode of assimilation I discuss in this chapter is banal assimilation. Members 
of this group believe in individual liberties above their collective identity; they give 
less power to external forces, such as the state, and lend greater agency to individuals, 
in order to enhance their ability to take charge of their own selfhood. The majority of 
Jewish and Muslim assimilationists fall into this category based on their reactions to 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively. 
Now, I discuss each mode of assimilation in detail so as to illustrate their 
particularities using expressions and examples found in both historical Antisemitism 
and contemporary Islamophobia case studies. 
 
3.1. Integrative Assimilation   
Integrative assimilationists aim to persuade all members of their in-group to realise 
the benefits that immersing oneself within wider society can offer. They insist 
individuals belonging to their in-group to ‘do more,’ so that they may grow as 
individuals, independent of the cultural baggage inherited from their in-group. The 
common denominator between Weimar Jewish and contemporary British Muslim 
integrative assimilationists is that they overwhelmingly uphold universal rights, 
justice and equality. Furthermore, integrative assimilationists firmly believe their 
response is ‘correct,’ giving them a sense of authority as well as superiority. They 
pride themselves on their belief in a public-private divide and ‘inadequacy of a purely 
religious definition’ of their group, and they strongly assert a ‘need to replace 
customs’ (Reinharz 1975: 37-38). Integrative assimilation is highly focused on the in-
group’s need for change stemming from within. Integrative assimilationists are not 
necessarily anti-religion, but rather open-minded and could even be religious in 
private. However, they strongly feel their religious identity is an entirely private issue. 
This belief in the public-private divide is a result of this group’s fear that wider society 
holds negative perceptions of their in-group. In striving for a more positive self-image 
in the eyes of the other, integrative assimilationists are fervent believers in educating 
members of their in-group of the positives of assimilation as well as putting an end to 
certain practices held by their in-group that they believe are considered unfavourable 
by wider society and the cause of prejudice.  
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Integrative assimilationists exhibit three main forms of expression: a strong belief in 
social justice; upholding the private-public divide; and putting an end to ‘ghetto 
culture.’ I now discuss the three forms of expression of integrative assimilation using 
personal accounts from archival sources and interview excerpts in order to build 
narratives to elaborate each form of expression.  
 
3.1.1. Social Justice  
One expression common amongst integrative Weimar era Jewish and contemporary 
British Muslim assimilationists is their strong commitment to social justice. In both 
historical and contemporary case studies, integrative assimilationists defend even 
those whose interests are not directly aligned with their own. One of their principle 
aims entails encouraging the more withdrawn members of their respective in-groups 
to shed ‘unnecessary baggage’ found in their in-group collective. Social justice, as I 
conceptualise it here, is a means by which integrative assimilationists mobilise their 
fellow in-group members to break away from the comfort provided by their in-group, 
and to integrate themselves into wider society wholeheartedly.  
 
Historical case 
Social justice was at the cornerstone of integrative assimilationist Jewish movements 
during the Weimar era. Crucially, they believed that one can only combat 
Antisemitism by working within the legal and political framework provided by wider 
society. They felt that the onus was on German Jews to accept the laws and social 
norms of wider Gentile society. However, they did not consider this to be a reciprocal 
relationship; wider society was not expected to adapt its legal or political framework 
in accordance with German Jews’ particularities (Meyer 1998). An example of an 
integrative assimilationist Jewish movements is the Centralverein deutscher 
Staatsbürger jüdischen (Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), 
or CV for short. Founded in 1880, the CV consisted of a group of like-minded 
integrative assimilationist Jews who, in the face of strong Anti-Semitic sentiments, 
decided to find a solution to the ‘Jewish Question.’  
While many of the integrative assimilationist Jews of the Weimar era were not often 
directly affected by overt physical or verbal Antisemitism, they were perturbed by 
what their less assimilated co-religionists had been experiencing, and what their 
responses had been perpetuating. Sometimes wider society’s animosity directed 
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towards accommodationist and withdrawn Jews would occasionally tip over and, in a 
subtle form, affect the more assimilated German Jewry. For this reason, the CV 
dedicated itself to rebranding the German Jewish image (Meyer 1998). The CV 
worked to establish a strong German-Jewish identity so that Weimar Jews would 
identify as self-confident German Jews (Pulzer 2003: 108). As is evident from this, 
the CV worked on creating change from within the Jewish in-group by inculcating a 
positive association with Germanness.  
Furthermore, while integrative assimilationist Jews, who upheld social justice, 
believed in actively promoting Germanness, they did not seem to do the same for their 
Jewish identity. This is summed up in the words of Eugen Fuchs, founder of the CV: 
‘he who does not fight justice will not receive justice’ (Fuchs 1919); (Rosenblum 
2013: 38). Fuchs believed that the CV must actively support Jews against 
Antisemitism, but he also expected the Jews to consider themselves first and foremost 
as Germans, who just happened to be of the Jewish faith (Fuchs 1919). Thus, these 
integrative assimilationist Jews believed in fighting Antisemitism, whilst maintaining 
a certain level of indifference with regards to expressions of their Jewishness within 
wider society (Niewyk 1980); (Meyer 1998: 167).  
Niewyk (1980) describes the CV’s reaction toward Antisemitism as a two-pronged 
approach. On the one hand, the CV’s public face was an outspoken critic of Anti-
Semitic German movements. On the other, it worked inwardly with German Jews, 
encouraging them to believe in the beneficial aspects of immersing themselves within 
in wider society. This inward-looking approach, Niewyk asserts, attempted to bring a 
‘sense of security and confidence to the Jews themselves’ (Niewyk 1980: 87). It 
worked quite well, as it managed to assimilate many of the Östjuden (Eastern Jews) 
quite quickly. Their tactics were also far subtler as compared to their 
accommodationist counterparts, many of whom believed in civil disobedience and 
protests. Leaders of the CV ‘employed reason to combat impulse’ to protest, as they 
feared this ‘could never penetrate armor of devout Judeophobes,’ (Packer 1975: 37-
38); (Niewyk 1980: 88). Instead, integrative assimilationist Jewish movements like 
the CV worked quietly and covertly. This is because while such groups despised 
Antisemitism, being good citizens and abiding by German law was equally, if not 
more, important to them (Fuchs 1919).  
For this reason, the CV ‘believed in affirming the legal and moral rights of Jews to 
live as German citizens’ through upholding their Germanness (Niewyk 1980: 89). 
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Robert Weltsch, a prominent German Jewish philosopher of the time, praised Tietz, a 
leading CV member, because Tietz believed that the most effective way for Jews to 
defeat Antisemitism was through the promotion of German patriotism grounded in 
assimilation above all else (Weltsch 1927: 29-30); (Brenner & Penslar 1998: 71). 
 
Contemporary case 
British Muslims in contemporary England who choose to counter Islamophobia 
through integrative assimilation also hold dear the principle of social justice. This can 
be exemplified in the work of organisations like British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy (BMSD). Like the CV, BMSD want a more independent, freethinking and 
confident individual, aware of their surroundings. This, they believe, is the best way 
to tackle anti-Muslim prejudice. Being of Muslim origin and British are not seen as 
mutually exclusive by integrative assimilationists. But, many take issue with the 
terminology; Islamophobia is not seen as an accurate reflection in their view. This is 
because, many integrative assimilationist British Muslims believe the term stifles 
debate surrounding religious practices and dogma, which in their eyes are 
questionable. They assert that criticism of rituals and practices needs to be 
differentiated from hatred of followers or practitioners of faith, which they like to call 
‘anti-Muslim hatred.’ Integrative assimilationist British Muslims are cautious of 
organised religion, but respect others’ right to be part of these groups, so long as it 
does not hinder their participation and integration within wider society. Like most 
other assimilationist Muslims in general, they view religious practices to be a matter 
of personal choice, to be practised privately, downplaying the strictness of religious 
codes or rituals.  
Most importantly, integrative assimilationist Muslims do not express much in terms 
of direct experience of Islamophobia. Although they seem more aware of the problem 
of ‘Islamophobia’ than extreme or banal assimilationist Muslims. While, they feel 
most of their fellow faith in-group members, particularly the more withdrawn, have a 
detrimental effect upon assimilation, making them easier targets of Islamophobia as a 
whole. However, unlike other assimilationists, integrative assimilationist British 
Muslims have shown that they believe change in mind-sets is possible. An example 
of the archetypal integrative assimilationist British Muslim can be found in Samar, a 
30-something year-old human rights lawyer and second-generation British Muslim 
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Londoner with a passion for social justice issues.20 She is a prominent member of the 
BMSD and is one half of an inter-racial marriage. According to Samar her family was 
‘never really very traditional or religious.’ Samar refers to herself as a ‘secular 
Muslim,’ a common moniker amongst assimilated British Muslims, which she 
describes as a person who ‘may be practising in their personal life…but at the same 
time has an unshakable commitment to equality and human rights.’ She vehemently 
refuses to ‘advertise’ her faith. Growing up, Samar remembers how she felt 
‘disconnected from the mosque community’ while it seemed so ethnically diverse. 
The social and cultural conservativeness, Samar says, is what caused her increasing 
alienation, so she ‘just doesn’t fit in with that community’ as it has become ‘much 
more Salafi-oriented,’ devoid of ‘ethos of inclusion and no understanding or 
appreciation of equalities as they exist in modern British law.’ Samar made reference 
to many inter-faith and inclusive organisations such as the British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy and the Inclusive Mosque Initiative, which is pioneering the concept of 
women and LGBTI rights within the British Muslim communities.21  
Hatred against Muslims is a real concern asserts Samar, however, she takes issue with 
the term ‘Islamophobia’: ‘Even I've been labelled as Islamophobic’ by people who 
have ‘hijacked and misappropriated the term.’ As such, she feels we need to 
distinguish between critique of the ideas and practices related to the faith of Islam, 
and hatred and violence directed towards Muslims.  Samar says:  
 
“Instead I use the term ‘anti-Muslim sentiment,’ which is any kind of verbal or 
physical sort of behaviour against any Muslim or group of Muslims which is hostile 
and threatening based on that person's faith or perceived faith identity.”  
 
There should be room for critique of practices, says Samar, but individuals’ rights 
must be safeguarded. As such she also actively supports groups such as TellMAMA 
(Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks), which monitors racial and religious hatred.  
Shahid is a prominent social networker and entrepreneur based in London.22 Much 
like Samar he began our conversation by describing his middle-class upbringing. He 
‘knows’ that he is an anomaly amongst the British Muslim in-group. Due to his ‘very 
different mind-set…and belief in equality and justice’ he is often outcast as a ‘deviant 
                                                
20 I conducted an interview with Samar on October 15th 2014 in London. 
21 She believes her faith group is not a monolith. 
22 I conducted an interview with Shahid on November 24th 2014 in London. 
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Muslim.’ It is increasingly difficult to change this popular narrative within the in-
group, as Shahid feels the more withdrawn and culturally conservative are difficult to 
engage: ‘the first thing they do is put up a barrier and their immediate response is no 
you’re wrong’. Shahid gave one example of a personal grievance with regard to 
Islamophobia. His name has been placed on a US no-fly list. This has severely 
inconvenienced Shahid, as a businessman and thus regular jetsetter. He feels 
humiliated, but thanks to his networks and links with established mediators, Shahid 
says he was able to resolve the issue. While he acknowledges that not everyone is as 
well connected as he is, Shahid maintains that people in such ‘tricky’ situations must 
actively engage in dialogue, respectful of ‘the laws of the land,’ as ‘you need to stay 
within the legal remits of our liberal democracy.’ 
 
3.1.2. Public-Private Divide  
The second expression common to integrative assimilationists in both cases is the 
strong belief in a divide between private and public spheres. In their eyes, a divide 
between what an individual can do within the private, as opposed to the public realm, 
is absolutely necessary. This is to ensure that within the private sphere the individual 
is free to observe and display all aspects of their religious or ethnic identity. In 
contrast, individuals are expected to maintain a strict secular face when conducting 
themselves in public spaces. Essentially, integrative assimilationists work to promote 
the secularisation of the public sphere and a minimalist or covert approach to 
expressions of faith within this realm. Unlike their more extreme assimilationist 
counterparts who rally for the complete abstinence from practices of faith in all 
spaces, integrative assimilationists feel that relegating religious practices to the 
private realm would serve as a logical compromise. In the eyes of integrative 
assimilationists, it serves to appease those who refuse to disband with aspects of their 
faith in-group identity for which they are targeted. 
 
Historical case 
Facing a constant barrage of unwarranted Antisemitism, Weimar Jewish integrative 
assimilationists were concerned by their image in the midst of wider society, and they 
responded in a manner that was consistent with their values and beliefs. In their eyes, 
the best way to counter abuse directed towards their in-group was to look inwardly 
and do what was in their capacity to make themselves less conspicuous and more in-
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line with wider society’s norms. This included making faith personal; assimilationist 
Weimar Jews preferred subtle and private expressions of faith, as opposed to the more 
overt and obvious public displays of faith (Brenner 1998).  
For members of the Centralverein (CV), faith was a private matter, and like the 
overwhelming majority of assimilationist Weimar Jews, they argued that it was not 
about rigidly structured ritual practises. Many assimilationist Jewish scholars of the 
time, such as Rosenzweig, believed that while the synagogue was a bastion of hope 
and redemption, for the sake of assimilation – and ultimately Jewish existence 
amongst Gentiles –  Jews should disband with overt public expressions of faith and 
‘withstand the allure of Zionism and political activism’ (Meyer 1988: 25). This 
signifies a separation between synagogue and state; the separation of private, religious 
life from the public, secular face. Important to note is that integrative assimilationists 
did not condone the complete abolishment of faith establishments, but rather, they 
respectfully subordinated ritualistic faith practices lest they take control of Jewish 
identity (Brenner & Penslar 1998). Creating the public–private distinction means the 
Jewish individual could choose which elements of their faith identity to share with 
wider society and which not to disclose. As such, agency lies with the target as to 
when and where they choose to express particular facets of their identity, cautious of 
the repercussions oversharing certain conflictual parts of religious identity that might 
cause rifts with German society at large.  
Examples from autobiographies and memoirs show the latent hostility the more 
assimilated Jews had for their in-group fellows who were overt in their expressions 
and manifestations of faith within the public realm. In the case of Kurt Blumenfeld’s 
writings, he speaks about the manner in which the assimilated Jews who upheld the 
strict public–private divide interacted with the ‘obvious,’ overtly practising Jews 
within wider society (Blumenfeld 1962). Kurt Blumenfeld writes about one encounter 
from his youth – before he had embraced Zionism – detailing how he chose to distance 
himself from a fellow Jew, one who was visibly orthodox. Blumenfeld was 
approached by this person and asked for directions. Blumenfeld himself was much 
immersed within wider society and was an ‘unidentifiable Jew,’ and was ‘fearful of 
being seen with this obvious Jew’ (Blumenfeld 1962: 59- 64). As such he refused to 
acknowledge the man and continued on his way. Similar behaviour was demonstrated 
by Ruth Schmidt’s family in her memoir of life as a Jewish teenager in Weimar 
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Berlin.23 Ruth’s family showed signs of integrative assimilation in how they treated 
faith practises. The Schmidts had a distinct secular public face, one that was ‘not 
particularly Jewish,’ however, covertly adhering to synagogue visits on High 
Holidays was an unquestionable part of their identity, one that was not given much 
thought. But overt expressions of their Jewishness in the public sphere was something 
Ruth’s father scolded her for.24 
 
Contemporary case 
Just like her fellow assimilationist British Muslims, Samar is a strong critic of rigid 
‘ritualistic’ and ‘trivial things’ which she says keeps the community from looking at 
‘the bigger picture.’25 Unfortunately, she realises that she is in the minority, as she is 
constantly struggling to have her voice heard by the in-group collective as well as the 
mainstream public discourse, which are both proponents of a ‘typical’ brand of 
Muslim, rendering her and other integrative assimilationists ‘unauthentic Muslims,’ 
without the obvious ‘visual markers’ of piety such as headscarves and lengthy beards. 
Much like Samar, Shahid decries the ritual-based Islam that dominates understanding 
of the faith.26 This he feels leads people to become more conservative and withdrawn. 
He attempts to rationalise the decisions of some British Muslims to become 
withdrawn:  
 
‘...once you're in that environment of stability and comfort, it's very difficult to go 
elsewhere… it’s very difficult to break out.’  
 
His stance on faith resonated with Samar’s idea of secular Muslims. Shahid asserts 
how he ‘will question everything. And won't accept something until we believe it to 
be right.’ Faith to him is also a personal matter:  
 
‘I don't use my [online] platforms to talk about religions because I think that opens 
the audience up to a very different market and in my experience people tend to be 
more religious online.’  
 
                                                
23 Schmidt, R. [date]. Forever Ago. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New York, New 
York.  
24 Ibid. 
25 I conducted an interview with Samar on October 15th 2014 in London. 
26 I conducted an interview with Shahid on November 24th 2014 in London. 
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Strategies of integrative assimilation are also employed by some of the older of British 
Muslims. For instance, Sameena, a retired teacher from London, believes in upholding 
a public-private divide: ‘my religion is here [points at heart] it's not an outward show. 
It's not to be publicised or advertised.’27 Similarly, Dr Patel, a middle-aged surgeon 
based in Birmingham is a self-professed ‘liberal,’ for whom faith must be 
‘intellectually relatable.’28 In discussing Islamophobia Dr Patel says that it is 
inevitable for people to make judgements regarding one another on ‘how you look 
and how you speak.’ Personally, Dr Patel says he has never directly faced 
Islamophobia throughout his life, and attributes this to his personal etiquette, which 
entails:  
 
‘behave[ing] in a very professional manner, you're not associated with any of the 
stereotypes of being Muslim…[like] having a long beard or putting on a cap or 
wearing your pyjama-kurta and moving around in society. If you do that, you'll be 
stereotyped into that type of ethnic group and you will not be treated well.’  
 
Tahir is a second-generation British Muslim banker from Birmingham currently 
working in London.29 Religious practice for Tahir has been nominal, mainly restricted 
to festivals like Eid. To his knowledge, Tahir has ‘not really’ been negatively 
stereotyped as a Muslim and he feels it is his conscious decision to ‘blend into’ wider 
society – both aesthetically and in mannerism – that has ensured he has been 
safeguarded:  
 
‘I think the way we dress and the way we portray ourselves will have an impact. So 
with me, I don’t really keep a beard, I don’t wear a jubbah [Arab long dress] when 
I’m in public. When [other Muslims] wear that they have more negative spotlight on 
them compared to me… there has to be a clear distinction between what’s acceptable 
in public and how you live your life in the comfort of your own homes.’  
 
3.1.3. Preaching to the Ghetto  
The third expression of integrative assimilation is the desire to halt ghettoisation of 
the in-group. Not only are integrative assimilationists bastions of a public-private 
divide, they also believe that making changes internally can potentially resolve the 
issue. A noteworthy point about integrative assimilationists is that they are very vocal 
                                                
27 I conducted an interview with Sameena on December 1st 2014 in London. 
28 I conducted an interview with Dr Patel on January 22nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
29 I conducted an interview with Tahir on January 22nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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in their demands for the abolishment of ghettos.30 In the case of the Weimar era, 
German Jews were opposed to the ghettoisation particularly concentrated in major 
cities, such as Berlin and Frankfurt, by Östjuden (Jews from the East), who were 
relatively recent settlers in Germany from Austria and Russia, fleeing persecution. 
Similarly, British Muslim integrative assimilationists dislike the ‘bad repute’ that the 
newer migrants from Muslim majority nations – as well as the ghettoised enclave-
dwellers in places like East London, parts of Birmingham and Manchester – bring to 
the in-group collective.  
 
Historical case 
Along with calls for dissociation from synagogues, integrative assimilationist Jews 
rallied for an end to ghetto-life. Besides the influence of the ghettoised culture on the 
German Jewish youth, integrative assimilationist Jews were tired of having to clear 
their name because of its association with the Östjuden and their seemingly 
‘backwards’ cultural practices. In the eyes of wider society, Östjuden had become the 
catch-all term to refer to Jews in Germany. As such, assimilated integrative Jews felt 
it their mission to put an end to the ghettos smearing their name, and causing 
Antisemitism.  
An example of calling to abolish ghetto culture is evident in one-time mayor of city 
of Gera (from 1945- 48), Friedrich Blach:  
 
‘We must finally end our involvement with our overseas Glaubensgenossen [Jewish 
brethren]. As long as they are in need, we will certainly help them. That is our human 
duty. But to ask them to make their homes in our country, that is against duty and 
reason. Duty towards Germany: We really cannot use these ‘East European’ elements 
here…Against reason: For over fifty years our most passionate goal has been the 
extinction of all traces of our centuries-old ghetto life and to efface all cultural 
distinctions between us and the majority’ (Blach 1911: 20-21).31  
  
Integrative assimilationists believed that Antisemitism was heightened when Jews 
withdrew from wider society and ‘function as a separate community with 
recognizable cultural features’ (Aschheim 1982: 225-226). It is apparent that the 
                                                
30 Their more extreme assimilationist counterparts are vocal in blaming ghetto culture however, they 
are not hopeful that things can change. As such, they remove themselves from the in-group, instead 
of engaging with it. 
31 Translation from Aschheim, S., E. Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and 
German Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923. Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1982, p. 49. 
 91 
integrative assimilationist Jews were probably just as much, if not more anti-
immigration as their far-right Gentile compatriots. In their eyes, the newer immigrant 
Jews from the East were negatively influencing their thoroughly German Jewish 
youth by making the youth more susceptible to withdrawing from wider society in the 
name of Jewish nationalist ideology. Firstly, assimilationist Jews felt that above all 
they were German nationalist and there was no room for any other nationalist ideology 
to surface if one were to become fully immersed within wider German society. 
Secondly, the negative stereotypes associated with Östjuden were now widely being 
used by Anti-Semites to stigmatise all Jews, regardless of their chosen coping 
strategy. Be they withdrawn or assimilated, Anti-Semites spared no one, and they 
tarred all Jews with the same prejudicial brush. In the view of integrative 
assimilationists, it was time to take matters into their own hands and rally against the 
scourge of Ostjude, which had caused the sharp increase in Anti-Semitic sentiments 
that the assimilationists Jews were now facing (Aschheim 1982: 45). To this end, 
integrative assimilationist German Jews engaged with their in-group, forcing it to 
change the distortion of its name and values, which they felt were German through 
and through. 
While integrative assimilationist Jews were quick to distinguish themselves from the 
more overt, orthodox Jews, they still held the view that the more withdrawn Jews 
could change themselves and shed certain detrimental characteristics of their in-group 
identity. For instance, a young Theodor Lessing concludes that ‘we were not really 
Jewish in that sense’ referring to his own family (Lessing 1930/1969: 112). Whilst 
maintaining this distinction between himself and his withdrawn brethren, Lessing still 
pursued dialogue with them in hopes that his words would encourage them to embrace 
assimilation. Similar sentiments were expressed by the likes of Walther Rathenau, the 
German Jewish statesman and one-time Foreign Minister during the Weimar 
Republic. Rathenau wrote using an alias to criticise his fellow Jews for creating ‘a 
half-voluntary, invisible ghetto, not a living member of the nation, but a foreign 
organism in its body’ (Rathenau 1902: 3-20). He insists that onus was on Jews to ‘do 
more’ and become part of wider society:  
 
‘the state has granted you citizenship so that you can become educated as Germans. 
But you have only remained foreigners, and now you demand that [the state] bestow 
you with equality of rights? You speak of duties fulfilled: military service and taxes. 
But there is an unsaid duty for you to fulfil. That of trust’ (Rathenau 1902: 3-20).  
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Rathenau was not an extreme assimilationist who called for the mass conversion of 
Jews to Christianity, however, in his writings he pleads with Jews to disband with 




Integrative assimilationist British Muslims in contemporary England display similar 
tactics used by their Weimar Jewish counterparts discussed above. Prominent media 
Muslims, such as Yasmin Alibhai-Brown as well as popular academic Muslims, like 
Ziauddin Sardar, have for decades emphasised the importance of British Muslims 
breaking away from the ghetto, both physically and mentally. Alibhai-Brown, a self-
proclaimed ‘non-conformist believer’ accepts that outright racial and religious hatred 
exists, and she asserts that perpetrators are non-Muslims as well as Muslims (i.e. 
sectarianism) (Alibhai-Brown 2011). She is well known for vocalising her displeasure 
of selective government policies, which Alibhai-Brown claims only acknowledge 
superficial and ‘sexy’ elements of Asian culture, e.g. ‘saris, samosas and steel drums’ 
(Alibhai-Brown, 2001). But simultaneously Alibhai-Brown, an outspoken backer of 
the ban on the burqa (face veil) in Britain, encourages Muslims to let go of religious 
and ethnic traditions that are making them easy targets of Islamophobes (Alibhai-
Brown, The Independent 2010). For such assertions, Alibhai-Brown has on numerous 
occasions been labelled an Islamophobe (Taras 2012: 199). Islamophobia, according 
to Alibhai-Brown, has warped into ‘a convenient label, a figleaf…used to blackmail 
[wider] society’ (Alibhai-Brown 2003); (Malik 2005).  
Similar sentiments can be found in the writings of scholar, Ziauddin Sardar, who 
stresses the need for more nuanced understandings of faith and interpretations of a 
‘British Islam,’ which is sympathetic to the everyday lives of the ordinary British 
Muslim. Sardar suggests that in order to be effective and draw less attention from 
critics, British Islam must become less strict in terms of adherence to ritual practices, 
and also less attached to ‘cultural Islam’ found within the Eastern ‘homelands’ of 
many diaspora Muslims, be they from the Indian Subcontinent or the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region (Sardar 2011a). Sardar has for decades been a staunch 
critic of his fellow British Muslims, asserting that the reason why Muslims are 
‘behind’ and prey to Islamophobia is ‘because they have allowed parochialism and 
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petty traditionalism to rule over their minds. We must break free from the ghetto 
mentality’ (Sardar 2011b).  
Many of my interview participants echoed the sentiments of Alibhai-Brown and 
Sardar. Dr Patel, for instance, believes that Islamophobic abuse can be minimised if 
British Muslims:  
 
‘just behave normal in society, you will be accepted more if you want to live here, 
you've got to make sure that you adapt [sic] the ways of living in the West.’32  
 
According to Dr Patel, those dealing with Islamophobia ‘should adopt British ways.’ 
He also critiques ‘ghettoised’ Muslims for: 
‘liv[ing] in their own little areas. Living in the ways they were living in Pakistan, or 
India or Bangladesh and they haven't been able to go into the wider society… they 
should do something. And be considerate to others as well.’  
 
3.2. Extreme Assimilation  
When faced with prejudice, extreme assimilationists commonly react by detaching 
themselves from their in-group and completely immersing themselves into wider 
society. Unlike integrative assimilationists, the more extreme variety find it difficult 
to hold back in their fervent critique of the more reserved members of their faith in-
group, mainly because they do not feel there is much hope for internal change. While 
integrative assimilationists premise their reactions on the liberal ideal of social justice 
and the notion of self-improvement, extreme assimilationist responses are, to an 
extent, couched in self-loathing. In some cases, extreme assimilationists believe that 
the prejudicial rhetoric is justified and they internalise the critique, often leaving them 
harbouring increasingly negative sentiments towards fellow members of their in-
group collective. Extreme assimilationists do not feel need to respect or show empathy 
with the less assimilated members of their targeted in-group. Weimar era Jews in this 
mode of assimilation placed blame with a few different groups, namely: religious 
Orthodoxy, second-wave Zionists, and Östjuden for their ghettoised lifestyle and 
negative influence on youth. As for contemporary British Muslims classified as 
extreme assimilationists, their grudge is against a few pockets of the in-group. These 
                                                
32 I conducted an interview with Dr Patel on January 22nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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groups include religious zealots, staunchly conservative religious and community 
leaders, and newer immigrant Muslims.  
Extreme assimilationist strategies are composed of three main forms of expression: 
self-loathing; detachment; and blame or hostility directed towards the in-group. I now 
discuss the three forms of expression of extreme assimilation using personal accounts 
from archival sources and interview excerpts in order to  build narratives to elaborate 
each form of expression in detail. 
 
3.2.1. Self-Loathing 
An expression of extreme assimilation is the act of self-loathing. This involves more 
than just critique of certain actions that are prevalent amongst in-group members, and 
are looked upon scornfully by wider society. Self-loathing is not just restricted to 
blaming hatred faced by their in-group upon maligning actions of the less assimilated 
in-group members. Self-loathing assimilationists often become extremely hostile 
towards their less assimilated in-group contemporaries, attacking them on a personal 
level. In the case of the extreme assimilationist Weimar Jews this manifested in actual 
incidences of Antisemitism between Jews, i.e. highly assimilated Jews being Anti-
Semitic towards the more withdrawn Jews, blaming them and their lifestyle choices 
for the growing Antisemitism directed towards all German Jews. Similarly, in the case 
of contemporary British Muslims, the more assimilated in-group members are not just 
heavily critical of the everyday lives of the more withdrawn British Muslims, but in 
some cases, as I show below, extreme assimilationists believe that the withdrawn 
members of their in-group are rightly targeted by bigots and deserve the prejudices 
projected at them.  
  
Historical case 
In the historical case study, an extreme assimilationist Weimar Jew’s level of 
internalised self-loathing can be evident in their strong resentment toward close 
relatives – who were visibly Jewish, thus deemed withdrawn – and blaming them for 
the Antisemitism directed against the entire German Jewry. An example of this is 
found in Henry Bauxbaum’s memoir in which he recounts how he used to question 
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why his elders chose to make apparent their Jewishness, as opposed to immersing 
themselves within wider German society.33 Bauxbaum questioned:  
 
‘Why did the [forefathers] have to remain strangers, forever strangers, Jews amongst 
the Gentile, living there for a thousand years and still keeping themselves apart. And 
now I have to suffer the pain of loss. What was the sense in such suffering? Was it so 
great, so irrevocably better, the life they clung to with the misery which went with it 
than the life lived around them…How easy, I thought, it would have been for them to 
mix with the others to become one of them, to become as whole as they were…they 
had left me behind another stranger, stranded to pay for their failure… I loved this 
country as much as they did, more so now in an hour of abandonment…I never forgot 
about this moment of bitterness and the despair.’34 
 
Extreme assimilation, as a result, can lead to strong feelings of self-hatred and the 
creation of the Jewish Anti-Semite. For example, the prolific journalist, Paul 
Nickolaus Cossmann, son of renowned cellist, Bernhard Cossmann, was a baptized 
Jew. In his adult life, Paul Cossmann disbanded with his Jewish identity and adopted 
‘conservative monarchism’ in the wake of patriotism post-World War I, and he 
converted to Catholicism at the age of 36 (Niewyk 1982: 99). Those in the extreme 
assimilation category have a tendency to express their reactions by internalising the 
hatred directed towards their in-group by accepting it, and in some cases, agreeing 
with the justification behind the hatred. They were ideologically opposed to the 
ghettoised German Jews as well as the newer Östjuden immigrants. As such, the 
extreme assimilationist Jews fervently blamed Antisemitism on these withdrawn 
contemporaries. Assimilationists, such as Eugen Ehrlich, Max Marcuse and Frit 
Mauthner, insisted that Judefrage or ‘Jewish question’ – along with the ensuing 
Antisemitism it caused – was a backlash to the influx of East European Jews. Extreme 
assimilationists went a step further by blaming Östjuden for ruining the lives of 
German Jews. They considered the influx of Östjuden in Germany to be a ‘radical 
threat’ to the position of German Jewry and that ‘Östjuden were responsible for the 
rise of anti-Semitism’ (Aschheim 1982: 47). Extreme assimilationists felt tremendous 
shame in associating with ghetto-dwelling Jews. As such, unlike integrative 
assimilationist Jews, extreme assimilationists did not preach to the withdrawn, and 
instead chose to maintain ‘psychological and cultural distance’ from ghetto-dwelling 
                                                
33 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York. 
34 Ibid., pp.102-105. 
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Jews and Östjuden (Bischoff 1916: 19); (Aschheim 1982: 151). Many Anti-Semitic 
media groups took advantage of this division amongst German Jewry and boasted that 
even ‘Jewish officers were disgusted and ashamed by the appearance and habits of 
their fellow religionists’ (Bischoff 1916: 19); (Aschheim 1982: 151).  
 
Contemporary case  
In the case of contemporary British Muslims, the self-loathing might not be obvious 
nor fierce. This is partly because, up until recently, the concept of a ‘cultural Muslim’ 
– one who is of Muslim heritage, but does not believe in the basic tenets of Islam – 
was considered a misnomer. In the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Muslims, 
one ceases to be a Muslims if they no longer believe in the basic principles of Islam. 
While Jew is both a religious and ethnic label, the same cannot be said of Muslims. 
Quite telling accounts are mainly related to how the less assimilated Muslims are 
prone to ‘blowing things out of proportion’ and ‘playing the victim’, as Sameena, a 
75-year-old retired teacher asserts.35 Even with regard to issues such as the Charlie 
Hebdo caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which caused overwhelming 
outrage amongst most Muslims, Sameena feels that the uproar was a reflection of how 
some British Muslims trivialise matters of faith. Sameena’s response to the Charlie 
Hebdo incident is such: ‘[laughs] Big deal? He [The Prophet (pbuh)] would have 
laughed.’ She acknowledges that Muslims do face prejudicial abuse, and she describes 
how, in the past, she herself experienced on the streets; she remembers being called 
racial slurs such as ‘blacky,’ which she chose to ignore, and seemed almost 
desensitised towards. Instead, Sameena continually puts contemporary issues of 
Islamophobia into perspective. In fact, when discussing certain incidences of 
Islamophobia in Britain, Sameena would quickly retort, as a way to rationalise 
experiences of hatred:  
 
‘Look at Pakistan there is killing every day. They [the Taliban] are coming to kill you. 
Who are the Taliban? Your uncles, probably. You're related to them. Who is coming 
there and killing you? And if people do [hate Muslims], they are suspicious. The fault 
is of our own [Muslims]. We should do more’. 
 
                                                
35 I conducted an interview with Sameena on December 1st 2014 in London. 
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 Sameena’s self-blame was coupled with the fact that she refused to refer to these 
incidences as ‘Islamophobia,’ instead she likened the experience to bullying, which 
she believes is a ‘part of every culture.’ And directly to the newer immigrants from 
majority Muslim countries, Sameena says:  
 
‘In the Quran it says when you go to a different country you should abide by their 
laws. It says clearly [with] instruction to the Muslim. So if you’re not abiding go away, 
go back.’  
 
Here she directs her speech towards newly arrived Muslims in England, telling them 
they do not belong here if they do not conform to a certain degree.  
In the view of another older British Muslim woman, Afrida, a retired counsellor, the 
withdrawn Muslims ‘have only themselves to blame’ for the Islamophobia they 
experienced.36 Afrida says initially she ‘tried reasoning’ with ‘ghettoised’ Muslims, 
as well as the newly arrived foreign-origin Muslims. However, Afrida confesses that: 
 
‘there came a point where I know there was not much use for me trying to make them 
become normal. We’re a hopeless bunch…and then it’s amusing when we try to claim 
we’ve somehow been abused? Give me a break! We’re our own worst enemy. It’s 
shameful. It’s pitiful.’  
 
3.2.2. Detachment from In-group 
Another manner in which extreme assimilationists express their reaction to prejudice 
is that they actively distance themselves from the targeted in-group. They strip 
themselves of all associations and markers that they share with other members of the 
in-group, i.e. religious or ethnic symbols, traditions, or ideologies. For extreme 
assimilationists this serves as a way to achieve a heightened sense of self-esteem. By 
removing themselves from what they consider the problem, (i.e. the actual existence 
of the in-group) they feel secure in themselves and free of guilt by association.  
 
Historical case 
There are countless examples of extreme assimilationist Weimar Jews who were very 
obvious exceptions to images of their withdrawn, ghetto-dwelling kin. In fact, some 
were so fully immersed within wider German society having converted to 
                                                
36 I conducted an interview with Afrida on May 24th 2015 in London. 
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Christianity. Many of them did not even give this action much thought; of those who 
converted, most if not all were from families that had little or no connection to the 
ritualistic elements of Judaism. For example, mayor of the city of Gera (from 1945- 
48) Friedrich Blach’s37 level of self-denial and decision to cut all ties from his original 
faith in-group is a case in point:  
 
‘I no longer want to be the self that I was, I want to belong to that magnificent [Gentile 
German] people in whose midst I was born…We have endured too long’ (Blach 1911: 
42), (Aschheim 1982: 49).  
 
Others, like prominent Weimar era novelist, Conrad Alberti (1862-1918), went as far 
as to employ Volkish [far-right] critique of accommodated Jewry, accusing them of 
being ‘unethical pretenders’ (Alberti 1889: 1719-33).38 According to Alberti, Judaism 
no longer had any right to exist in modern times; it no longer served a meaningful 
purpose in Alberti’s eyes and was now fulfilling the role of a ‘clique’ (Alberti 1889: 
1719-33). 
Similar sentiments are displayed in Pierre Ferrand’s memoir.39 Despite being born 
into a relatively assimilated Jewish household, Ferrand grew increasingly aware of 
Antisemitism directed towards him, and thus began feeling ‘ashamed’ of his Jewish 
birth and resenting this association so much so that he denied his Jewish heritage 
altogether (Ferrand 1988: 200). In his memoir, Ferrand describes the feeling of 
assimilationists, like himself, had towards Östjuden:  
 
‘[they were] dirty, mean, ignorant, bigoted, or all of the above, and could not be 
assimilated in civilized countries. Most German Jews had long held this view of their 
Eastern brethren, with a special loathing for their language, Yiddish, considered a 
mangled and slovenly version of German, as degraded as their speakers,’ (Ferrand 
1988: 133).  
 
Such was the extreme assimilationists’ level of detachment from the in-group that 
they did not even spare the colloquial language used by many of their kin.  
 
 
                                                
37 His father, Ernst Bloch was a Jew who had been baptised as a Christian student. 
38 Condrad Alberti was born with the Jewish name Konrad Sittenfeld. 
39 Ferrand, P. (1988). Unbidden Guest: [A Memoir of an Odyssey to Ellis Island]. Leo Baeck 
Institute. Center for Jewish History. New York, New York. 
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Contemporary case  
Many assimilated British Muslims have often been labelled the ‘exception’ to 
negative stereotypes of Muslims. While accommodationist British Muslims (see 
Chapter Five) also speak of being labelled an ‘exception’ to the negativity associated 
with their faith in-group, this was something they take offence to. Assimilationists on 
the other hand, are very proud of such observations made by members of wider society 
and they wear this accolade with much pride. Unlike their Jewish counterparts 
discussed above, Muslims who have abandoned the faith are fewer in number and the 
majority of assimilated Muslims are still nominally Muslims in that they still hold 
minimal ties to their Islamic heritage in some shape or form. 
In the case of British Muslims, an example of detachment from the in-group can be 
seen in Umar a retired pensioner who lives in the city of Gloucester, having emigrated 
from India in his youth.40 Umar considers himself to be a nominal Muslim, describing 
Islam as a faith that he ‘doesn’t entirely agree with,’ and so he does not feel much 
need to associate with a wider Muslim community. Despite Islamophobia experienced 
directly by his wife – who has on more than four occasions been verbal abused in 
Gloucester town centre – Umar feels far ‘more comfortable’ in the presence of his 
‘English and non-Muslim Indian friends’ as unlike the Muslim community, ‘they are 
not concerned about one’s religious identity.’  
Saj, a 60-something year old senior medical doctor from Gloucester, felt similar 
resentment towards Muslim communities.41 Saj is divorced from his Christian wife 
and, like the majority of extreme assimilationists, Saj sees no reason to associate with 
a faith-based Muslim community, and he describes himself as ‘not a kind of practicing 
Muslim.’ Personally, he has not encountered anti-Muslim hatred directly. This he 
believes is because others do not see him as Muslim because he doesn’t ‘behave in a 
certain way or try to force my beliefs on others.’ He thinks wider society perceives 
him as ‘Asian,’ but not necessarily a ‘threat to anybody because of my attire 




                                                
40 I conducted an interview with Umar on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
41 I conducted an interview with Saj on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
 100 
3.2.3. Opposing Multiculturalism  
In this form of extreme assimilation, Jews and Muslims believe that bigots target their 
in-group because it poses challenges to the culture and ‘values’ upon which wider 
society is propped. In both the historical and contemporary cases, these ‘challenges’ 
take the form of competing ideologies emerging from their in-group. In the case of 
Weimar Jewish assimilationists, the key issue is in the form of Zionist ideology which 
put forward the notion of Jewish nationalism that stood as an obstacle to wider 
society’s Germanness. Likewise, contemporary Muslim assimilationists rally against 
the rituals and cultures couched in religious narratives, which they accuse of hindering 
the development of Britishness within Muslim communities. Assimilationists believe 
that this lack of Germanness or Britishness causes them to be targets of Antisemitism 
and Islamophobia, respectively. As such, this form of expression of extreme 
assimilation is vested in inculcating Germanness amongst Weimar Jews and 
Britishness amongst Muslims in contemporary England, whilst subverting all 
competing cultures and nationalisms that may offset this process. Very crudely, they 
Jews and Muslims believe that there would be no Jewish or Muslim ‘Question’ if such 
conflictual practices and cultures were to be abolished, and replaced with an identity 
firmly rooted in British and German ‘values,’ respectively.42 
 
Historical case 
As the Jewish historian, Niewyk (1982: 166), explains, highly assimilated German 
Jews fought Antisemitism by condemning and castigating their less assimilated 
brethren for exacerbating negative stereotypes associated with their in-group. One 
tactic employed by extreme assimilationists was to critique and ridicule the very basis 
of ‘Hebrew culture,’ which they believed was at the heart of withdrawn Jewry. For 
Constantin Brunner, an assimilated German philosopher who was of Jewish heritage, 
Zionism – that is, Jewish nationalism – was just as much of a threat to German identity 
as was the prevalence of Östjuden settlers in Germany (Brunner 1919: 77, 162). 
Brunner asserts that due to their foreign and dissociated cultural values, Östjuden and 
Zionist Jews were too alien to ever be part of wider German society (Brunner 1919: 
192). By upholding these outlandish and ‘unreasonable’ cultures, they were 
perpetuating the contradictions between their values and those of wider society, and 
                                                
42 Much ambiguity exists over what these ‘values’ allude to, even within wider society.   
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thus, increasing the stigmatisation of assimilated German Jews (Ibid. 192). Bruner 
believed that this strong attachment to a foreign culture created an ‘ingrown sense of 
otherness’ and although he acknowledges Zionism as a self-conscious response to 
Antisemitism, he refers to it as a ‘crypto-nationalist reactionary utopia,’ which needed 
to be abandoned and the Östjuden and Zionists must ‘forfeit playing Jews’ (Brunner 
1919: 289-344), (Niewyk 1980: 97) .43 
The hostility of extreme assimilation runs deep, with one German Jew, Gustav 
Witkowsky, feeling incredibly offended when he was singled out for being Jewish by 
Anti-Semites. Witkowsky responded: “How could I accept that I was a Jew…being a 
‘Jew’ in this sense entails being part of an economically and politically backward 
culture?” (Witkowsky 1918: 439). Furthermore, many Anti-Semites of Jewish 
heritage critiqued non-assimilated Jews not only through degenerative negative 
stereotypes as above, but also through arguments against the cultural particularities, 
which they blame for causing Jews to become a target of hate. In her memoir the 
Munich-based liberal Jew, Rahel Strauss, discusses why Antisemitism was so 
prevalent during the Weimar era, and she concludes that it was a result of Jews being 
taught to regard themselves as distinct and ‘above’ Gentile Germans (Strauss 1962: 
270-71).  
Many extreme assimilationist Jews were also outraged by what they claim was 
nothing short of hypocrisy on part of Zionists for claiming their rights as German 
citizens without submitting their allegiance to the nation, as they would eventually 
make Aaliyah (migration) to Palestine, rendering their stay in Germany temporary. As 
a result, most Zionist Jews were self-centred and they felt no need to struggle for the 
prosperity of German democracy on a societal level. This in turn fuelled Anti-Semitic 
rhetoric (Niewyk 1982: 143). This inevitably made life for assimilationist Jews 
difficult, and instigated a protest from a group of about 100 anti-Zionist Jewish 
liberals, regardless of political and economic background. The group in question is 
the Action Committee of German Jews, which was founded in 1929. The inaugural 
meeting took place in Berlin’s Kaiserhof Hotel on September 19, 1929 and the 
purpose, in their own words, was as follows:  
 
                                                
43 Brunner, C. (1931). Höre Israel und Höre Nicht-Israel (Berlin, 1931), 3-38; 
Brunner, C. (1930). Von der Pflichten der Juden und von den Pflichten des Staates (Berlin, 1930), 
19-62, 159-68. 
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‘We reject every Jewish nationalism. We together with the overwhelming majority of 
German Jews, consider ourselves to be part of the German, not Jewish, Volk [people]. 
We see in the establishment of a Jewish national homeland a misstep that cannot fail 
to endanger the emancipatory work of the pioneers of German Jewry and the religious 
and moral tasks of Judaism’ (anti-Jewish Agency appeal 1930).44 (Niewyk 1982: 
161).  
 
Other extreme assimilationist Jews, like Max Naumann, called for the complete 
‘denationalisation’ of Jewish identity, and claimed loyalty to the German fatherland 
could only be guaranteed when the mind-sets and cultural attitudes were brought in-
line with German ‘values.’ Naumann argues that the ‘real test of loyalty to 
Deutschtum [Germany] was not an external matter but a question of inner attitudes’ 
(Naumann 1921: 25). 
 
Contemporary case  
Extreme assimilationist British Muslims contend not only with nationalism in the 
form of an ‘Ummah,’45 but also numerous versions of the faith group found in various 
ethnic interpretations, each with its own particularities.46 This profoundly complicates 
their interactions in wider society, and, as pointed out by many of the extreme 
assimilationists I spoke with, it is a major factor for anti-Muslim hatred; they allow 
cultural variations of faith to take precedence in their identity. Many Muslims belong 
to different diaspora and often they are unwilling to forfeit their ‘cultural values,’ 
which over time have complicated faith practices. 47 
Afrida is a middle-aged, former counsellor based in London.48 She holds the opinion 
that Islamophobia is a result of withdrawn British Muslims’ ‘insufficient integration’ 
and ‘cultural baggage that conflicts with British society at large.’ Afrida disagrees 
with the lifestyle choices of newer migrants from the South Asian subcontinent as 
                                                
44 Translation found in Niewyk, D., L. The Jews in Weimar Germany. Transaction Publishers, 1982, 
161. 
45 The term ‘Ummah’ refers to a transnational Muslim brotherhood or kinship based on belief in 
Islam.  
46 Particularly amongst Muslims belonging to diaspora, their interpretations of faith are embedded 
within their specific cultural contexts. E.g. Somali British Muslims have different cultural etiquette to 
British South Asian Muslims regarding certain practises upheld by faith, like segregation, attire, 
education.  
47 When asked to explain what they meant by ‘cultural values,’ one interviewee, Afrida, replied that 
they are ‘backwards logic premised mainly on keeping up appearances and worrying what other 
people will think of you…it’s the reason why Muslims give great importance to honour and shame, 
saving face etc.’   
48 I conducted an interview with Afrida on May 24th 2015 in London. 
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well as the living arrangements of those in ghettoised communities. Unlike them, 
Afrida attempts to blend in with wider society’s ‘mainstream culture.’ Interestingly, 
Afrida says that she is ‘absolutely thrilled’ to hear about the on-going ‘Tory 
crackdown on visas of non-European immigrants,’ as ‘they [Muslim immigrants] all 
come here to abuse and cheat our [British] benefits system. They give us normal non-
white people a bad name.’  
Similarly, Islamophobia in Umar’s eyes is a result of the circumstances and ‘events 
that are happening, you know, terrorism,’ suggesting that anti-Muslim sentiments are 
an inevitable result of terrorist atrocities.49 Others, like Gloucester doctor, Saj, agree 
with Umar on this point.50 For Saj, Islamophobic attacks are caused by the actions of 
the ‘terrorist variety of Muslims,’ who ‘use their faith to justify their political actions.’ 
Umar asserts the vital need for patriotism and loyalty to the British nation:  
 
“We need to assimilate and that is not happening. We try to assert ourselves as a 
separate identity. ‘Muslims.’ Since we are living in this country we have to identify 
as members of this country, our loyalty should be to the country, not loyalty to the 
faith. Instead, faith comes to us first and then comes our loyalty to the country, which 
is wrong.”  
 
Umar believes that Muslims need to put state above faith, which is a very rare and 
unpopular opinion amongst the majority of British Muslims. According to Umar the 
root of the problem lies in Muslims putting faith before British nationalism:  
 
‘…our Muslim brethren they say: 'we are first Muslims and then we are British or 
English or whatever.’ I don't agree. Because since we are in this country, we are living 
here, we are benefiting… and our lives and everything is dependent on this country. 
Rather than our faith. Faith is something, which is entirely different. It's personal. 
Religion is a personal factor; it should not come in the way of your loyalty to the 
country.’  
 
Alongside lack of nationalism amongst British Muslims, Umar also lays blame on 
diaspora cultures for preventing British Muslims from feeling truly British:  
 
‘You have to identify with the country you live in. You are still identifying with the 
home countries.’ In Umar’s view there is no room for compromise and one must 
                                                
49 I conducted an interview with Umar on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
50 I conducted an interview with Saj on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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completely immerse themselves within wider British society by ‘assimilating in them 
rather than try [sic] to influence them.’ 
 
Following the same line of argument as Umar, Art, a 40-something artist from 
Birmingham, feels Islamophobia persists because of:  
 
‘the dynamic we have in Muslim communities, it’s our own personal failure to rise 
above rigid constructs of culture conflated with faith…This won’t change though, 
‘cause [sic] Muslims just won’t let go of their cultures.’51   
 
When asked to explain in detail what he meant by ‘constructs of culture,’ Art replied:  
 
“everything that gives Muslims a bad name. Y’know, like honour killings that are 
done to save face, domestic violence, and at the same time this self-imposed 
‘othering,’ to give us Muslims this feeling of superiority, We Muslims see ourselves 
as divinely chosen ones. Until these mind-sets exist Islamophobia will prevail. We 
cannot stop people bad-mouthing Muslims. What we can do is work to change these 
mind-sets and stop indoctrinating our kids from a young age.”  
 
3.3. Banal Assimilation  
The majority of assimilationists choose the mode of banal, i.e. mundane or everyday 
assimilation. This group of assimilationists is in favour of plurality, freedom to choose 
and express oneself, and while they are not in agreement with some of their fellow in-
group members, they would not suggest their own way is the ‘correct’ and sole means 
of responding to prejudice. Subconsciously, they follow a separation between public 
and private, but do not feel it necessary for the government to institutionalise this 
mode of behaviour.  Banal assimilationists prefer to remain quiet and refuse to dictate 
how their fellow in-group members choose to express themselves. They are liberals 
in the traditional sense of the word; they value freedom, liberty and less state 
involvement in their daily lives. Above all, they value individuality, and are not 
interested in the ‘image’ of the in-group, as they do not see themselves as 
representatives of their in-group; their choices are not an indicator of their in-group. 
In this way, they attempt to subvert the negative stereotypes aimed at their in-group 
without decrying how their fellow in-group members are reacting incorrectly to 
prejudice, or trying to rectify their responses. For banal assimilationists, individuality 
                                                
51 I conducted an interview with Art on March 10th 2015 in Birmingham. 
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trumps all forms of collective identity, and at times this might result in them coming 
across as indifferent to prejudice and its backlash.  
Banal assimilation can broadly be expressed in two forms, namely: anti-
institutionalism and the philosophy of ‘live and let live.’ Crucially, banal 
assimilationist strategies are less action driven, and according to my Prejudice Coping 
Model (see Chapter Two), banal assimilation mainly entails emotion-focused as 
opposed to problem-focused coping. Using personal accounts from archival sources 
and interview excerpts, I build narratives to elaborate each form of expression, below. 
 
3.3.1. Anti-Institutionalism  
In this category, banal assimilationists strongly uphold classic liberal ideology. In 
particular, the harm principle is embedded within their subconscious.52 In line with 
this notion, banal assimilationists believe that all individuals should be free to go 
about their business, and their thoughts and actions must be tolerated by wider society, 
as long as they do not cause harm to others. For this reason, when banal assimilationist 
Jews and Muslims in this category experience prejudice, they give very little 
consideration to the responses of other members of their in-group. In fact, banal 
assimilationists believe that an individual’s choice is ultimate and they should be free 
to express it.  
 
Historical case 
Many Weimar era memoirs and diaries contain ample examples of banal assimilation 
coping strategies. This is because autobiographical accounts often document the 
ordinary, everyday activities of individuals. An interesting example is Hanan 
Waizner’s memoir, ‘Middle name Israel.’ Waizner asserts in this memoir that he 
belonged to ‘an assimilated family. My parents’ culture was German… and [they] just 
so happened to be of Mosaic Persuasion.’53 This shows that his family was German 
in every respect, but their Jewish heritage was something secondary; being of ‘Mosaic 
                                                
52 The harm principle, as proposed by John Stuart Mill in his seminal work, On Liberty (1859), states 
that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’  
53 Waizner, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). Middle Name Israel. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York, p.2. 
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persuasion’ was not something important to the Waizner family’s identity. Being 
‘culturally German’ Waizner explains was about immersing oneself in music and arts:  
 
‘To my parents, Wagner, Goethe and Schiller were the giants and together with music 
and the romanticism of the opera these were the sum total of their enlightenment…Our 
Jewishness went no further than fleeting visits to the synagogue on the High 
Festivals.’54  
 
In the case of many banal assimilationists, their memoirs and diaries neglect to make 
any mention of Antisemitism.55 On the surface this could be because these particular 
Weimar Jews did not face discrimination, and being so far removed from their faith 
in-group, they were oblivious or indifferent to the plight of those Jews who were 
targets of abuse. On the other hand, their failure to mention Antisemitism in memoirs 
of their everyday life was a form of denial, i.e. ‘out of sight, out of mind.’ Denial or 
purposeful repression of Antisemitism would allow ordinary Weimar Jews to continue 
about their mundane activities within wider society without feeling resentment 
towards it.  
Coping strategies employed by banal assimilationists tend to be very subtle instead of 
the more outspoken approach taken by integrative or extreme assimilationists. 
Another subtle everyday mechanism common to many assimilationist was mentioned 
in Waizner’s memoir. He speaks about why his name was chosen:  
 
‘I was named Hans, because it was as German a name as could be. That’s why my 
father was called Fritz. There would be no Jewish stigma on me!’56  
 
Interestingly, the Waizners were well aware of how rife Antisemitism had become in 
the Weimar, however, their chosen strategy of preventing it entailed the smallest of 
actions, i.e. selecting more German-sounding names in order to blend-in to wider 
society, without hassle. Banal assimilation was found in the day-to-day lives of 
German Jews, consciously of amalgamating within German society, based on their 
individual as opposed to collective identity.  
                                                
54 Ibid., p.2-3. 
55 Many examples from the online collections that I read featured autobiographies by Weimar 
German Jews that did not even mention their Jewishness, let alone the discrimination they faced as a 
result of it.   
56 Waizner, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). Middle Name Israel. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York, p.10. 
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Banal assimilationists were quite reserved in their approach to disguise their Jewish 
heritage and did not believe it was their job to convince their fellow Jews to become 
more assimilated. For one, this did not even factor as a concern for banal 
assimilationists. Stella Louise Graumann in her memoir, wrote about the interaction 
between banal assimilationist Jews and their withdrawn contemporaries:  
 
‘We had just about nothing in common. They made a choice to be stubborn and 
backwards in thinking…So we [assimilated Jews] interacted very little with the 
ghetto-dwellers. What use would it be, anyway? It was not our duty nor place to 
change their ways. If we somehow caught their eye, they glared at us with loathing. 
And we ignored them, carried on without a care. They did not matter to us. They could 
do us no harm’ (Graumann 1979).   
 
Despite their attempted assimilation, hostile views were also spewed by wider society 
against the banal assimilationist Jews who had even converted to Christianity and 
married non-Jews. Henry Bauxbaum’s memoir57 contains the example of an 
assimilated female cousin on whose wedding day the mayor officiating the couple’s 
marriage license took the bridegroom aside and the following conversation ensued:  
 
“He [the mayor said]: ‘Why, you don’t want to marry this girl! You know where she 
comes from, you know that she is a non-Aryan?” The bridegroom at this point cut him 
short say: ‘I know it. I know it all, and I’m going to marry her just the same for your 
satisfaction.’”58 
 
Contemporary case  
Ali is a self-described ‘secular Muslim’ from London who was brought up in a liberal 
household.59 During his time at university, Ali was exposed to Islamophobia and notes 
how counterproductive the reactions of withdrawn Muslims can be. Ali reveals that 
whilst at university he was a classmate of a young Muslim man, an active member of 
the university’s Islamic society (ISoc) who would go on to become radicalised and 
later convicted for terrorism. Ali deeply internalised this event as it led him to question 
his life choices and how ‘cliquey’ university society mentality could become:  
 
                                                
57 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York., p.154. 
58 Ibid. 
59 I conducted an interview with Ali on November 12th 2014 in London. 
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‘it doesn’t take too long to radicalize someone…it really depends on how you use 
Islam. It really is down to the individual. And as there is no compulsion in faith, we 
cannot force anyone to follow our liberal secular way.’ 
 
This shows that banal assimilationist Muslims believe in quietly becoming part of 
wider society, by upholding a liberal lifestyle. Crucial to note is that many banal 
assimilationist Muslims will quote the Quranic verse regarding how faith cannot be 
forced – as Ali has done – as they would inevitably interpret their faith through a 
secular lens. This is because they consciously live their lives with great respect for the 
value of liberty.  
Ibrahim is a middle-aged, divorced chairman of public services.60 He is a second-
generation British Indian and represents a quintessential, middle-class liberal. Ibrahim 
has always considered his Muslim identity to be a ‘private and personal’ matter so he 
has ‘never tended to speak through the prism of faith’, which means that he ‘carries 
that identity differently to most people.’ Although he is very much assimilated, though 
he disagrees with the gist of the terminology, as Ibrahim feels that it undercuts 
‘extremely illiberal tendencies’ in a ‘progressive’ society:  
 
‘I wouldn’t dare say to somebody this is the right way.’ He would argue to ‘practise 
your faith from within’ but he also believes that people ‘…physically want to exhibit 
that they should have the freedom to do that’, but they should be wary that ‘…the 
times we’re in people are drawing inferences and conclusions simply by looking at 
them.’  
 
To Ibrahim, all is down to personal behaviour:  
 
‘I’m self-conscious that people will infer and interpret…so I’d conduct myself for all 
intents and purposes as somebody who’s got the job title they have…and that would 
be the lens through which I’d expect to be received.’  
 
There have not been many occasions where Ibrahim has experienced overt 
Islamophobia, however, regarding subtle rhetorical remarks, he asserts ‘I’m more 
comfortable with that than the verbal or physical abuse… it’s raw, visceral, on the 
street.’ Although he chooses to keep faith a personal matter, in typical liberal fashion 
                                                
60 I conducted an interview with Ibrahim on February 25th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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Ibrahim disagrees with the idea of ‘institutionalising’ this decision. Instead, Ibrahim 
believes that society must leave ‘that choice to the individual.’  
 
3.3.2. ‘Live and Let Live’ 
The second feature of banal assimilationist responses is that they reject the idea of 
individuals as representatives of their collective in-group. As such, the response of an 
individual towards prejudice is not necessarily the viewpoint of the in-group as a 
whole. For this reason, banal assimilationists are against the notion that an 
individual’s actions should somehow be monitored and regulated so as to save face 
for the collective. Banal assimilationists are firm proponents of individual autonomy 
devoid of cultural or collective restraints. In some cases, this indifference can lead 
them to overlook the extent of prejudice in wider society, as they tend to avoid 
discussion of it. By removing the narratives of negativity and racial and religious 
hatred from their discourse – a means of coping no doubt – they feel a sense of relief. 
This cloak of indifference means that many of the Jewish and Muslims banal 
assimilationists manage to maintain an elevated individual self-esteem. This blissful 




Denial of the prejudice made it easier for Weimar Jews to distance themselves from 
the abuse directed at their faith in-group. Henry Bauxbaum in his memoir gave the 
example of how, when one Jewish man was being physically assaulted, a fellow Jew 
hoping to go under the radar and deflect attention. Bauxbaum said of this onlooker:  
 
“He listened, and shaking his head sadly, turned around again to go back where he 
had come from, remarking to each and all who wanted to hear him: ‘Why, what a 
shame, why don’t they leave those people alone?’ This way the onlooker could 
distance himself in every sense from the hatred, by referring to his fellow Jews as 
‘they/them.’”61  
 
It made Bauxbaum think:  
 
                                                
61 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York, .251. 
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‘He [the on looking Jew] tried to convince himself and, as he imagined, all of us that 
the same could have happened to any Gentile. He didn’t want to see the whole affair 
[sic] for what it visibly was.’62  
 
 
On part of the onlooker, who in this case had taken a banal assimilationist approach, 
tactfully hid his own Jewish links. His actions served to protect him from being 
targeted and he continued with his daily routine.  
Similarly, in many of the memoirs and autobiographies of assimilated Weimar Jews 
speaking of their everyday lives, very few paid any attention to incidences of Anti-
Semitic hatred. And in the ones that did mention the air of hostility, it was just 
considered part and parcel of life, not something that was in their hands to change. 
However, crucial to note is the complexity of what it truly means to be assimilated. 
For example, despite their desire to do away with their ties to Judaism and Jewish life 
on an everyday and personal level, Waizner notes that many banal assimilationist 
Jews did not completely shun others Jews in the process. Waizner remarked in his 
memoir: ‘Despite my families [sic] assimilation they had many Jewish friends, always 
meeting each other at weekends at the same coffee-house.’63 However, as Waizner 
clarified, such friendships amongst Jewish families were not based on religious or 
ethnic commonalities but because they were ‘like-minded’ individuals. As such, 
alliances of this sort had nothing to do with upholding ties of kinship or in-group 
identity, but rather about individuals, who happened to be classified in the same in-
group, bonding over a shared interest in ‘German culture, art and music.’64  
 
Contemporary case  
Lara, a second generation British Pakistani, is a community worker from Gloucester.65 
Growing up in the 1960s in a relatively conservative household, Lara says she 
struggled ‘to marry’ all elements of her identity as a British Pakistani Muslim 
teenager, ‘blending in’, ‘not drawing attention’. She regards her faith as a private 
matter and says she is often described as a ‘modern Muslim’:  
                                                
62 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York, p.252. 
63 Waizner, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). Middle Name Israel. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York, p.3. 
64 Waizner, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). Middle Name Israel. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York, p.4-5. 
65 I conducted an interview with Lara on February 23rd 2015 in Gloucester.  
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“I don’t see it as my job to beat a drum and say ‘you need to accommodate me’ 
because I’m a Muslim…I don’t feel the need to make people aware of what I am.”  
 
Like other banal assimilationists Lara believes that she is not a representative of her 
faith:  
 
‘I have had instances in work, not in this job, where somebody would speak to me as 
if I personally knew something about it. What d’you think, I’m the spokesman for 
Islam?... I can’t speak for them [extremists]’.  
 
This was the closest experience Lara has had to Islamophobia. Moreover, when 
speaking about certain events that shaped the narrative of Muslims in Britain and how 
they are perceived, Lara remembered the Rushdie Affair of the 1980s, quite 
indifferent to it, she says how she ‘didn’t care [as]…demonizing somebody who’s 
done something against the Prophet is not going to help anybody’. Such antics on part 
of Muslims Lara feels has led to Muslims being ‘regarded with more caution’ in post-
9/11 Britain.  
Another banal assimilationist is Reema, a young personal assistant in her 30s who 
works in the City of London.66 She describes herself as at times a spiritual Sufi, which 
contrasts with her conservative, tight-knit, Pakistani upbringing. During her teens, 
Reema chose to wear a hijab and described how that made her more ‘conscious of 
being discriminated.’ Like Lara, Reema feels she can’t be singled out as either a 
spokesperson for her faith, or as a ‘good Muslim’ with a colleague once saying 
directly to her ‘most people think Muslims are terrorists but you’re okay!’ And on 
many occasions, due to her South Asian appearance, she is often mistaken for being 
Sikh. For Reema, faith is a personal matter: ‘I never say I am [Muslim], because I 
don’t need to say who I am…It’s not because I’m ashamed.’  
Reema believes in ‘keeping things to yourself.’ She says, she has ‘learnt to tailor’ her 
communication depending on who she is speaking to so that she is ‘on par with them.’ 
Moreover, whilst Reema acknowledges that Islamophobia has worsened since 9/11, 
she has never encountered more than subtle, covert Islamophobia in the workplace. 
Reema believes that this is because she abides by the philosophy of ‘live and let live… 
without the pressure of being a token Muslim representative or a good Brit.’ 
                                                
66 I conducted an interview with Reema on October 13th 2014 in London. 
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4. Discussion  
The targets’ responses to prejudice in both cases give us a glimpse into their chosen 
coping strategies, as well as their inter- and intra-group relations. The expressions of 
responses I detailed earlier in this chapter are derived from specific examples and 
anecdotes to illustrate assimilation in both cases. However, as a result of extensive 
analysis of interviews and archival sources, I realise that there are numerous other 
underlying factors to explain the spectrum of behaviours that assimilationists display. 
Below, I discuss these in detail, beginning with transition to assimilation, cultural 
variations in assimilation, and the importance of ‘values’ in assimilation.  
 
4.1. Transitions towards Assimilation   
What is noteworthy about the assimilationist coping strategy is that many targets who 
choose it have often ‘transitioned’ toward it from another coping strategy. For 
example, in the case of Weimar Jews, the majority had been assimilationist for 
generations, however, many transitioned to assimilation during the Weimar era. At 
that time, an internal war of sorts was brewing between the liberal, CV-supporting 
assimilated Jews and the withdrawn Zionists. Some assimilated Jews became so fed 
up with the hostility of withdrawn Zionists that many started penning open letters to 
young German Zionists, urging them to leave Germany, and in some cases they were 
successful. One such popular letter was written by Moritz Goldstein in the prominent 
German journal, Der Kunstwart. Goldstein suggests that German Jews who felt 
unhappy in Germany should not complain, and instead leave for Palestine if they so 
wish (Goldstein 1918). Moreover, on transitioning to assimilation, many Jews found 
that they had become completely unaware of the existence of Östjuden. For example, 
Richard Lichtheim (1885-1963) –recalling his transition from a ‘relatively cut-off’ or 
isolated to an assimilated Jew – speaks about how, upon transitioning, he became 
oblivious and desensitised to the plight of Eastern Jews, until he encountered Zionism 
later in life (Lichtheim 1970: 72). This shows that targets’ responses to prejudice are 
not static.  
Interestingly, present-day assimilationist British Muslims belong predominantly to 
the older generation, and banal assimilation is perhaps their most favoured mode. My 
research indicates that since 9/11, a considerable number of British Muslims have 
transitioned from the withdrawal coping strategy (see Chapter Four) to become 
assimilated, and more secular and less religiously observant, in the sense of strict 
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adherence to faith-based rituals. This usually occurs when targets grow older and 
experienced of, for example, the clash between literalist interpretations of Islamic 
texts and the secular lifestyle common within wider British society. In the 
contemporary case, many of the withdrawn contemporary Muslims who had 
experienced first-hand the knock-on effects of being in radicalised movements, 
particularly the politically motivated kind, e.g. members of radical Islamist groups, 
were very likely to transition to assimilation and ‘relapse’ back to supporting wider 
society. Such sentiments are echoed by assimilationist contemporary Muslims who 
accuse their withdrawn brethren of being ignorant of the very ideas of Ummah. Also 
former jihadists like Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz have realised that there is more 
to life than this ‘testosterone driven madness’ (Nawaz 2012: 10). A similar experience 
was shared by an interview participant, Ali, a young Londoner who speaks about 
transitioning from being a withdrawn Salaafi student, to becoming a self-styled 
secularist.67 Ali says of his transition: ‘it’s not easy, and it can’t be forced. But it does 
happen organically.’ 
 
4.2. Cultural Variations in Assimilation  
Assimilationist Weimar Jews and contemporary British Muslims believe that it is 
important for individuals to distinguish between different understandings of Jewish 
and Muslim ‘culture,’ respectively. Jews can become secular and remain comfortably 
Jewish, because it is also an ethnic identification, as well as a religious marker. On 
the other hand, Islam is a religion, and its adherents have many diverse ethnic 
identifications. Assimilated Jews maintained that crucial to their identity is the notion 
that they cannot belong to a set Jewish culture (Kulturjuden), as this was a relic of the 
Middle Ages. They insisted that as Western Jews they were part of cultural 
communities (Kulturgemeinschaften) which meant that they were either culturally 
German (Kulturdeutsche) or French (Oppenheimer 1910); (Poppel 1977: 58), 
(Aschheim 1982: 97). As Oppenheimer asserts, Jewish culture, in the eyes of 
assimilationist Weimar Jews was:  
 
“a product of ‘the ghettos of the East, stands infinitely lower than modern culture 
which our [Western] nations bear. We can neither regress nor do want to. But it would 
be impossible for the Eastern Jews to be Russian or Rumanian…. They must be Jews 
                                                
67 I conducted an interview with Ali on November 12th 2014 in London. 
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by culture… for the mediaeval Jewish culture stands exactly as far above East 
European barbarism as it is beneath the culture of Western Europe” (Oppenheimer 
1910a).68  
 
In comparison, there is no such thing as ‘Muslim culture,’ per se. In reality, many 
ethnic and tribal cultures make up the identity of British Muslims. Since the 
overwhelming majority of British Muslims belong to the diaspora, their identities are 
informed by the cultures of their ethnic or ancestral homelands. As I analyse in further 
detail in Chapter Eight, British Islam is shaped by numerous different diaspora 
cultures.69 What is most apparent from the analysis of the modes of the assimilation 
coping strategy is that the key difference between the responses of assimilationist 
Weimar German Jews facing Antisemitism and contemporary British Muslims 
tackling Islamophobia is hinged upon the very differences between Judaism and Islam 
as understood by faith in-groups. The targets’ responses are dictated to a large extent 
by their respective in-group norms; there is only so much one can do to break away 
from the collective and yet still be considered part of it. 
From this analysis, it is apparent that it was not a particularly strenuous task for the 
assimilated Weimar Jews to vocalise and live their lives as individuals immersed in 
the culture and practices of the mainstream German society. By contrast, it is 
definitely far more difficult for a Muslim in today’s England to take similar steps. 
This is due to many reasons. For one, the majority of British Muslims have roots 
within the diaspora, making it more difficult for them to ‘blend into’ wider society. 
Secondly, as previously alluded to, Islam is a religion as opposed to Judaism which is 
also an ethnic category.70 So, whilst Jews can break from the faith, they do not cease 
to be Jews in the ethnic sense. This can be both a blessing and a curse, as many of 
those who had even converted out of Judaism still wound up in concentration camps 
based on their identity. But to some degree, the same in a way can be said of the 
Muslim counterparts who choose to convert out of Islam. While the label of apostate 
by fundamentalist Islamic interpretations holds a blood libel, many Muslim 
‘apostates’ are still stigmatised by wider society on the basis of their ethnic or racial 
                                                
68 Translation from Poppel, S., M. Zionism in Germany, 1897-1933: The Shaping of a Jewish 
Identity. Jewish Publication Society of America, 1977. 
69 Muslim diaspora cultures are dominated by South Asian cultures as South Asians comprise the 
majority of British Muslims. Arab and West African (mainly Nigerian) cultures also influence the 
practises of Islam in contemporary Britain. This will be elaborated in Chapter Eight. 
70 This will be expanded upon in Chapter Eight. 
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background. Thus breaking away from the ethnic particularities of their African, 
Asian or Arab heritage can be increasingly difficult.  
 
4.3. Importance of ‘Values’ in Assimilation 
A common theme running through the discourses of assimilationists across spatial and 
temporal lines is that they associated assimilation with adhering to and promoting 
German and British ‘values,’ respectively. Most intriguing is that the term ‘values’ in 
both historical and contemporary cases is so loosely defined. Yet somehow still, it 
was argued by assimilationist logic that “the ghetto Jews would be redeemed only by 
internalizing the quintessentially ‘German values’” (Aschheim 1982: 152). However, 
what constitutes these ‘German values’? In some Weimar era memoirs and 
autobiographies, Jewish authors have defined these to include arts, music, and 
philosophy that take root in the West. Similarly, it is hard to ascertain what comprises 
‘British values.’ It is indeed a highly contested term and it is often roughly conflated 
with the ideologies of liberalism and democracy. However, with the rise of right-wing 
extremism and ultra-nationalism that we are experiencing in our midst today, we are 
once again forced to reassess the meaning of the term. At the core of assimilation for 
Jews and Muslims was the act of simultaneously upholding ‘German values’ and 
‘British values,’ whilst ridding oneself of all sorts of ‘foreignness’ that could 
potentially hamper one’s complete immersion in wider society. The term ‘values’ is 
forever influx and subject to change with relation to temporal and spatial settings. 
 
5. Causality Issues 
Here I present why I think that the responses I discuss throughout this chapter were 
mostly caused by Antisemitism and Islamophobia, rather than a result of a normal 
acculturation phenomenon, or because of other prejudices. Determining causality or 
making a credible link to a causal claim, is a major obstacle for qualitative researchers. 
Some qualitative researchers, as argued by Patton (1990: 423) fall into the trap of 
making ‘linear assumptions of quantitative analysis and begin to specify isolated 
variables that are mechanically linked together out of context…Simple statements of 
linear relationships may be more distorting than illuminating.’ But other qualitative 
researchers, like Miles and Huberman (1984: 132), reject these claims and instead 
assert that ‘[qualitative] field research is far better than solely quantified approaches 
at developing explanations of what we call local causality – the actual events and 
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processes that led to specific outcomes’ (Miles and Huberman 1984: 132; emphasis 
in original).  
In the case of my research I have data directly from first-hand oral and written 
accounts; interviews of British Muslims in contemporary England, and memoirs, 
diaries and journals from Weimar German Jews. In my historical case study, all 
archival sources I use to gauge assimilationist responses of Weimar Jews towards 
Antisemitism specifically asserted that the individual’s feelings and actions were a 
direct result of the Antisemitism they were facing.  
When speaking to British Muslims in the assimilationist group, all of my participants 
who employ this coping strategy do so to formulate their response in reaction to 
Islamophobia. Firstly, it is because of the nature of the semi-structured interview, and 
the way in which I posed questions to my participants. In addition, I enquired how the 
individual deals with such issues in their daily lives, why they feel they respond in 
such a way, and how much importance they give to these negative encounters, as well 
as how it affects their interactions with wider society in the long term. In order to 
develop a causal link between Islamophobia and my participant’s responses, I kept in 
mind if they made mention of any particular events in time, which may have led to a 
heightening of Islamophobia, and whether they moulded their interactions with wider 
society, accordingly. 
Most if not all of my participants claim that their reaction was a direct result of the 
Islamophobia in society. For example, Samar and Shahid from London, along with 
Umar from Gloucester, all say something along the lines of ‘as a result of the 
Islamophobia,’ they choose to ‘distance’ themselves ‘from other Muslims.’ Similarly, 
many participants said that following an ‘increase in Islamophobia post-9/11’ they 
have actively sought to be ‘less of a visible Muslim,’ ‘associate less with other 
Muslims,’ or become ‘more normal,’ like the ‘rest of society.’ In addition, some 
participants, like 20-something Ali, from London tells me how he transitioned to 
becoming an assimilationist as a direct result of his personal experiences with 
Islamophobia and the ‘Islamist radicalisation it was causing’ in some of his fellow 
Muslim students whilst he was at university.71 Ali says he did ‘not want to be like 
them [withdrawn British Muslims]’ and he also feels that Islamophobia was ‘bad, but 
rejecting wider society is making it worse for Muslims.’ The solution, in Ali’s eyes is 
                                                
71 I conducted an interview with Ali on November 12th 2014 in London. 
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that ‘we all try and become like the rest of our compatriots. We’re all British and we 
should [become] secular. It’s the only way to get rid of the Muslim question.’  
In addition, sometimes interviewees spoke about their personal transition from one 
type of coping strategy to another. For example, some assimilationist interviewees, 
like Afrida, Lara and Reema, say how Islamophobia made them reconsider the way 
in which they interact with wider society. Afrida notes how following the backlash of 
Islamophobia in England post-7/7 she became ‘self-conscious of being a Muslim.’72 
She says she felt it was ‘right’ for ‘Muslims to show [wider society] that we are not 
terrorists and that we are British above all else.’ Some older interviewees compare 
their responses to current, post-9/11 Islamophobia to their reactions toward anti-
Muslim hatred following past world events such as the Rushdie affair of the late 
1980s. Such interviewees, like Afrida and Lara, say they were not ‘offended’ by 
Islamophobia of that era. As Lara states: ‘the Muslims burning Rushdie’s book were 
doing themselves a disservice, of course they’d be attacked, and rightly.’73 
Furthermore, Lara says assimilation is the ‘only way to counter the spread of anti-
Muslim hatred,’ because she says ‘the problem is, and always has been, with Muslims 
as a community. We need to change ourselves, and shed our baggage… have tough 
skin.’   
However, in order to confirm that their answers to interview questions were genuinely 
indicative of a causal relationship, sometimes I had to consider other possible reasons 
for their choice of response and rule out these ‘rival explanations’ (Johnson 1997: 
287) i.e. they so happen to be acculturated in society in an assimilated manner 
regardless of Islamophobia, or they have a strong dislike for their faith in-group, 
irrespective of wider society’s opinions. I ruled out such rival explanations in 
numerous ways during the course of my interviews. For instance, whilst I recorded 
the interviews, I also took notes on tone of voice and emotions of interviewees in 
order to gauge their frame of mind. There were two interviewees who, as a result, 
drifted off course during the interview; instead of answering my questions regarding 
their negative experiences within society one interviewee decided to explain the 
benefits of secularism without any mention of Islamophobia or negative encounters 
with wider society.  
                                                
72 I conducted an interview with Afrida on May 24th 2015 in London. 
73 I conducted an interview with Lara on February 23rd 2015 in Gloucester. 
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6. Conclusion  
This chapter explored the assimilation coping strategy, and how Weimar era German 
Jews and British Muslims in contemporary England choose to assimilate into wider 
society despite the onslaught of prejudice against their respective in-groups. Engaging 
with the process of this coping strategy in-depth, I found that assimilation shows a 
wide array of responses. I discussed three major modes of assimilation, namely: 
integrative assimilation, extreme assimilation and banal assimilation. Each of the 
three modes of assimilation are manifest in different expressions. The first and 
foremost entails expressions such as belief in social justice, upholding a strong public 
private divide, and attempting to convince members of their faith in-group to become 
assimilated. Alternatively, the second group are the more fervent kind of 
assimilationists whose responses are driven by self-hate, and entail a complete self-
removal and detachment from their faith group, whilst blaming their in-group 
members, devoid of any hope for them changing their ways and assimilating. Finally, 
the more passive ones are banal assimilationists, who do not see themselves as 
representatives of their in-group and they do not believe in forcing their views upon 
members of the in-group, commanding them to become one with wider society. 
My study suggests that there is no set pattern as to which mode is favoured and when. 
However, the overall commonality amongst all three modes of assimilation is that 
they all blame the targeted in-group for the ills of prejudice. Subconsciously, such 
behaviour gives them a feeling of being ‘above’ others. By removing oneself from the 
stagnant ways of the in-group, all assimilationists feel cleansed of internal baggage, 
and this can be a source of liberation for them. 
One final point to raise is that during the course of my research, I noticed the influence 
of subjective moderating factors, like age and gender, upon the responses of targets 
of Islamophobia and Antisemitism. With regards to British Muslim responses in the 
case of contemporary Islamophobia, 14 of the 90 people I interviewed are 
assimilationists; the lowest number of individuals slot into this coping strategy. 
Moreover, they consist predominantly of older individuals, mainly men, who are often 
quite educated. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this set of findings is that none 
of the young British Muslim women (aged 20- 34 years-old) are assimilationist. The 
reason for such findings, as I realised on speaking to interview participants, is much 
to do with the social, peripheral factors. For instance, it is more common among older 
generations of British Muslim men to have a certain life ethic that entails being quiet 
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and getting on by. Whereas, this is less likely to be the response favoured by second 
and third generation British Muslims, possibly because they do not see themselves as 
belonging to anywhere other than Britain, and thus they feel much more ownership of 
this aspect of their identity than their elders, who have meekly accepted their foreign 
status within wider society. 
In the case of Weimar Antisemitism, however, the majority of memoirs and archival 
sources that I read were of assimilationist Weimar Jews. This makes sense, as 
assimilation was the most accepted and common response towards Antisemitism in 
Germany at that time. In addition, a larger number of older as opposed to younger 
Weimar Jews comprised the assimilationist category. Much like the British Muslim 
case, this intergenerational divide amongst Weimar Jews reflects the differences in 
social attitudes between older and younger Jews of that era; younger people were 
slowly becoming more self-aware and much more likely to challenge the dominant 
and expected ways of behaving, and instead they were more easily influenced by 
approaches that questioned the status quo.  
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Chapter Five. Withdrawal 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I explore withdrawal, the second of the three coping strategies, in order 
to engage with my third research question: ‘How and why do targets of Antisemitism 
and Islamophobia choose their coping strategies?’ I begin the chapter by reiterating the 
meaning of withdrawal, generally and specifically as a response towards prejudice. I then 
consider the anticipated themes, and emergent themes that form the basis of three different 
modes of withdrawal, namely: social, political and banal withdrawal. Later, I analyse 
these modes of withdrawal in detail to illustrate their particularities using expressions 
and examples found in both the historical Antisemitism and contemporary 
Islamophobia case studies. Following an extensive exploration of the three modes of 
withdrawal, I discuss various other underlying factors to explain the spectrum of 
behaviours that withdrawn individuals display. I then provide an explanation for 
issues of causality to show that the choice of withdrawal is in response to 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia rather than normal acculturation. The chapter 
concludes with a brief comment regarding the role of subjective moderating factors, 
such as age and gender, in influencing the choice of withdrawal as a coping strategy.  
 
2. Withdrawal as a Coping Strategy  
The second coping strategy – that of withdrawal – involves removing oneself from 
the folds of wider society. The withdrawal strategy is considered by far the most 
negative and counter-intuitive response of all three coping strategies explored in this 
thesis. This is partly because it requires the individual to choose between belonging 
to the in-group over pledging full allegiance to wider society, and it negates all notions 
of balancing multiple schemas of identity. Those in the withdrawal group are 
disillusioned by wider society; the only way to claim one’s ‘true identity’ in their eyes 
is to remove themselves entirely from wider society. In my research, I treat the concept 
of withdrawal similar to Richman and Leary, who suggest that individuals in this category who 
are facing prejudice might ‘avoid further rejection and its accompanying hurt’ to their self-
esteem by ‘withdrawing from social contact, not only with those who have rejected them but 
sometimes from others whose acceptance they doubt’ (Richman & Leary 2009: 368). Here, it 
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is crucial for me to emphasise the role of prejudice as the stressor that causes an individual’s 
choice to withdraw, as a means to cope with it and protect their collective self-esteem. Hence, 
withdrawal in the context of my research is a ‘response shaped by experience of prejudice’ 
(Gibson. 1988: 67).  
Withdrawn targets overwhelmingly believe that one should not succumb to changing 
themselves in order to appease the demands of ‘fitting into’ society at large. Instead, 
their aim is to uphold and embrace the identity of the in-group. Whilst some targets 
who choose to withdraw might take a very stern and robust stance through boycotting, 
other forms of withdrawal might be expressed in subtler ways. Essentially, withdrawal 
is not a singular process propped on a ‘straight-line account’ with different reasons for, and 
trajectories, leading towards it (Joppke & Morawska 2002: 50-52).  
What is common to all responses in this coping strategy is that withdrawn individuals use 
them to preserve or enhance their self-esteem. The coping strategy of withdrawal 
anticipates that the withdrawn individuals will: acknowledge prejudices against their in-
group yet reject wider society’s negative perceptions regarding their in-group; 
reaffirm and reclaim their in-group identity; and dissociate from wider society. These 
‘anticipated themes’ formed the basis on which I segregated withdrawn responses 
from the rest of the data. On further analysis of these withdrawal responses, using 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software, and exploring archival sources in detail, 
certain other themes emerged, which are: strengthening their in-group ties whilst 
questioning their associations with wider society; refusing to participate in the 
established political system and sometimes going as far as removing themselves from 
the territorial boundaries of wider society to uphold their collective identity; 
remaining silent and denying or redefining the prejudice they face whilst withdrawing 
themselves from daily encounters with wider society. These emergent themes formed 
the basis of the three different modes of withdrawal, namely: social withdrawal, 
political withdrawal and banal withdrawal. 
 
3. Modes of Withdrawal  
In this section, I illustrate the spectrum of responses towards Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia in the form of three modes withdrawal.  Social withdrawal involves targets 
questioning their affiliations with wider society, and they find a strong sense of safety from 
prejudice through strengthening their bonds with their in-group collective. Such individuals find 
themselves questioning their Germanness or Britishness, and challenging its importance, 
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sceptical of its supposed benefits. As such, this mode of withdrawal is popular amongst Jewish 
and Muslim youth who consider their parents’ generation’s unquestionable assimilation to be 
the reason for Antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively. They believe the solution to 
prejudice is to reclaim their heritage.  
Political withdrawal tends to attract individuals who refuse to participate within the established 
political framework of wider society, with some even choosing to emigrate in order to 
completely withdraw from all participation within society. Many of these individuals have 
transitioned from assimilation to withdrawal as a result of experiencing prejudice when they 
were fully immersed within wider society. In the case of Weimar German Jews, political 
withdrawal took the form of popular Zionist movements. In the case of contemporary British 
Muslims, it takes shape in political Islamism, which acts as a disguise to reaffirm a strong in-
group identity.  
Banal withdrawal entails individuals removing themselves from the folds of wider society by 
either staying silent and denying the extent of prejudice, or redefining the threat it causes. The 
overwhelming majority of these people have never experienced assimilation. Their lifestyle can 
be classified as ghettoised and the majority happen to be older people. In the case of Jews in the 
Weimar Republic, many banal withdrawn individuals were ghetto-dwelling Eastern Jews, or 
those Western Jews who emulated the ghetto lifestyle. Specifically, in the case of British 
Muslims, the banal withdrawal category is composed mainly of elderly housewives.  
Now, I discuss each mode of withdrawal in detail so as to illustrate their particularities using 
expressions and examples found in both historical Antisemitism and contemporary 
Islamophobia case studies.  
 
3.1. Social Withdrawal  
Those who choose to opt for social withdrawal tactics are aware of, and acknowledge, the deep-
seated hatred directed towards their in-group, and most are articulate in their responses towards 
the prejudices they face. Whilst the targets in this mode are not necessarily classified as 
‘ghettoised,’ facing hatred has resulted in them recoiling and preferring – voluntarily or 
involuntarily –  to isolate from wider society, and they seek a sense of belonging in their roots. 
A substantial number of those who slot into this subgroup have most likely transitioned from 
the middle ground accommodation coping strategy. Usually spurred by an incident of negative 
prejudice, targets are forced to question a fundamental component of their identity. In the case 
of Weimar Jews, it is their Germanness, and for British Muslims in contemporary England, it 
is their Britishness.  
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Social withdrawal encompasses two major forms of expression: self-questioning and a return 
to roots. I now discuss each form of expression of social withdrawal using personal 
accounts from archival sources and interview excerpts in order to build a narrative to 
elaborate each form of expression.  
 
3.1.1. Self-Questioning  
The initial, or primary stage of social withdrawal is that of self-questioning. In the cases of 
historical Antisemitism and contemporary Islamophobia the social withdrawal response is a 
favourable tactic amongst the youth. This seems almost inevitable considering that their 
questioning of religious and racial identity is happening at a time when these targets are coming 
of age, and most likely posing existential questions about their selfhood (Sharfman 2003). 
Naturally, the youth will have such questions, and in some cases, it may manifest in rebellion. 
 
Historical case 
There are several examples to illustrate the turning point at which many targets of abuse resort 
to pessimism regarding assimilation within wider society. In the case of Weimar Jews, targeted 
individuals were forced to self-reflect usually following an incident of Antisemitism, either 
directly experienced, or observed first-hand. This caused the individual to challenge the 
unquestionable fundamentals of what began to feel like an ‘imposed’ sense of Germanness. In 
1910s Berlin, Leopold Kessler, a young man from a relatively easy-going and somewhat 
assimilated household, spoke of an incident of Antisemitism directed towards a fellow Jewish 
colleague, Polini, who was insulted ‘by a disparaging remark made by another member of his 
Korps concerning his race.’ Kessler continued about the effect of the incident upon him, and 
how he was taken aback by it:  
 
‘Indifferent or even opposed to all religious dogma, like a great many other students of that time, 
I felt myself entirely German, but the Polini [incident] called forth some doubts regarding the 
correctness of my a priori assumed status. I began to ponder over my position as the son of 
Jewish parents in the German world in which important changes were then taking place… [it] 
made me cringe and recoil.’74  
 
A similar experience was expressed in the memoir of Pierre Ferrand, a middle class, man who 
came of age at the peak of Weimar Antisemitism. According to Ferrand’s autobiography (1988: 
                                                
74 Kessler, L. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). An Unfinished Autobiographical Memoir. Leo Baeck Institute. 
Center for Jewish History. New York, New York.  
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114-15), his wife Paula, was severely affected by the Antisemitism she faced in her school years 
in the early 1920s. Teased by her Gentile classmates, Paula was treated as an ‘outcast’ and had 
her grades lowered by teachers for no other reason but ‘because you are Jewish’ (Ferrand). 
Ferrand asserts in his memoir: 
  
‘[Paula’s] Germany was not yet the Germany of genocide -- but it was getting there. Though 
Paula was kind, generous and gregarious by nature, she could never forget or forgive the 
experiences which had blighted her life as a little girl, and she violently rejected her German 
roots.’75  
 
As both negative incidents above suggest, events in the formative years of Weimar Jews left 
emotional scars that would cause inevitable thoughts about selfhood and belonging in the back 
of the targets’ minds. This self-questioning, in the case of withdrawn Jews, caused some to self-
isolate from wider society. Such experiences forced targets of Antisemitism to question 
what it really meant to be Jewish. For the likes of young Zionists, such as Erich 
Fromm and Leo Löwenthal, it spurred a realisation that German Jews were unaware 
of their history and that they needed to revisit and overhaul their ‘inner Jewish 
development goals’ (Fromm et al. 1922).  
 
Contemporary case 
Many withdrawn British Muslims I spoke to feel that they are constantly being told to ‘do more’ 
by wider society, and media portrayals depict them as the enemy to the state. This creates a great 
sense of shame amongst many Muslims, and often they feel helpless. As Atif, a 30-something 
lawyer from Birmingham asserts: ‘the more you do, it’s never enough.’76 Following the terror 
attack of the storming of the Bataclan concert theatre in Paris, France (2015), many of my 
interview participants say that the immediate thought they had was: ‘I hope and pray that the 
perpetrators are not Muslim.’ As Atif suggests, this is because he, like many of his fellow 
Muslims, is ‘sick of apologising’ and such blowbacks against their in-group make them 
question if they are “truly British if we’re always seen as ‘the other’?”  
Fahd, an undergraduate student from Gloucester city, echoes the self-doubting sentiments 
expressed by Atif.77 Fahd has recently become part of his university’s Islamic society, which 
                                                
75 Ferrand, P. (1988). Unbidden Guest: [A Memoir of an Odyssey to Ellis Island]. Leo Baeck 
Institute. Center for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.115-116. 
76 I conducted an interview with Atif on January 5th 2015 in Birmingham. 
77 I conducted an interview with Fahd on February 23rd 2015 in Gloucester. 
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he says has given him company and acceptance. On campus, Fahd says he experiences 
Islamophobic prejudice from classmates: ‘you can feel when [non-Muslim classmates] 
don't want you around. And it makes you wonder, why me?’ Fahd also gives the example 
of his brother-in-law being a target of a violent Islamophobic attack at a bus stop and the 
reactions following it:  
 
‘If people end up pushing you away you'd be less likely to interact with other people 
of that group. I distanced myself form the wider community as a result of that 
experience when I was younger. To a certain extent I'm still like that now, I'm not 
open and willing to get involved with the wider community.’  
 
In the process of self-reflection such unsettling thoughts and doubtful questions are the first step 
towards social withdrawal. Realising and accepting the force and influence of such stigma can 
cause the targeted individual to feel isolated and vulnerable within wider society. This fosters a 
vacuum of security, which the individual feels the need to fill. This security void thrusts the 
target into deep self-questioning and naturally, these self-reflective questions take centre stage 
in their identity struggle. In this way, the individual rediscovers the stigmatised element of their 
identity – their faith group affiliation – in new light, as the social withdrawal coping strategy 
forces them to look introspectively and ask existential questions regarding the target’s very 
being, their identity. Removing oneself from the equation by distancing oneself from wider 
society enables some socially withdrawn targets of prejudice to alleviate the damage done to 
their self-esteem. 
 
3.1.2. Return to Roots 
Once socially withdrawn targets begin to question their sense of belonging, they also feel a 
desire to define the point of contention on their own terms. For instance, targeted Jews and 
Muslims seek complete ownership of what it means to be Jewish and Muslim, respectively. So, 
in order to challenge prejudices, they respond by returning to the very roots of this condemned 
aspect of their identity – such as culture and religious rituals – and they consciously reinforce its 
positive characteristics. What is most striking about this response of social withdrawal is that it 
brings to light a generational divide amongst members of the in-group collective, regardless of 
whether or not the targeted group is Jewish or Muslim. Both historical and contemporary 
examples of this show how many members of the younger generation of the targeted group 
counter prejudice in a way that intentionally subverts the responses of their elders. Younger 
withdrawn Jewish and Muslim targets are often incredibly vocal in their disapproval of the more 
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Withdrawn Weimar Jewish youths who chose the approach of social withdrawal did 
so because they desired a revival of a somewhat fantasised epoch in which Jews took 
pride in belonging to their faith in-group. This was particularly the case with regards 
to the post-World War I German Jewish youth who fervently ordered fellow Jews to 
reminisce and glorify their shared history as a people, and take control of their own 
future in a way that would emancipate them from the hostility of Antisemitism (Meyer 
1998: 24). While some Jews sought emancipation by joining socialist, communist or 
spiritualist ‘utopias,’ some of the revolting Weimar Jewish youth were actively 
engaged in a more conservative movement, one that ‘emphasized a return to Judaism 
and Jewishness’ (Brenner & Penslar 1998: 56).  
In his memoir, Henry Bauxbaum gives the example of an incident during his youth 
when he was part of a Wanderwogel (Jewish German youth camp) and how Gentile 
youths once shouted at him and his team, instructing them to place a swastika upon 
their pennant which was decorated with a Star of David. Bauxbaum said he cheekily 
responded by:  
 
“raising my behind against [them], patting it to make sure they understood, yelling 
back, ‘That thing [swastika] we will stick on our ass.’ At once all hell broke loose. 
They jumped down the stairs and at the same time set the dogs on us.”78  
 
Yet they remained resilient, the Jewish youths encouraged each other loudly: ‘Fear 
not, fear not, they won’t get us.’ 
Klara Caro a zealous and politically active Zionist, shares an even more poignant and 
visceral anecdote. In her memoir Klara gives an example of how she was brutally 
stopped and searched on a train when returning to Germany from Holland in the early 
1930s:  
 
‘It was terrible…One of the Gestapo beasts took me off the train and took me into a 
wooden shack at the border. There he raged and yelled at me that he would take me 
                                                
78 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York, p.241. 
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to Dachau, and why did we Jews still exist. He rummaged through my little bit of 
luggage and tapped every sole of my shoes. Then he reached for a book with a red 
cover. That must be communist propaganda! I always took books to my Herman.’79 
 
Following the harassment Klara recounts how she stood on the platform desperately 
waiting for the next Dutch train back, feeling a combination of ‘anger’ and ‘shame.’80 
This, she says, is marked in her memory as ‘the most horrible time of my life.’81  
 Such incidences were quite commonly experienced by withdrawn German Jewish 
youth in their formative years and often served as a reason for their choice to 
completely withdraw from wider society and individuals express them in two ways: 
by reembracing cultural heritage and reinvigorating religious rituals. In her memoir, 
Rosemarie Joseph82 recalls how her choice to become part of a Zionist youth group 
was a result of her facing isolation at the hands of her Gentile peers. Joseph says: 
  
“Since I had lost all my old friends, I looked for Jewish children of my age. I joined a 
Zionist Youth Organization called, ‘Werkleute,’ which means builder for Palestine 
(Israel),” (Joseph 1999: 31). 
 
Many German Jewish youth sought escape from Antisemitism through withdrawn 
conservatism. Some youths blamed their parents’ generation for the ‘sin’ of 
assimilation, and were quick to declare this a major cause of Antisemitism. Brenner 
& Penslar suggest that this led many youths to ‘revolt against the established notions 
of the paternal world’ (Brenner & Penslar 1998: 56). Many youngsters joined Zionist 
groups, like the Blau-Weiss and the Jüdische Lierable Jugend (JLJ), in staunch 
opposition to their parents’ supposed weakness of succumbing to assimilation. In fact, 
such was the great extent of inter-generational strife regarding the matter, that – as 
Klara Caro recalls in her memoir – some parents sat in Shibah (mourning) when their 
children made Aaliyah (emigrated) to Palestine.83 
Alfred Malecki in his memoir of youth, gives an example that illustrates the division 
that existed between the socially withdrawn Jewish German youth and their 
                                                
79 Caro, K. (1976). A Seder Night to Remember. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York, p.13 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Joseph, R. Memoirs. (1999). Rosemarie: A Memoir. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York.  
83 Caro, K. (1976). A Seder Night to Remember. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York, p.2. 
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assimilated parent’s generation. Malecki describes how he and others his age felt 
about the chanting of hatred in riots against Jews in the early 1930s:  
 
“They would march through sections of the city where there was a predominance of 
Jewish dwellers and sing provocative songs such as ‘Wenn das Judenblut vom Messer 
spritzt gehts uns nochmal so gut’ which means ‘when the Jewish blood splashes from 
our knives we’ll have it twice as good’. Our parents who in every sense were good 
citizens must have felt awful when this scourge suddenly interrupted and destroyed 
their peaceful lives and existence; for us of the younger generation it was a shock, 
which could only lead to the strong desire to leave this inhospitable country as quickly 
as possible. However, the young don’t have the wherewithal to leave without parental 
support and many families, ours included, deluded themselves.”84  
 
Weimar Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, gave a series of talks to university-going 
Jews titled “Three Addresses on Judaism.” Buber addressed the Bar Kochba student 
society in major German and Austrian cities between 1909 and 1919. On hearing 
Buber rally Jewish youth to take pride in their Jewishness, many took solace in the 
positive self-esteem provided by Zionism. Without having to emigrate to Palestine, 
Zionist inspired by Buber’s writings on self-love of Jewishness, rebelled against 
Antisemitism by embracing cultural elements of their Jewishness that their elders had 
long disbanded with. For example, “Frank Kafka’s enthusiasm for Yiddish theater, 
Franz Rosenzweig’s excitement when he stumbled into a ‘disorderly’ Orthodox 
prayer service, and Walter Benjamin’s troubled encounters with the strange Hebrew 
language” are all ways in which this return to roots manifested (Brenner & Penslar 
1998: 57). In short, withdrawn Weimar youth took pride in embracing all aspects of 
their Jewish cultural heritage at the expense of their Germanness as a means to 
challenge Antisemitism. Essentially, the very reasons they were targets of prejudice 
were being re-appropriated by the targets, in order to heighten their self-esteem. 
For socially withdrawn Jewish youth, retaliation against Antisemitism was not simply 
restricted to re-appropriating Jewish culture. Although fewer in number, some Jewish 
youth sought to revive Judaic tradition in the form of religious rituals. Countering 
Antisemitism wholeheartedly, they believed, entailed shunning the materialism of 
wider Gentile society. Moreover, socially withdrawn Orthodox youth frowned upon 
accommodationist attempts to negotiate faith practices with worldly affairs. For 
                                                
84 Malecki, A. Memoirs. [1921- 1960]. (n.d.). Dad. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York. 
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example, many Berliner Orthodox Jewish youth groups vehemently condemned the 
teachings of Samson Raphael Hirsch, which were based on the principle of torah im 
derekh erets; balancing observance of Jewish religious rituals with political 
participation within wider Gentile German society.  
Orthodox Jewish youth, like the Misrachi Jewish order under the guidance of Rabbi 
Nehemiah Anton Nobel, were in favour of isolationist policies and blamed the rise of 
Antisemitism on their assimilated elders. They were heavily critical of their parents 
for being too assimilated, condemning them of neglecting their duties as Orthodox 
Jewish parents. Interestingly, many of the religious withdrawn youth came from 
secular Jewish households. For example, Eva Marcuse, a member of the Jüdische 
Lierable Jugend (JLJ) youth group asserted that the majority of JLJ youth group 
members belonged to families that were ‘completely indifferent toward Judaism,’ so 
much so that they made ‘conscious effort to avoid any Jewish influences whatsoever’ 
(Die JLJ 1919); (Zweig 1927); (Brenner & Penslar 1998: 60). Similarly, many of the 
members of the most prominent Weimar Jewish youth group, the Blau-Weiss, were 
from assimilated households, devoid of all Jewish cultural or religious practices.85  
In their quest for belonging however, these newly-converted Orthodox youths were 
criticised by the likes of Gershom Scholem who accused them of being ‘spiritually 
empty,’ as they did not seem to take any interest in pursuing religious piety. Instead, 
showing affinity with the religious elements of their in-group provided targeted 
Jewish youths with a potential shield from wider, prejudicial society (Jüdische 
Rundschau 1918); (Sharfman 2003: 207). Essentially, the overall aim of such youth 
groups was to inculcate a positive sense of Jewishness, without feeling shame and to 
‘bring back an alienated youth to the well-springs of their Jewishness’ (Zweig 1914: 
16-17); (Aschheim 1982:128). Withdrawn Weimar Jews achieved this by subduing or 
completely neglecting their German identity. Moreover, socially withdrawn Orthodox 
youth did not restrict their criticisms to their families. In fact, they accused Jewish 
faith schools for not being ‘Jewish enough.’ As Brenner and Penslar suggests these 
actions were ‘not a revolt against too much authority but against too little; where they 
expected guidance, they often received only empty words’ (Brenner & Penslar 1998: 
58). 
                                                
85See the unpublished memoirs of an ex-member Herbert Nussbaum, ‘Weg und Schicksal eines 
deutschen Juden’, Memoir collection at the Leo Baek Institute New York. 
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Contemporary case 
In the case of socially withdrawn, contemporary British Muslims, there are many parallels that 
one can draw with the responses of their Weimar Jewish counterparts. When faced with 
Islamophobia, one of their immediate responses is to question and challenge the importance of 
‘Britishness,’ i.e. being and feeling British. The second response they tend to have, which I now 
look at, is that they attempt to rationalise a utopian ideal, where they are free from proving their 
Britishness. In the eyes of socially withdrawn British Muslim youths who feel Britishness is 
enforced upon them, an acceptable form of rebellion is to deny their being British entirely. In 
fact, they refuse to participate in discourses surrounding the meaning of Britishness, deeming it 
irrelevant to their identity. This is because in their eyes a far more fruitful way to tackle 
Islamophobia is to focus their energy on reclaiming their Muslimness, the very aspect of their 
identity that is being maligned by prejudice. By defiantly upholding a strong sense of Muslim 
identity, these individuals attempt to elevate their bruised self-esteem.  
Socially withdrawn Muslim youth are also critical of their parents’ generation for allegedly 
being so caught up in affirming their Britishness that they have deviated from the true meaning 
of being Muslim, the very essence of their faith identity. In fact, socially withdrawn British 
Muslim youths believe that the rise of Islamophobia is a result of their parent’s neglect of their 
Muslim identity, which they feel their elders have consciously stifled to appease wider society. 
In the eyes of socially withdrawn Muslim youths, this method adopted by their parents’ 
generation has failed to protect them from Islamophobia. Rather, they feel, it has encouraged 
wider society to increase their demands for Muslims to ‘do more’ to ‘fit in,’ i.e. give up whatever 
else is remaining of their original in-group identity. Socially withdrawn Muslims desire a sense 
of belonging, which, they seek from within their in-group enclaves e.g. community circles, 
mosques and youth groups. This is because they find comfort and heightened self-esteem when 
they are surrounded by others in a similar position to them. In short, individuals express this in 
two ways: a revival of faith, and seeing religion above culture.  
Young Muslims whom I interviewed – like 21-year-old undergraduate student, Ameen, from 
Birmingham and 35-year-old Banker Mustafa – believe that the reason why Muslims are not 
able to end Islamophobia is that they are not practising Islam with pride. According to Mustafa, 
who is in the midst of a personal ‘spiritual awakening,’ Islamophobia forces Muslims to 
confront their lack of spirituality and religious observance, as otherwise: 
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‘We [British Muslims] are not learned in the deen [Islamic faith], we’ve grown distant from the 
Prophetic teachings of practising our faith defiantly.’86  
 
Mustafa confesses that he was ‘not very practising’ before he joined the Islamic society at his 
place of work in the City of London. Surrounding himself with other young Muslims he says 
has encouraged him to become more overtly practicing. Whereas before, Mustafa jokes about 
his ‘hedonistic lifestyle’ in which he partied and assimilated with young non-Muslims, now he 
supports what he calls a ‘Sunnah beard’ following the teachings of the Prophet (pbuh).  
Mustafa says he is constantly questioning his identity, and what it means to be Muslim. The 
turning point, he recollects, occurred when he faced Islamophobia in his formative years, which 
he says forced him to question his selfhood and Muslimness for the first time. Mustafa recalls 
the experience of his time in a Christian boarding school and how, during his A-levels, his 
religious studies teacher refused to give him – the sole Muslim student – the highest grade in 
the class. The teacher in question, Mustafa says, was caught by other students, scoffing: ‘how 
could a Muslim be so learned about Christianity?’ Paradoxically, Mustafa reveals how this 
incident led him to question how much he really knew about his own faith. He said it made him 
feel ‘embarrassed and ashamed’ about how little he really understood Islam. The incident forced 
him to channel his energy towards becoming more knowledgeable about it. Now Mustafa gives 
Da’wah (preaches Islam) during Islam Awareness Week, an event that his colleagues at work 
hold every November. Although he has faced very little Islamophobic prejudice since his high 
school years, Mustafa believes he is now equipped to deal with the challenges, as he is more 
aware and confident of himself as a Muslim. 
Similar thoughts were expressed by Ameen, an active member of his university’s Islamic 
Society, who feels that young Muslims need to engage with ‘Islamic teachings’ and revive ‘their 
Islamic heritage.’87 According to Ameen, Islamophobia is worsened because Muslims stop 
practising Islam in the face of abuse: ‘giving up is a sign of weakness and the oppressors [bigots] 
win.’ Although he does not mention any personal first-hand accounts of Islamophobia, Ameen 
speaks at length about his 12-year-old sister, Amina’s experience of being a direct target of 
verbal and physical Islamophobia at school by bullies who, on more than one occasion, pulled 
her hijab (headscarf) off. Ameen says he was infuriated by the school authority’s failure to 
redress the issue. For this reason, he says he encourages his sister to stand ‘firm’ in the face of 
her attackers and become a ‘better Muslim.’ 
                                                
86 I conducted an interview with Mustafa on November 23rd 2014 in London. 
87 I conducted an interview with Ameen on January 21st 2015 in Birmingham. 
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Haseeb, a twenty-something youth worker from London, echoes the sentiments of Ameen and 
Mustafa.88 He also speaks at-length about his personal ‘religious awakening’ in his university 
days, before which he was a ‘party monster.’ Haseeb refers to himself as a ‘born again Muslim’ 
who believes it is his duty to encourage his fellow Muslims to become more literate in Islamic 
teachings, as this is the best way to counter misconceptions about Muslims and Islam. 
According to Haseeb:  
 
‘there is only one solution to all this hate against us…we’ve got to strive to be better Muslims 
and everything else about our identities needs to take a backseat, as this has got to be the number 
one priority in life.’  
 
While the Jewish social withdrawn group were mainly concerned by the complete assimilation 
of their older generations within wider society, socially withdrawn British Muslims would add 
another set of grievances against their elders. Along with some complaints against assimilation, 
many British Muslims are heavily critical of ethnic identities warping the true essence of their 
faith. This is often a grievance made by second and third generation British Muslims whose 
families originally hail from the Indian Subcontinent or Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region. Other critiques of this nature come from converts to Islam. They deem it essential to 
separate cultural and ethnic practises from the faith, for numerous reasons. One being that often 
when Islamophobes target Muslims, they do so on the basis of their ethnic heritage as opposed 
to their faith practices. Socially withdrawn Muslims thus call for a revival of Islamic teachings 
that are ‘untainted’ by ethnic and cultural practices (Taras 2012).  
Yahya is a middle-aged teacher who resides in Birmingham with his family.89 A rarity amongst 
my interviewees, Yahya is a white convert but he does not see himself as a convert anymore, 
having been Muslim for so long. This, Yahya says, gives him liberty to ‘switch in and out’ of 
‘using the Muslim moniker.’ Emphasising the importance of race, he goes on to suggest that 
‘being white you can be invisible.’ He notes how his non-Muslim colleagues often pass 
outrageous remarks about Muslims as being ‘medieval’ or ‘backward,’ without realising that 
he is one. In Yahya’s view ‘the general [British] population is pretty anti-Muslim’. Despite 
being white, on the occasion that he has worn traditional Arab attire in public, he has suffered 
Islamophobic harassment. Yahya recalls an incident in Small Heath, Birmingham:  
 
                                                
88 I conducted an interview with Haseeb on November 24th 2014 in London. 
89 I conducted an interview with Yahya on January 23rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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‘a car full of white guys threatened and shouted abuse at me, at the station and I was on my way 
to the mosque wearing a jubbah [Arab long dress] as mosque was down the road. I had some 
serious abuse and I was quite worried that I was going to be physically attacked. I was being 
called a traitor, and all sorts of stuff.’  
 
His resolution following this experience has been to keep himself in ‘a Muslim space…live in 
a Muslim area, I have only Muslim friends.’ This, Yahya asserts, is because ‘only collectives 
can give you that support, not being alone.’ Despite this incident in which Islamophobes 
targeted Yahya for his seemingly ethnic attire, paradoxically, Yahya speaks at length about his 
disdain for non-white, specifically South Asian-origin Muslims, and their ‘peculiar ethnic 
practices,’ which he accuses of being racist. For instance, he is highly critical of how many 
South Asian British Muslims ‘conflate their cultural traditions’ with religious teachings. Yahya 
laments: ‘we need to be Muslim first, and your ethnicity, South Asian culture etc. should be 
secondary.’ In Yahya’s eyes, Muslims give Islamophobes ‘more reason to target Muslims by 
giving cultures the status of religion in life.’ 
Similar sentiments are shared by, Zainab, a 24-year-old university student from 
Birmingham.90 An openly observant Muslim, Zainab is highly critical of the older 
Muslim generations for not practising, what she deems, ‘a spiritually enriched’ Islam, 
which is rooted in the ‘teachings of hadith [sayings of the Prophet (pbuh)] and fiqh 
[Islamic jurisprudence].’ She accuses British South Asian Muslims of ‘polluting 
Islam,’ with their cultural practices and traditions, like keeping up appearances and 
arranged marriages, which Zainab says sometimes even ‘contradict’ Islamic 
principles. She believes that British Muslim responses towards Islamophobia are 
flawed because they are not ‘true to the faith.’ Zainab stresses that the only way to 
tackle Islamophobia effectively is by reembracing ‘core teachings of Islam’ that have 
been lost over time and need to be ‘restored.’ 
 
3.2. Political Withdrawal  
Politically withdrawn individuals are primarily those who have experienced assimilation and 
then transitioned towards withdrawal of a political nature. This subcategory does not see any 
value of working within the political system upheld by wider society. This is because they have 
negatively experienced prejudice, despite being fully assimilated. Political withdrawal is 
broadly expressed in two forms. The first expression is being anti-establishment, which entails 
                                                
90 I conducted an interview with Zainab on January 23rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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living within wider society, but calling for complete self-removal from the political and social 
system. I analyse this by delving into Zionist and alternative Jewish nationalist voices from the 
Weimar era, and political Islamist and anti-nationalist voices from contemporary England. The 
second expression entails actual, physical removal from the territory itself and establishing a 
socio-political system elsewhere. In the case of Weimar Jews this involved making Aaliyah to 
Palestine, and for contemporary British Muslims this would mean moving to nations with 
majority Muslim populations, where they hope to find a stronger sense of Ummah and live a 
more Shariah-compliant lifestyle.91 I now discuss the two expressions of political 
withdrawal using personal accounts from archival sources and interview excerpts in 
order to build narratives to elaborate each form of expression. 
 
3.2.1. Anti-Establishment  
Politically withdrawn individuals do not hold hope in the political system favoured by wider 
society. This is an intense form of response, as it entails fierce and vehement protest against the 
established order of a state, and individuals who politically withdraw do so usually in reaction 
to what they consider to be discriminatory codes of practice – either implemented by law or as 
social values – skewed against their in-group. As such, they actively rally for their fellow in-
group affiliates to boycott the political status quos of wider society, in order to destabilise it. For 
this reason, it is very common for these individuals to create politically motivated groups based 
on an extreme interpretation of their in-group identity. In the case of the Weimar Jews, the main 
group proposing anti-establishment consisted of second-wave Zionists. Whereas, in the 
contemporary case individuals who express this response are overwhelmingly Islamist. In a 
way, this can be seen as a sort of rebuttal or act of revenge against the negativity internalised by 
targets. These individuals are quite fervent in their response and have radical tendencies, hence, 
the potential to become violent in order to achieve their desired outcomes.  
 
Historical case 
Zionists were at the forefront of expressing the anti-establishment view of political 
withdrawal. In particular, second-wave Zionist saw no use in upholding their 
allegiance to the German state. Many of them had experienced being assimilated 
German Jews, loyal to the state, yet they still felt they were treated as second-class 
citizens. Instead, they tried heightening their self-esteem by ‘preserving’ their 
                                                
91 Shariah - Islamic law based on religious jurisprudence. 
 135 
Jewishness in a way that required them to refrain from all forms of social and political 
participation in wider German society (Niewyk 1980: 126).92 In order to guarantee 
that their demands for a complete boycott of political engagement were met, some 
militant Zionists, like Nahum Goldman, went to extreme lengths. To ensure that the 
Jews of Heidelberg abstained from voting in the National Assembly elections of 1919, 
Goldman spent days on end plastering anti-state posters on kiosks across the city. 
These posters addressed local Jews, warning them of the dangers of allying with the 
German state, and urging them to boycott the elections (Holdheim 1932); (Schwadron 
1919: 177-180); (Niewyk 2001: 143).  
In some rare cases, Weimar Zionists participated in local elections, for example, 
political parties like the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland (ZVfD, Zionist 
Federation of Germany) and the Jüdische Volkspartei (Jewish People’s Party). Such 
groups took part in German politics with the sole aim to subvert political order, almost 
an act to symbolise how the system was skewed against the Jewish people. For the 
ZVfD in particular, it was a means to mobilise the support of German Jews under one 
common banner, before they could realistically break from the established political 
system and demand repatriation in Palestine.  
The Zionist movement employed political withdrawal in its second wave, when it 
became more radical. Political withdrawal caused a rift between old and new Zionists, 
as interestingly, first wave Zionism (that of its founder, Theodore Herzl etc.) was not 
anti-establishment. Zionist elders were in fact outraged by the radical Zionists’ 
assertion that Germanness and Jewishness were irreconcilable, and Zionism in its true 
form entailed entwurzelung (uprooting) from Germany to make Aaliyah (emigrate) to 
Palestine (Aschheim 1982: 99). The rift between first and second wave Zionists 
deepened when the teachings of Martin Buber became popular amongst the radical, 
politically withdrawn Zionists. Martin Buber is often credited as a father of second 
wave Zionism, and although Buber promoted the philosophy of Jewish nationalism 
amongst disenfranchised Weimar German Jews, he himself never called for them to 
become politically withdrawn. Buber’s writings appealed to the new Zionists because 
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it offered them an alternative Weltanschauung (worldview) (Sharfman 2003: 204). In 
their quest for a personal identity that was not stigmatising, the Zionist youth were 
drawn to Buber’s words, which resonated with their desire to revive their Jewish 
roots.93 Whilst asserting his presence as a Jew in the midst of a hostile Gentile German 
society, Buber symbolised a ‘spiritual Jewish alternative to the establishment’ 
(Aschheim 1982: 132).  
Although he may not have been withdrawn, Buber was most definitely a fierce critic 
of assimilation. In one of many written exchanges with Oppenheimer, Buber asserts 
that the difference between assimilation and Zionism is that, while the former meant 
appeasing the majority’s demands and forfeiting one’s true identity, the latter allowed 
the Jews to live freely, as masters of their own destiny, without bowing to pressures 
of Anti-Semites (Buber 1910: 287). Politically withdrawn Weimar Jews were 
clinching onto a sense of belonging that they found, at times, in misinterpreting 
Buber’s work, as it satiated their psychological needs. For instance, many young 
radicals who idealised Buber’s analogy of the freedom and independence offered in 
the philosophy of Zionism, interpreted this to mean living like the withdrawn 
Ostjunden, completely removed from wider German society (Aschheim 1982: 107).  
In Henry Bauxbaum’s (198) memoir he shows how and why Zionism emerged and 
took shape amongst the German Jewry. In Bauxbaum’s view it has much to do with 
the German Jews being influenced by the migration of Eastern Jewish students, from 
Poland and Russia, to Germany. Bauxbaum stressed that:  
 
“it was Zionism, [Theodore] Herzl’s “Der Judenstaat,” a new political concept of 
Jewish existence. By osmosis, the German-Jewish students were suffused with the 
same ideals and the two groups [Eastern and German Jewish youth] together formed 
a Zionist-oriented fraternity.”  
 
Thus, for many Weimar Jews facing Antisemitism the anti-establishment presence of 
Zionism was an aggressive form of self-assertion for Jews who felt removed from the 
politics of wider German society and its demands for assimilation. Furthermore, in 
the words of Isaak Zwirn, a young, second-generation Zionist, the decision was 
autonomous of other religion and norms of the Östjuden. According to Zwirn, they 
                                                
93 See Buber’s addresses to the Bar Kochbas in 1903; Buber’s writings had great appeal for the 
young Hans Kohn, ‘Rückblick auf eine gemeinsame Jugend’, in Hans Tramer (ed.), Roberk Weltsch 
zum 70. Geburtstag (Tel Aviv, 1961), p.115.SEe 
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were not drawn to Zionism out of a religious conviction to ‘Holy Aaliyah 
(immigration),’ or because they were influenced by the Östjuden, but rather because 
it was their own independent escape from Antisemitism (Zwirn 1912: 206).  
Klara Caro, a lower class Jew from Hildesheim explained how ‘gifted’ younger 
people, herself included, were drawn towards Zionism as it served as ‘a counter 
balance to home and school.’ Gathering together she says: 
 
“We called ourselves ‘The Clique’ and were even then Zionist-orthodox. My 
brother’s fellow-students who visited my parent’ house, Alfred Klee and Heinrich 
Loewe later became Zionist leaders. I was just eight years-old when Heinrich Loewe 
told us about his first trip to Palestine. From then on I was an ardent Zionist,” (Caro 
1976: 1). 
 
Klara also recounts how Zionists in 1919 had to tread carefully: 
 
‘we few Zionists used to meet clandestinely, very romantically in an obscure back-
alley. To be pro-Palestine was sneered at as being unpatriotic.’  
 
But she questioned:  
 
‘Why did Jews have to be patriotic?... What did we know about bombs? Then after 
the war was lost, came the British occupation. [We are] much too decent for these 
German people,’ (Caro 1976: 3).  
 
Owing to its escapist tendencies, second wave Zionism was at the heart of the political 
withdrawal coping strategy for Weimar Jews. Essentially, regardless of how one came 
to it, the ideology offered Weimar Jews a chance to strengthen their ‘positive self-
image of their [faith] group’ and heighten their collective self-esteem (Sharfman 
2003: 207). 
 
Contemporary case  
Considering that my interview data shows little in terms of first-hand experiences of politically 
withdrawn British Muslims, this section is mainly grounded in an analysis of excerpts from 
autobiographies and memoirs of former Islamist radicals whose responses give archetypal 
examples of the anti-establishment rhetoric to illustrate the politically withdrawn strategy. Much 
of the political withdrawal of contemporary British Muslims post-9/11 I can divide into two 
waves as well. The first wave I attribute to the likes of radical Islamists who were part of 
organisations such as Al-Muhajuroon (the Emigrant) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Order of God). Both 
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groups were quite active in across Britain from the early- mid 1990s but became even more 
prominent in the wake of the politically charged climate of the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 
bombings in London. Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) consisted mainly of young, professional Muslim 
intellectuals who were politically conscious and disgruntled by what they deemed a ‘war on 
Muslims.’ This was perhaps a product of its time; HT grew in popularity in the midst of the 
Kosovo War and Massacre of Srebrenica, which many young British Muslims considered a 
wake-up call to defend their fellow Ummahti (Muslim brethren) (Hamid 2007). University 
campuses and after-work professional, Muslim networking events became popular locales for 
mass mobilisation, where they called on their fellow Muslims to stand up to the scrooge of 
Islamophobia by opposing ‘the Kufaar [infidel] system’ of neo-liberal democracy (an-Nabhani 
1996).  
Following the anti-Muslim backlash post-9/11, HT as well as its one-time militant wing, Al-
Muhajuroon, believed that Muslims in the West had a moral duty to establish a global Islamic 
Khalifate (Nixon Centre Report 2004). Such dreams enable their followers, many of them 
having experienced Islamophobia, to reminisce on the Islamic ‘Golden Age,’ a time when 
Muslim identity was strong, and their collective self-esteem was high. I notice that this feeling 
is present in some of the interviewees whom I spoke with, like 40-something Imran, an engineer 
from Gloucester. Discussing the ‘failure’ of British Muslims to tackle Islamophobia effectively, 
Imran refers to ‘the modern Muslim tragedy’ of being ‘ignorant of our glorious past.’ Here 
Imran is referring to the Islamic ‘Golden Age,’ which he believes British Muslims need to 
revive through learning and ‘teaching our kids about the pioneering Muslim scientists, like Ibn 
Sina [Avicenna]…to make them feel good about being, first and foremost, Muslims.’  
Visions of a future Khalifate give some politically withdrawn British Muslims a chance to 
strengthen their self-esteem. As former radical-turned-liberal, Maajid Nawaz, suggests, many 
radical jihadists originally begin on the path of self-isolation as a reaction to numerous factors, 
and elevating their self-esteem following Islamophobic abuse is one of them. In his 
autobiography, Radical (2012), Nawaz documents his personal journey from being a second 
generation, British-Pakistani from an under-privileged background to becoming an Islamist. 
Nawaz recounts how he mobilised other British Muslim youths to remove themselves from 
wider British society, and instead pursue a politically charged lifestyle to enable a wider Muslim 
‘unity,’ without the confinement of territorial borders and nationalism. As another former-
jihadist, Ed Hussain, says about his time in HT (Hussain 2009: 35): ‘Now I was not a mere 
Muslim, like all the others I knew; I was better, superior.’ The sense of camaraderie and unity 
that disenfranchised young men such as Hussain and Nawaz felt gave them a heightened sense 
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of self-esteem, and self-worth. As Nawaz asserts: ‘This was my ultimate purpose, this was my 
destiny and realising this was a source of liberation’ (Nawaz 2012: 34).  
These points illustrate how Islamist movements can be incredibly appealing to British Muslims 
who feel their faith identity is being maligned. Islamist rhetoric provides an atmosphere that 
safeguards the target’s in-group identity and protects their fragile collective self-esteem, which 
is something they struggle to attain through their Britishness. As one of my interviewees who 
exhibits political withdrawal, 30-something IT-specialist from London, Zulfikar, asserts:  
 
‘I’m not British [sniggers]. What has this place ever given me? Talk to any white British person- 
they’re too full of privilege. Their whole narrative is warped.’94  
 
On being asked how Muslims should react to this, Zulfikar retorted:  
 
‘We [Muslims] will never be treated as equals so why do we even bother deluding ourselves 
with democracy? It’s all a big sham.’ 
 
Second wave Islamism, similar to second wave Zionism, is composed of a youthful 
demographic and has arisen and taken shape in recent years with the formation of the 
self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) in 2013, which has taken the 
politically withdrawn activities to a new, violent extreme. Firstly, the rhetoric of ISIS 
gives way to an ideology that is rooted in a desire to establish a state along territorial 
boundaries as opposed to the original concept of an Ummah, or Muslim brotherhood 
that transcends physical borders. Moreover, much like second wave Zionism’s call 
for Aaliyah, this current second form of radical Islamism shifts the purpose of political 
withdrawal amongst withdrawn British Muslims; they are no longer just abstaining 
from participation within the established political system and setting up a grassroots 
movement that challenges the status quo or a transcendental Kalifate, second wave 
Islamism is also calling for British Muslims to physically uproot from their lives in 
Britain and make Hijra (migrate) to the lands occupied by the so-called Islamic State. 
Many of those who have made this move are ‘brain-washed’ younger generation of 




                                                
94 I conducted an interview with Zulfikar on November 10th 2014 in London. 
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3.2.2. Repatriation: Aaliyah and Ummah 
For many targets of prejudice, unity was – and is – missing when one decides to live 
amongst wider society. In their view a strong sense of unity, as well as collective 
identity, is secured by living in a land that is run by and for their ‘own kind.’ Weimar 
Jews would have achieved this when Jewish nationalism superseded all else and they 
had achieved the physical territorial homeland, following their Aaliyah (repatriation) 
in Palestine. For many Weimar Jewish families this was a final hope when they could 
not find a feasible alternative to remain living in Germany towards the tail end of the 
Weimar Republic, and impending seizure of power by the Nazis. As such, many 
assimilated and accommodative Jews transitioned to this coping strategy near the final 
days of the Weimar Republic; it was by all means not their initial choice of response. 
It was mainly a result of dire need, when Anti-Semitic sentiments reached 
unprecedented heights that they transitioned towards repatriation.  
Modern-day British Muslims do not fear for their lives in the same way as their 
historical Jewish counterparts did. However, many withdrawn British Muslims in 
contemporary England whom I spoke with have a desire to live ‘amongst their own 
ilk.’ Many young people, second or third generation British Muslims of a diaspora 
community, often wish to make ‘hijr’ or migrate to more Islamic countries, where 
they can live amongst others of the Ummah, (transnational Muslim brotherhood). It is 
noteworthy that many British Muslims often use the Ummah label as a way to detach 
from wider society, and to remove any remnants of their ancestral diasporic cultures, 
valuing religious lifestyle over ethnic and tribal nationalisms.  
 
Historical case 
It was in 1912 when the Posen convention of the German Zionist Federation called 
on every Zionist to plan personally to emigrate to Palestine (Niewyk 1980: 125). 
According to Henry Bauxbaum it wasn’t until the First World War that many Jewish 
families became ‘Zionist Zealots in Germany (until then the Zionist movement hardly 
had any spokesmen inside Germany) [who] preached a return to the land of Israel.’95 
In Keil Baruch’s memoir he describes the physical assault on his shop owner father 
                                                
95 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York, p.124. 
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by racist youths.96 His father had attempted to get police to intervene, but they said 
there was nothing they could do. As a result of the hatred, Baruch says:  
 
‘Father wanted to emigrate [sic] to Palestine. He had very little money left…This did 
not deter him, however, because he knew he could start again and rebuild what had 
been destroyed. He was a Misrachist that is a religious Zionist and his greatest hero 
was Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism. Father reasoned that since the Anti-
Semites had destroyed his possessions they had given him the incentive to leave the 
diaspora and to go where he belonged Palestine, Erez Israel’ (Baruch 1996: 7). 
 
Part of this stems from a desire for sense of belonging, as Pierre Ferrand explains in 
his memoir that as a young man he was disturbed by the slur that Anti-Semites used 
against him, calling him a ‘rootless cosmopolitan Jew’ (Ferrand 1988: 61). Thus, 
repatriation offered disillusioned Weimar Jews a sense of hope, a sense of security 
and stability in the form of a homeland where they felt they would be accepted. 
Moreover, it had the potential to offer them a feeling of nationalism and belonging, 
which for them was missing in Germany, or at least was becoming less and less 
accessible, because of their Jewishness. Instead of cutting out their Jewishness, these 
Jews decided to move somewhere that was more accepting of this aspect of their 
identity, somewhere this could be nurtured, as for them their self-esteem was highly 
connected to their sense of Jewishness and collective ‘we’ feeling of belonging to a 
Jewish community. This was particularly true for many Jews near the tail-end of the 
Weimar era, as virulent Antisemitism grew to unprecedented heights, meaning that 
their Jewish identity required greater protection (Meyer 1998: 154). This is because 
for these Jews individual self-esteem was very much tied to collective self-esteem; 
their collective community mattered a great deal to them, as it was at the heart of their 
very existence. Hence, whereas the Galuth (exile from foreign lands) and ideas of 
Jewish nationalism had been latent amongst the Jewish diasporas in Germany for 
centuries, they were brought to the fore in times when Antisemitism was at its peak. 
The Weimar era was undoubtedly a prime example of this, and repatriation of German 
Jews, was an attempt to bring back pride in Jewish heritage and nationalism, that 
manifest in a desire to forge a territorial homeland; going back to ‘reclaim root’ in the 
Holy Land of Palestine. In fact, such was the desire to escape from German 
                                                
96 Baruch., K., J. (1996). Memoir. Wiener Library Collections, Wiener Library, London. 
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Antisemitism to Erez Israel that in the decade between 1919 and 1929, over 120,000 
Jews made Aaliyah to Palestine (Richman 2008). 
 
Contemporary case  
The Ummah is considered the Islamic brotherhood or a signifier of unity amongst 
Muslims beyond borders. This is particularly interesting in the age of globalisation. 
However, the desire for a homeland, or a territory –  that is not necessarily an Islamic 
State per se, but at the very least is accepting and welcoming of their differences – is 
something in which many withdrawn British Muslims find respite, following the tense 
environments of post-7/7 Britain.  
This is illustrated aptly by the frustration of one interviewee from Gloucester who 
shares her feelings about traveling abroad. Latifah is a university student born and bred in 
Gloucester who adheres to a considerably conservative outward observance of faith; she dons 
the hijab (headscarf) and abaya (dress-cloak), and she completed her schooling at an Islamic 
all-girls school in Gloucester.97 She is clearly very tight-knit within her local Muslim 
community. Faith to her is about ‘adhering to commandments…using Islam as a guideline.’ 
She is very aware of society being secular where ‘religion isn’t always a good thing,’ but she 
feels that it is vital for Muslims to ‘reclaim Islam’ from the negative stereotypes seen in the 
media.  
Latifah feels she is fully aware of the negative manner in which wider society perceives 
Muslims: ‘people think Islam is not a viable religion… and the world would be better off 
without a religion like Islam.’ This is the general view that Latifah has of society’s perceptions 
of her faith, as such, she does not feel a sense of belonging within it. In contrast, Latifah 
described her experience of visiting Muslim-majority country, Morocco:  
 
‘it felt really nice not knowing these people but being made to feel really welcome, because I 
wear a headscarf…and it’s not like here [in England]. Even though I was born here people don’t 
see me as British.’  
 
Although she had spent less than a week in Morocco, she says she was comfortable there, in a 
foreign land, because the ‘Muslims there made me feel accepted.’ Interestingly, Latifah is 
adamant that she does not desire acceptance from wider society if it means that she has to 
                                                
97 I conducted an interview with Latifah on February 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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constrain her practices of faith. In somewhere like Morocco, Latifah feels that she would be 
respected without having to change her way of life, and she finds this incredibly appealing.  
A desire for a homeland, or at least a land that is understanding of one’s religious 
particularities, does not always manifest in a radical ‘Islamist’ form. This is perhaps 
why some second and third generation British Muslims are opting to relocate to 
affluent Middle Eastern countries. Speaking to interviewees, many had siblings who 
had chosen to start a family in such ‘Muslim-friendly’ environments. Such was the 
case of Shahid who makes mention of his older sister and her convert husband, who 
together migrated to the U.A.E. to raise their young children in a ‘Muslim 
environment,’ as they feared the rise in anti-Muslim sentiments was having a 
detrimental impact upon their lives.98 This notion of leaving your place of birth and 
‘relocating to Arab lands’ for an assimilated, secular Muslim like Shahid seems all 
too perverse.  
The major difference between them and their Jewish counterparts is specifically how 
their identity is manifest; while the Weimar Jews were concerned with safeguarding 
their sense of Jewish selfhood, which for them stemmed from a strong sense of Jewish 
nationalism, British Muslim self-esteem is grounded in religious ideology, and the 
community ‘we’ feeling of being Muslim, regardless of national or ethnic affiliations. 
This is because the concept of the Ummah is one that transcends such boundaries. In 
the case of the majority of British Muslims, this form of repatriation has not yet taken 
the shape of a mass political movement like their Jewish counterparts. At present, it 
is only in the stages of desires; some withdrawn British Muslims want to move to a 
place where the political system aligns with their core beliefs and gives room for them 
to practise their faith without fear of Islamophobia. However, it is inevitable that with 
a peak in anti-Muslim hatred, some British Muslims who are politically withdrawn 
retreat towards their in-group, and naturally the Ummah, to gain a sense of security 
and self-esteem, which they think will be protected there.  
 
3.3. Banal Withdrawal 
The final mode of withdrawal is that of banal, or every day, withdrawal. In this mode, 
individuals express these responses in two forms: silence and denial or self-definition. The silent 
and denialists refuse to speak about, or outright reject, the extent of prejudice. Those in the self-
                                                
98 I conducted an interview with Shahid on November 24th 2014 in London. 
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definition group pick apart the negative attributes associated with their in-group for numerous 
reasons. What is common to silence and denial, and self-definition is that they allow targets to 
take significant pride in their in-group and remove themselves from wider society. Crucial to 
note is that although conventional logic would have us believe that all those who choose banal 
withdrawal reside in ghettos or minority enclaves, this is not always the case. My findings 
suggest that one can express aspects of banal withdrawal whilst not necessarily being physically 
ghettoised from wider society. In fact, some British Muslims I interviewed assert how they feel 
isolated from wider society whilst seemingly living within it. Below, I discuss the expressions 
of silence and denial, and self-definition as well as the reasoning behind them. I do this using 
personal accounts from archival sources and interview excerpts in order to build 
narratives to elaborate each form of expression. 
 
3.3.1. Silence & Denial  
An interesting expression of banal withdrawal occurs when the target chooses to stay 
silent or go to the extreme of outright denying the influence of prejudice upon their 
in-group collective. In the case of Jews, those who choose banal withdrawal refuse to 
acknowledge the influence of Antisemitism, and for Muslims it means ignoring the 
problem of Islamophobia or denying its influence. Those who intentionally remain 
silent or actively refute the importance of prejudice, do so as a conscious protective 
strategy. This form of response allows targets to prevent feelings of vulnerability and preserve 
a positive attachment to their in-group. Silence and denial are also favoured because 
speaking up about or acknowledging the existence of prejudice requires some form of 
action – both psychological and physical – that these targets do not wish to take, lest 
it disrupt their routine lives. So in order to go about their days without much hassle, 
avoiding the issue can be a successful defence mechanism. A second reason why 
targets might not actively discuss prejudice is because they are already so isolated 
from wider society that they have never come into contact with such negative 
experiences. These people tend to be ghetto-dwellers who are completely oblivious to 
the detrimental influence of prejudice on self-esteem, as it rarely happens to them. 
 
Historical case 
Most everyday accounts of banal withdrawn Weimar Jews did not detail their 
experiences of Antisemitism. This is because if one chooses to remain silent in their 
expressions regarding the influence of prejudice, they are unlikely to make much 
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reference to it in their writings. For this reason, many memoir collections of 
withdrawn Jewish families that I read make hardly any mention of Antisemitism. 
Instead, these accounts focus on the everyday lives of the Weimar Jewish family 
setup, their particularities, things that they considered important.  
Some withdrawn Jews actively preferred to remain silent about the Antisemitism their 
collective was facing, and they internalised this state of being so much so that they no 
longer acknowledged that there was any hatred against Jews at all, wilfully glancing 
over it. As Bauxbaum said of the withdrawn Jews of his era:  
 
“their motto had been to accept all the assaults and defamations in silence – ‘immer 
Gestieke,’ they were not to be exaggerated and they had little reason to fight for this 
right…[they] didn’t belong to the society around them; [they were] outside it in every 
practical respect.”99  
 
The reason for their silence was that they were dispirited; they were conscious of 
Antisemitism but they felt hopeless, unable to challenge it, and so instead they decided 
to remove themselves from actively participating in a society that they felt would 
provide them with little sense of belonging. In Stella Louise Graumann’s memoir, she 
writes about how the German Jewry, even those who were not residents of ghettos, 
preferred to ‘stick together’ and shop ‘only from Jewish traders’ and associate only 
with ‘their own kind’ (Graumann 1979). This, she says, is a result of them feeling 
despondent at wider society’s growing Antisemitism towards them. As such, it was in 
the subtle, everyday acts that banal withdrawn Jews expressed their removal from 
wider society, without saying or acknowledging Antisemitism overtly.  
In Eleanor Alexander’s account, she describes coming across a snippet of Walter 
Rathenau’s words in a catalogue of an exhibition of ‘Jews in Germany under Prussian 
Rule’:  
 
‘Every German Jew experiences one painful moment when he becomes fully 
conscious of the fact that he was born a second-class citizen, and that no achievement 
or merit can liberate him from that condition.’100  
 
                                                
99 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for 
Jewish History. New York, New York, p.218. 
100 Alexander, E. (2001). Lecture given at the Goethe Institut San Francisco. Wiener Library 
Collections, Wiener Library, London, p.4.  
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Alexander goes on to assert that being conscious of their outsider image, many 
Weimar Jews chose to ‘recoil’ from wider society. They did not seek to redress the 
issue, as they did not believe that this was achievable.  
In the case of the few ghetto-dwelling Weimar Jews who documented their 
experiences, most did not mention their experience with Antisemitism as they had not 
encountered much substantial abuse first-hand and thus, they remained indifferent 
toward it. Most of the time, they simply did not factor it into their discourse to begin 
with. In addition, they were already so far removed from wider society that they 
continued living their lives, unfettered by occurrences of Antisemitism. This was made 
easier for them as many banal withdrawn Weimar Jews who lived in the ghettos of Berlin and 
other major German cities were in close contact with, and thus influence by, the Östjuden 
(Eastern Jews newly migrated from Poland). Some withdrawn German Jewry began emulating 
the day-to-day lifestyle of these newcomers. Ghetto culture had mass appeal amongst 
many young German Jews to fill the void of acceptance. Sometimes it was purely just 
about seeing how Jews lived ‘normal’ lives, went about their days, just 
‘unselfconsciously’ like any other community would do (Gronemann 1924: 200); 
(Aschheim 1982: 189). A factor contributing to the further withdrawal of the already 
stigmatised group was that many lived in areas that were mainly Jewish, and thus 
grew further distant from wider society. As Ruth Gutmann in her memoir explains, 
her family’s living conditions had a drastic impact on their social interactions with 
wider society: 
 
‘Our life in the Jewish community building, a large house we shared until 1935 
confirmed our mother’s feeling of isolation and ours of being unlike our school 
friends. While we children had each other, mother lacked any kind of neighbour or 
Gentile friends.’101 
 
Gutmann asserts that despite the ‘isolation,’ her family decided to ‘stay put,’ as 
changing their residence would be an unnecessary hassle, and of no use, because they 
would ‘still be Jews,’ in the eyes of wider Gentile society. 
 
 
                                                
101 Gutmann, R. Memoirs. [date]. Memoir 1933. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York. 
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Contemporary case 
Banal withdrawn British Muslim often reside in major cities alongside newer 
immigrants, where there are tight-knit communities that hold together many 
generations of certain ethnic Muslim communities that have been living in the same 
area for many generations. One major example of this is the British Bangladeshi 
community of Tower Hamlets in the East End of London. Another is that of the British 
Pakistani community in the area of Sparkhill in Birmingham. Like their Weimar 
Jewish counterparts who lived in certain walled off areas of Berlin, these British 
Muslims find it quite a comfortable life, being cut off from wider society. In isolation, 
they can be as unwittingly indifferent to the views and perceptions that wider society 
might have of them. This provides them respite from constantly having to ‘prove’ 
themselves out of fear of not fitting into the status quo’s definition of an accepted 
British person.  
Living in close proximity with others of their kind has meant that their individual 
identity is very much tied to their collective faith group identity, and their self-image 
and self-esteem as an individual is highly dependent upon their feelings of positivity 
for their faith group. A quintessential example of this can be found in Asiah, a middle-
aged housewife of Somali origin who has resided in the East End of London for the majority of 
her life.102 Her life centres on her family and close-knit British Somali friends in her locality. 
Her community is fundamental to her very being, and at one point she even mentions 
how she is ‘nothing without her community.’ Her exposure to wider society has been 
relatively limited, a thought that rarely ever crosses her mind. In fact, it is only through the course 
of our interview that Asiah realises her situation and confesses, ‘I don’t have any non-Muslim 
friends.’ Thus, Asiah has no experiences of Islamophobia to share. Moreover, when asked to 
define prejudice, she was unaware of the term.  
Saira is a homemaker of Indian origin and a resident of Gloucester.103 Saira has an even smaller 
community that she socialises with and as she is not a prominent member of the local Muslim 
groups, her circle of acquaintance is confined to her children’s school run, or meeting other 
mothers of South Asian origin at tea parties. Like many of her banal withdrawn counterparts, 
Saira is coy to share her experiences with Islamophobia, treating it like a taboo. It is as if by not 
discussing the issue at hand she is denying it in her own way. As Saira asserts:  
                                                
102 I conducted an interview with Asiah on November 11th 2014 in London. 
103 I conducted an interview with Saira on February 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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‘I don’t bother about these things [Islamophobia] because we have to live here. I don’t think 
about it. Socialising is different, living is different. I do not have to socialise to live here.’  
 
Here, Saira distinguishes between residing in England and being forced to socialise with wider 
society. She does not see socialisation as a necessary requirement to ‘live’ in this country. In 
response to my questions about her experiences of Islamophobia, Saira abruptly responds by 
saying ‘Never happened. Never. I don’t know.’ This could mean one of two things. Either, a) 
her interactions are so limited that she might not have ever encountered anyone to allow for 
such an incident to occur, or b) she is denying its occurrence in order to maintain a calm 
demeanour, as acknowledging the hatred against her would mean having to face up to it and 
take action. By denying its influence, Saira and others in her group manage to stay content in 
who they think they are, protecting their self-image and self-esteem. Saira’s philosophy 
regarding the whole discourse in her own words is, ‘try to keep yourself away from [wider 
society]. Keep to yourself and others like yourself.’  
Similarly, when I spoke with elderly British Pakistani women in Birmingham, I 
noticed how these women felt a great sense of camaraderie with other Muslims as 
opposed to society as a whole. Their very existence is determined by the community 
and upholding it is of upmost importance to them. One woman, Khursheed, jokes how 
it’s been years since she has had a conversation with a white or black British person 
‘gora’ or ‘kala’ as she refers to them.104 Naseem, was one of these women, and an orthodox 
literalist, who describes how isolated her life is:  
 
‘I don’t really meet [non-Muslim] British people. I don’t work or anything. I only stay around 
Muslims. So I don’t know what they [non-Muslims] feel. I don’t have any relation with 
them.’105  
 
She goes on to say that she had never been target of racial and religious abuse, because her 
interactions are so limited:  
 
‘I don’t have any contact with non-Muslims at all, only these women here [points at friends in 
other room] are the ones I associate with.’  
 
                                                
104 I conducted an interview with Khursheed on February 3rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
105 I conducted an interview with Naseem on February 3rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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Not only does Naseem speak unabashedly about her limited social circle, she is unaware that 
there is a word to describe prejudice or hatred against Muslims (Islamophobia). 
 
3.3.2. Self-Definition  
The second form of banal withdrawal is that of self-definition and withdrawn individuals 
express this response through the process of refashioning of the negative stereotypes they 
encounter, in order to make sense of the prejudices they face. This response is premised on the 
ideology that targets believe their collective is superior to wider society, which is continuously 
bolstered through self-aggrandisement, and they cannot quite grapple with the fact that their in-
group would be disliked at all. Weimar Jews express this by seeing ghetto-dwelling Jews and 
Östjuden as the standard-bearers of praise-worthy Jewish lifestyle. For British Muslims it entails 
them denying and deflecting the accusations made by Islamophobes regarding their in-group.  
 
Historical case 
Amongst the withdrawn Weimar Jews, it was common belief that the Western Jew 
settled in Germany for many generations was conflicted in their identity, or 
‘fragmented’. In contrast, the immigrant Jew of the East was said to have ‘healed the 
dichotomy between humanness and Jewishness’ (Aschheim 1982: 108). Noteworthy 
here is that they made no mention of being German, in fact, withdrawn Jews somehow 
saw an intrinsic connection between humanness and Jewishness. For this reason, 
withdrawn German Jews – many of whom were German Zionist youth in search for a 
sense of selfhood –  re-defined themselves by cutting off any remaining ties with 
German ‘volk’ (people) and associating strongly with Eastern Jewish settlers in 
Germany. As a result, the inner Jewish self of these withdrawn folk was undeterred 
and undefeated by Anti-Semitic abuse (Aschheim 1982: 155).  
In addition, as these Jews felt at loss and unable to connect with the wider Gentile 
society, they harboured a strong dislike for members of wider society and began 
subverting and re-appropriating the negative stereotypes they faced. A caricature of 
this is present in Wilhelm Raabe’s Hungerpastor (1864) in which we see Moses 
Freudstein as a Jew with an almost intrinsic ghetto hatred of the Christian. He dealt 
with his low status in society by belittling German Christians and inflating his self-
esteem through self-aggrandisement. Other withdrawn Jews – those who accepted the 
extent of Anti-Semitic stereotypes – felt that allegations against Jews were 
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misdirected at their collective as a whole, while the main ‘culprits’ were not 
representative of the whole group of German Jews. This is not because they agreed 
with negative stereotypes against Jews, but rather because they wished to avoid 
confrontation with Anti-Semites. For example, often withdrawn Jews who professed 
to begin ‘Trotzjuden (defiant Jews)’ would distinguish themselves from the Jews of 
the petite bourgeoisie – who were often the primary targets of Anti-Semitic abuse 
(Brenner & Penslar 199: 81) (Aschheim 1982: 191). This was principally because 
Trotzjuden considered it more important to concentrate on upholding their 
Jewishness, and thus they stayed clear of any discussions regarding their Germanness, 
continuing to live in their tight-knit communities, unperturbed by the negativity of 
Antisemitism. Instead, many of them focused on emulating the ways of life of the 
Östjuden, which allowed them to assert their identity as distinct from the assimilated 
petite bourgeoisie.  
 
Contemporary case  
For some banal withdrawn British Muslims, who accept that Islamophobia is 
occurring, it is important for them to distinguish themselves from the negative 
portrayals of Muslims in the media. This is because many withdrawn Muslims are not 
able to distinguish between Islam as a faith and Muslims as a faith group. So, they 
reason that Islamophobes are actually ‘confused’ individuals who do not dislike 
Muslims, but are ‘only targeting terrorists, who are not really Muslims.’106 Such is the 
defence mechanism exhibited by the banal withdrawn Muslims I spoke with.  
For example, Asiah’s understanding of faith is, like other withdrawn British Muslims, 
ritualistic and about ‘follow[ing] the rules by Allah.’107 She is a prominent member of her local 
Somali community and often teaches classical Arabic to other women. She feels Muslims are 
always seen as foreign and non-Muslims just don’t understand Muslims or Islam, and ‘they 
don’t understand, if they believe in submission to Allah they will do same as I do, they would 
believe it’s faith, which exists [sic].’   
For some British Muslims, the denial can be subconscious, often because these individuals are 
so cut off and secluded from wider society. Khalil, a cultured businessman and resident of 
Birmingham asserts:  
                                                
106 This was a current theme that ran along many of my banal withdrawn interviewees. 
107 I conducted an interview with Asiah on November 11th 2014 in London. 
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‘I am surrounded by Muslims where I live. Outside some [in wider society] people pass 
remarks, you know, racial slurs. I don’t take notice of them- I don’t react. I avoid them… these 
racists are not a true reflection of [white] mainstream British people. The majority do not dislike 
us [Muslims]. They know that the terrorist does not represent me.’108  
 
Similarly, despite the one or two occasions when she faced racial slurs from passers-by on the 
street, Khursheed says she was unfazed by the negative encounters she faced. To an extent she 
refuses to acknowledge their occurrence, brushing off her abusers as ‘mostly uneducated 
people. Not representative of all Brits.’109  
The words of Khalil and Khursheed are echoed by quite a few of the other older withdrawn 
participants in my study. It is interesting how they have, in a way, redefined and re-processed 
the incidences of Islamophobia in a manner that allows them to feel better about their faith in-
group. In this way, banal withdrawn British Muslims cope with Islamophobia by refashioning 
the abuse, rationalising it on their own terms.  
Zeenat is a homemaker from Birmingham and an active member in her local Muslim 
community.110 An outwardly observant Muslim, Zeenat speaks of being Muslim as giving her 
‘a goal to reach my Creator.’ She feels she is recognised as Muslim within wider society because 
of ‘dress, value and principles.’ According to Zeenat there is a general negative perception of 
Muslims:  
 
‘because of what’s going on in the world at the moment. We are judged on the actions of these 
[terrorists] who aren’t really Muslims at all…these Islamophobes don’t actually hate Muslims, 
you see, ’cause they don’t like terrorists. People in general don’t hate Muslims, they’re just 
confused.’  
 
Although Zeenat says Islamophobes are not representative of wide society, she still feels uneasy 
and ‘interacts with more caution’ when dealing with people outside of her own religious 
community. She believes that the reason Muslims are being maligned is that Islamophobia is a 
necessary evil, it is part of a ‘divine decree,’ something that ‘Allah tests us with to have sabr 
[patience]. We must endure and it means we become closer with our own kind.’ This sentiment 
is echoed in the comments of other banal withdrawn British Muslims who manage to find an 
underpinning religious reason for strengthening their in-group ties, self-defining their in-group 
                                                
108 I conducted an interview with Khalil on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
109 I conducted an interview with Khursheed on February 3rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
110 I conducted an interview with Zeenat on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
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The responses of targets of prejudice in both cases give us a glimpse into their chosen 
coping strategies, as well as their inter- and intra-group relations. The expressions of 
responses I detailed earlier in this chapter derive from specific examples and 
anecdotes to illustrate withdrawal in both cases. However, as a result of extensive 
analysis of interviews and archival sources, I realise that there are numerous other 
underlying factors to explain the spectrum of behaviours that withdrawn individuals 
display. Much of the responses of withdrawn targets are premised on various factors, two of 
which I will now analyse: rejecting other in-group responses and transition to withdrawal.  
 
4.1. Rejecting Other Coping Responses  
The reason why many Jewish and Muslim targets of prejudice choose to withdraw is 
that they find faults in the other two coping responses. They feel that both coping 
responses of assimilation and accommodation are flawed when it comes to tackling 
the abuses they are facing. In the case of Weimar Jews, many who chose to withdraw 
accused assimilationists such as the Centralverein (CV) ‘of neglecting the positive 
value of the Jews by drawing Jewish self-consciousness from the struggle against 
Antisemitism rather than vice versa’ (Niewyk 2001: 146). For example, in Einstein’s 
widely published letter to CV in 1920 he argued that Jews must feel a sense of self-
worth and respect themselves and their dignity before allying with non-Jews (Jüdische 
Rundschau 1920). He wrote:  
‘let [Jews] not pay attention to Aryans’ continued anti-Semitism…and instead let us 
focus on loving our own people’ (Ibid. 1920).111  
 
Through such critiques of liberal, assimilationist Jews, the withdrawn perpetuated a 
vicious cycle of blame: In 1921 Arnold Zweig called out liberal, assimilated Jews who 
desperately sought to fit into a society that was – in his eyes – unwilling to accept 
them, as: 
                                                
111 This quote is not to suggest that Einstein was withdrawn, but rather that his words in this letter 
appealed to the more withdrawn Weimar era Jews, the same way Martin Buber’s philosophy 
appealed to them, even though he was not withdrawn per se. 
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‘sinking, dissonant, full of conflict, and tragic; sinking as a part of the Jewish people, 
dissonant to the German nationality, full of conflict in relation to public life, and filled 
with deep tragedy for those high-minded and valuable individuals who see their place 
within German culture and as part of the German people’ (Zweig 1920/21: 388).112 
 
The popular Zionist philosopher Theodor Lessing coined the term ‘Jewish self-hate’ 
to describe the complete internalisation of Antisemitism to the extent that targets make 
every effort to rid themselves of the Jew within (Lessing 1930: 10-41). Jewish 
historian, Niewyk suggest that according to the overwhelming majority Weimar era 
Zionists:  
 
‘assimilation was dangerous precisely because it threatened permanently to suspend 
German Jews in a state of torment and frustration. Beyond disfiguring the Jewish 
character, assimilation intensified anti-Semitism, in the Zionist view.’ (Niewyk 1980: 
127).  
 
Zionists were heavily critical of the work of the Centralverein (CV), accusing it of 
doing more harm than good. The CV’s ‘assimilationist doctrines’ they said hindered 
any attempts at successfully challenging Antisemitism, and some even suggested that 
it heightened the slander against Jews as it stressed that Jews were good Germans and 
thus it ‘falsely denied their Jewish nationality and tried to force them upon an 
unwilling Germany’ (Niewyk 1980: 129).  
Accommodationist Jews were not spared from withdrawn Jews’ condemnation either. 
The staunch Zionist, Jacob Klatzkin, in his writings, accuses accommodationist Jews, 
such as the neo-Hasidic attempts to “‘spiritualise’ Judaism (Geist des Judentums)” as 
a means to create a more palatable image of the Jew for Gentile society. He refers to 
neo-Hasidism as ‘stylised Judaism’ that was acceptable enough for the non-Jews to 
feel unthreatened (Klatzkin 1918: 127); (Aschheim 1982: 135). They considered 
accommodationist Jews’ attempts to reinvent the German Jewish collective as a form 
of appeasement, a way to make expressions of Jewishness acceptable to wider society.  
Withdrawn British Muslims make similar critiques against their assimilationist and 
accommodationist brethren. Overall, everyone in this category whom I spoke with, 
was very defensive of their communities and heavily critical of groups like Prevent 
                                                
112 Translation taken from Niewyk, D. L. (2001). The Jews in Weimar Germany. Transaction 
Publishers. 
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strategy as it has come under fire in the past for ‘spying on Muslim communities.’ 
Many of the withdrawn British Muslims I spoke to single out some assimilated and 
accommodationist Muslim-led groups, such as the British Muslims for Secular 
Democracy (BMSD) or Sara Khan’s v-Inspired organisation that work toward 
countering violent extremism at the grassroots. Some of my interviewees, such as 34-
year-old civil rights campaigner, Qasim, accuse such organisations of ‘selling out,’ of 
being ‘house Muslims’ who, in Qasim’s words, ‘package Islam’ in a manner that 
‘pleases the non-Muslims masters.’113  
In fact, some of my interview participants are worried about the purpose of my study, 
such is the level of distrust amongst people within walled-off Muslim communities. 
Some of them wanted complete clarity regarding my supposed ‘ulterior motives,’ 
considering my Muslim sounding name and ethnic physical appearance many 
withdrawn participants wanted complete assurance that I won’t ‘make us look bad,’ 
as Asiah, a middle-aged, Somali-origin interviewee from East London asked me at 
the end of her interview.114 Other participants asked me point-blank if I were a 
‘government stooge.’ Once I had gained the confidence and trust of some participants 
they told me that while my intentions might not be malicious, I should stay clear of 
‘people like the Prevent-brigade, ‘cause [sic] they’ll want to misuse you to smear 
Muslims,’ said 20-something year-old student, Nafeesa from London.115 These 
sentiments are echoed by Navida, a 34-year-old woman from Gloucester: ‘these lot 
[assimilated Muslims] don’t care one bit about our communities. They just want to 
please their masters and get paid.’116 Navida referred to the government as the master 
and criticised Prevent campaigners.  
 
4.2. Transitions towards Withdrawal 
Those who choose the withdrawal coping strategy often ‘transition’ toward it from another 
coping strategy. In the case of Weimar Jews who transitioned towards withdrawal is the 
example of Erich Gutkind (1877-1965) who felt an inner Jewish spiritual revival in 
1916 and went on to become the leader of revivalist Jewish group, the Volksheim, in 
1919 (Scholem 1980: 81). Those who made the drastic switch from being assimilated 
                                                
113 I conducted an interview with Qasim on November 10th 2014 in London. 
114 I conducted an interview with Asiah on November 11th 2014 in London. 
115 I conducted an interview with Nafeesa October 20th 2014 in London. 
116 I conducted an interview with Navida on February 19th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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to becoming withdrawn Jews, like Gutkind, believed that they were ‘engag[ing] in a 
noble, radical experiment at whose center lay real Erlebnis,’ which was a real sense 
of community, ‘we’ feeling only to be found amongst their ‘own kind,’ in this case 
fellow Jews alone (Lubinski 1930); (Weil 1930: 281); (Aschheim 1982: 195-196).  
Even the most assimilated of German Jewry felt completely isolated at the thought of 
Germany being controlled by the Anti-Semitic Nazis. Henry Bauxbaum in his memoir 
illustrates this with the example of his mentor, Mr Kaufman whom he describes as: 
 
‘a believer in German greatness, and never being a Jew, considered himself apart from 
Germans…But the coming of the Nazis and their Anti-Semitic policies had turned his 
forever love of Germany and the German people into a fiery hate. Like with so many 
strong and upright natures; as his love had always been all love, so now his hate had 
become all hate.’117 
 
Pierre Ferrand gives the anecdote of his father’s transition from an assimilated, ‘self-
satisfied,’ Stuttgart middle-class Jew to a politically withdrawn Jew who called on his 
fellow Jews to immigrate to Palestine. Whereas before, Ferrand Sr. was a ‘German 
citizens of Jewish faith’ – with the accent on ‘German,’ interestingly, Ferrand notes 
how, in the early 1930s, his father began:  
 
‘urging the necessity of exile, especially for Jews, and stressed that pride in one’s 
roots, attachment to property, German patriotism and fear of the difficulties of exile 
were self-destructive feelings under these circumstances,’ (Ferrand 1988: 152).  
 
While the lower income ghetto Jews had their own explanation for fleeing Germany, 
or for remaining within Germany and yet not part of the system, the assimilated Jews, 
who in the initial days of Weimar would never have dreamt of calling for Aaliyah to 
Palestine, justified their choice in a manner similar to Kurt Goldstein: 
 
‘For us younger people, who groped with the question of our Jewish destiny, there 
seemed to be only two answers: a return to Orthodox and strict believing and a new 
form of ghetto life, or the recognition of the national entity of the Jewish people and 
their legitimate claim to the land of their fathers and to self-determination [sic]’ 
(Goldstein 1976: 97). 
 
                                                
117 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.200.  
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Many British Muslims have turned away from assimilation and accommodation to 
become withdrawn in the wake of terror attacks and their backlash. The continuous 
negative media portrayal is something all interviewees are acutely aware of and for 
many it is a reason to move away from wider society as 20-something Londoner, 
Nafeesa, said: ‘you feel unwanted.118 You are told you belong to the enemy.’ It is this 
sense of rejection that has led many of the withdrawn contemporary British Muslims 
to ‘stop trying to fit in as you know you’re not wanted,’ as Nafeesa asserts. 
Withdrawing away from wider society, and instead looking for unity within the faith 
in-group, gives withdrawn British Muslims a stronger sense of collective identity. 
Many find healing from Islamophobia in the bosom of ritualistic aspects of the faith 
that connect them with others who have also suffered as a result of Islamophobia. 
Thus, the hatred against their in-group acts as a glue; it reaffirms their belief that their 
in-group is the pinnacle of their selfhood, and it also boosts their relationship and 
connection with other isolated and withdrawn British Muslims.  
 
5. Causality Issues  
Here I present why I think that the responses I discuss throughout this chapter were 
mostly caused by Antisemitism and Islamophobia, rather than a result of a normal 
acculturation phenomenon, or because of other prejudices. Determining causality or 
making a credible link to a causal claim, is a major obstacle for qualitative researchers. 
Some qualitative researchers, as argued by Patton (1990: 423) fall into the trap of 
making ‘linear assumptions of quantitative analysis and begin to specify isolated 
variables that are mechanically linked together out of context…Simple statements of 
linear relationships may be more distorting than illuminating.’ But other qualitative 
researchers, like Miles and Huberman (1984: 132), reject these claims and instead 
assert that ‘[qualitative] field research is far better than solely quantified approaches 
at developing explanations of what we call local causality – the actual events and 
processes that led to specific outcomes’ (Miles and Huberman 1984: 132; emphasis 
in original).  
In the case of my research I have data gathered directly from first-hand oral and 
written accounts; interviews and autobiographies of British Muslims in contemporary 
England, and memoirs, diaries and journals from Weimar German Jews. In my 
                                                
118 I conducted an interview with Nafeesa on October 20th 2014 in London. 
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historical case study, all archival sources I used to gauge withdrawal responses of 
Weimar Jews towards Antisemitism specifically asserted that the individual’s feelings 
and actions were a direct result of the Antisemitism they were facing.  
When speaking to British Muslims in the withdrawal group, all of my participants 
who employ this coping strategy do so to formulate their response to Islamophobia. 
Firstly, it is because of the nature of the semi-structured interview, and the way in 
which I posed questions to my participants. In addition, I enquired how the individual 
deals with such issues in their daily lives, why they feel they respond in such a way, 
and how much importance they give to these negative encounters, as well as how it 
affects their interactions with wider society in the long term. In order to develop a 
causal link between Islamophobia and my participants’ responses, I kept in mind if 
they made mention of any particular events in time, which may have led to a 
heightening of Islamophobia, and whether they moulded their interactions with wider 
society, accordingly. 
Most if not all, of my participants claim that their reaction was a direct result of the 
Islamophobia in society. For example, most withdrawn participants who are (socially 
or politically) withdrawn, like Fahd, Atif, Mustafa and Zulfikar tell me how they have 
reacted to incidents of Islamophobia in the past, and their reasons for choosing to 
withdraw. Most if not all socially and politically withdrawn individuals I spoke with 
say they faced rhetorical or physical Islamophobia and it has meant they have been 
‘less willing’ to be part of wider society. In the case of most banal withdrawn people 
I spoke with, many are already so far removed from wider society that they claim they 
have never encountered Islamophobia directly. However, although they feel 
Islamophobia exists, they deny that the phenomenon affects them. Thus, indirectly, 
Islamophobia has perpetuated the withdrawal of individuals who are already 
ostracised from society. Other banal withdrawn individuals reason Islamophobia by 
suggesting that people who are targeting Muslims are ‘not aware about the goodness 
of Islam’ (Zeenat) and ‘they are misguided’ (Khursheed).119 120 
In addition, sometimes interviewees spoke about their personal transition from one 
type of coping strategy to another. For example, many withdrawn interviewees, like 
Mustafa and Ameen, tell me they were ‘forced to question their Muslim identity’ 
                                                
119 I conducted an interview with Zeenat on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
120 I conducted an interview with Khursheed on February 3rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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because of Islamophobia, and their response to countering it has been to ‘return to 
what Islam means.’121 122 ‘The only way to tackle Islamophobic abuse is to become a 
better Muslim,’ Mustafa aptly summed up. Other participants, like Zulfikar, say that 
they felt ‘an intensification of Islamophobia’ within society, ‘be it through media 
portrayals or in my day-to-day life.’123 Zulfikar says how his ‘life dramatically 
changed’ following the anti-Muslim backlash post-9/11. He tells me that he has been 
stopped and searched ‘over 50 times in the past two years,’ and this has made him 
grow despondent of wider society. ‘I wasn’t always like this,’ Zulfikar says, ‘as a 
young adult I had hopes that things would change, but now I’ve become cynical, you 
could say.’  
However, in order to confirm that their answers to interview questions were genuinely 
indicative of a causal relationship, sometimes, I had to consider other possible reasons 
for their choice of response and rule out these ‘rival explanations’ (Johnson 1997: 
287) i.e. they were naturally predisposed – by way of their personal character or 
family background – to withdraw from wider society. I ruled out such rival 
explanations in numerous ways during the course of my interviews. For instance, 
whilst I recorded the interviews, I also took notes on tone of voice and emotions of 
interviewees in order to gauge their frame of mind.  
 
6. Conclusion  
This chapter explored the withdrawal coping strategy, and how and why Weimar era 
German Jews and contemporary British Muslims choose to withdraw from wider 
society when faced with prejudice against their faith in-group. Engaging with the 
process of this coping strategy in-depth, I found that withdrawal shows a wide array 
of responses. I discussed three major modes of withdrawal, namely: social 
withdrawal, political withdrawal and banal withdrawal. Each of the three modes of 
withdrawal are manifest in different expressions. The first and foremost entails a great 
deal of existential questioning, looking inwardly on the part of the targeted individual. 
In this process, they often return to their roots, their origins, where they believe to 
have emerged within their faith in-group, deepening their strong attachment to the 
group. The second form involves the targeted individual expressing strong political 
                                                
121 I conducted an interview with Mustafa on November 23rd 2014 in London. 
122 I conducted an interview with Ameen on January 21st 2015 in Birmingham. 
123 I conducted an interview with Zulfikar on November 10th 2014 in London. 
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views by working outside of the established social and political frameworks of wider 
society. Heightening of such feelings can eventually lead the individual to leaving the 
physical boundaries of the established territory that commands wider society, leading 
them to search for a home to which they feel they can belong. The final mode, that of 
banal withdrawal, sees the individual becoming quiet, almost silent and passive in 
their response; choosing instead to either deny the extent of the prejudice they face, 
or reappropriate the stigma associated with being a member of their faith in-group. 
I also documented and explained targets’ transition toward withdrawal. I found it 
interesting to observe how most of those in the political withdrawal mode were former 
assimilationists who have had negative experiences with fully assimilating; despite 
giving up all aspects of their religious or ethnic identity they were not accepted by 
wider society. Hence, they revolted by asserting their Jewishness or Muslimness, 
respectively; an aspect of their identity that had prior to this been supressed and 
removed from their daily lives. What is common to all three modes of withdrawal is 
the need on part of targets of prejudice to feel secure and safe in being a Jew or a 
Muslim, devoid of any prerequisite stipulation of ‘fitting in’ to be considered ‘normal’ 
by being German and British, respectively. 
One final point to raise is that during the course of my research, I noticed the influence 
of subjective moderating factors, like age and gender, upon the responses of targets 
of Islamophobia and Antisemitism. With regards to British Muslim responses in the 
case of contemporary Islamophobia, 18 of the 90 people I interviewed are withdrawn, 
so a considerably small portion of the total. The overwhelming majority are women 
aged 35+ years-old, consisting mainly of housewives or stay-at-home mothers. 
Interestingly, the majority of withdrawn British Muslims whom I interviewed happen 
to be banal. The above two aspects of my findings together can help make sense of 
the nature of withdrawn responses; the majority of withdrawn British Muslims are 
banally withdrawn females over 35, who have little to no financial independence, and 
their general engagement with wider society on a daily basis is minute. Perhaps a 
reason why they choose to remain silent or deny the extent of the Islamophobia they 
face is because they simply do not have access to the resources which would allow 
them to tackle prejudice using a problem-focused response. Thus, their coping 
strategy is restricted to emotion-focused responses found in the form of banal 
withdrawal.  
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Interestingly, my findings for the case Weimar Antisemitism are somewhat similar to 
that of my contemporary case. The memoirs I read in which the response towards 
Antisemitism would be attributed to the withdrawal coping strategy consisted mainly 
of more mature Weimar era Jewish people. However, it also contains a sizeable 
number of younger Jews who were lured by the appeals of anti-establishment 
movements like Zionist struggle for Jewish nationalism. As such, while the older 
withdrawn Weimar era Jews subscribed to banal withdrawal, the younger generation 
of withdrawn Weimar Jews was more interested in political withdrawal, which 








In this chapter, I explore accommodation, the final of the three coping strategies, in 
order to engage with my third research question: ‘How and why do targets of 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia choose their coping strategies?’ I begin the chapter 
by reiterating the meaning of accommodation, generally and specifically as a response 
towards prejudice. I then consider anticipated themes and emergent themes that form 
the basis of three different modes of accommodation, namely: social, political and 
banal accommodation. Later, I analyse these modes of accommodation in detail to 
illustrate their particularities using expressions and examples found in both the 
historical Antisemitism and contemporary Islamophobia case studies. Following an 
extensive exploration of the three modes of accommodation, I discuss various other 
underlying factors to explain the spectrum of behaviours that accommodationists 
display. I then provide an explanation for issues of causality to show that the choice 
of accommodation is in response to Antisemitism and Islamophobia rather than 
normal acculturation. The chapter concludes with a brief comment regarding the role 
of subjective moderating factors, such as age and gender, in influencing the choice of 
accommodation as a coping strategy. 
 
2. Accommodation as a Coping Strategy 
Accommodation occupies the middle ground between the assimilation and 
withdrawal responses towards negative stereotyping, stigma and scapegoating. This 
coping strategy entails adapting within the parameters of an external environment, 
whilst simultaneously retaining elements of one’s targeted in-group identity. It 
involves the individual adjusting both the in-group and the out-group identity; 
moulding the self to fit within the out-group of wider society, whilst simultaneously 
creating a sense of acceptance within wider society for certain in-group particularities. 
In prior theories, accommodation is defined as a form of mutual adaptation between 
individuals and wider society ‘for the purpose of reducing conflict and allowing group 
identities and cultures to be maintained’ (Berry 1980). Here, it is crucial for me to 
emphasise the role of prejudice as the stressor that causes an individual’s choice to 
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accommodate in order to cope with it. Hence, accommodation in the context of my 
research is a ‘response shaped by experience of prejudice’ (Gibson. 1988: 67).  
Accommodationists can express themselves in many different ways, however, what 
is common to all forms is that it is a gradual process, founded in the formation of 
alliances, building bridges and fostering empathy within, rather than agitation or 
protesting against, wider society. Essentially, accommodation is not a singular process 
propped on a ‘straight-line account’ with different reasons for and trajectories leading 
towards it (Joppke & Morawska 2002: 50-52).  
In sum, having discussed the above, I find that accommodation is a ‘third way’ 
response that is not just a static form of robust rebuttal by a targeted individual vis-à-
vis society. Accommodation does not function in a vacuum and when it comes to 
decision-making, accommodationist individuals choose their strategy based on spatial 
and temporal occurrences, hence, they readily attune their response with time and 
experience. However, what is common to all responses towards prejudice in this 
coping strategy is that accommodationists use them to preserve or enhance their self-
esteem. Accommodation entails the following anticipated themes: acknowledging 
wider society’s prejudices regarding their in-group without accepting them as a true 
reflection of the group, and realising that the in-group has its flaws; clearly 
distinguishing and negotiating between wider society’s negative perceptions of their 
in-group and their own personal evaluation of the group.  
On further analysis of these accommodationist responses, using NVivo qualitative 
data analysis software, and exploring archival sources in detail, certain other themes 
emerged, which are: engaging in a diplomatic manner with the in-group and out-group 
by coordinating with wider society; working actively within the established political 
system and valuing inter-group alliances whilst maintaining in-group identity; 
keeping a low profile with regards to their in-group and out-group identity whilst 
valuing both identities in their day-to-day lives. These emergent themes formed the 
basis of the three different modes of accommodation, namely: social, political and 
banal accommodation.  
 
3. Modes of Accommodation  
In this section, I illustrate the spectrum of responses towards Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia in each of the three modes of accommodation. Social accommodationist 
involves the individual seeking to create a cohesive middle group between their in-
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group and wider society when faced with prejudice. This is quite a diplomatic 
approach to challenging the dominant narratives of wider society, whilst 
acknowledging that their in-group also requires adjustment. Social accommodationist 
Weimar Jews and British Muslims in contemporary England value internal self-
discipline, and many engage with interfaith advocacy as well as community cohesion 
initiatives in order to tackle prejudice.  
Political accommodation entails individuals politically engaging in wider society in 
order to deconstruct hateful narratives against their in-group, all the while working 
within the established political framework of wider society (Taras 2012). In general, 
political accommodationist belief upholds that they cannot be selective in their cause; 
for their voices to be heard, they deem it necessary to form alliances with other 
minority groups that are targeted for their differences. Both Weimar era Jews and 
British Muslims in contemporary England who choose political accommodation 
believe in the power of grassroots initiatives that call for change from within their 
respective faith in-groups, as well as on the part of society at large, for their identities 
to be accepted and not just tolerated.  
Banal accommodation is the everyday form of accommodation, which entails 
individuals keeping a low profile regarding their collective identities when faced with 
prejudice. Banal accommodationists ‘pick and choose’ from elements of wider 
society, in order to maintain the main internal narrative of both their in-group and out-
group identities. Individuals in this category acknowledge the benefits that wider 
society has to offer them and although they internalise prejudice, they are not upfront 
and willing to express a direct challenge to society at large, even if they feel it is 
necessary.  
Now, I discuss each mode of accommodation in detail to illustrate their particularities 
using expressions and examples found in both historical Antisemitism and 
contemporary Islamophobia case studies. 
 
3.1. Social Accommodation 
Social accommodationists are capable of thinking outside of their in-group collective, 
which encourages them to engage in a diplomatic manner with wider society, in order 
to spread awareness about their in-group’s intricacies and particularities. 
Simultaneously, this mode acknowledges need for change from within the in-group 
as well. Essentially, social accommodationists call for internal as well as external 
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change, i.e. mutual adaptation of both their collective and wider society. Followers of 
this mode of accommodation include proponents of inter-racial harmony and inter-
faith dialogue. Choosing social accommodation demonstrates the importance of 
upholding pride in oneself by making a counter-intuitive claim to suggest that not only 
is their targeted identity compatible with wider society, in fact, their internal narratives 
and identities compliment it. This gives the individual a sense of direction, surety and 
clarity in their selfhood and choice of responses to prejudice.   
Social accommodation strategies are favoured by a multitude of voices combating 
both Antisemitism and Islamophobia. They include advocates of community level 
movements for social cohesion and building bridges on the basis of faith identities.  
People who choose to express themselves in this way have two aspects to their 
reaction. Firstly, they acknowledge the need to look inwardly within their collective, 
and to tactfully adapt and accommodate to positive aspects of wider society. This I 
refer to as internal self-discipline. Secondly, accommodationists feel it their duty to 
bring about social change within wider society, usually through education, and to 
dispel misconceptions and negative portrayals of their in-group, through community 
cohesion. I now discuss the two forms of expression of social accommodation using personal 
accounts from archival sources and interview excerpts in order to build narratives to 
elaborate each form of expression.  
 
3.1.1. Internal Self-Discipline 
The first form of expression of social accommodation entails a need to look inwardly 
so as to somehow ‘prevent’ the occurrence of targeting. This by no means suggests 
that like their more assimilated brethren, social accommodationist also find in-group 
practices to be abhorrent and thus decide to do away with them. Instead, they 
recognise such practices as potential triggers for prejudices and so they act cautiously 
and tactfully to fend off hatred. Those following this form of social accommodation 
wish to simultaneously educate society of their in-group’s particularities, and 
encourage their fellow collective in-group members to adapt to, and involve 
themselves in, the ways of wider society. Essentially, they acknowledge that the 






Maintaining self-discipline amongst their collective was a major priority for 
accommodationist Weimar Jews as a way to combat Antisemitism, by preventing 
Jews from being exploited at the hands of Judeophobic rhetoric. In times of 
heightened tension between Jews and wider society, more visibly apparent Jews were 
admonished by their accommodationist fellows for aggravating Anti-Semitic 
behaviour from wider society (Meyer 1998: 104). Accommodationist Jews were not 
asking for a full public-private divide like their assimilationist counterparts, but rather, 
they saw the need for Jews to feel self-assured in their Jewishness, yet simultaneously 
cautious and considerate of Gentile Germans in wider society. Their lives were a 
constant struggle to negotiate the Jewish and German aspects of their identity. The 
notion of self-discipline became so popular that in 1920 Leo Loewenstien founded a 
special ‘self-discipline committee’ (Schäffer 1926: 153).  The committee held pride 
in its drive to return ‘to a simpler more serious form of living’ (Kämpft mit uns 1921); 
(Niewyk 1980: 92). It was this spiritually grounded, immaterial belief that enabled 
Weimar Jews to feel that becoming good Germans was intrinsically linked to 
becoming good Jews. An example of this is found in Kurt Alexander’s 1919 assertion: 
 
‘For us, being German is not a political, but rather a spiritual and emotional concept. 
For us, being German is an inner experience. In our souls we can no longer distinguish 
between what is German and what is Jewish. German and Jewish are fused into 
oneness in our souls, and never can any power on earth tear the German, the love of 
our homeland, out of our hearts’ (Blätter 1919: 180).124 
 
This sentiment is echoed by Rosenweig that suggests that becoming more of a Jew 
did not make one less of a German:  
 
‘Perhaps I am especially innocent with regard to the problem of Germanism and 
Judaism. I believe that becoming more Jewish has not made me a worse but rather a 
better German. I really think that those in the generation before us… were no better 
German than we are’ (Rosenzweig 1923: 1887-88).125 
 
                                                
124 Translation taken form Niewyk, D. L. (1998). The Jews in Weimar Germany. Transaction 
Publishers. 
125 Translation from Meyer, M. A. (Ed.). (1998). German-Jewish History in Modern Times, volume 4: 
Renewal and Destruction, 1918-1945. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 166 
As with most faith-based communities, the message of self-discipline was especially 
geared towards women. Weimar Jewish women were ‘advised to avoid tactless 
displays of ostentatious clothing and jewellery,’ and carry themselves in a modest 
manner as they were vice-regents of their faith group (Der Schild 1922: 47-9); 
(Niewyk 1980: 92). In fact, such was the desire to portray their faith in-group in 
positive light, as both upstanding German citizens and proud Jews, the Israelitisches 
Familienblatt – which was one of the bestselling German-Jewish newspapers of its 
time – began printing weekly ‘advice’ leaflets, in order to educate its readership to 
become exemplary Jews for wider society, and create a positive image that was 
equally confident in its Jewishness as well as its Germanness (Israelitisches 
Familienblatt 1923). This message was increased tenfold during High holidays and 
festivals when communal leaders and rabbis, knowing that there would be an 
unusually large number of Jews out in the open, asked for their congregants to carry 
themselves politely and respectfully, and to avoid carrying religious items and prayer 
books, lest they cause ‘rishes’ (provocation of Antisemitism) (Meyer 1998: 104). The 




Much like their Jewish counterparts, British Muslims also stress the need to avoid 
drawing attention to one’s religious identity in the public sphere. For example, 
Rakshanda, a middle-aged librarian from Gloucester, speaks of how she is a ‘proud’ 
and ‘openly observant Muslim,’ but she would not wear the shalwar kameez (South 
Asian traditional garments) outdoors as ‘people will think I am dressed differently.’126 
It attracts unwarranted negative racist attention and one should ‘try to minimise such 
things.’ Similarly, Naheed a retired community worker from Gloucester mentioned 
‘whenever I go out I wear trousers’ after facing verbal abuse and racial slurs of 
‘taliban’ directed at her for wearing a shalwar kameez in public.127  
British Muslim religious and community leaders have emphasised the need to be 
discreet in their display of faith to avoid unwarranted Islamophobic attacks. Many 
scholars have issued fatwas (religious edicts) calling Muslim women to remove the 
                                                
126 I conducted an interview with Rakshanda on February 19th 2015 in Gloucester. 
127 I conducted an interview with Naheed on February 19th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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headscarf, lest it provoke unnecessary negative attention, particularly in the wake of 
7/7 hostilities and fears of backlash. Some accommodationist British Muslims 
consider this a sensible way to protect British Muslim women, as they are the biggest 
victims of anti-Muslim hate-crimes (Tell MAMA 2016). Some religiously observant 
participants I spoke with believe, that being a practising British Muslim means that 
they had to be good British citizens. These people emphasise the teachings of the 
Prophet (pbuh) to claim that that Muslims ‘living in foreign lands’ must adhere to the 
laws of that country in order to remain ‘true to the faith of Islam.’ 
Such sentiments are expressed by Shaheen, a 30-something lawyer from London who 
considered herself to be a representative of her faith. Shaheen feels: 
 
‘a responsibility because of my headscarf… It is very important for me that [wider 
society] understand. I like to turn the stereotype on its head. So that's why I do things 
like taekwondo, I go trekking quite a lot. I have interactions with non-Muslims quite 
a bit…I know that I'm making an impression because we have so much negative 
publicity in the media, it's quite frightening...but I do believe we are vice-regents, 
representative of the Muslim community.’128  
 
That said, accommodationist Muslims also expect a certain degree of acceptance of 
their religious particularities such as being ‘visibly Muslim in public spaces.’ They 
believe that there should be ‘no compulsion’ for Muslims to assimilate, or give up 
their expressions of faith. According to 21-year-old London student, Halima:  
 
“the choice to reveal or conceal our faith practices should be up to us as individual 
Muslims, whatever we’re comfortable with. The state should not tell us to ‘tone down’ 
our Muslimness in public spaces. What’s next they’ll be enforcing bans on hijabs?”129  
 
Halima’s words resonate with Nina, a 60-something grandmother from a middle-class 
neighbourhood in Birmingham.130 Nina believes that wider society must 
accommodate for Muslims and they should be accepted for who they are, provided 
they are ‘civil, respectful and law-abiding.’ In attempt to convey the importance of 
being accepted by wider society, Shaheen echoes Nina’s sentiment by asserting that, 
the ‘major obstacle’ against Islamophobia is that wider society does not offer British 
Muslim a ‘level playing field,’ and this ‘perpetuates the prejudices they face.’ 
                                                
128 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
129 I conducted an interview with Halima on October 19th 2014 in London. 
130 I conducted an interview with Nina on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
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Furthermore, many people I spoke to, feel similar to 30-something Londoner and 
pharmaceutical consultant, Waseem.131 He says that it has now become necessary for 
British Muslims to engage within wider society with the aim of ‘projecting a positive 
image of Muslims.’ However, he maintains that he is upset at this predicament of 
‘constantly having to prove that you are normal.’ Such is the ‘balanced’ view of 
accommodationists; they acknowledge that sometimes they need to mould themselves 
in accordance with wider society’s norms, but wider society should also accept and 
actively engage members of their in-group.  
 
3.1.2. Community Cohesion  
Religious minorities have long championed social engagement, inter-faith advocacy 
in particular, as it gives them a sense of belonging by connecting different groups 
based on core principles and shared experiences. This form of socialisation is of 
tremendous advantage to minorities, in terms of dispelling myths and increasing 
awareness.  Their motto is to live in harmony without completely letting go of who 
they are. Both in the case of Judaism and Islam, followers have found it particularly 
positive for their self-worth to affirm links with the dominant values of wider society. 
For them it is not a matter of choosing between either of their dichotomous identities; 
between being a German and being a Jew, or being a Briton and being a Muslim. In 
reality, their goal is to strike a balance in expressing both ‘halves’ of their identity 
simultaneously (Wassermann 1921: 126). In terms of interfaith activism, it is about 
the faithful ‘walking together’ but strictly ‘without merger [into one]’, it emphasises 
‘a oneness of worship without a oneness of worshippers’ (Die Kreatur 1926: 1). 
 
Historical case 
It was their ‘quest to adjust personal life to its fuller existential reality’, which led 
many German Jews to ‘reaffirm their national and spiritual identity as Jews’ (Meyer 
1998: 165). Furthermore, upholding the ‘right’ version of Judaism was significant to 
accommodationist Jews, making them fervent proponents of a religious revival of 
sorts, particularly in response to the Antisemitism preceded by the World War (Beegle 
2008). As such, for some Jews there was great emphasis on inter-faith work as a means 
to gain this acceptance. It was about the German Gentile and the German Jew meeting 
                                                
131 I conducted an interview with Waseem on October 18th 2014 in London. 
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‘as equals’ (Meyer 1998: 165). Several rabbis and community leaders were 
instrumental in building bridges to their Christian neighbours by inviting groups of 
them to visit synagogues in order to familiarise themselves with Judaism (Straus 1962: 
266); (Niewyk 1980: 94). Open days and talks in synagogues were held in 1930 by 
the Representative Assembly of the Berlin Jewish Community in order to educate, 
dispel misconceptions and to combat intolerance and Antisemitism (der Israelit 
1931).132 In the eyes of many Berlin Jews, this intolerance for the other was bred out 
of ignorance. Rahel Straus’s introspective comment on the disconnect between Jewish 
and non-Jewish women in her surroundings who had come together to fight racism is 
very revealing in this respect:  
 
‘We lived among each other, sat together in the same school room, attended university 
together met at other social events – and were complete strangers. Was it their fault? 
Ours? Hard to say, but also meaningless. It was a fact, of portentous consequence for 
the time, that those who wanted to stand up for us knew nothing about us’ (Straus 
1962: 266).133 
 
Another example of inter-faith dialogue between German Jews and Christians was 
Die Kreatur, a quarterly journal published from 1926 to 1930 jointly edited by a 
Catholic, Joseph Wittig, a Jew, Martin Buber, and a Protestant, Viktor von 
Weizsäcker. The journal ‘studiously avoided theological discussion’ (Meyer 1998: 
163). Similarly, Grüsse aus den Exilen journal was formed to foster community 
cohesion, whilst respecting differences. Harmony between German Christians and 
German Jews was only possible through understanding each other’s religion. This 
sentiment is apparent in Rosenzweig’s letter to Martin Buber:  
‘During the century of emancipation…the Christian ignored the Jew so as to tolerate 
him; [similarly] the Jew ignored the Christian so that he could be tolerated…Now we 
have begun entering – or rather have entered – the new era of persecution…as a result, 
the silence of the last centuries comes to a halt’ (Rosenzweig 1924). 
 
Essentially, this idea of mere tolerance was no longer an option in the eyes of German 
Jews; there was need to have their differences accepted by wider society in order to 
feel at ease and to protect self-esteem.  
                                                
132 See also, Gemeindeblatt der Jüdischen Gemeinde zu Berlin, XX (1930), 131-36,  
133 Cited in Niewyk, D. L. (1998). The Jews in Weimar Germany. Transaction Publishers, p.94. 
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Accommodationist German Jews considered community cohesion a powerful and 
ennobling experience. This form of social accommodation took root in inter-faith 
activism and allowed accommodationist Jews to differentiate themselves from both 
the merged assimilationists and the Zionists. Rosenzweig’s writings explain how the 
assimilation, premised on the Centralverein’s notion of a ‘synthesis’ was:  
 
‘but a slogan designed to avoid acknowledging the reality of the tension,’ while 
Zionism sought to resolve the situation ‘by securing integrity of Jewish identity at the 
price of abandoning involvement with Deutschtum  [Germanness]’ (Rosenzweig 
1923: 887-88).134  
 
The reason why some accommodationist Weimar Jews desired to partake in 
community cohesion was because they saw it as a means to actively engage in the 
education of masses within wider Gentile society. Moreover, they saw it as a duty of 
an accommodationist German Jew to engage, not just on the basis of faith, but more 
explicitly to prove they were just like any other functioning member of society. In 
doing so, Jews sought preservation of self-esteem at an optimal level. Most of the 
more self-confident and grounded Jews were those who could articulate their stance 
and negotiate both their German and Jewish identities in direct face of negativity and 
hatred. Tackling racist congregations is a dangerous task and being successful in 
collapsing them can be very rewarding internally. In this way the German Jew was 
not compromising either form of their dichotomous identity.  
 
Contemporary case 
British Muslim accommodationists are also assertive in their social engagement, as 
they feel wider society must be educated about their collective in-group’s intricacies 
in order to counter Islamophobia. In their eyes, it is essential for members of their 
faith in-group to maintain a balance between internal narratives of faith and 
socialisation within wider society so as to give them an optimal identity and protect 
self-esteem. Inter-faith work has been a core component of British Muslim activism 
for decades, but has become a major response in the face of ever-increasing 
Islamophobia. It has gained widespread popularity particularly amongst younger 
                                                
134 Translation partially taken from Meyer, M. A. (Ed.). (1998). German-Jewish History in Modern 
Times, volume 4: Renewal and Destruction, 1918-1945. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
in 161. 
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generations. There are numerous inter-faith networks across Britain established long 
before 9/11, but exponentially expanding in roles and work in the past decade. Joining 
such groups allows practicing Muslims like their Jewish counterparts to dispel myths, 
educate and build bridges based on faith (Peace 2005: 205).  
Interfaith activism is no longer confined to reading groups or scriptural similarities 
although that is a large component of tradition Abrahamic interfaith work. For 
example, activities supported by the London-based interfaith networks, such as the 
Three Faiths Forum (3FF), have now expanded to include art exhibits, Urban Cultural 
Festivals, and interfaith choirs, alongside the more traditional outreach programmes 
to schools visiting places of worship and dialogue projects between community 
leaders.135 Such projects have become even more prominent in London following the 
election of Sadiq Khan as the first Muslim mayor of the city in 2016. Khan’s election 
has been dubbed a victory against prejudice, considering his opponent’s attempts to 
slander him with Islamophobic accusations in the run-up to election (Khaleeli 2016). 
Khan is passionate about interfaith cohesion and sums up the meaning of social 
accommodation: 
 
“Social integration is not about ‘assimilation’ and it is perfectly possible for people to 
have multiple identities. I myself am a Londoner, a Brit, someone of Pakistani 
heritage, and a Muslim. But it is clear that a laissez-faire, hands off approach to 
integration simply doesn’t work.  We must build bridges rather than walls and we 
must be strong, proud and patriotic in asserting our progressive and tolerant western 
values.” (Khan 2016).136 
Many of my interview participants empathise with Khan’s belief in ‘building bridges.’ 
For instance, despite the Islamophobia she faced throughout her life, Nina from 
Birmingham maintains that it is her inter-faith community that served as the source of 
her ‘tolerance and forgiveness.’ Similarly, Shaheen from London says that she has 
‘had a very practical understanding of Islam…built on loving thy neighbour.’137 This 
highlights how ‘in-touch’ some accommodationists could be with their faith in a very 
personal and private sense, but also how, when they were in the public eye; they could 
repackage their faith in a way that would fit in well with society at large. Shaheen 
                                                
135 The Three Faiths Forum in London, which began as an interfaith charity set up by a Muslim, a 
Jew and Christian 
136 This is an excerpt from Sadiq Khan’s speech, Building bridges rather than walls, given to an 
audience of academics and political leaders in Chicago (15 September 2016). 
137 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
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goes on to expand her definition of her faith, using a famous quote from Imam Ali 
(as.):  
 
‘You’re either my brother in humanity or you're my brother in religion [faith] That is 
the key reason why we are here to serve others.’   
 
Implementing this message in practice is very dear to the accommodationist British 
Muslims I encountered. One such person is a young religious preacher from 
Gloucester, Usman, who holds regular open days, in order to dispel misconceptions 
and build bridges between Muslims and non-Muslims.138 Alongside this, Usman is 
well-known amongst the Muslims and non-Muslims of Gloucester city for his charity 
drives and engagement with foodbanks. Usman believes that it is his duty as a Muslim 
and as a Briton to help the poor and needy on his doorstep before he could help those 
in other ‘impoverished countries.’ For him, the best tool for a British Muslim in 
countering Islamophobia is to:  
 
‘start small…[and] engage with your neighbours. Just speak to others. This is your act 
of good citizenship and the prophetic teaching of Da’wah [missionary work].’    
 
This resonates with the actions of Birmingham Central Mosque’s recent, successful 
‘Best of British’ tea party in response to an English Defence League (EDL) march. 
Mosque officials joined forces with West Midlands Police force to invite local 
residents to the mosque to show community cohesion in the face of far-right 
extremism. The mosque’s chairman, Muhammad Afzal, said of the event: 
‘When the English Defence League is protesting and trying to divide the community, 
we are holding this party just to prove to them that Birmingham is a multicultural, 
multi-ethnic and multi-faith community…We are all united and they will not be able 
to divide us and create hatred.’ (Telegraph 2017). 
 
3.2. Political Accommodation 
This mode entails a slightly more robust expression of individuals’ responses to 
prejudice. Individuals in this group actively seek to change the status quo through 
political activism. Political accommodationists are not only fighting a battle against a 
selective form of prejudice that affects their in-group, as often such struggles highlight 
                                                
138 I conducted an interview with Usman on February 19th 2015 in Gloucester. 
 173 
the interdimensionality of their identity. Their struggle of coping with prejudice 
affecting their in-group is intertwined with the fight against racism, sexism and even 
homophobia. For this reason, sometimes they empathise with other targets of 
prejudice, but more often, it is because they are trying to fend off prejudices directed 
towards the multiple layers of their identity. Through this, they gain a sense of security 
in their actions and rhetoric, and become part of cross-group alliances within wider 
society. For example, in the Weimar era, many Jews were also part of the German 
Socialists Party (SPD), combatting anti-fascist movements, and present-day British 
Muslims are prominent members of groups like Unite Against Fascism and Black 
Lives Matter.  
Crucial to note here is that political accommodation is premised on the concept of 
resilience, which entails the individual adapting to wider society in the face of conflict 
or disarray (Simon & Randalls 2016: 46). Choosing to be resilient involves being 
defiant in the face of prejudice and this means that the targeted individual retains 
greater agency in decision making, and can often restore a strong sense of self through 
community engagement or allying with other groups within wider society (Hargreaves 
2015). Resilience differs sharply from resistance (employed by withdrawn 
individuals), as unlike resistance it requires the individual to work within the 
established socio-political system of wider society instead of going against it.  
I now discuss the two forms of expression of political accommodation using personal 
accounts from archival sources and interview excerpts in order to build narratives to 
elaborate each form of expression.  
 
3.2.1. Grassroots Activism 
In both the Weimar and contemporary cases, individuals join grassroots organisations 
that provide a greater platform to air their grievances against prejudice (Abbas 2010). 
Grassroots organisations are often composed of youth groups, student activists, and 
religious minority groups campaigning for an end to prejudices. Both wider society 
and the in-group often consider these groups as rogue, because they perceive that 
grassroots activism and its efforts against prejudice require the target to ‘be the 
change.’ This form of political accommodation places great emphasis on the voices 
of the youth, and ‘minorities within minorities,’ which can sometimes ruffle the 
feathers of current figureheads of their in-group.   
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Political accommodationists differ from their social counterparts in that they find even 
less comfort in the idea of an all-encompassing collective, monolithic concept of a 
faith-based in-group (Peace 2015); (Rahman 2010). Thus, they feel it is not their 
moral obligation to protect the ‘honour’ of their in-group community, and yet they 
still feel comfortable in being individual members of their in-group, i.e. as Jews and 
Muslims in their respective faith in-group communities. This is apparent in both 
historical and contemporary cases, as I now show, below.  
 
Historical case  
Political accommodationist Weimar Jews were strong proponents of grassroots 
organisation, i.e. mobilising from the bottom up. This is because political movements 
at the grassroots consisted mainly of young, energetic and politically active men and 
women who, in the face of growing Antisemitism, ‘aimed not to assimilate passively 
or melt into the German people but to rekindle a spirit of Judaism that had long since 
passed’ (Sharfman 2003: 200). In order to achieve this, they believed it was vital to 
organise with other like-minded individuals, which led many of them to join local 
chapters of political parties, like the German Socialists Party (SPD), largely because 
of its stance against Antisemitism (Meyer 1998). Whilst this was their outward 
response directed toward wider society, politically withdrawn Jews were critical of 
the apathy found within their Jewish social circles. For instance, many were highly 
critical of the older generation for their rapid assimilation within Gentile society and 
accused them of neglecting their Jewish heritage in favour of ‘materialist bourgeois 
lifestyles,’ (Sharfman 2003: 200). Although there were numerous such groups, the 
Blau-Weiss youth group stands out in particular.139 In its initial days, this group served 
as a glue for many young German Jews who might have felt confused regarding their 
position as a scapegoated minority within society. This is partly because their aim was 
to ‘bring pride back to Judaism,’ and they achieved it by showing the youth a way 
‘that they could be Jewish without diminishing their love to their German Fatherland’ 
(Sharfman 2003: 200).  
As such, for Weimar Jews, being German and Jewish signified more than just 
membership of a Glaubensgemeinschaft (faith community). For them, their in-group 
                                                
139 Later the Blau-Weiss transitioned to withdrawn group, but initially it was a politically 
accommodative group of student activists. The commitment to Germanness was only initial pre-1921. 
Then in 1926-7 complete move to Palestine meant loss of German and Jewish (in the religious sense). 
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was also a Volksgemeinschaft (socio-political community), in which religion was just 
one strand binding the group together, alongside heritage and political will (Sharfman 
2003, 200).140 This was particularly important to grassroots movements that sought to 
redefine Jewishness in post-World War I Germany, a time when political 
assertiveness within the mainstream, was necessary, especially for those who did not 
wish to withdraw from wider society completely. During this period, Antisemitism 
had reached a peak, and for politically accommodationist Jews this was considered an 
opportune moment to reassert their Jewish Germanness in a political domain, by 
attending anti-racism rallies alongside demonstrations supporting troops. Resilient 
socio-political engagement of this nature also took shape in the activities of Jewish 
defence groups, such as the Jewish Frontline Veterans (Reichsbund jüdischer 
Frontsoldate), established to dispel misconceptions about Jews by handing out 
leaflets and organising anti-racism demonstrations to counter fascist marches across 
German towns (Niewyk 1980: 90). 141 
Other politically accommodationist Weimar Jews who joined grassroots organisations 
in the frontlines in the fight against Antisemitism did not display an overt bond with 
their faith in-group. Their main purpose to end fascism was not driven by their 
intrinsic desire to uphold their Jewishness; they just happened to be Jewish. This was 
the case for the overwhelming majority of German Socialists of Jewish heritage who 
were radically opposed to Antisemitism, but not so because of a strong connection to 
Judaism or affiliation with their fellow in-group members. In fact, most of these sort 
of political accommodationist Jews were for all intents and purposes secular, and 
distant from the Hebrew heritage (Niewyk 1971: 16). That said, they believed that 
being secular was a choice and no one should be forced into assimilation. An example 
of this is Hermann Gerson, who stood as a local German Socialists Party (SPD) 
election candidate to represent the town of Kameraden in 1932.  In a speech, Gerson 
addressed his unique position as a politically engaged German Jew who was neither 
assimilated nor withdrawn:  
 
                                                
140 I cannot stress enough that this was initial. The spirituality was more accommodative, then when 
they lost sense of this it was at the time when nothing felt stronger than choosing Galuth (forced exile 
of Jews). Aim and vision became skewed. 
141 Also see groups such as the Jewish Boxing Club Maccabi, and the Zionist Sports Association ‘Bar 
Kochba’ which along with the league above founded the Jewish Defense Service (Jüdischer Abwehr-
Dienst) 
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“Dear Friends! Time and again I hear this question: ‘Why aren’t we [all] Zionists?’ 
That means, ‘Why aren’t we going to Palestine?’ I will make my best effort to address 
this question. It is true that we supposedly assimilated Jews have grown more in touch 
with our Jewishness. So, naturally, we are asked: ‘Why shouldn’t we be entirely 
Jewish, why shouldn’t Jewish life be complete for us?’ And I say, here [in the 
diaspora] life cannot be complete in simply [being Jewish]. We [Jews] cannot forget 
that we live in galuth [exile], with all it strains and sorrows, but emigrating to Palestine 
is not the correct way to redress this either” (Gerson 1932).142 
 
Here, subscribing to Zionism is equated with losing touch with wider society. Political 
accommodationists acknowledged the drawbacks of being a resented minority in 
Germany, but many did not believe that a strong bond with Jewish nationalism 
(Zionism) was the answer. Instead, they asserted their independence as politically 
aware Jews in wider Gentile society, whilst forging a healthy distance from their faith 
in-group, so that it did not consume their individual identity entirely. In similar vein, 
it was quite common around election time for some politically active and not 
necessarily party-affiliated Jews to attend rallies and demonstrations, as illustrated in 
Bauxbaum’s memoir where he gives the example of the ‘three Levi brother from 
Nidda’ who were proud of their Jewish heritage, without constantly referring to it. 
Bauxbaum commends the brothers, as they:  
 
‘Stood out for their fearlessness and intrepidity during [Anti-Semitic] encounters. 
They always marched into the meeting halls as a team and fought as a team. Their 
fearlessness and courage impressed even the Anti-Semitic [sic] within the crowd. I 
remember a few meetings when they were being applauded.’143  
 
Contemporary case  
With regards to the contemporary case, British Muslims who choose political 
accommodation are often fighting a larger battle for acceptance and not just on the 
basis of their faith in-group identity. This could potentially explain why there has been 
a rapid increase in Muslim student activism in past five years in university campuses 
across England, and indeed the rest of the UK, with British Muslim students holding 
high-ranking positions in student unions and societies (Massoumi 2016: 4). 
                                                
142Excerpt quoted in Klönne, I. (1993). Deutsch, Jüdisch, Bündisch, Erinnerung an die aus 
Deutschland vertreibene jüdische Jugendbewegung (puls. Dokumentationsschrift der 
Jugendbewegung, p.12. Cited in Brenner, M., & Penslar, D. J. (1998). In Search of Jewish 
Community: Jewish Identities in Germany and Austria, 1918-1933. Indiana University Press, p.40. 
143 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.220. 
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Interesting to note here is that political accommodationists are not necessarily 
religious, in terms of practice. However, some cite the reason for their commitment 
to activism is that wider society forces them to question and re-assess their 
‘Muslimness’ in the immediate aftermath of terrorist atrocities. This has led many 
politically active British Muslims I spoke with to become cautious of Islamophobia 
and redress it. Being young British Muslims who are coming of age, during this time, 
many are forced to become aware of their Muslim heritage, not as a religion or way 
of life, but as a marker of who they are in the eyes of others.  
The importance of grassroots organisations was articulated by Mahmood, a Bengali-
origin student from Birmingham who is a strong proponent of ‘various levels of 
organising Muslims at grassroots.’144 But like other political accommodationists, 
Mahmood takes a firm stance that organising is ‘strictly not to apologise,’ echoing the 
sentiments of their historical counterparts who were equally as defiant and determined 
in their demands for recognition and acceptance from wider society. A Muslim mayor 
from Gloucestershire, Ahmed, also supports this idea of education and organisation 
‘at a grassroots level. To change people’s minds it should be done at a school level.’145 
Ahmed believes that for this to happen, Muslims need to push for ‘platforms to have 
their voices heard.’ Mahmood echoes this idea for the ‘need to push boundaries’ 
which he says can be achieved when young British Muslims ‘demand safe spaces.’  
While it is questionable to suggest that political accommodationist Muslims on the 
whole tend to be less outwardly observant, it is perhaps more appropriate to state that 
members of this group are less focused on the superficial elements of faith practice. 
As a result, political accommodationist Muslims are often stigmatised from within 
their in-group faith collective. For instance, Mahmood speaks of how he was treated 
and labelled negatively by Orthodox Muslim counterparts for being a ‘radical 
feminist.’  
Those who express a desire to end Islamophobia through engagement with grassroots 
organisations are not necessarily active just because they are Muslims. This feeling 
can be displayed aptly in a comment made by Nadia, a former Student Union officer 
and Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) campaigner from London:  
 
                                                
144 I conducted an interview with Mahmood on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
145 I conducted an interview with Ahmed on February 15th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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‘I don’t actually have many Muslim friends…as a [faith] group we can become very 
exclusive and that bothers me.’146  
 
It is crucial to recognise, as Nadia asserts from experience, that for many politically 
accommodationist British Muslims although their lack of participation within their 
faith in-group acts as an obstacle in connecting them with other like-minded Muslims, 
they find support of fellow political accommodationist Muslims ‘through other 
means… and automatically [we] connect on a political cause,’ as Nadia asserts. Some 
political accommodationist British Muslims like Nadia and Mahmood believe that 
there are so many internal divisions within the British Muslim community that stops 
Muslims from mobilising around a common cause, as Nadia points out:  
 
‘there're so many sects and that sometimes drives people apart, but if you 
automatically connect on a political thing then, you're already on the same path you 
share the same [political] ideology regardless of how practising you are.’  
 
Nadia is also highly critical of some of the more ‘orthodox’ brand of Muslims, 
especially students, who she says they are apathetic to political movements when they 
are not solely premised on faith-based activities, like Da’wah [missionary work] or 
charity for Muslims:  
 
‘when they know it has not much to do with faith, they want nothing to do with it. We 
need to make them realise that we can’t keep just socialising on matters of faith, ’cause 
everything is all political.’ 
Hence, successfully challenging Islamophobia in the minds of young political 
accommodationist British Muslims, like Nadia, is about changing mind-sets and 
encouraging other Muslims to mobilise at a grassroots level. 
 
3.2.2. Inter-Group Alliances  
The second expression I discuss in the mode of political accommodation is inter-group 
alliances, which consists of individuals who believe in a ‘bigger picture.’ This 
revolves around the notion that members of the targeted group believe in equality for 
all, hence they are not selective in their demands to end prejudice; they are not solely 
fighting against prejudice, but their activism against sexism can be just as fervent 
                                                
146 I conducted an interview with Nadia on October 16th 2014 in London. 
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(Massoumi 2016); (Rahman 2010). Political accommodationists in both historic and 
contemporary cases are more likely to be well adjusted in themselves and less likely 
to rely solely on their collective identity. This means that the reason for their political 
activism is not a result of their in-group membership alone. In fact, they are much 
more aware and attuned to realise broader issues (Rahman 2010). As such, they are 
less fixated on their collective identity as a priority and instead their individual 
selfhood is perhaps more important in this specific context.  
 
Historical case 
Inter-group alliances were a pragmatic solution for Weimar Jewish political 
accommodationists. Many of them had joined the German Socialists Party (SPD) 
which was an offshoot of the General German Workers’ Association (1863-) and the 
German Social Democratic Labour Party (Niewyk 1971: 10). For these Jews, being 
an affiliate of two larger mainstream political parties was necessary, as the SPD alone 
could not hold its own when trying to push against Anti-Semitic legislation against 
Jews. It was important in such circumstances for politically accommodationist Jews 
who had Socialist leanings to form alliances with non-Jewish organisations and 
political parties, becoming a part of an overarching struggle against fascism (Wistrich 
1984: 93–94). For this reason, it was a very appealing thought for politically aware 
and determined German Jews to branch out instead of fixating on a singular selective 
cause of Antisemitism. Arnold Zweig, a Jewish novelist and close ally of high-ranking 
SPD officials, was influential in building a cross-group narrative of support against 
state-level Antisemitism as he accused the ‘the authoritarian German government’ of 
scapegoating German Jews for all that was wrong with the state (Zweig 1931: 5).  
Similarly, many Jewish members of the German Social Democrats party believed that 
the rise in Antisemitism in Germany post-World War I was a result of a skilful 
distraction on the part of elites to divert people’s attentions away from the defeat of 
the war and economic downturn in its wake. Antisemitism was not just an issue one 
could confine to racial stigma, it had major repercussions on the socio-economic and 
political issues plaguing society at large. Thus, political accommodationist Jews and 
their politically aware Gentile allies realised the fascist attempts to divert attention 
away from other issues and toward the Jews who comprised just under one percent of 
Weimar Germany’s population. Through cross-group alliances between Jewish and 
non-Jewish Germans, as well as other German minorities, politically 
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accommodationist Jews highlighted the reality of scapegoating as part of a large, more 
connected group – as opposed to Jews working alone – and they dedicated their lives 
to fighting off fascism in all its forms. In their eyes, this was the most effective way 
to pose a political challenge to groups like the Abwehr-Verein (Association for the 
Defense of Antisemitism) (Niewyk 1971: 30).   
Although few in number and relatively under-explored, inter-group alliances of this 
nature became popular in some circles of the SPD the early 1920s. For instance, 
during an address to his socialist comrades in Munich, the Bavarian SPD leader 
Erhard Auer, stressed the onus on all Germans to fight prejudices of all kinds:  
 
‘We must extinguish feelings of hatred and revenge against all’ and ‘all good men 
will strive against Antisemitism.’ (Auer 1920: 14, 15).  
 
Political accommodationist Jews held similar sentiments regarding the power of 
cross-group alliances. This is evident in the words of a Jewish garments work, Paul 
Singer, who was the SPD candidate in a local election in 1920s Berlin. He saw his 
candidacy as more than just a momentous symbol against Antisemitism, and saw it as 
the way to unite all Germans who valued acceptance:  
 
‘my candidacy goes far beyond myself as a person, it provides the assurance that the 
workers will also in the future uphold the principle of equality for all, that they will 
not ask who the man is, but: what kind of man he is’ (Bernstein 1917: 116).147  
 
Jenny Bornstein, in an excerpt from her memoir,148 echoes the sentiments of Singer 
in which she recalls how she embarrassingly declared her non-selective, social 
activism to her shocked mother during a heated debate: 
 
‘I am a Socialist; all men are brothers…I love others even more than myself when 
they are in need or seek help. Moses gave us good, eternal laws, but most of the time 
they are not felt in their deepest sense,’ (Bornstein 2010: 90).  
 
                                                
147 Translation originally cited in Wistrich, R. (1984). Whos Who in Nazi Germany by Robert 
Wistrich. Random House Value Publishing, p.96. 
148 Bornstein, J., B. Memoirs. (2010). A Jewish Girlhood in Berlin: A Memoir by Jenny Barth 
Bornstein, M.D. Jenny Barth Bornstein Collection. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York.  
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This account from Bornstein illustrates how politically accommodationist Weimar era 
Jews embraced the intersectionality of their identities. It was not a matter of choosing 
either Jewishness or Germanness, as Borstein’s quote highlights, it was through the 




It is interesting to see how British Muslim accommodationists express inter-group 
alliances. Many young political accommodationist Muslims whom I interviewed 
attest to being anti-prejudice of all kinds. They are not selective about the causes that 
they back. In the eyes of Mahmood – the Birmingham student activist mentioned 
earlier – inter-group alliances are the only way to counter community disengagement 
and the nuisance of prejudice.149 In Mahmood’s view tackling prejudices should not 
be a selective battle; Muslims, he says, should not fixate on fighting Islamophobia, 
but couch their understanding in the bigger problem of anti-fascism, which would 
require the ‘entire community’ to challenge extremism ‘of both the EDL [English 
Defence League] and Islamists’ in order to ‘reclaim our spaces.’ Mahmood sums up 
the importance of cross-group alliances of political activism, succinctly: 
 
‘If we're not locally engaged with multiple groups, what we're saying is none of us 
matter. It doesn't matter that our spaces are now being claimed by fascists… and it 
doesn't matter that the government is passing legislation that is actively racist and 
harmful.’  
 
Mahmood continues by linking the current situation of Islamophobia to historic 
examples of racialization of diaspora communities, and suggesting that: 
 
‘it's all part of a wider battle, not just Islamophobia…a wider sense of responsibility 
towards everybody, and it's not just about Muslims here, it's about using our 
understanding of our previous, racialized oppressions.’ 
 
Zahra, a mature politics student and activist from Birmingham, also likens 
Islamophobia to other social injustices, referring to it as a form of ‘structural 
                                                
149 I conducted an interview with Mahmood on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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oppression,’ similar to racism and sexism.150 For this reason, Zahra considers it her 
duty to challenge all forms of oppression ‘equally’ as they are all ‘intertwined.’ 
Islamophobia, according to Zahra, cannot be challenged by simply knowing the 
‘correct’ version of Islam. Instead, Zahra asserts, the proper way to tackle 
Islamophobia is to:  
 
‘work alongside other allies to dismantle systems and structures of oppression that are 
holding us all back. We cannot expect to challenge Islamophobia when anti-black 
hatred is still rife.’  
 
Nadia echoes Zahra’s sentiments in that she believes in being part of bigger groups, 
‘not just Muslim-only causes’ as in the long-run, Nadia feels her activism is about 
working towards the betterment of ‘British society’ and not just ‘Muslim 
communities.’151 These examples illustrate that political accommodationist Muslims, 
like their Weimar Jewish counterparts, are driven by self-awareness and acceptance 
of their multi-layered identities. Thus, for them, challenging Islamophobia cannot be 
a narrow-minded response, neglectful of other forms of prejudice (Rahman 2010). 
 
3.3. Banal Accommodation   
Individuals in this mode function without substantial interactions with wider society, 
as they prefer their close-knit, albeit reserved and constricted, lifestyle. They gain 
security in their sense of self by being part of their internal collective, whilst picking 
and choosing elements of wider society. They avoid confrontation with wider society 
and they leave any grievances against wider society unchallenged and unmitigated. 
They are not entirely indifferent to prejudice (as many of those in the withdrawal 
group would be), and are aware of their rights and impediments towards them, yet 
unlike the assimilationists they are unwilling to give up their identity completely. 
Hence, the banal accommodationist is neither fully ‘out there’ and assimilated, nor 
have they completely ghettoised, and shunned wider society. Effectively, they wish 
to live ‘under the radar,’ go about their daily lives without being seen or heard, but 
feel it is someone else’s duty to bring about change and educate wider society. They 
extol the virtues of certain cliché phrases: ‘society must do more,’ and ‘other people 
                                                
150 I conducted an interview with Zahra on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
151 I conducted an interview with Nadia on October 16th 2014 in London. 
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are ignorant.’ For this reason, some critics lambast banal accommodationists for their 
‘all talk and no action’ stance towards prejudice. I now discuss the three forms of 
expression of banal accommodation using personal accounts from archival sources and 
interview excerpts in order to build narratives to elaborate each form of expression. 
 
3.3.1. Best of Both 
The first expression of banal accommodation entails targets maintaining their desire 
– even if just mentally – to gain the best of both aspects of their dual identity. For 
Weimar Jews this means balancing being both German and Jewish, and for Muslims 
in contemporary England, this requires negotiating being British and Muslim. While 
this ‘balancing act’ is common amongst all three modes of accommodation, the banal 
mode is the subtlest of the three and it illustrates how this balance is attained in the 
everyday, mundane actions or even just conceptualised in thoughts of targets.  
 
Historical case  
A good example of how ordinary Jews attempted to balance the two main aspects of 
their identity is in matters concerning the schooling of their children. Many Weimar 
Jewish liberals disagreed with the idea of faith schools, as they felt this would ‘alienate 
their young people from Germans and Germany, causing them to retreat into a 
spiritual and intellectual ghetto’ (Jüdusche Rundschau 1928); (Niewyk 1980: 110-
111).  Furthermore, they feared that the support Jewish-only schooling garnered from 
Zionist groups would mean that Zionist teachers who would ‘magnify Palestine and 
neglect Germany’ (Niewyk 1980: 110-111). These fears can be seen in a report on the 
behaviour of Jewish school children in Königsberg who refused to write a project on 
the title ‘How I Can Be a Good German’ (Goldmann 1919: 5-51); (Niewyk 1980: 
110-111).  
This divisive nature of Jewish nationalism was seen as a strong label for the more 
liberal Jews who would try to accommodate banally. They would rather go under the 
radar and blend in with regard to their everyday lives, particularly when it came to the 
education and schooling of their children, and basic functioning within society. Yet 
Anti-Semitic bullying and abuse was very much rife within the German schooling 
system. One recommendation by the Jewish Association of Teachers in Bavaria for 
example was that they would debate and come up with best ways possible to protect 
and ‘immunize’ Jewish pupils against such Anti-Semitic bullying. Their reports 
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concluded that ‘our [Jewish] pupils must recognize that this phenomenon is 
inextricably bound up with our fate and will only disappear when human beings have 
advanced to a higher moral level.’ In the meantime, ‘buoyed by a healthy sense of 
self-confidence,’ young people would have to ‘proudly and faithfully fulfil the duties 
incumbent upon them as citizens and as members of our community.’ (Bayerische 
Israelitische Gemeindezeitung 1927); (Meyer 1998: 51). This is reflective of the very 
essence of what banal accommodation entails. It is simultaneously acknowledging the 
prevalence of Antisemitism within society and believing that the best possible 
response should be dependent on one’s own personal capacity. This is where the banal 
accommodationist differs from the more expressive and vocal demands of both their 
social and political accommodation fellows.  
 
Contemporary case  
The case of contemporary British Muslims resonates with their historical banal 
accommodationist Jewish counterparts. In the case British Muslims trying to attain 
the ‘best of both’ identities, silent disapproval yet simultaneously trying to ‘blend into 
the mainstream’ is quite apparent, particularly when exploring their responses to first-
hand experiences. In this form of banal accommodation, Muslims collectively 
acknowledge the problem of Islamophobia, but they reason that the response of an 
individual is tied to his connection with the faith in-group community.  Much of 
religion is ‘to do with company’ according to Munir, a young Black Muslim who 
works in the City of London.152 He was one of many to critique ghetto culture. Like 
many of the British Muslim men I interviewed, Munir has been subject to several stop 
and searches at public transport areas. Once he was even taken off a plane and 
searched extra again. He kept his calm in every case, however, this particular incident 
caused him to freeze. Munir believes that if he were to react abrasively it would not 
help his cause:  
 
“I’m not suggesting to ignore or pretend that Islamophobia does not exist. I’m just 
saying it’s in our interest to fight it covertly. Otherwise, if we get worked up we just 
fall into a trap of ‘angry terrorist Muslim.’ We’ve got to keep cool-headed.” 
 
                                                
152 I conducted an interview with Munir on October 15th 2014 in London. 
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 Munir articulates a ‘catch 22’ dilemma encountered by many young Muslims who, 
on the one hand believe that Islamophobia is wrong, but at the same time they suggest 
Muslims should tone down their response, lest it exacerbate the stigma attached to 
being Muslim. 
Another everyday experience and response is given by Neha a third year medical 
student who was unable to respond to her senior consultant’s passive aggressive 
comments about people of faith, particularly an elderly Muslim patient.153 Neha 
recounts the incident and felt complacent and ‘out of place.’ She felt she could not do 
anything in such a situation that would ease the tension and that it would:  
 
‘look so bad for me to challenge my boss. It’s bad on both counts: it’s incredibly 
cringeworthily and un-British, but I’d also think it’s rude by Islamic standards, too.’  
 
Similar was the response of Bina, a middle-aged social worker from Birmingham who 
feels she was singled out by one of her clients for carrying an Arabic prayer in her 
car.154 She was told by a client that she was not able to understand what it was like to 
be a white father because she is a brown Muslim woman, and hence this would affect 
her role as a social care worker. Bina asserts how this really startled her, but she felt 
that retaliating with words would only exacerbate the already tense situation. Instead 
Bina felt she should:  
 
‘accept that such things [Islamophobia] happen, but we need to remember that our 
motto of being good British citizens, and all the while we need to ensure that we live 
life content in our personal religious self.’  
 
Bina continued by extoling the virtues of both her Muslim and British identities: 
‘Being who I am, belonging to both reaffirms to me that I must not fight unwarranted 
battles.’  
 
3.3.2. Educating Wider Society  
If there is any ‘action’ response favoured by banal accommodationists it is just this: 
‘educate wider society.’ However, this is not something they actively pursue on an 
individual basis. Whilst they assert that it is important to ‘educate’ the out-group 
                                                
153 I conducted an interview with Neha on October 30th 2014 in London. 
154 I conducted an interview with Bina on January 22nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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regarding their in-group’s certain particularities, they do not feel the onus is on them 
on a micro-level to educate their friends and acquaintances in wider society.  
 
Historical case  
In the historical case there was definitely a belief that Antisemitism was ‘rooted in 
confusion and self-deception as to the nature of these [social] evils’ and those who 
supported Antisemitism were cast as ‘not yet enlightened’ and ‘a falsely perceived 
self-interest blurs their view’ (Bernstein 1907); (Wistrich 1984: 101). This essentially 
alludes to the idea that those who supported Anti-Semitic activity were doing so 
because they were misled to believe that they faced disservice at the hands of the Jew 
and that the Jew was an enemy of sorts. As Eduard Bernstein, said a way to change 
their outlook was through ‘enlightenment’ or awareness of their false perceptions of 
threat (Bernstein 1907). According to Joseph Kurt:  
 
‘Antisemitism remained the privilege of the so called educated classes who tried to 
exclude Jews from the rights they had for themselves and to infect the minds of the 
children with anti-Jewish feelings.’155  
 
Joseph Kurt continued about the children of ‘so-called educated classes’ who would 
toss about nasty phrases, a favourite being ‘Jew-boy.’ In both cases it highlights the 
level of Antisemitism rife amongst the seemingly ‘educated’ mainstream Gentiles. 
Simultaneously, it shows the lack of ‘education’ in the sense of being respectful of 
others’ differences and not being prejudiced or using this difference as a slur.  
Similarly, according to Willy Buchheim’s memoirs156 of his family tree he sees a 
blatant correlation between lack of education and strong Anti-Semitic tendencies:  
“there was less antisemitism among the peasants than among the so called ‘educated’ 
groups such as teachers, students of the Hamburg university,” (Buchheim 1957). 
 
This claim was backed up by an incident Buchheim recalled from his youth:  
 
                                                
155 Kurt, J. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). No Homesickness. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York.  
156 Buchheim, W. (1957). The Story of the Buchheim Family 1780-1957. Retrieved from 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/33024178, TROVE, The National Library of Australia.  
Caro, K. (1976). A Seder Night to Remember. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York.  
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“Said my teacher to me when I was 6 years old: ‘A Jew can’t get the first place in a 
German school.’ Six months after our enrolment in school, we were placed according 
to our marks. I got second place although I had the best marks,” (Buchheim1957). 
 
Continuing about the experiences of Antisemitism in schools, Buchheim went on to 
say:  
 
‘It seemed to the hobby of another teacher to tell the class slanderous stories about 
Jewish customs and ceremonies,’ (Buchheim 1957). 
 
Henry Bauxbaum also spoke of how such hatred was a result of passive indoctrination 
of sorts received in schools:  
 
“It was the teacher in the higher educational system -- the high schools and 
universities -- who impressed upon them the notion that the Germans were a superior 
breed of men rightfully contemptuous of other nations: They had to exaggerate or 
invent the shortcomings of other nations to raise themselves to the higher level of the 
human species they so richly deserved. ‘Deutschland Uber Alles’ was no empty song 
to them.”157 
 
In the eyes of these banal accommodationist Weimar Jews, there was a strong 
understanding of Antisemitism and its causes, and also how one should go about to 
redress them. However, they did not act upon these thoughts and feelings.  
 
Contemporary case  
British Muslims who choose banal accommodation strategies are often of the opinion 
that people are Islamophobic because they are fed misconceptions from the media and 
wider society was not ‘educated enough about Muslims.’ For example, Zack, a 21-
year-old student from Birmingham, believes that the real reason for Islamophobia is 
‘not religious extremism or zealotry.’158 Instead Zack suggests that it is a result of 
‘social ills and misconceptions’ about Muslims. He suggests that ‘the government 
should do more to dispel these myths perpetuated by the media against Muslims.’ 
There should be an ‘active promotion of good stories about Muslims in the media’ 
says 27-year-old Zama from London.159 Others like 30-something lawyer from 
                                                
157 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York. 
158 I conducted an interview with Zack on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
159 I conducted an interview with Zama on October 18th 2014 in London. 
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London, Shaheen, feel that even portraying ‘normal activities carried out by normal 
Muslims’ should be brought to prominence:  
 
‘Success stories and even little segments that the BBC is doing about Muslims helping 
the Homeless or even the Ramadan diaries thing they had on a few years ago…this 
can be effective.’160 
 
Interestingly, banal accommodationists valued education, but the onus of educating 
rests firmly in the hands of those in authority.  
 
‘Real change doesn’t come from us. It requires the government to step in and do more 
to give us a better name. Without publicity we can keep being good British people but 
we don’t get credit and nothing changes unless the government cares.’  
 
The above comment is made by youth worker, Afsheen, from London.161 Even in 
schools if there is more awareness of Muslims as ‘being just like everybody else’ says 
Sana, a youth worker from Gloucester.162 It starts with the everyday and every place; 
Muslims are all around us not all are bad and they do not deserve hate ‘because of the 
actions of a few.’ The everyday Muslims want to distinguish between terrorists: 
 
‘Who make up what 0.001% of Muslims and do not represent Islam… we need to 
draw attention within the mainstream to ordinary good British Muslims,’ asserts 
Afsheen.  
 
3.3.3. Inaction not Indifference  
Many banal accommodationists react to prejudice often through the act of inaction. 
Unlike their banal withdrawn counterparts, banal accommodationists exhibit this 
behaviour not out of indifference, and they do not deny the existence of prejudice. In 
fact, they are quite vocal in their belief that prejudice is wrong and unjust. However, 
as the examples below illustrate, the biggest challenge for banal accommodationists 
is that when they are faced with Antisemitism and Islamophobia, they are unable to 
conjure up a response, as often times they fear they would achieve very little, were 
they to take concrete action. Thus, in the case of banal accommodationists, their belief 
                                                
160 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
161 I conducted an interview with Afsheen on March 13th 2015 in London. 
162 I conducted an interview with Sana on March 2nd 2015 in Gloucester. 
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in justice and condemnation of prejudice may not be in line with the actual, tangible 
response they exhibit.  
 
Historical case  
One particular example is that of Joseph Kurt, a young man living in 1920s Berlin. In 
an extract from his memoir, Kurt asserts that as a result of Anti-Semitic allegations 
against them:  
 
‘Jewish people are often in defence – driven into activity – or restraining themselves, 
having recognised how unfairly they are being treated.’163  
 
Kurt personally took the later approach of restraint. This he said was because he 
happened to be apolitical. While he held certain views, he was not expressive as he 
believed it was best to remain ‘under the radar,’ lest vocalising his angst would garner 
further Antisemitism directed towards him.  
Another incident was recounted by Willy Buchheim of his uncle Isaac’s experience. 
This was about the high levels of Antisemitism within the armed forces around the 
turn of the 20th century. Racial and religious slurs were used jokingly to constantly 
remind one of their otherness. Willy documented in his memoir164, an anecdote shared 
by his uncle, Isaac Buchheim, who recalled an incident where his fellow soldiers 
reminded him of his Jewishness. When out on duty near the Red Sea a fellow officer 
turned to Isaac and mocked:  
 
‘Buchheim, was it not here where your ancestors, the Children of Israel, crossed the 
Red Sea when they left Egypt?’ (Buchheim 1957).  
 
The unnecessary remark was sadly one of many that German Jewish soldiers faced on 
a daily basis. However, they were in no position to retaliate or rebuke such nasty 
comments, and thus considered it best to just ignore. Sometimes, like Isaac Buchheim 
assert, one felt like deserting the force in order to avoid the prejudice he was facing. 
                                                
163 Kurt, J. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). No Homesickness. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York. 
164 Buchheim, W. (1957). The Story of the Buchheim Family 1780-1957. Retrieved from 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/33024178, TROVE, The National Library of Australia.  
Caro, K. (1976). A Seder Night to Remember. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
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However, he was incompetent to do this because of the severe consequences he feared, 
which included a heavy monetary and social penalty. Like many Jewish men 
experiencing such hostility from their own comrades, Isaac Buchheim admitted to at 
times considering suicide as an escape.  
Similarly, Henry Bauxbaum shares a poignant and sombre snippet from his mother, a 
relatively devout Jewish German woman who felt complete helplessness over the air 
of hostility created by Anti-Semites: ‘My Son, they have ripped us out of the soil with 
our roots.’165   
Rosemarie Joseph, in her memoir,166 recounts her school days and how despite her 
teacher’s prejudice, she and her mother were unable to take action:  
 
‘My teacher for four years did not like Jews. I was a good student, learning was easy, 
but she did not miss an opportunity to lower my grades. At school plays, I was never 
picked as an actor, even though I knew the play by heart. My mother was furious, but 
she could only complain,’ (Joseph 1999).  
 
Rosemarie speaks of her feelings regarding an incident, which took place during her 
teens. Her best friends began ignoring her. She remembers confiding in her mother:  
 
‘I asked her [mother], “What is wrong with me? AM I dirty? Do I smell?” “Nothing 
is wrong with you. We are Jews, and from now on you will have to expect this,” was 
her answer,’ (Joseph 1999).   
 
Erna Franck, in her memoir,167 describes her reaction when a friend and colleague Dr. 
Hans Harbeck, director of the Hamburger Kammerspiele would use derogatory 
remarks to refer to her, still giving him the benefit of doubt she asserts:  
 
“He may have been slightly Anti-Semitic without being aware of it. He called me 
‘schoene Orientalin’ (‘the beautiful oriental’). A neighbor of ours had called me, as a 
teenager, ‘Esmeralda, die schoene Zigeunerin,’” (Esmeralda, the beautiful gypsy)’ 
(Franck 1995: 22). 
 
                                                
165 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York.  
166 Joseph, R. Memoirs. (1999). Rosemarie: A Memoir. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York.  
167 Franck, E. Memoirs. (1995). Erna Franck's Memoirs: (1900-1981). Wiener Library Collections, 
Wiener Library, London.  
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In the case of such micro-aggressions of Antisemitism, some Weimar Jews, as is 
evident from the above accounts, were not against reacting per se, it was more that 
they were too shocked or unable to react to the incidents. They did not feel indifferent 
towards the Antisemitism they had experienced and in hindsight, they articulated that 
‘more needs to be done’ to safeguard their faith in-group. 
 
Contemporary case 
In the case of banal accommodationist British Muslims that I interviewed, many 
shared similar experiences with regard to their reactions toward Islamophobia. Banal 
accommodationists who acknowledge their ‘inaction’ in this case include 22-year-old 
London medical student Sarah who recounted a couple of incidences from her time 
shadowing a senior academic consultant who would often make snide prejudicial 
remarks directed at his patients and students.168 Others who experienced Islamophobia 
and reacted with ‘inaction’ include Nasir, a retired pensioner, and Rozina, a retired 
nurse, both from Birmingham.169 170 It is interesting to note that both Rozina and Nasir 
speak of similar personal experiences of Islamophobia at the hands of retail service 
staff. Rozina says that she was unwilling to assert herself because she felt that:  
 
‘what difference was I going to make? Who is going to care about what a fragile little 
ethnic woman like I have to say? Those in power and figures of authority and 
popularity can only make a difference.’  
 
Nasir echoes Rozina’s sentiments: ‘I know what they are doing is wrong and it hurts 
me, but what am I to do?’  
 
In hindsight, they both expressed desire to have been able to stand up against the 
abuse.  
Asma, a 20-something chemistry PhD student has similar experiences to share.171 She 
says because she is ‘visibly Muslim’ (wears a headscarf) she is often a target of verbal 
abuse: 
 
                                                
168 I conducted an interview with Sarah on March 15th 2015 in London. 
169 I conducted an interview with Nasir on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
170 I conducted an interview with Rozina on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
171 I conducted an interview with Asma on October 18th 2014 in London. 
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‘I’ve been shouted out, the usual- told to go “back home”, whatever that’s supposed 
to mean…but no, I haven’t stopped it. I just sit there awkwardly and feel the pain 
build up inside.’  
 
Although she kept her calm in public and decided not to interact with her abuser, 
Asma decided that the best form of action was to report the incident to Tell MAMA 
(Monitoring Anti-Muslim Abuse) (Tell MAMA 2016).  Here, much like in the 
historical case, we see ordinary minorities who acknowledge that they are facing 
prejudice, but their coping strategy on the surface can be deemed this inaction 
however, it does not equate with indifference or denial coping strategy employed by 
withdrawn targets of the hate that we discussed in Chapter Four. This is because banal 
accommodationist British Muslims actually articulate their desires to redress their 
grievances and show that they ‘would if they could,’ but unfortunately, some succumb 
to the pressure of the moment in time and are rendered incapable of quashing the 
abuse there and then.  
 
4. Discussion 
The responses of targets to Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudices give us a 
glimpse into their chosen coping strategies, as well as their inter- and intra-group 
relations in this ‘third way’ response. The expressions of responses I detailed earlier 
in this chapter are derived from specific examples and anecdotes to illustrate 
accommodation in both case studies. However, as a result of extensive analysis of 
interviews and archival sources, I realise that there are numerous other underlying 
factors to explain the spectrum of behaviours that accommodationists display. I now 
elaborate my findings in a way that incorporates these factors, which I discuss under 
three major themes, namely: accommodation transitions; the difficulties of balancing 
identities; and the conscious identity trade-off made by accommodationists.  
 
4.1. Transitions towards & from Accommodation 
Individual responses to prejudice are not rigidly fixed, in fact, they are open to change 
with time and experiences that targeted individuals encounter. This is most evident in 
the accommodation coping strategy in the case of both Weimar era Jews facing 
Antisemitism and British Muslims in contemporary England facing Islamophobia, 
respectively.  
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For many Weimar Jews, the rise of Antisemitism in the aftermath of the First World 
War caused a return to Jewish identity, as in the case of the Berlin writer Georg 
Hermann, author of the novel Jettchen Gebert (1906), a classic portrait of Berlin 
Jewry, who emotionally proclaimed in 1919:  
 
“I used to believe that, first and foremost, I was a German and that I was only carrying 
a kind of residue of Jewishness around with me, just for sentimental reasons… out of 
a sense of piety, so to speak, along with a few lingering, half-abraded racial 
particularities. All that has changed over the past five years…Whether we wanted to 
or not, we were forced to reflect upon our Jewishness” (Hermann in Neue Jüdische 
Monatshefte 1919: 400).172 
 
Hermann’s excerpt shows us his transition from being seemingly assimilationist, and 
rather unaware of his Jewishness, to becoming conscious of his difference, even if 
unwittingly. This self-reflection in the case of accommodationists gives way for them 
to internalise and constructively adapt in response to negative stereotypes. An excerpt 
from Kurt Goldstein’s memoir,173 in which he talks about his grandfather’s transition 
towards accommodations later in life, resonates with Hermann’s account. Goldstein 
reflects on the life journey of his elderly grandfather who Goldstein says:  
 
‘had gone through the stage of assimilation, but overtime [developed] a habit of 
always covering his head with a large silk skull cap and always washing his hands 
before meals…he gradually became both German and Jewish,’ (Goldstein 1976: 22).  
 
Henry Bauxbaum also speaks about how his assimilated family gradually became 
more aware and accommodating. In Henry’s words, up until the First World War, the 
Bauxbaums believed in ‘astute assimilation.’ However, the aftermath of the war, 
Henry says encouraged his family to:  
 
‘fight not to lose our intimate attachment to the people, to the society around us…To 
cut us off from the environment which had become totally our environment in 
language, literature, in our emotional ties with the people and the land, meant cutting 
off organs which had grown within us into one with the former self and which had 
molded [sic] us into a new and mightily alive organism, one which would bleed death 
                                                
172 Translation from German to English found in Meyer, M. A. (Ed.). (1998). German-Jewish History 
in Modern Times, volume 4: Renewal and Destruction, 1918-1945. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, p.105. 
173 Goldstein, K. M. Memoirs. (1976). Retrospect and Reflections: (My Life and My Times). Leo 
Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New York, New York.  
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if cut in two. No wonder that we did fight back to reassert our right of belonging. 
Another automatic reaction was that the more they -- they our enemies -- lowered our 
worth, as a people, as Jews, the more were we made to feel our self-worth. This new-
found Jewish identity, as a consequence, veered away from the accepted direction of 
Jewish life in Germany which, for the four or five preceding generations, had been 
striving for full assimilation.’174 
 
In the contemporary case, many of the younger accommodationist British Muslims I 
spoke with say that they were not actively concerned by Islamophobia prior to 9/11. 
Interviewees like 20-something Afsheen from London, suggests that prior to the 
backlash of 7/7, they had not really considered themselves to be Muslim.175 Afsheen 
says:  
 
“I spent my youth always trying to ‘fit in’ and be one of the girls, but then I remember 
in 2005, I was in high school and I just knew I couldn’t keep trying.”  
 
 
When I asked her to elaborate what she meant by ‘trying,’ Afsheen said:  
 
‘I had to make a choice- I could either keep trying to fit in or I could show people that 
I am just as much of a Muslim as I am British…and us Muslims, we are good people. 
Accept us for who we really are and not based on false perceptions created by the 
media.’  
 
Triggered by the events of the 7/7 London bombings, though not a direct target of 
Islamophobia, Afsheen has spent the last ten years volunteering as a youth worker 
with disadvantaged, inner-city Muslims. She believes that it is her ‘calling in life’ to 
show younger Muslims that they shouldn’t fear if they find themselves questioning 
their identity. It’s ‘perfectly okay’ and you can ‘always turn it into a positive,’ says 
Afsheen. 
Others whom I spoke with, like Mahmood and Zahra – both young activist Muslims 
– say that they also shared similar experiences to Afsheen. Zahra asserts that she was 
brought up ‘blissfully unaware’ that she was different form her peers, in her words, 
Zahra was:  
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for Jewish History. New York, New York.  
175 I conducted an interview with Afsheen on March 13th 2015 in London. 
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‘Assimilated to a T,’ but the ‘Islamophobia backlash post-9/11 was a wake-up call, it 
made me feel I needed to represent my community and at the same time be respected 
as a Muslim and Brit.’176  
 
Being an accommodationist is a ‘choice’ say many of its proponents whom I 
interviewed. ‘You choose to be a Muslim; you choose to be a British person. It’s my 
decision to be both,’ asserts Zahra. She says that as a student of philosophy she has 
often had her ‘objectivity questioned because I’m a visible, headscarf-wearing 
Muslim.’  
Zahra says she is not perturbed by such incidences, and, in fact, she ‘doesn’t choose’ 
to be a Muslim ‘despite of this,’ but ‘because of these incidences.’ For this reason, 
Zahra suggests that the Islamophobia she faces reinforces her perseverance to become 
a ‘better’ British Muslim.  
 
4.2. Balancing Identities 
For accommodative Jews and Muslims, at the heart of their chosen response is a need 
to negotiate their ‘two-ness’ (Du Bois 1903). As is apparent from the various ways in 
which these individuals express themselves, maintaining a balance is not easy. This 
is especially true, because often their fellow in-group members refuse to acknowledge 
the occurrence of prejudice, or they downplay its effects. For example, according to 
Joseph Kurt, in his memoirs, some German Jews:  
 
‘did not take the new movement [anti-Jewish Social German Workers Party] 
seriously. They were convinced that Anti-Semitism was alien to the German 
people.’177  
 
Kurt continues by asserting that the reason for this denial was because ‘assimilated 
German Jews as a whole regarded Germany as their motherland and this state of mind 
became their tragedy.’178 
Ruth Gutmann, in her memoir, echoes this difficulty to strive towards the ‘middle 
path’ between the religious and secular aspects of one’s identity.179 Gutmann speaks 
                                                
176 I conducted an interview with Zahra on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
177 Kurt, J. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). No Homesickness. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York. 
178 Kurt, J. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). No Homesickness. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. 
New York, New York. 
179 Gutmann, R. Memoirs. [date]. Memoir 1933. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York.  
 196 
of her father, Samuel Herskovits’ (1883-) quest to keep both faith-based and 
mainstream education:  
 
‘He distinguished himself both in his Jewish studies which culminated in a rabbinical 
degree, and in his clandestine efforts to obtain a secular education… [he was] 
determined to learn about life outside the yeshiva. To attain that strictly forbidden 
goal without being detected, he escaped from the yeshiva by climbing over its wall 
and returning by the same route…While he seems not to have questioned his own 
faith, he was unwilling to observe its minutae [sic] or to preach to others to do so. [He 
was] an admirer of German culture and its classical literature.’180  
 
Gutmann continued about her father: ‘While he did not fulfill [sic] her [his wife’s] 
fervent wish to observe all Jewish laws to the letter, his faith in the Almighty was 
unshakable.’181 
 
Very rarely, to some Jewish families, such as the Buchheims of Berlin, negotiating 
identities came naturally; they suffused their religious, Jewish values with their 
German lifestyle effortlessly. Henry Buchheim recalls:  
 
‘[we] observed the Sabbath and holidays and fastdays [sic] and kept Kosher homes 
and all the Jewish customs and ceremonies. We saw to it that our children received 
religious instructions and taught them to say their daily prayers at the appointed time. 
They led the kind of good lives that earned them respect, and in many cases even the 
affection of the German peasants in whose midst they were living.’ 
In contrast, some accommodationists, like, Franz Oppenheimer, saw no reason for this 
to be a forced decision. Oppenheimer writes in 1931:  
 
‘I felt thoroughly German, but I have never been able to understand why awareness 
of my sense of Jewish origins should be incompatible with belonging to the German 
people and its culture’ (Oppenheimer 1931: 212, 214).182 
 
Franz Oppenheimer, like many, German Jews was convinced that his Jewishness, 
whether strong or subtle was not a hindrance to their longing for Germanness (Meyer 
1998: 160). Wassermann echoes Franz’s feelings:  
 
                                                
180 Ibid., p.1. 
181 Ibid., p.3. 
182 Translated from German to English found in Meyer, M. A. (Ed.). (1998). German-Jewish History 
in Modern Times, volume 4: Renewal and Destruction, 1918-1945. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, p.160. 
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‘I am a German, and I am a Jew, one as intensely and as completely as the other, 
inextricably bound together.’ (Wassermann 1921: 126).183 
 
British Muslims exhibit almost identical responses. Some interviewees find it difficult 
to separate the ‘values’ that they derive from their British and Muslim identities, 
respectively. Shaheen believes that the two sets of ‘values are intertwined and 
indistinguishable.’184 37-year-old Waseem, a pharmaceutical consultant from 
London, echoes Shaheen’s sentiments. Waseem asserts:  
 
“I feel I am a ‘good’ Briton only when I am a ‘good’ Muslim. For me, the values 
intrinsic to my Britishness are inseparable from those of my Muslim heritage.”185  
 
Unfortunately, many accommodationist British Muslims, like Waseem, constantly 
feel the burden of desire to prove that they are ‘normal.’ For accommodationist, this 
middle ground provides a more workable alternative than completely giving up one 
aspect of their identity completely.  
On the whole, British Muslims who choose to accommodate are also relatively more 
practising of their faith. In fact, some reason their choice of accommodation by way 
of Islam. Shaheen, Naheed, and Waseem amongst many others I spoke to, assert that 
little acts of kindness are part of Prophetic tradition or Sunnah. For example, Shaheen 
and Waseem both remark that they go out of their way to smile at members of the 
public when commuting, or going about their day. Both say they do so because 
‘smiling is Sunnah of the Prophet (pbuh).’186 187 
Another way in which British Muslims express their ‘two-ness’ is by giving charity, 
which is: 
 
‘both a service to humanity that Islam teaches us, and it’s about helping out your 
neighbours, as any good British person would,’ says 21-year-old London student, 
Halima.  
 
                                                
183 Translation from German to English found in Niewyk, D. L. (1980). The Jews in Weimar 
Germany. Transaction Publishers. 
Oppenheimer, F. (1910a). ‘Stammesbewusstsein und Volksbewusstsein,’ Jüdische Rudschau 15 (25 
February 1910): 278-81. 
184 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
185 I conducted an interview with Waseem on October 18th 2014 in London. 
186 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
187 I conducted an interview with Waseem on October 18th 2014 in London. 
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In her spare time Halima is a volunteer for an Islamic charity that helps feed the 
homeless across London.188 She feels this is her ‘duty’ as both a Muslim and an 
exemplary British citizen: ‘it helps me stay grounded and at peace… almost balanced 
in who I am.’  
 
4.3. Conscious Trade-off 
Those who choose to accommodate do so knowingly and conscious of the fact that 
their actions, at times, require a sort of ‘trade-off’ between various aspects of their 
identity. Although they hold an acute awareness of prejudice, and can be outspoken 
in condemning it, accommodationists are willing to make a ‘judgement call’ which 
may require them to ‘tame’ a particular component of their identity (Dovidio 2005). 
In the cases of Antisemitism and Islamophobia, this ‘taming’ of a particular 
component of their identity, sometimes hampers certain elements of their Jewishness 
and Muslimness, respectively.  
In his memoir, Joseph Kurt, an officer in the German Army during World War I, 
recalls how he took great pride in his Germanness during his early adulthood:  
 
‘Due to my upbringing I was still proud to be German regardless of the Anti-Semitic 
experiences I had gone through, and sang with all the others at all opportunities that 
the Lord would punish the treacherous English.’  
 
Interestingly, Kurt remains firm in his dedication to Germany, despite noting that he 
was not a recipient of a Military Medal for the ‘sole reason’ of being a Jew. Kurt is 
steadfast in both his Germanness and his Jewishness. For him, Judaism is the ‘Jewish 
religion, a religion which I honour wholeheartedly.’ However, Kurt includes a caveat 
to suggest that he chose when to ‘actively live up to it.’  
Henry Bauxbaum speaks of his accommodative farmer parents’ conscious effort to 
live ‘as normals’ in the Hessian countryside:  
 
‘in many aspects of their life [they] were as close to the Gentile as they were to the 
Jew. Feeling so strongly Jewish produced no clash with their intimate feeling for the 
life of the Gentile, certainly not in their close, personal relationships.’189  
 
                                                
188 I conducted an interview with Halima on October 19th 2014 in London. 
189 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.234. 
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Bauxbaum continues about his mother:  
 
‘My mother carried with herself the same sense of history as her ancestors…Still she 
never showed herself as clannish in the interest of her people as was -- and still is – 
such a common trait with our German-Jewish families.’190  
 
Bauxbaum’s mother deliberately suppressed what her son considers to be a ‘typical 
trait’ of German Jews in order to balance her German and Jewish identities.191   
British Muslims who consciously make an effort to balance being both Muslim and 
British are aware of the everyday trade-offs they are expected to make. Many Muslims 
whom I spoke with rationalise this in two ways. Firstly, they believe that it is logical 
as a citizen of the state, one must conform and ‘behave like a Briton.’ This was 
something that is taken as a given by most if not all accommodationists I spoke with. 
The second way in which they rationalise this decision is through the Islamic teaching 
of ijtihad (independent reasoning). Many Muslims like Waseem and Nadia, as well 
as Mahmood mention this concept in passing. All three assert the importance of 
ijtihad. Mahmood in particular says how ijtihad is necessary, ‘in times we live in,’ 
especially when trying to create inter-group alliances with communities, that most 
Muslims usually take issue associating with, such as the LGBTQIA.192 193 Waseem 
feels that this independent reasoning may help his fellow Muslims to understand that: 
  
‘you don’t have to give up your faith in order to be British. The point is that you just 
have to make sure that the choices you make on a daily basis reflect your Britishness 
as much as it has to do with you being a Muslim.’   
 
5. Causality Issues  
Here I present why I think that the responses I discuss throughout this chapter were 
mostly caused by Antisemitism and Islamophobia, rather than a result of a normal 
acculturation phenomenon, or because other prejudices. Determining causality or making 
a credible link to a causal claim, is a major obstacle for qualitative researchers. Some qualitative 
researchers, as argued by Patton (1990: 423) fall into the trap of making ‘linear assumptions of 
quantitative analysis and begin to specify isolated variables that are mechanically linked 
                                                
190 Ibid., p.235. 
191 Ibid. 
192 I conducted an interview with Mahmood on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
193 I conducted an interview with Waseem on October 18th 2014 in London. 
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together out of context…Simple statements of linear relationships may be more distorting than 
illuminating.’ But other qualitative researchers, like Miles and Huberman (1984: 132), reject 
these claims and instead assert that ‘[qualitative] field research is far better than solely 
quantified approaches at developing explanations of what we call local causality – the actual 
events and processes that led to specific outcomes’ (Miles and Huberman 1984: 132; emphasis 
in original).  
In the case of my research, I have data directly from first-hand oral and written accounts; 
interviews and autobiographies of British Muslims in contemporary England, and memoirs, 
diaries and journals from Weimar German Jews. In my historical case study, all archival sources 
I used to gauge accommodationist responses of Weimar Jews towards Antisemitism 
specifically asserted that the individual’s feelings and actions were a direct result of the 
Antisemitism they were facing.  
When speaking to British Muslims in the accommodationist group, all of my participants who 
employ this coping strategy do so to formulate their response to Islamophobia. Firstly, it is 
because of the nature and structure of the semi-structured interview, the way in which questions 
were asked. In addition, I enquired how the individual deals with such issues in their 
daily lives, why they feel they respond in such a way, and how much importance they 
give to these negative encounter, as well as how it affected their interactions with 
wider society in the long term. In order to develop a causal link between Islamophobia 
and my participant’s responses, I kept in mind if they made mention of any particular 
events in time, which may have led to a heightening of Islamophobia, and whether 
they moulded their interactions with wider society, accordingly. 
Most if not all, of my participants claim that their reaction was a direct result of the Islamophobia 
in society. For example, Shaheen, Waseem and Nadia from London as well as Mahmood and 
Zahra from Birmingham all say something along the lines of this: as a result of the Islamophobia 
‘I decided to take action against the bad image of Muslims,’ or ‘I felt the onus was on me as a 
representative of British Muslims.’ Similarly, many participants say that following an ‘increase 
in Islamophobia post-9/11’ they had actively sought to ‘balance being both British and Muslim,’ 
‘not assimilating and losing my Muslim identity,’ but also maintaining that they are an upright 
and dutiful ‘British citizen.’  
In addition, sometimes interviewees spoke about their personal transition from one type of 
coping strategy to another. For example, many accommodationist interviewees, like Waseem 
and Shaheen, say how they ‘became more aware’ of Islamophobia, and felt they needed to 
actively commit to being ‘equally Muslim and British,’ following heightened anti-Muslim 
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prejudice as a backlash to 9/11 and 7/7.194 195 Older interviewees compare their response to 
current, post-9/11 Islamophobia to that of anti-Muslim hatred following past world events such 
as the Rushdie Affair of the late 1980s. Such interviewees, like retired nurse, Nina, says she was 
not entirely ‘bothered by the situation’ in the wake of the Rushdie Affair, but ‘Islamophobia 
since 9/11 and 7/7 has been of a different nature…it’s racialized us [Muslims].’196 
Accommodationist interviewees, like Nina and Shaheen, say that they have become ‘more 
aware of their Muslimness’ as a result of this, and they’ve looked ‘inwardly.’ As Shaheen says, 
this has caused her to reflect and ‘choose’ to work for the betterment of Muslims as well as the 
whole of society at the same time.’  
However, in order to confirm that their answers to interview questions were genuinely 
indicative of a causal relationship, sometimes, I had to consider other possible reasons for their 
choice of response and rule out these ‘rival explanations’ (Johnson 1997: 287) i.e. individuals 
might be acculturated in society in an accommodated manner regardless of Islamophobia, or 
they thought it was ‘fashionable’ or ‘popular’ to be accommodative. I ruled out these rival 
explanations during the course of my interviews. For instance, whilst I recorded the interviews, 




This chapter explored the third and final coping strategy, which I dubbed 
accommodation. I have shown through this chapter how and why targets of 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia employed accommodation. Engaging with the 
process of this coping strategy in-depth, I found that accommodation shows a wide 
array of responses. I discussed three major modes of accommodation, namely: social 
accommodation, political accommodation and banal accommodation. Each of the 
three modes of accommodation are manifest in different expressions. The first and 
foremost entails social cohesion and acting as a vice-regent for one’s faith in-group, 
acting as its representatives in front of wider society. The second mode involves more 
forceful and politically active responses expressed in the form pledging allegiance to 
grassroots movements to tackle religious prejudice, as well as working alongside 
organisations that counter other forms of prejudice, such as sexism and homophobia. 
                                                
194 I conducted an interview with Waseem on October 18th 2014 in London. 
195 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
196 I conducted an interview with Nina on February 7th 2015 in Birmingham. 
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The final mode, that of banal accommodation, entails less active forms of responses, 
and instead focuses on what the targeted individuals value as being correct was to 
counter prejudice, i.e. educational programmes to dispel misconceptions about their 
in-group. The main commonality amongst all three is the desire to balance being both 
German and Jewish, or British and Muslim, respectively. Accommodationist Weimar 
Jews and contemporary British Muslims believed that feeling secure in themselves 
and protecting their self-esteem required negotiation between both their internal 
affiliations with their faith in-group, and their identification with wider society and its 
prevalent norms. They desire to ‘fit in’ and be perceived as ‘normal,’ while finding 
common ground between their collective in-group identity and wider society. 
Fundamentally, they push for wider society to accept their in-group’s individuality 
and expressions of their selfhood, but they simultaneously try to compromise certain 
aspects of their in-group identity in order to agree with the established framework of 
wider society. This was an invaluable exercise as it allowed me to see the fluidity of 
responses and in particular, the complex ways in which those in the ‘middle path’ 
cope with Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices.  
One final point to raise is that during the course of my research, I noticed the influence 
of subjective moderating factors, like age and gender, upon the responses of targets 
of Islamophobia and Antisemitism. With regards to British Muslim responses in the 
case of contemporary Islamophobia, 58 of the 90 people I interviewed; the large 
majority of British Muslims whom I spoke with choose this coping strategy. 
Moreover, the majority of accommodationists are young (aged 20-34 year-old). To an 
extent, this reflects the general acculturation attitudes towards more diverse and to an 
extent ‘multicultural’ means of coping; targeted individuals who happen to be second 
and third generation ethnic, who have not experienced first-hand any other form of 
national belonging, feel encouraged to respond in a manner that demands acceptance 
of their differences with wider society, which they see as a melting-pot of numerous 
different identities.  
In contrast, my findings for the case Weimar Antisemitism show that accommodation 
was not the most widely employed coping strategy amongst Jews of that era, as the 
majority favoured assimilation, accommodationist Jews made up a considerable 
number of individuals whose diaries and memoirs I read. Furthermore, in some 
respects, findings for my historical Antisemitism case were quite similar to the 
contemporary Islamophobia case, and this was for similar reasons. For instance, the 
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majority of Weimar accommodationists were younger people who are more socially 
aware, and politically engaged in comparison with their older counterparts.  
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Chapter Seven. Islamophobia Case Study: Qualitative & 




This chapter brings together both qualitative and quantitative findings simultaneously, 
by engaging with analysis of the collective self-esteem of British Muslims in 
contemporary England. The chapter begins with Part A where I recap the credibility 
of the qualitative aspect of my research and evaluate the validity of its findings. 
Following this, I display my findings in a semi-quantifiable form. I then interpret my 
findings for each coping strategy and attempt to show the possible relationship they 
may have with any of the personal moderating factors, i.e. age and gender.  In Part B 
I seek to address my fifth research question, which is: ‘How do the coping strategies 
of targets of Islamophobia relate with their collective self-esteem?’ I do this through 
a quantitative approach, by empirically measuring Public and Private Collective Self-
Esteem values and their correlations. I then show the reliability and validity of my 
quantitative analysis. Following this I display and elaborate the results. In Part C, I 
end the chapter by showing whether or not these quantitative results verify and 
validate my qualitative findings. If not, then I will discuss what might be the cause.  
 
Part A. Islamophobia Case Study: Qualitative Findings 
2. Credibility of Research 
In order to ensure credibility of qualitative research, some scholars, like Dixon-Woods 
et al. (2004), stress the importance of methodology, whereas others, like Lincoln et 
al. (2011) place emphasis on the interpretation of results. In addition, Meyrick (2006) 
suggests that the key to credible qualitative findings is having ‘transparency’ and 
‘systematicity.’ Keeping all of the above in mind, Leung (2015) argues that ‘every 
step of the research logistics (from theory formation, design of study, sampling, data 
acquisition and analysis to results and conclusions) has to be validated if it is 
transparent or systematic enough’ (Leung 2015: 325). In agreement with Leung’s 
assertion, I approach both the process and results of my research with rigour to ensure 
that they are valid, reliable and generalizable. I now discuss all three components 
separately.  
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2.1. Generalizability  
If findings are generalizable, it means that they are applicable to different samples of 
people, in different places at different times etc. Since the purpose of most qualitative 
research is to study a particular phenomenon, in a specific time and place, 
generalizability is not usually considered a required element in qualitative findings 
(Leung 2015: 326). For instance, this part of my study is based on evidence gathered 
from a select sample of 90 British Muslims in contemporary England to see their 
responses to Islamophobia. To this end, my findings are not generalizable to the entire 
population of British Muslims. However, keeping the idea of research applicability in 
mind, I tried my best to ensure that my select sample be as close as possible to reflect 
the general population of British Muslims in contemporary England. For this reason, 
I chose a purposeful sample of 90 people – with an equal number of men and women, 
from three different age groups, and from three different cities – to create a certain 
framework by which it would be possible to potentially understand the responses of 
British Muslims towards Islamophobia more broadly. 
 
2.2. Reliability  
Reliability refers to the extent to which the process and results of the study can be 
replicable. I did this in several ways throughout my study. Firstly, I conducted 90 
interviews using a standardised, semi-structured technique, and I audio-recorded all 
of them, whilst taking notes alongside. After transcribing the interviews and matching 
them with my notes, I would often share the transcripts of the interviews with the 
participant in order to ‘double check’ what I had recorded. This ensures a level of 
consistency and replicability in my process of data collection. Furthermore, I display 
my results in semi-quantifiable (tabular) form in order to increase reliability of my 
findings. Although the procedure I followed can be replicated, it does not guarantee 
that the results will be the same, as certain situational and human factors will 
inevitably affect the results. Thus, a margin of error in qualitative findings must be 
given, even if one ensures the same setting, sample and processes of data collection 
and analysis.  
 
2.3. Validity  
Validity refers to the ‘appropriateness’ of a research study’s tools, methods and data 
(Leung 2015: 325). Throughout my research, I have tried my best to ensure validity 
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in all aspects of my study. To begin with, I maintained concept validity by ensuring 
my research questions were appropriate enough to fully understand the dynamics of 
Islamophobic prejudice and responses towards it. Followed by this, I tried to make 
sure that the typology I devised was an appropriate description of responses towards 
prejudice against British Muslims. Similarly, in order to ensure method validity, I 
chose a case study approach to appropriately illustrate the responses to, and dynamics 
of, Islamophobia.  
I also tried to maintain the validity at every level of my study design, in numerous 
ways. To begin with, I chose a combined study technique of a convergent design in 
order to validate my qualitative findings through a quantitative means, which I will 
elaborate in Part C of this chapter. In addition, I used a standardised semi-structured 
interview, covering my subjective biases as a researcher, and choosing a purposeful 
sample in order to have an equal distribution of age groups and gender. I collected the 
data carefully, by audio-recording, note-taking, transcribing and coding amongst other 
things. I discussed these points in detail in the Methods section of Chapter Three. In 
addition, I ensured results validity of my study by discussing and ascertaining the 
causality of my findings, as detailed in the final sections of Chapters Four, Five and 
Six respectively.  
 
3. Semi-Quantifying Qualitative Findings  
I now turn to the validity of my qualitative findings, which I ensure in two ways. 
Firstly, below, I semi-quantify my findings. Secondly, in Part C of this chapter, I 
verify my findings using quantitative results. In Chapters Four to Six, I included the 
majority of accounts from my interview participants, however, there are still some 
individuals whose interview excerpts I did not feature in those chapters. I now look at 
the responses of all 90 participants by segregating them with respect to their choice 
of coping strategy. By semi-quantifying my results in a tabular form, I can show the 








Table 1: Number of Participants in Each Coping Strategy  







I interviewed 90 people, and I classified each participant into one of three coping 
strategies depending on their responses towards Islamophobia. As Table 1 (above) 
shows, out of the 90, the majority (58) are accommodationists, the minority (14) are 
assimilationists and 18 participants slot into the withdrawal category.  
 
4. Personal Moderating Factors & Coping Strategies  
Certain factors, namely personal, structural and situational factors, ‘moderate’ the 
relationship between the stressor of prejudice and the response outcome by way in 
which they affect the appraisal and coping of the targeted individual (Major et al. 
2003: 87). 
So far, very few studies have attempted to measure the role of moderating factors with 
relation to prejudice and coping responses. However, one study by Cassidy et al. 
(2004) tested the role of collective self-esteem in the relationship between ethnic 
prejudice and coping strategies based on Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Transactional 
Model, and found that the role of collective self-esteem was moderated by gender 
(Cassidy et al. 2004). Due to time and resource constraints, I cannot place heavy 
emphasis on the role of such moderating factors in my research. However, I suppose 
that personal factors, like age and gender, may play a part in influencing the 
individuals’ choice of coping strategies towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia. 
Here, taking a closer look at the findings for each of the three coping strategies, I see 
the breakdown of results by age and gender, which might have acted as personal 















20-34 years-old 2 5 23 
35-49 years-old 5 8 17 
50+ years-old 7 5 18 
 
Table 2 (above) shows the relationship between age and the chosen coping strategies 
of participants. It shows that the majority of young people – those aged 20-34 years-
old – are accommodationists, while only two young people are assimilationists and 5 
are withdrawn. Out of the 14 assimilationists, half of them are 50+ years-old, and 5 
are aged 35-49 years-old. 
 










Male 9 7 29 
Female 5 11 29 
 
Table 3 (above) shows the relationship between gender and the chosen coping 
strategies of participants. Interestingly, out of the 58 accommodationists, there is an 
even divide between males and females, with 29 in each group. Females make up a 
large majority (11) of the withdrawal group, whereas, more males than females are 
assimilationists.  
As is evident from my findings above, there is difference in choice of coping strategy 
with relation to age and gender. However, it would be interesting to see what further 
breakdown of results would indicate. Below, I look at each coping strategy separately 









Male Female Total 
20-34 years-old 2 - 2 
35-49 years-old 3 2 5 
50+ years-old 4 3 7 
Total 9 5 14 
 
Table 4 (above) shows the relationship between age and gender of assimilationists. 
Most assimilationists are male and out of them, the majority are 50+ years-old.  
Noteworthy is that there are no young women (aged between 20 and 34 years-old) in 
the assimilationists coping strategy.  
 




Male Female Total 
20-34 years-old 3 2 5 
35-49 years-old 2 6 8 
50+ years-old 2 3 5 
Total 7 11 18 
 
Table 5 (above) shows that most withdrawn individuals are female, out of which more 
than half (6), are women aged between 35 and 49 years-old. Interestingly, only 2 















Male Female Total 
20-34 years-old 10 13 23 
35-49 years-old 8 9 17 
50+ years-old 11 7 18 
Total 29 29 58 
 
Table 6 (above) shows that there is equal gender distribution amongst 
accommodationists. The majority of men who are accommodationists are 50+ years-
old. Interestingly, the largest group of accommodationist individuals, 13, are young 
women (aged 20-34 years-old).  
A few interesting patterns emerge from these findings. Firstly, with relation to age, 
the overwhelming majority of accommodationists are young people, with an equal 
number of men and women in this category. Young women especially chose this 
coping strategy, with 13 out of the 15 young women (~87%) I interviewed being 
accommodationists. In contrast, none of the young women whom I interviewed are 
assimilationist. Moreover, the majority of withdrawn participants are women in the 
middle-age group of 34- 49 year-olds.  
In sum, these findings reveal age and gender might be acting as moderating factors in 
the choice of coping strategy. At this point I can say that personal factors, like age and 
gender, may play a part in influencing contemporary British Muslims’ choices of 
coping strategies towards Islamophobia. This, I can explore in future studies with 
larger samples, as currently it is incredibly difficult to verify this link through 
quantitative means with the sample size of my current study.  
 
Part B. Islamophobia Case Study: Quantitative Approach 
5. Quantitative Study Description 
In the qualitative aspect of my study, I interviewed contemporary British Muslims 
regarding their experiences with Islamophobia and the ways in which they cope with 
it (see Chapters Four, Five and Six). This helped me to explain how and why they 
choose to respond as they do in order to protect their collective self-esteem. In the 
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quantitative aspect of my study, I now measure the potential link between the choice 
of coping strategies and collective self-esteem.  
Ideally, when measuring collective self-esteem of targets of prejudice, one would 
have access to a base-line value of what the collective self-esteem of these individuals 
would be when they are not targeted by prejudice, and simply acculturating within 
wider society. This, however, is virtually impossible to measure, because collective 
self-esteem is a subjective phenomenon, which is dependent on the significant 
emotional attachment of the individual to their in-group, and real-world research does 
not occur in a vacuum; certain moderating factors may influence the outcomes. 
Instead, one could explore collective self-esteem of targets and its relationship with 
their chosen coping strategies against prejudice. While this is not the cause and effect 
relationship we would have liked to establish, to some degree it allows us to see 
quantifiable values and trends of collective self-esteem of individuals who assimilate, 
withdraw or accommodate. However, here, we encounter yet another challenge, as 
collective self-esteem itself is not a unified whole that can be measured easily, as it is 
composed of diverse, often competing, elements (Major et al. 1998). In order to 
resolve this, Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) developed a scale to empirically measure 
the different composites of collective self-esteem. According to their scale, collective 
self-esteem consists of four main facets, each measuring a different construct:  
 
- Public Collective Self-Esteem: how individuals believe others evaluate their social in-
group. 
- Private Collective Self-Esteem: how individuals privately evaluate their social in-
group.  
- Membership Collective Self-Esteem: individuals’ sense of how well they function as 
members of their social groups, i.e. how much of a ‘worthy’ member they are for their 
in-group. 
- Importance to Identity: the role of group membership in self-concept. This sheds light 
on how individuals rank importance of their social in-group identification with the in-
group to one’s self-concept. 
 
Membership Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) and Importance to Identity measure the 
level of one’s emotional attachment to their in-group, and this is beyond the scope of 
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my study. Whereas, both Public and Private CSE are determined by the individual’s 
interaction, socialisation and recognition within wider society (intergroup relations), 
and this is affected by prejudice, which is very relevant to my study, and so I will refer 
to it in detail, below.  
In their study into the collective self-esteem and well-being of young White, Black 
and Asian Americans, Crocker et al. (1994) employed a race-specific CSE scale, and 
one of their main areas of interest was to measure subjects’ mean Public and Private 
CSE values and their correlations. They did this based upon the theory of symbolic 
interactionism. Symbolic interactionism puts forward the idea of the ‘looking glass 
self’ (see: (Cooley 1956); (Mead 1934)) according to which self-concept takes form 
through interactions with others and is a direct ‘reflection of those others’ appraisals 
of oneself’ (Crocker et al. 1994). Research into the relationships between one’s self-
perception and other’s perceptions of them suggests that self-perceptions are highly 
influenced by how individuals internalize others’ perceptions of them (see: (Shrauger 
& Schoeneman 1979). Taking the symbolic interactionist perspective into account, 
Public and Private CSE scores should be highly correlated.  
In lieu of the initial Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) study in which the CSE scale was 
developed, Crocker et al. (1994) expected to see definitive congruence between mean 
Public and Private CSE scores, albeit at a variety of levels, some subjects showing 
more and others showing less congruence between these scores. Interestingly, 
however, in their study of race-specific CSE, Crocker et al. (1994) gathered 
unexpected results, with Black subjects showing almost zero correlation between 
Public and Private CSE scores. This means that Blacks’ beliefs about wider society’s 
perceptions of their (‘race’) in-group potentially have very little to no influence on 
how they privately regard their in-group. Crocker et al. (1994: 510) tried to reason the 
divergence between public and private aspects of Blacks’ CSE by suggesting that 
Blacks were part of ‘consciousness-raising movements’ and this result was a 
consequence of their ‘coping mechanism,’ having ‘faced hundreds of years of 
prejudice and discrimination.’ This explanation was minimal, as it did not expand 
upon how exactly these ‘coping strategies’ are manifest. For instance, the study 
treated Black students as one monolithic group, and the different Public and Private 
CSE scores and correlations for individual Blacks were not explored. This angle of 
study could have potentially shown the different ways in which Blacks coped, and 
how their Public and Private CSE scores and correlations varied as a result.  
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In light of this study and inferences that can be drawn from it, I felt encouraged to see 
the level of congruence between mean Public and Private CSE scores regarding my 
faith-specific case study of British Muslims experiencing Islamophobia. However, 
instead of relating my CSE findings to symbolic interactionism, I base them upon the 
different coping strategies towards prejudice. Thus, due to the differences in coping 
mechanisms of each of my three coping strategies, targets’ mean Public and Private 
CSE scores and congruence between both values will potentially differ from one 
strategy to the other. I will conduct this part of my study using a faith-specific CSE 
questionnaire with the same people whom I interviewed regarding their choice of 
coping strategies (as featured in Chapters Four, Five and Six). In this way any flaws 
in my qualitative study will become apparent, alternatively, if the quantitative findings 
from the questionnaire reinforce the claims made from my qualitative study, it could 
serve to verify my qualitative findings.  
 
6. Predictions  
Using the overarching themes of my three coping strategies that explain how 
participants in each coping strategy associate with their in-group and out-group, I can 
predict how they might measure up in terms of their Public and Private CSE values 
and correlations. Thus, my predictions regarding the values of Public and Private CSE 
scores, and their correlations for British Muslims in the three respective coping 
strategies are as follows: 
1. Assimilationist British Muslims will have a low Private CSE score and a low 
Public CSE score. They will exhibit a positive correlation between their 
Private CSE and Public CSE scores.  
 
2. Withdrawn British Muslims will have a high Private CSE score and a low 
Public CSE score. They will exhibit a negative correlation between their 
Private and Public CSE scores.  
 
3. Accommodationist British Muslims will have a high or low Private CSE score 
and high or low Public CSE score. They will show no correlation between 




7. Collective Self-Esteem Questionnaire  
To measure the values of Private and Public Collective Self-Esteem of my 
participants, I used an adapted version of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective 
Self-Esteem scale, specific to faith group identity, in order to see the effects of 
Islamophobia on the collective self-esteem of British Muslims in contemporary 
England. On the basis of this scale, I devised the questionnaire for my study. It 
consists of 16 statements specific to the target’s faith in-group. The participants were 
expected to state their level of agreement with each statement, from a choice of 7 
options on a varying degree of agreement. The participants had the choice to either: 
strongly disagree (1); disagree (2); disagree somewhat (3); neutral (4); agree 
somewhat (5); agree (6); or strongly agree (7).  
Before conducting the interview for my qualitative method, I asked each of my 90 
participants to complete the CSE questionnaire. Later, questionnaires were segregated 
into the three coping strategies. This was inferred from the initial grouping of 
strategies made in the qualitative part of the study, as each participant was given the 
same alias for their interview transcripts and questionnaires.  
 
8. Analysis of Results  
I now calculate the mean values of Public and Private Collective Self-Esteem, as well 
as the correlation between these values for each of the three coping strategies. I do 
this using Spotfire analysis software with the help of a statistician, and below I give 
the reliability and validity of the statistical methods of data analysis. 
 
8.1. Reliability 
In order to ensure reliability, I conducted an internal consistency check based on 
Cronbach’s alpha test with the help of a statistician, reporting the interdependence of 
respondent scores to collective self-esteem measures. This demonstrates good overall 
consistency between the defined collective self-esteem variables of Private and Public 







Table 7: Reliability Analyses of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale 
Scale Private Public 
Scale Mean 5.25 4.98 
Scale Standard Deviation 1.45 1.98 
Alpha .72 .75 
NOTE: Ns= 90 
 
As Table 7 (above) shows, the Cronbach alphas were substantial in both cases, 
ranging from .72 for the Private and .75 for the Public CSE. The scale mean and 
standard deviation for both sub-scales are also within suitable range. This means that 
my results are quite reliable.   
 
Subscale correlations 
My quantitative results in this chapter are primarily concerned with the correlation 
between Public and Private CSE. The highest correlation between Public and Private 
CSE was found among the assimilationist British Muslims (r = .734, p< .001), and the 
lowest correlation among accommodationist British Muslims (r = -.038, p< .05). The 
remainder of this chapter discusses these and other results in detail.  
 
8.2. Validity 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with each type of coping strategy as the 
independent variable shows significant effects on the Public subscale, F(2, 90) = 
33.23, p< .001. The Newman-Keuls procedure was used to further explore the 
pairwise differences. This showed that withdrawn individuals reported significantly 
higher levels of Public and Private collective self-esteem than any of the other groups, 
(all p< .05).  
 
8.3. Displaying Results  
I now display and interpret my quantitative results with respect to my predictions 
regarding Public and Private CSE values and correlations. As I mentioned earlier, 90 
people completed the questionnaire, and I classified them into one of the three coping 
strategies based on their qualitative findings. For each strategy, I measured the Public 
and Private Collective Self-Esteem scores and correlations. Table 8 (below) gives the 
mean scores and standard deviations of the faith group-specific questionnaire of 
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collective self-esteem for all three coping strategies. Table 9 (below) gives the 
correlations between Public and Private Collective Self-Esteem of all individuals in 
each coping strategy.  
 
Table 8: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) on the Faith Group-Specific 
Questionnaire of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) and Its Subscales by Chosen Coping 
Strategy  
CSES Subscale Assimilation Accommodation Withdrawal 
Private Ms 4.96 6.19 6.46 
(SD) (1.66) (0.81) (0.69) 
Public Ms 3.87 3.82 4.82 
(SD) (1.39) (1.36) (1.46) 
NOTE: Means within rows not having a common subscript differ at p<.05 or more, according to 
Newman-Keuls tests. 
 
Table 9: Correlations between Private and Public Subscales of the Faith group-specific Questionnaire 




 Public   
Private  
 Assimilation Accommodation Withdrawal 
Assimilation 
(n=14) 
.734**   
Accommodation 
(n=58) 
 -.038*  
Withdrawal 
(n=18) 
  .244 
NOTE: *p< .05; **p<.01 
 
8.4. Evaluation of Results 
I now evaluate the results of each coping strategy separately and show whether or not 
they confirm my predictions. 
 
8.4.1. Assimilation 
As Table 8 (above) illustrates, assimilationists have the lowest mean Private CSE 
score (4.96) and a low mean Public CSE score (3.87). This is as predicted and it 
highlights that assimilationists do not regard their faith in-group all that highly and 
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they feel their in-group is evaluated poorly by the out-group. I also predicted that 
assimilationists will have a strong positive correlation between Public and Private 
CSE, and this is confirmed by the result that shows a statistically significant, positive 
correlation between both values (.734), shown in table 9.197 This means that it is quite 
possible that the assimilationists’ views of their faith in-group are positively 




Table 8 shows that those in the withdrawal category have the highest mean Private 
CSE (6.46) and the highest mean Public CSE scores (4.82) of all three strategies. 
These scores are not as predicted, as I expected a high Private CSE and a low Public 
CSE. I also predicted that those in the withdrawal category would show a negative 
correlation between Private and Public CSE scores. From Table 9, I see that the 
correlation between their Private and Public CSE is non-significant and slightly 
positive (.244), which was unpredicted. This means that it is quite possible that the 
withdrawn British Muslims’ views of their faith in-group are slightly, positively 
influenced by wider society’s perceptions of their in-group, as opposed to being 
negatively reinforced by them. As this part of the prediction is not fully confirmed, I 
will explain this result in more detail in Part C of this chapter.  
 
8.4.3. Accommodation  
As shown in Table 8, accommodationists have a reasonably high mean Private CSE 
score (6.19) and the lowest mean Public CSE score (3.82). This is potentially as 
predicted, as for accommodation, I suggested that both Private and Public CSE scores 
can be either high or low. It can mean that accommodationists regard their faith in-
group highly and they feel their in-group is evaluated poorly by wider society. From 
Table 9, I see that there is a statistically significant result of an almost zero correlation 
between Private and Public CSE (-.038).198 The lack of any correlation between 
Private and Public CSE scores is as I predicted, which suggests that 
                                                
197 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient) 
198 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient) 
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accommodationists are potentially uninfluenced by wider society’s views of their in-
group. It means that it is possible for accommodationists to distinguish between what 
they think is wider society’s perception of their in-group and what they personally 
feel about their in-group.  
 
Part C. Convergence of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches   
In order to ensure credibility of my research, I employed a mixed methods approach, 
of a convergent design, using both qualitative and quantitative methods for my case 
of British Muslims experiencing Islamophobia in contemporary England. Wisdom 
and Creswell (2013) state that a convergent design involves: 
 
‘collecting both types of data at roughly the same time; assessing information using 
parallel constructs for both types of data; separately analyzing both types of data; and 
comparing results through procedures such as a side-by-side comparison in a 
discussion, transforming the qualitative data set into quantitative scores, or jointly 
displaying both forms of data’ (Wisdom & Creswell 2013). 
 
After analysing my qualitative findings and quantitative results separately, I now 
compare and discuss the verification and validation of my qualitative findings with 
respect to the quantitative results regarding each coping strategy separately.  
 
9. Assimilation  
In case of my quantitative results, the most statistically significant result I achieved is 
in relation to the assimilation coping strategy. The strong positive correlation between 
Private and Public CSE of assimilated British Muslims implies two things. Firstly, it 
shows how their personal views regarding their in-group are potentially influenced by 
wider society’s supposed negative perceptions of the group, by taking the critique 
positively. Secondly, the result suggests that an individual’s judgment of themselves 
(in this case their faith in-group) will be a complete reflection of what they perceive 
is wider society’s evaluation of their in-group. My qualitative findings also support 
these results. One theme that runs across interviews with assimilationist British 
Muslims is that there is an onus on the ‘Muslim community’ to change and reform in 
order to reflect wider society’s expectations. Many assimilationists justify the 
negativity of society towards their faith in-group. For instance, both Umar, a secular 
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Gloucester pensioner, and Samar, the London-based human rights lawyer, said that 
they ‘can understand why Muslims are disliked.’199 This was also said by retired 
teacher, Sameena, who claimed that: 
 
‘it is only the Muslims blowing things up, so rightly they are hated. It’s only natural’. 
Others said word for word ‘Muslims bring [Islamophobia] upon themselves.’200   
 
For many assimilationist British Muslims I spoke with, their reason for transitioning 
and becoming assimilationists is a result of their strong disapproval for their faith 
group co-members. As many have voiced in the interviews, Islamophobia is 
perpetuated because of the actions of some Muslims who ‘retaliate’ and become 
‘offensive’ and ‘demanding’ instead of looking inwardly for solutions. In the words 
of Samar:  
 
‘It is important to strive for justice but without becoming offended and offensive, 
which unfortunately many British Muslims tend to do [sic], and it isn’t helping the 
cause.’  
 
Both Samar and Shahid, a video-blogger from London, take issue with the very 
terminology of Islamophobia. In another participant, 50-something Saj’s, words:  
 
‘Islamophobia is the wrong word to use. It is not what we mean… what we are 
referring to is anti-Muslim hatred. I propose we use this instead as it accurately 
describes the situation. We should be free and okay to critique the ideology or 
religious doctrine, as long as we are not being offensive towards or harming other 
people.’201 
 
He continues:  
 
‘Sometimes other Muslims label me an Islamophobe simply for standing up against 
abhorrent traditions, which by the way aren’t even part of the tenets of the faith. This 
is why I cannot socialise with the mainstream of Muslim society found in mosques 
and cultural centres. It is not for me. It’s isolating and regressive and they are 
unfriendly to me for marrying outside of my ethnicity.’  
 
Shahid echoes Saj’s sentiments by suggesting that: 
                                                
199 I conducted an interview with Umar on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
200 I conducted an interview with Sameena on December 1st 2014 in London. 
201 I conducted an interview with Saj on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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“we need to distinguish between Islam as a doctrine and Muslims as a people…it’s 
okay to say bad things about a belief. That’s fine. But attacking Muslims as people, 
because they are ‘different’ is wrong. And Muslims shouldn’t become hostile if their 
religion is critiqued. That’s part and parcel of liberal society.”202 
 
The above discussion shows that assimilationist British Muslims believe that wider 
society evaluates their in-group unfavourably (low Public CSE) and they also 
privately evaluate their in-group negatively (low Private CSE). This could mean that 
their own personal views of their in-group are very much a reflection of the negative 
opinions held by wider society regarding their in-group (strong positive correlation 
between Public and Private CSE). This is in line with my anticipated theme regarding 
assimilationists, which states that: ‘assimilationists acknowledge wider society’s 
prejudices against their in-group and agree with wider society’s negative perceptions 
regarding their in-group; reject the in-group characteristics; and adopt wider society’s 
views.’ Hence, both my qualitative findings and quantitative results regarding 
assimilation converge. This means that the qualitative findings are validated and 
verified through my quantitative results.  
 
10. Withdrawal 
Regarding the withdrawn group, I predicted that there would be a negative correlation 
between Public and Private CSE. This would mean that as Public CSE gets lower, 
Private CSE gets higher i.e. the more negative society’s supposed perception of their 
faith in-group becomes, the higher the target’s personal evaluation of their in-group 
will be. This means that the withdrawn individual’s personal evaluation of their in-
group would be negatively reinforced by wider society’s perceptions of their in-group.  
Instead, my results show a slightly positive, yet non-significant correlation between 
Public and Private CSE. This suggests that though their personal evaluation of their 
in-group (Private CSE) is the highest amongst all three coping strategies, however, 
their perceptions regarding wider society’s supposed views about their in-group 
(Public CSE) is slightly high (but not statistically significant enough to take into 
account). This is because some individuals in the withdrawn category take wider 
society’s criticisms of their in-group positively, or ignore it. Although the quantitative 
                                                
202 I conducted an interview with Shahid on November 24th 2014 in London. 
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results for withdrawn do not back my initial prediction regarding the withdrawal 
coping strategy, my qualitative findings can still explain why this might be the case.  
All those British Muslims I spoke with who choose to withdraw personally feel proud 
of their affiliation with their in-group. Regarding wider society’s views of their in-
group, there is a divide. The minority of withdrawn British Muslims understand that 
Islamophobia is directed toward their community. Those like Fahd, an undergraduate 
student from Gloucester, speak about Islamophobic bullying. Fahd asserts how his 
experiences of being targeted by his peers simply for being Muslim has led him to 
become reserved and ‘not open and willing to get involved with the wider 
community.’203 In addition, Fahd believes that it is ‘natural’ for him to find a sense of 
belonging by actively seeking out other ‘like-minded Muslims,’ as according to Fahd, 
‘it’s nice to be around people who care about you.’ By this understanding, as his 
Public CSE decreases, Fahd’s Private CSE increases. Similar reasoning is given by 
multiple other withdrawn participants like Ameen, Zulfikar and Mustafa. For them, 
becoming ‘more practicing Muslims’ or ‘returning to Islam’ are the solutions to 
Islamophobia.204 205 206 This would lead us to suspect that they would exhibit a 
negative correlation between Public and Private CSE. However, this is not uniform 
across all withdrawn participants, because a considerable portion of them do not show 
similar reasoning for their response or appraisal of Islamophobia.  
These withdrawn British Muslims do not acknowledge the extent of Islamophobia, or 
prefer to stay silent when the topic is broached. This might be because these 
individuals choose to respond solely using emotion-focused means (i.e. denial, blame, 
restraint, turning to religion etc.), as they usually lack responses to allow more 
problem-focused responses that involve inter-group relations. For instance, many of 
the elderly and middle-aged female interview participants from Birmingham, like 
Naseem and Zeenat, deny the extent of prejudice, positively reinterpret it, or redefine 
it in order to protect their collective self-esteem. They hold their in-group in high 
esteem and believe others in the out-group would also view their faith group with such 
positivity:  
 
                                                
203 I conducted an interview with Fahd on February 23rd 2015 in Gloucester. 
204 I conducted an interview with Ameen on January 21st 2015 in Birmingham. 
205 I conducted an interview with Zulfikar on November 10th 2014 in London. 
206 I conducted an interview with Mustafa on November 23rd 2014 in London. 
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‘AlHamdulilah for my being born a Muslim [sic]. We are a great community. It gives 
me meaning… Why would anyone ever have bad feelings towards us?’ says 
Naseem.207  
 
Another way to understand the positive correlation is that many of the banal 
withdrawn British Muslims I spoke to, like Asiah and Khursheed, are people who 
suggest Islamophobia is a backlash against terrorism. In their minds, it is directed at 
terrorists who are not Muslim, so by proxy, the negative feelings of Islamophobia are 
‘not because society dislikes Islam or Muslim communities,’ asserts Khursheed.208  
 
‘[Wider society] does not dislike Muslims. They only dislike the terrorist. And those 
terrorists are not even Muslim,’ she continued.  
 
Similarly, these banal withdrawn individuals categorically attest that terrorists were 
not part of their faith group, as Asiah, say:  
 
‘These people who bomb [sic] they are not Muslims, as a Muslim does not kill 
innocent people.’ 209 
 
This defence mechanism in the above two examples shows how the threat of prejudice 
is reappraised by these banal withdrawn individuals through their denial of 
Islamophobia, and this in turn protects their collective self-esteem. This gives them a 
higher Public CSE as well as a higher Private CSE. In my opinion, this might be a 
possible reason why I did not see a negative correlation between their Public and 
Private Collective Self-Esteem.  
Interesting to note is that despite their belief that Islamophobia is directed by wider 
society towards ‘terrorists’ who are ‘non-Muslims,’ withdrawn individuals whom I 
spoke with assert that the best response in countering Islamophobia is to:  
 
‘strengthen your identity as a Muslim above all else,’ or to ‘return to Islam and shun 
the materiality of worldly pleasures’ as Khursheed says.  
 
                                                
207 I conducted an interview with Naseem on February 3rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
208 I conducted an interview with Khursheed on February 3rd 2015 in Birmingham. 
209 I conducted an interview with Asiah on November 11th 2014 in London. 
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Such esoteric practices allow withdrawn British Muslims to deny the influence of 
Islamophobia in their expressions and speech, yet simultaneously, in reality they 
continue to withdraw from the realm of wider society.  
After explaining how certain individuals employ these emotion-focused defence 
mechanisms against Islamophobia, I suggest that it might be the reason why the Public 
CSE values are unexpectedly high. This finding may have caused a skew in my Public 
CSE results, and the slight positive correlation exhibited between their Public and 
Private CSE scores. This can perhaps also explain why my quantitative prediction 
regarding withdrawal is not confirmed. From this I can now say to some extent that 
the slight positive correlation of Public and Private CSE can only partially fit with the 
anticipated theme in the qualitative aspect of my study, which states that ‘withdrawn 
individuals acknowledge prejudices against their in-group yet reject wider society’s 
negative perceptions regarding their in-group; reaffirm and reclaim their in-group 
identity; and dissociate from wider society.’ 
 
11. Accommodation  
Quantitative results for accommodationist British Muslims are in line with the 
prediction that there would be no correlation between the Private and Public CSE 
scores. Moreover, this is statistically significant and it can be supported by qualitative 
evidence, too. The overwhelming majority acknowledge that wider society holds a 
negative perception of their faith in-group. Despite this, most accommodationist 
British Muslims privately evaluate their in-group in high regard. However, some 
accommodationists from my interviews also feel their in-group has its flaws, and they 
believe there is definitely need for self-improvement. My qualitative findings also 
support these results. This can be illustrated with the words of 21-year-old London 
student, Halima:  
 
‘I know we get a bad rep [in the media], but my aim is to challenge this. To represent 
Muslims in a good light…this isn’t a true representation of Islam and Muslims.’210  
 
Others believe it is their duty to represent Muslims, like Shaheen, a young lawyer 
from London, says:  
                                                
210 I conducted an interview with Halima on October 19th 2014 in London. 
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‘There is definitely hostile feelings in the mainstream about Muslims… I will actively 
consider it my duty to reflect the positivity of my community, through charity work, 
and the Human Library project.211’212  
 
This highlights that even though they feel wider society looks at their faith in-group 
unfavourably, they believe that it is not a reason for them to shun their in-group.  
On the other hand, in some cases, accommodationist British Muslims often blame the 
isolated and ghettoised nature of their withdrawn brethren for their ties with the newer 
Muslim immigrant communities. Accommodationists believe this to be a reason why 
their withdrawn brethren have not been able to break away; the culture is holding them 
back and causing them to behave in a markedly ‘un-British’ manner. In seeking to 
balance being both British and Muslim and making a ‘determined effort’ towards self-
improvement, British Muslim accommodationists seek to instil change inwardly, 
without compromising their in-group identity. For example, accommodationist 
British Muslims decry certain cultural traditions, which are by no means part of the 
faith, yet are considered ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ and they go unquestioned. Although 
they believe in freedom of choice and do not adhere to a strict public-private divide, 
accommodationist Muslims still acknowledge certain practices and that sometimes 
‘ineptitude’ on part of their fellow in-group members exists. This would explain why 
some such participants commented disapprovingly of the activities of their in-group, 
without a complete rejection of it. For example, 25 years-old, Amber from London, 
testifies that while she sees the good ‘like unity and brotherhood’ that her in-group 
has to offer, she also feels British Muslims have the duty to ‘try and better their own 
situation…without compromising either [of their identities].’213 23-year-old Rahm 
from London can resonate with these remarks. According to Rahm, ‘backwards 
traditions’ are being conflated with religious doctrine meaning that:  
 
“We as Muslims even become confused and begin appeasing violations like FGM and 
forced marriages. We need to strip spirituality from such barbaric ‘traditions’ and 
                                                
211 The Human Library Project was founded in 2001 in Denmark as an initiative to foster social 
cohesion, in a friendly environment people can learn more about one another and breakdown 
stereotypes and prejudices. The project entails people with interesting stories to tell volunteering as 
‘books’ that other can ‘takeout’ and ‘read’ to learn more about that particular individual. For more 
information please see: http://humanlibrary.org/ 
212 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
213 I conducted an interview with Amber on March 20th 2015 in London. 
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foster a way of life that is respectful of difference. That’s the real way to end hatred 
against Muslims.”214  
 
Simultaneously, Rahm points out that this form of internal change emerging from 
within the in-group should not be seen as changing ‘because they [wider society] force 
us to.’ Rahm and Amber, as well as many other accommodationist British Muslims 
are strong proponents of in-group autonomy. Hence, they believe that internal changes 
should be for the good of the British Muslim communities and not ‘enforced.’ Rahm 
asserts:  
 
‘We need self-improvement so that we can become a better version of ourself [sic] 
and that’s how we can stand up against Islamophobia.’ She, like her fellow 
accommodationists, believes that a successful response towards Islamophobia can 
only be achieved if wider society ‘accepts us for who we are. We can’t be expected 
to be like everybody else. That’s to happen naturally and for [British Muslims] to 
decide for ourself [sic].’ 
 
The above discussion shows that accommodationists acknowledge that wider society 
holds a negative perception of their faith in-group (low Public CSE). Despite this, 
most accommodationist British Muslims privately evaluate their in-group in high 
regard (high Private CSE), and their opinion of their faith in-group is most likely 
unaffected by wider society’s view of the group (no correlation between Public and 
Private CSE). This is in line with my anticipated theme regarding accommodationists, 
which states that: ‘accommodationists acknowledge wider society’s prejudices 
regarding their in-group without accepting them as a true reflection of the group, and 
realising that the in-group has its flaws. They clearly distinguish and negotiate 
between wider society’s negative perceptions of their in-group and their own personal 
evaluation of the group.’ Hence, both my qualitative findings and quantitative results 
regarding accommodationists converge. This means that my qualitative findings are 
validated and verified through my quantitative results. 
 
12. Conclusion  
In this chapter I sought to attain credibility of my research by converging the findings 
from the qualitative aspect of my study, with my quantitative results. Qualitative 
                                                
214 I conducted an interview with Rahm on March 20th 2015 in London. 
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methods in and of themselves are valuable in terms of carrying out in-depth 
exploration and analysis of subjective phenomena using questions that enable 
substantial understanding of complex human behaviours and attitudes. However, a 
mixed methods approach that incorporates quantitative methods can help to ensure 
greater validity and reliability of intricate, descriptive data found through qualitative 
means (i.e. interviews). Moreover, biases can arise during the course of the interviews, 
although in the case of my research, I had them covered. For instance, when the 
researcher interprets the interviewees words and transcribes them on his/her own 
terms, or if the interviewee finds the topic difficult to discuss, and as such they might 
choose to lie or conceal their true feelings about the issue of discussion. This is why 
carrying out quantitative analysis of the same data set simultaneously – in this case, 
conducting a questionnaire with the same interview participants – ensured that my 
qualitative methods could be further bolstered with the support of quantitative 
methods and vice versa.  
The quantitative part of my study took the shape of fixed numerical data from which 
I could ascertain statistical significance and thereby validity, reliability and 
verification of my qualitative findings. Ultimately, this proved to be a useful exercise, 
as overall both qualitative and quantitative elements of my study into contemporary 
British Muslim responses towards Islamophobia converged. However, in the case of 
the withdrawn coping strategy the quantitative results were not verifiable with my 
initial predications; the results are not statistically significant and individuals exhibit 
high Private and high Public CSE scores, and their correlation between the two values 
is slightly positive. I reasoned this through descriptive means from my qualitative 
study. The unexpected slightly positive, yet non-significant correlation between the 
Private and Public CSE scores of withdrawn individuals is likely down to the fact that 
most withdrawn British Muslims who took part in my study exhibit banal withdrawal, 
and they deal with Islamophobia through emotion-focused coping. This defence 
mechanism is mainly expressed in two ways, as found in their interviews. Firstly, 
through self-aggrandisement of their in-group and a firm belief that their faith teaches 
them to be patient in the face of Islamophobia. Secondly, through reconceptualising 
the hatred of Islamophobes as not a true representation of wider society’s feelings; on 
the whole prejudice is against terrorists who are not ‘real Muslims’, and thus their 
feelings of hostility are not against the Muslim faith group per se.  
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Chapter Eight. Antisemitism Case Study: Collective Self-
Esteem & Coping Strategies  
 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter seeks to address my fifth research question, which is: ‘How do the coping 
strategies of targets of Antisemitism relate with their collective self-esteem?’ It is 
almost parallel to the previous chapter, which focused on the collective self-esteem of 
British Muslims facing Islamophobia in contemporary England. I begin by giving a 
brief description of my study. I then conduct discursive analysis to examine the link 
between each of the three coping strategies and collective self-esteem of Jews facing 
Antisemitism in Weimar era Germany. Following this, I look into the potential 
relationship between the personal moderating factors, i.e. age and gender, and choice 
of coping strategy. I end with a brief conclusion regarding how the collective self-
esteem of Weimar era Jews is linked to their coping strategies, and whether or not 
personal moderating factors play a role in their choice of responses against 
Antisemitism.  
 
2. Study Description 
The aim here is to investigate the potential link between collective self-esteem and 
chosen coping strategies of Weimar era Jews. In other words, I explain how they 
internalised and appraised Antisemitism, and how their experiences of being 
stigmatised affected their collective self-esteem. While, in the case of Islamophobia 
my participants completed questionnaires from which I measured their collective self-
esteem, using an adapted version of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-
Esteem scale. In contrast, there is no quantitative data set available to measure the 
collective self-esteem of Weimar era Jews, as all of my potential participants are 
deceased. However, I conduct secondary analysis of the same data of Weimar era 
Jews that I used for my qualitative study. This part of my research is based on the 
three outcomes of Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) studied by Luhtanen and Crocker 
(1992) and Crocker et. al (1994). In their study, Crocker et al. (1994) assert that the 
correlation between Public and Private CSE can have three main outcomes: 
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1. Firstly, an individual can have a positive correlation between Public and 
Private CSE. This means that the individual’s personal evaluation of their in-
group is positively influenced by what they deem to be wider society’s 
perception of the group. In this case, if the Public and Private CSE are both 
low, it means that they believe wider society evaluates the individual’s in-
group unfavourably and the individual’s personal evaluation of their in-group 
is also negative. However, if the Public and Private CSE are both high, it 
means that they believe wider society holds the individual’s in-group in high 
esteem and the individual’s personal evaluation of their in-group is also 
positive.  
 
2. Secondly, an individual can exhibit a negative correlation between Public and 
Private CSE. This means that the individual’s personal evaluation of their in-
group can be negatively reinforced by what they deem to be wider society’s 
perception of the group. In this case, if Public CSE is high and Private CSE is 
low, it means that while the individual think’s wider society holds their in-
group in high esteem, their personal evaluation of their in-group is low. 
However, if Public CSE is low and Private CSE is high, it means that while 
the individual thinks wider society holds their in-group in low esteem, their 
personal evaluation of their in-group is high.  
 
3. Thirdly, an individual can exhibit zero correlation between Public and Private 
CSE. This means that the individual’s Private CSE can be either high or low, 
i.e. they can hold their in-group in high or low esteem, while their Public CSE 
can be either low or high, in such a way that they do not show a correlation. 
This might mean that the individual’s personal evaluation of their in-group is 
uninfluenced by what they perceive to be wider society’s evaluation of the 
group. 
 
3. Discursive Analysis 
Here, I conduct secondary analysis of the same data found in direct written accounts 
from memoirs, diaries and journals used in chapters Four, Five and Six in a discursive 
manner by picking out the psychological themes apparent in the narratives of the 
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individuals in each coping strategy, through an assessment of their use of emotive 
language, or ‘triggers words’ in order to evaluate their subjective emotional 
attachment to their in-group and how wider society viewed their in-group. I do this by 
using professional judgement in trying to gauge their Private Collective Self-Esteem, 
which is their personal feelings about their faith in-group; and their Public Collective 
Self-Esteem, which in this case is how they felt wider society perceived their in-group; 
and any congruence (correlation) or alignment between Private and Public Collective 
Self-Esteem, which shows, potentially, how far their personal evaluations may have 
been influenced by wider society’s opinion of their in-group. 
Through this analysis, I now look into the relationship between collective self-esteem 
and each coping strategy, separately.  
 
3.1. Assimilation 
In the majority of memoirs, autobiographies and journals from the Weimar era that I 
read, German Jews predominantly adopted the assimilation coping strategy in 
response to Antisemitism.215 My qualitative findings reveal that assimilated Weimar 
Jews did not look favourably upon their fellow in-group members. This suggests that 
their Private Collective Self-Esteem would have been low. For example, many blamed 
other less assimilated Jews, particularly the newly arrived Ostjuden (Eastern Jews), 
for failing to become part of society and they claimed that this was a direct cause of 
Antisemitism. In fact, so prevalent was this feeling amongst assimilationist Jews, it 
was often a trend seen within families; it was common for assimilationist Weimar 
Jews to hold negative views about their withdrawn relatives, as Bruno Weil in his 
memoir describes his maternal grandfather and his extended family as:  
 
‘very archetypal of close-knit Jewish German communities found in the Hessian 
countryside…incredibly walled-off and clannish in their ways, and determined to 
resist change.’216 
 
Similarly, holding onto their roots was looked down upon by assimilationist Jews. 
Others, like Hugo Levi, a young Jew from Berlin referred to his contemporary 
                                                
215 Of the 300 or so memoirs and journals that I encountered, over two-thirds of them belonged to 
assimilationist Weimar Jews. 
216 Weil, B. Diary. [date]. (n.d.). Diary of the East Front Diary, Bruno Weil Collection, box 10, 
folder 19, AR 7108. Center for Jewish History. New York, New York. 
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withdrawn Jews, resident in ghettos, as ‘stubborn in their orthodox ways. Then they 
ask why we are despised by the Gentiles?’217 Similar sentiments are echoed in Ruth 
Gutmann’s diary in which she explains: 
 
“The Eastern Jews were generally among the poor of the congregation. Almost 
invariably they had large families, and they observed the Jewish laws more strictly. 
Many German Jews looked askance at the ‘Ostjuden,’ and it was not uncommon to 
hear the dubious charge that it was the Eastern Jews who, by their demeanour and 
obvious ‘otherness,’ had helped to intensify, if not actually introduce 
antisemitism.”218  
 
Many assimilationist Weimar Jews would agree with Ruth Gutmann’s comment, as 
in their eyes, it was right to blame withdrawn members of their in-group for causing 
or intensifying Antisemitism. From this, one can infer that the Public CSE of 
assimilationist Jews would also have been low; they believed that wider German 
society held their faith in-group in low regard. For this reason, many assimilated Jews 
tried effortlessly to prove that they were ‘not like them [the ‘other’ less assimilated 
Jews].’  
This is echoed in the memoir of Ruth Schmidt who was a teenage Berliner in the 
1920s. In her journal, she kept note about how many of her Jewish friends and 
acquaintances ‘tried to out-German the Gentiles… they [Jews] would make effort to 
be seen as anything but Jewish.’219 Similarly, in his memoir, Henry Bauxbaum speaks 
about the psychology of the assimilated Jews who – having felt a negative perception 
of their in-group prevalent within wider German society – decided to immerse 
themselves amongst their Gentile peers and distance themselves from other, more 
‘apparent Jews.’ In doing so, they felt they could ‘go under the radar’ and not get 
caught out. The logic behind this is as follows:  
 
‘in the early 1900s many consoled themselves with the pleasant illusion that the anti-
Jewish measures…were directed only against the large number of Jews from the east 
living in Germany. It took a while for them to realize that [Gentiles] had different 
ideas about it, and I’m certain some had a hard time to be converted.’220  
                                                
217 Levi, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). My Life. Wiener Library Collections, Wiener Library, London.  
218 Gutmann, R. Memoirs. [date]. Memoir 1933. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York, p.4. 
219 Schmidt, R. Memoirs. [date]. Forever Ago. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York. 
220 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.136. 
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Finally, my qualitative findings show that the personal views of assimilationist 
Weimar Jews regarding their in-group were very much influenced by how they 
perceived wider society evaluated their faith in-group. This means that the congruence 
between both their Public and Private Collective Self-Esteem would have been quite 
high. In excerpts that I refer to throughout Chapter Three, assimilationist Jews not 
only acknowledged that wider society held Anti-Semitic views, they also justified 
why such negativity persisted. Often a self-hating Jew would take the abuse to great 
lengths as Bauxbaum explains, much to his befuddlement, the mixed offspring of 
those with Jewish blood ‘were markedly Anti-Semitic.’221  
Bauxbaum tries to reason this strange behaviour suggesting ‘it might have been the 
result of their being continuously confronted with their origin through the other Jewish 
families.’222 This suggests that self-hatred was a learnt experience, and it started from 
the home, the very place one feels most secure. Bauxbaum even recounts how, on 
many occasions, he was racially abused and called ‘a Goddamn Jew’ by his next-door 
neighbour, who was himself of Jewish blood from his maternal side223. Bauxbuam 
goes on to quote an old Jewish proverb: ‘there is no worse anti-Semite than the one 
who has gone over to the other side, the Apostate.’ He also gives the example of the 
clash between assimilationist groups and the more withdrawn strand of Zionism. He 
does this by discussing the clash between German Jewish university groups; the 
Zionist group opposed wider society and upheld their heritage, whilst the assimilated 
Jews were ready to give up all their vestiges of identity, and become one with wider 
Gentile society. In an excerpt, Bauxbaum talks specifically about the ‘competition’ 
between both groups:  
 
“At the big universities in Frankfurt the Zionists had to compete with the true-blooded 
German Jewish students in their assimilation-oriented fraternities, the ‘Kartell Jude. 
Verbindunger,’ the “KC.” The ‘KC’ mimicked the Germanic ‘Burshenschaft’ 
(fraternity) in all their inanity, going so far as to incorporate duelling requirements. 
The Zionists had nothing but derision and mockery for their ‘Germanism’ 
(Deutschtum), while to the KC the Zionists were either ‘Pollaks’ [slur for Eastern 
Jews] who perpetuated anti-Semitism or, at best, ‘daydreamers’ who were an affront 
to Jewish life in Germany. The KC was representative of the common German-Jewish 
attitude toward Zionism in general and toward eastern Jews in particular. To the native 
Hessian, Badenian, or Bavarian Jews they were a foreign element, and an undesirable 
                                                
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid., p.139. 
223 Ibid., p.198. 
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one at that. They defied and at the same time lowered the image of the German-Jews 
beheld of themselves as in the eyes of the Germans. They would have liked nothing 
better than to keep them out of Germany altogether. They reminded them of the 
ghetto, of a Jewish past they had thrown off or escaped from long ago.’224  
 
Here again we see assimilationist Jews attempting to detach themselves from the 
negative connotations and backwardness associated with ghetto clannishness, as this 
in their eyes, was inherently ‘holding Jews back,’ and also frowned upon by wider 
German society at large. As Bauxbaum notes, the assimilationist Weimar Jew was so 
far removed from members of their faith in-group as they thought that wider German 
society would regard them negatively. As such, the assimilationists’ view of their own 
faith in-group was very much a reflection of their deep internalisation of Gentile 
Germany’s Antisemitism.  
In another example, Martin Gumpert recounts in his diary about how his own father, 
an assimilationist Jew, openly castigated his non-assimilationist brethren using 
derogatory slurs. According to Gumpert, his father justified this because he believed 
that wider society’s negative opinions (Antisemitism) ‘were rightful’ and this caused 
him to see withdrawn Jews as ‘the biggest problem we [Jews] had’ as Gumpert asserts: 
 
‘My own father, like the Gentiles around him referred to all the Jews from the east, 
and those ghetto-dwelling Jews using the slur of ‘Pollack’ [derogatory slur for Eastern 
Jews]… He like his assimilated contemporaries viewed Eastern Jews as inferior to us 
Western, German Jews. We were superior in every aspect of life because we belonged 
to the German culture, you see. All other Jews were regarded in low esteem. Such was 
the hierarchy that permeated into our own Jewish collectives.’225 
 
To sum up, I have shown by way of examples from historic accounts that: 
assimilationist Weimar era Jews looked down upon their in-group, so they would have 
had a low Private Collective Self-Esteem; they thought wider society looked 
unfavourably upon their in-group, so their Public Collective Self-Esteem would have 
been low, too; and there would been congruence between both their Public and Private 
CSE if we had the quantitative data to assess this relationship. This suggests that the 
assimilationist Jew was potentially positively influenced by what they perceived were 
                                                
224 Ibid., p.199. 
225 Martin Gumpert’s diaries complied in: Ittner, J. Diaries. (1998). Augenzeugen im Dienst der 
Wahrheit: Leben und literarisches Werk Martin Gumperts (1897-1955). Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag. 
Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New York, New York.  
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wider society’s negative thoughts regarding their faith in-group, and this was apparent 
in how they emulated wider society’s hostile feelings towards less assimilated Jews.  
 
3.2. Withdrawal  
Withdrawal, the second coping strategy, was a response to Antisemitism favoured by 
a reasonable number of Jews whose memoirs and journal accounts I analysed. This 
group consisted of the isolated, ghettoised, and Zionist Jews. The Private CSE of 
withdrawn Weimar Jews would have been quite high as they were closely attached to 
their in-group and held it in high esteem. This can be seen from many of the memoirs, 
diaries or articles by withdrawn Jews of the time, and their role within their in-group. 
A prime example of this is illustrated in the fact that group membership was a matter 
of pride, and anyone who chose to associate with the out-group e.g. via conversion 
was seen as a traitor of some sort. For instance, Karl Goldstein in his memoir226 recalls 
the story of a relative (his mother’s male cousin) who converted to Christianity upon 
marrying a Gentile woman and suffered as a consequence when he visited his 
withdrawn family in the countryside as ‘this in his folks’ eyes, I guess was worse a 
crime than marrying her,’ (Goldstein 1976: 154). On visiting his parents after 
marriage Goldstein says his cousin was immediately thrown out of the family home 
by the father, who justified his actions by saying ‘Gentiles treat us as filth and he has 
married one of their kind- does he not feel shame? Has he no honour for his family, 
for his own kind?’ (Goldstein 1976: 154).  
Another peculiar point to highlight the powerful status of the in-group in the eyes of 
withdrawn Weimar Jews is the role of various Zionist youth groups. An apt illustration 
of this is not just their interactions with wider society, but also their engagement with 
fellow Zionist youth groups. Despite all the Antisemitism they faced, Hanan Waizner 
describes why he chose to opt out of the youth movement altogether:  
 
‘one thing that I remember about my Zionist Youth meeting was being told explicitly 
by the youth leader who our enemies were. He was not referring to any other Jew-
haters. Sadly, he was referring to our rival Zionist Youth movement.’227  
 
                                                
226 Goldstein, K. M. Memoirs. (1976). Retrospect and Reflections: (My Life and My Times). Leo 
Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New York, New York.  
227 Waizner, H. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). Middle Name Israel. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York. 
 234 
This shows that they valued the in-group so much that they fought amongst 
themselves over who was in control and the legitimate authority within the in-group. 
This is what led to the infighting. Very counter-intuitively, it was their insistence and 
pride in their faith in-group’s unity and the power that was vested in this unified 
existence and the concrete identity it gave them, that ultimately led to their intra-
collective disunity. Withdrawn Jews were so strongly attached to the in-group inner 
circle that not only were they being shaped by its internal narratives, but also they 
wanted to take charge of constructing and implementing these very narratives that 
shape their identities. More simply put, they wanted to ensure that the perfect balance 
of their in-group would remain restored, and in a way, each withdrawn Jew held the 
in-group in such high esteem and made it their duty to safeguard the in-group’s status. 
Hence, they quarrelled amongst themselves (in this case other Zionist youth groups) 
to potentially have more sway over the direction of discourses and narratives 
disseminated by the in-group. 
Most withdrawn Weimar Jews from their written accounts reveal how wider society 
held a negative opinion of their faith in-group, which suggests that their Public CSE 
would have been low. This is indicated in many of the accounts of socially and 
politically withdrawn Jews featured in Chapter Four. For them, wider Gentile 
society’s Anti-Semitic views and behaviour were the reason for their internal self-
questioning and doubt. Those like Leopold Kessler and Paula Ferrand, whose 
accounts I used in Chapter Four felt that the Anti-Semitic abuse that they faced was 
the primary reason for them to look inwardly, questioning – and at times shunning – 
their Germanness. For the likes of young Zionists, such as Erich Fromm and Leo 
Löwenthal (Chapter Four) such was the height of Antisemitism that it caused them to 
seek solace in other forms of their identity. In his writings, Erich Fromm suggests that 
not only were Jews regarded as ‘lowly’ by wider German Gentile society, but it also 
forced them to reflect and return to what it truly meant to be Jewish in Weimar 
Germany. In their case, this deep self-reflection as a result of Antisemitism led them 
to do away with their Germanness and focus solely on the betterment of their maligned 
Jewish heritage (Fromm et al. 1922).  
However, not all withdrawn Weimar Jews were as outspoken regarding wider 
society’s Antisemitism directed towards their faith in-group. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, those Jews who were categorised in the banal withdrawal group expressed 
themselves by either denying or re-appropriating the stigmatisation caused by 
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Antisemitism. Such Jews, as Ruth Gutmann in her memoir asserts, sought liberation 
in ‘staying silent’ on the matter of anti-Jewish sentiments found in wider society.228 
This idea of strength through silence is also found in Gronemann’s writings, in which 
he states that ignoring the Antisemitism in their midst allowed Weimar Jews to go 
about their daily lives ‘unselfconsciously’ (Gronemann 1924: 200). It was not that 
they denied the existence of Antisemitism, but they denied the extent to which it 
impacted their self-esteem. For many in this is group, to stay silent on the matter or 
deny its significant influence was a defence mechanism through emotion-focused 
coping. This is because thinking that others hold a negative view of your in-group can 
cause you to internalise the negative feelings and lower your personal evaluation of 
your group, whereas, if one denies the hatred directed against their in-group, they are 
less likely to hold a low personal evaluation of their group. Naturally, if they were 
silent regarding the issue of Antisemitism (which would have determined their 
thoughts on wider society’s view of their in-group), they would not have documented 
it in their memoirs or autobiographies. This makes it difficult for me to gauge their 
Public CSE. However, if we were to measure the Public Collective Self-Esteem of 
such individuals, relative to the socially and politically withdrawn Jews, it would 
perhaps have been higher.  
In terms of the relationship between the possible Public and Private CSE of withdrawn 
Jews, there may have been some congruence; as Anti-Semitic feelings intensified 
some socially and politically withdrawn Weimar Jews increased their affiliation with, 
and positive evaluation of, their faith in-group. However, overall withdrawn Jews, 
much like their Muslim counterparts, had mixed reactions towards the prejudice they 
faced. Many felt clearly that wider society held a negative view of their in-group 
(meaning that their supposed Public CSE would be low), and it made them feel it was 
their duty to strengthen their personal ties with their faith in-group. For example, Ruth 
Gutmann explains in her writings how, following the disastrous Antisemitism faced 
by her family at the hands of German soldiers just weeks before the end of the Weimar 
era, led them to internalise the anti-Jewish hatred against them and seek solace in 
surrounding themselves with other Jews, in some cases by fleeing to Palestine:  
 
                                                
228 Gutmann, R. Memoirs. [date]. Memoir 1933. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York.  
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‘[We spent] years seeking accommodation with a regime with which no 
accommodation was possible. Successive anti-Jewish measures, planned to constrict 
Jewish lives had the… effect of gradual inurement. Each inflicted pain but catalyzed 
[our] Jewish resolve to hold out, to make do with what was left. They absorbed the 
insults and ignored the threats... They hoped to avert new blows…Those who realized 
the unrelenting hatred of the Jews was more than an intensification of endemic 
antisemitism fled to [Palestine].’229 
 
Gutmann’s comment shows it is clear that some Jews became withdrawn as a result 
of the Antisemitism they faced from wider society. For these Jews, shedding their 
Germanness and holding dear their stigmatised Jewish identity became a form of 
catharsis. However, the same could not be said of some banal withdrawn Weimar 
Jews, because they did not feel nor overtly express the intensity of negative feelings 
resulting from Antisemitism. This is not to suggest that they were not influenced by 
Antisemitism, in fact, their denial could serve as a defence mechanism to not have to 
deal with the reality of the threat of Antisemitism. 
To sum up, I have shown by way of examples, through the emotive tone of language 
and use of ‘trigger words,’ that withdrawn Weimar era Jews held their in-group in 
high esteem, so they would have had a high Private Collective Self-Esteem. However, 
regarding wider society’s opinions of their in-group, there was a divide. While most 
socially and politically withdrawn Weimar Jews felt society held their in-group in low 
esteem, the same could not be said of their banal counterparts, because these 
individuals either refrained from discussing the matter or denied the influence of 
wider society’s negative views. Thus, it is difficult to predict what would have been 
their Public Collective Self-Esteem. As a result, it is also difficult to ascertain if there 
would have been much congruence between their Private and Public CSE, as their 
appraisal and internalisation of the Antisemitism was overall very different. On 
balance, the socially and politically withdrawn would have shown a congruence 
between both values (in the form of negative correlation), whereas, the more banal 
withdrawn Weimar Jews perhaps would have shown a more positive congruence 
between their Public and Private CSE. 
 
 
                                                
229 Gutmann, R. Memoirs. [date]. Memoir 1933. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York, p.12-13. 
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3.3. Accommodation   
For the final coping strategy against Antisemitism, that of accommodation, the Public 
CSE of accommodationist Weimar era Jews would have been low, as in many of the 
archival accounts I analysed, they acknowledged that wider society held negative 
perceptions of their faith in-group. On the other hand, the Private CSE of 
accommodationist Weimar era Jews would have been relatively high, as most of them 
viewed their in-group favourably on a personal level. However, in the case of Weimar 
Jews, much like their contemporary British Muslim counterparts, the congruence 
between Private and Public CSE would be little to non-existent. This is because in the 
overwhelming majority of memoirs and diaries that I analysed, Weimar era 
accommodationist Jews give the impression that while they acknowledge that their 
faith in-group had its flaws, they do not subscribe to the negative feelings that wider 
society held regarding their in-group.  
While the accommodationist Jews might have felt a strong attachment to, and as a 
result active need to promote their faith in-group identity, the majority of these Jews 
were of the opinion that wider German society did not hold their in-group in equally 
high esteem. There always existed this deep-seated, latent understanding that no 
matter what, one would always be ‘first a Jew’ (negative connotation). For instance, 
Henry Bauxbaum in his memoir states:  
 
‘no matter how much the Jews considered themselves to be Germans, the Germans 
looked at them first as Jews, who lived with them but did not fully belong to them, a 
theme developed ad nauseum in all sorts of variations from the beginning of their 
emancipation to Hitler. It was this fact throughout the whole period of assimilation, 
their non-recognition as full German citizens, to which the Jews could never reconcile 
themselves, but which was perfectly clear to the masses of Germans and their 
spokesmen. It was this never-ceasing tension which underlay their whole relationship 
with the German world and which was a constant torture to generations of German 
Jews. Anti-Jewish attitudes and feelings were always there and could be blown into 
flame even at the most normal of times. It was up to the Jew to remain defiant and 
unshaken in his commitment to both his country and Jewish volk [people].’230   
 
This is perhaps what led to a difference between the responses to Antisemitism of 
accommodationist and assimilationist Jews during the Weimar Republic. 
Assimilationists might had agreed that their in-group is cast in negative light in the 
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sphere of wider society, but they would easily detach themselves from the in-group. 
Accommodationists, as they held their in-group in high esteem inevitably, did the 
opposite; they took pride in embracing their in-group identity, even if they believed 
their in-group was far from perfect. As the above excerpt suggests, what makes a Jew 
accommodationist is their desire to balance their ‘commitment’ to both elements of 
their identity; they refuse to give up either their Germanness or Jewishness in the face 
of Antisemitism. Judging from this, there would not be much congruence between 
their Private Collective Self-Esteem and Public Collective Self-Esteem, in other 
words, the negative opinions of wider society would not have influenced their 
personal evaluations of their faith in-group. For example, often in the face of extreme 
physical violence directed towards their in-group, (social and political) 
accommodationist Jews would stand up and declare their Jewishness fearlessly. An 
anecdote of this is shared by Bauxbaum in his memoir in which he recounts how, after 
an incident from his youth in which a leading Jewish figure had been lynched in the 
town of Hessia, he: 
  
“watched the excitement together with my former comrades in arms, a stranger who 
didn’t know me but was a friend of my friends, came running into our circle, his face 
aglow with enthusiasm, joyously announcing ‘Let’s take the Jews down to the 
Seewiess and shoot them.’ My friends looked embarrassed and even more 
embarrassed was the fellow when I told him: ‘Alright, you can start right with me, I 
am a German, I am a Jew, take me down there and shoot me. He came to with a start 
and left as quickly as he had come.’”231  
 
This was an exceptionally courageous thing to do; to literally stand in the face of 
Antisemitism, actively risking physical assault. Not only does the writer take a defiant 
stance against anti-Jewish hatred, they simultaneously assert their Germanness with 
just as much vigour. Another example is given by Lucile Straus who was a young 
woman living in Berlin at the time of the Weimar. Lucile recounts in her memoir how, 
on one occasion during a gala, she was approached by a supposed gentleman who, in 
attempts to gain her attention, decided to make a racist joke at the expense of Jews, 
commenting on how at the gala there is luckily ‘not a Jew in sight.’232 Lucile says 
                                                
231 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
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although she ‘could have bit my tongue’ she swiftly replied: ‘Well, I doubt your luck 
as there is one standing right in front of you.’233 Lucile’s retort, she says, made the 
man speechless and uncomfortable.  
In the above examples we can see the emblem of the accommodationist Weimar Jew; 
in everyday situations they could well have chosen to disguise themselves as 
assimilationists, and go ‘under the radar.’ Alternatively, they could have chosen to 
withdraw from wider society by becoming agitated by the Antisemitism, or by 
denying the influence of the negative remarks and silently removing themselves from 
the folds of wider society, without any overt reaction. However, being 
accommodationists, these Jews acknowledged the Antisemitism, but they firmly stood 
against it without compromising their Germanness. They took a ‘third way’ approach 
to protect their collective self-esteem. By choosing this form of response they were 
uninfluenced by wider society’s negative opinions of their in-group. This meant that 
their Private and Public CSE would most likely have had no correlation, and it allowed 
them to strike a balance between both their German and Jewish identities, 
respectively.  
 
4. Personal Moderating Factors & Coping Strategies  
Here, I analyse the possible effects of the personal moderating factors, age and gender, 
on the chosen coping strategies of Weimar Jews against Antisemitism. I chose these 
specific factors because their potential influences were apparent to me throughout my 
initial analysis of the three coping strategies (see Chapters Three, Four and Five). 
From my professional judgement and personal observation, I can say there were 
possible variations in responses to Antisemitism between older and younger Jews, and 
between both genders. For instance, looking through accommodationist accounts with 
respect to age, I found that the majority seem to be of young Weimar Jews. On the 
other hand, quite a number of young Weimar Jews also featured in the withdrawn 
accounts. Whereas, to me, accounts from older Jews seemed most likely to be 
assimilationist. Looking specifically at gender, I feel that many of the accounts of 
young Weimar Jewish women are accommodationist. In order to explore these 
findings a little further, I now look into the potential role played by age, and gender, 
in shaping Weimar Jews’ coping strategies towards Antisemitism.   




As in the case of British Muslim responses to Islamophobia (detailed in Chapter Six), 
the ‘generational gap’ was also noticeable when I investigated the responses of 
Weimar Jews towards Antisemitism. In this case, unfortunately, I do not have the 
exact age of individuals whose memoirs, autobiographies and journals I am using. 
However, I tried my best to group them according to their age when it was mentioned. 
Sometimes, especially in the case of memoirs, the writer would recount an incident or 
experience of Antisemitism and they would mention their approximate age at the time. 
On other occasions, for example, I would make a rough estimate of their age if they 
would mention an incident and say that they were at university or a ‘young 
professional’ at the time. The majority of memoirs and archival sources I employ in 
this thesis give examples of individuals’ experiences of Antisemitism across a range 
of ages. In order to categorise them to see any emerging trends with relation to age, I 
took anyone aged roughly 40 years-old or older as the ‘older generation’ and anyone 
aged 20-40 years-old as belonging to the ‘younger generation.’ I now evaluate how 
coping strategies might differ between young and old Weimar Jews to see if there is 
a possible link between age and coping strategy in this case.  
Although most of the younger Jews acknowledged wider society’s Antisemitism, 
many of them did not believe that it was true or justified, and nor did they conform to 
it. Instead, many young Jews worked towards self-care and development of their faith 
in-group. This was done in two ways; either through resilience or radical means. As I 
have shown in chapters Four and Five, if they chose resilience they worked within the 
established framework of society and were drawn towards accommodation, and if 
they were radical they chose to withdraw and reject wider society’s established system 
of order. In both cases, what is crucial to note is that the younger generation of Weimar 
Jews tried to rediscover their roots and re-embrace their Jewishness.  
Many memoirs I read are of people who gave anecdotes from their younger years, 
when they joined youth groups, and other such communities, because they had 
decided to reclaim their national identity as Jews, and this, in their eyes, was seen as 
the best solution to Antisemitism at the time. An overwhelming majority of young 
German Jews had some sort of affiliation with youth groups, or had at least 
transitioned through and dabbled with the idea of Jewish youth groups and the unity 
such memberships promised. One of the most prominent of these groups was the Blau-
Weiss, who blamed the older generation for being wayward and ‘losing track of 
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rituals’ and ‘the very essence of Jewishness.’ These youth groups knew and 
acknowledged that society at large held a negative view of Jews, and in face of this, 
groups like the Blau-Weiss knew their purpose was to promulgate a positive image of 
Jewishness, one in which the younger Jews could take pride.  
This idea of reclaiming and restoring the narrative of Jewishness from wider Gentile 
society was not restricted to youth groups. Similar discourses were generated in the 
circles of university-going young adults in major cities, many of whom were ardent 
followers of Martin Buber (Neiwyk 1980); (Aschheim 1982). This Jewish ‘rebirth’ 
had transfixed congregations of Jewish undergraduate students across campuses 
where Buber would often give speeches. They felt a deep connection with, and desire 
to, reclaim and regenerate Jewish national spirit within German Jews. Essentially, for 
many young German Jews the Weimar era was a time for great introspection and 
identity (re)formation. 
In contrast to this highly positive recognition of Jewish identity that was instilled in 
the overwhelming majority of Weimar Jewish youth on their quest to self-discovery, 
the older generation found such ways of thinking to be crass and illogical. Many older 
Jews felt far more assimilated than the younger generation, and unwilling to dwell on 
the Antisemitism they faced, considering it ‘part of life. Learning to live with it.’234 
For many older Jews, Antisemitism was, as Bauxbaum mentioned in his memoirs ‘a 
fact. It was the inevitable. It was unquestioned. But why wouldn’t it be?’235 Just 
looking at the memoirs and collections, Antisemitism rarely ever featured as a topic 
of discussion, and when it did, it took shape as more of side-note.236 On the whole, 
my finding illustrate how younger Weimar Jews were in deep pursuit for a stable sense 
of identity and belonging based in some part on their Jewishness. As such, a sense of 
community was important to Weimar Jewish youth in different ways to that of the 
older generation. In fact, younger Weimar Jews valued this sense of community and 
feared being alone so much so that some were even willing to ‘sacrifice themselves 
to every illusion of community’ (Buber 1919: 130).  
 
                                                
234 Kessler, L. Memoirs. [date]. (n.d.). An Unfinished Autobiographical Memoir. Leo Baeck Institute. 
Center for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.98. 
235 Bauxbaum, H. Memoirs. [date]. The emigration of two generations. Leo Baeck Institute. Center 
for Jewish History. New York, New York, p.8. 
236 In examples of many memoirs and collections, Antisemitism rarely features, and if it does it is 
almost gleaned over as an expected fact of life or a trivial non-issue for most older Jews. 
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4.2. Gender  
In accordance with the time, Jewish women, like all Weimar German women, did not 
have the right to vote until 1918 and their position in society was dependent upon their 
patriarchs. According to Gillerman, Jewish women of the Weimar era ‘suffered the 
double indignity of sexism and antisemitism, with second-class status imposed both 
inside and outside the Jewish community’ (Gillerman 2009).  In fact, many of the 
memoirs from the Weimar era written by Jewish women focused less on prejudice 
and feelings of othering, and more was written about their experiences of other banal 
issues, such as topics like domesticity, marriage and family (Kaplan 1979). 
Challenging this alone was quite the struggle, let alone the added attribution of 
belonging to a scapegoated minority group. Women almost always faced the brunt 
more so than men of the in-group. In Margaret Collins’ memoir237 she stands by this 
claim asserting that:  
 
‘based upon observation and experience, it is fairly safe to say that the female 
generations born between 1905 and 1922 were the most hampered in the development 
of their potential…they were doomed to a life submerged in mediocrity, to be rectified 
in preciously few instances’ (Collins 1979: 2). 
 
In contrast to this conventional line of argument, it is interesting to note that a sizeable 
portion of memoir excerpts and archival sources of accommodationist Weimar Jews 
that I read were of young women. This indicates that perhaps gender played a possible 
role in influencing the choice of coping strategy of Weimar Jews. One can argue that 
there were numerous women who broke the mould within segments of Jewish society, 
such women who were resilient, joined social and political movements. Historian, 
Claudia Prestel, refers to them as the ‘new Jewish women’ of the Weimar era. Though 
few in number, these women understood their Jewish identity in a much broader sense 
(Prestel 1998: 135). They joined communal endeavours that were not restricted to 
Jewish affairs. In fact, most of these women asserted their Jewish and German identity 
along with their womanhood, defiantly. Examples of organisations that many 
accommodationist Weimar Jewish women joined include the Jüdische Frauenbund 
(JFB) (League of Jewish Women), while others found the appeal of cross-group 
                                                
237 Collin, M. H. Memoirs. (1979). Once upon Four Decades. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish 
History. New York, New York. 
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alliances in the Socialists Workers Party. Interestingly, the women of the JFB fought 
hard against Antisemitism and simultaneously against Zionism within Jewish German 
communities for their one-sided response to anti-Jewish hatred (Prestel 1998: 137).     
Rahel Strauss is the archetypal example of the ‘new Jewish woman.’ I refer to Strauss 
throughout Chapter Five of my thesis when exploring the accommodationist coping 
strategy. She was outspoken against Antisemitism and whole-heartedly committed to 
forging an identity that was as equally Jewish as it was German. According to Prestel, 
Strauss led a legion of women to simultaneously ‘fight for suffrage and against 
antisemitism…participating in German and Jewish women’s organisations, educating 
women for their rights and duties’ (Prestel 1998: 139). Gillerman (2009), in her study 
of Jewish life during the Weimar era, also makes reference to the choices of these 
‘new Jewish women.’ Gillerman highlights how many Jewish women pioneered civil 
society communities of intellectuals during the Weimar era: 
 
‘Jewish salionières, most notably Rachel Levin Varnhagen and Dorothea Schlegel 
Mendelssohn, hosted social and intellectual gatherings in their homes that brought 
together Jews and non-Jews, noblemen and commoners to socialize and exchange 
ideas. Creating a cultural space unprecedented in its openness to Jews and women, 
these salons appear to have existed only for a brief historical moment as if outside the 
normal social constraints that enforced the hierarchical organization of society around 
the axes of gender, class and religion.’ (Gillerman 2009).  
 
The examples above are of Weimar Jewish women who were accommodationists; 
they were firm believers in self-development of both their Jewishness and 
Germanness. Crucially, these women did not allow themselves to be restricted by the 
view of society upon their faith in-group identity, nor by their gender identity 
(Brettschneider 2016: 10). Furthermore, these women who were liberated and resilient 
in the face of multiple setbacks, in the form of Antisemitism as well as sexism, were 
fervently unaccepting of all labels of negativity that wider society held up against 
them (Case 2016: 124). For this reason, they were just as unabashedly opposed to 
anti-Jewish stereotypes as they were to misogyny. These ‘new Jewish women’ had 
the education, exposure and the environment to become less caring of wider society’s 





5. Conclusion  
I began this chapter with an aim to investigate the potential link between collective 
self-esteem and chosen coping strategies of Weimar era Jews against Antisemitism. 
Acknowledging that it is near impossible for me to decipher the actual levels of 
collective self-esteem of Weimar era Jews using the available data, instead I drew 
inferences from their written accounts to see how they internalised and appraised 
Antisemitism, and in turn, how their experiences of being stigmatised affected their 
collective self-esteem. By conducting secondary analysis of the same data set in a 
discursive manner and using my professional judgement, I evaluated how emotive 
their responses were, and how far their personal opinions were influenced by wider 
society’s views, to see potentially, how congruent were their possible Private 
Collective Self-Esteem and Public Collective Self-Esteem (CSE).  
Through my analysis, I found that assimilationist Weimar Jews might have had a low 
Private CSE and a low Public CSE, and their personal evaluation of their in-group 
was most likely positively influenced by wider society’s negative opinions of their in-
group. With regards to withdrawn Weimar Jews, their Private CSE might have been 
high, however, it is difficult to ascertain what their overall possible Public CSE would 
have been, as potentially, social and political withdrawn Jews would have had a low 
Public CSE, while banal withdrawn Jews would have had a high Public CSE.  As a 
result, it is hard to determine whether or not there would have been any potential 
congruence between the Private CSE and Public CSE of withdrawn Weimar era Jews. 
Meanwhile, accommodationist Weimar Jews would have had a high Private CSE and 
a low Public CSE, but there would not have been any correlation between the two, as 
their personal opinions regarding their faith in-group were most likely uninfluenced 
by wider society’s negative perceptions of their in-group.  
My analysis also shows that the personal moderating factors of age and gender might 
influence individuals’ ultimate choice of coping strategy. These factors must be given 
careful consideration in a wider study. In light of this, sources must be chosen with 
the specific thought in mind to see the workings of a potential age gap and gender 
divide, with relation to individuals’ coping responses towards Antisemitism. For this, 
large scale data from archival sources must be collated and evaluated accordingly.  
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Chapter Nine. Conclusion 
 
 
1. Research Overview  
Through the course of my thesis, I endeavoured to explore the dynamics of 
Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices to see how and why targets of these 
prejudice respond towards it. Using the case studies of Jewish targets of Antisemitism 
in Weimar era Germany and British Muslim targets of Islamophobia in contemporary 
England, simultaneously, I examined the responses of targets in each case. This did 
not prove to be a simple task, as current research into Antisemitism and Islamophobia 
have not taken this angle to study responses towards prejudice through the target’s 
lens. Moreover, from the very outset of my study, I had been aware of the challenge 
in understanding the nuances of responses towards these prejudices by engaging with 
identity theory alone, and in my quest for richer, more comprehensive knowledge, I 
would need to delve into various different disciplines and academic fields, like 
psychology and sociology. So, I adopted an interdisciplinary approach. This, as 
defined by Klein & Newell (1997), entails: 
  
‘a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is 
too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or 
profession…and draws on different disciplinary perspectives and integrates their 
insights through construction of a more comprehensive perspective,’ (Klein & Newell 
1997). 
 
As such, I began by examining literature on prejudice quite generally to establish 
groundwork upon which I could then contextualise my cases. Thus, using an 
interdisciplinary lens, I developed two frameworks – one psychological and the other 
sociological – so as to understand prejudice, by discussing the concepts of stigma, 
self-esteem and collective self-esteem. In the psychological framework, I examined 
responses using an adapted version of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Transactional 
Model of Stress and Coping, as proposed by Major et al. (2003), which sees prejudice 
as a source of stress that leads to a threat against targeted individuals. I focused on 
symbolic threats (to religious identity) in order to see how targets perceive, appraise 
and cope with prejudice in terms of both emotion-focused and problem-focused 
responses to protect their collective self-esteem. Through the sociological framework 
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of analysis, I employed Brewer’s (1991) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, which 
acknowledges that each individual will have a unique optimum level of desired 
distinctiveness from their in-group and out-group. By combining both frameworks, I 
put forward a model of coping with prejudice, which gives a pivotal role to collective 
self-esteem, and takes into account the various nuances in responses, and is a 
comprehensive means to address why people in similar circumstances can have very 
different responses, and people experiencing different circumstances can have very 
similar responses, towards prejudice.  
The principle objective of my research was to devise a typology of coping strategies 
towards Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices, as currently none exist. I devised a 
typology of coping strategies through which I could categorise the nuances of 
responses towards prejudice into broad groups specific to Antisemitism and 
Islamophobia. I did this by employing a Du Boisian approach, and as such, my 
typology consists of three main coping strategies, namely: assimilation, withdrawal 
and accommodation. With the aid of Crocker et al. (1992) and Luhtanen and Crocker’s 
(1994) work into group interactions and collective self-esteem, I measured the 
collective self-esteem of targets and its relationship with chosen coping strategies. 
 
2. Study Findings & Inferences   
Certain findings evident from my research stand out in that they challenge commonly 
held, long-standing misconceptions regarding the responses towards Antisemitic and 
Islamophobic prejudices, as well as the behaviours and identities of Weimar Jews and 
British Muslims respectively. I discuss some of these findings and their inferences, 
below.  
 
2.1. Beyond Binary Responses  
From my study participants, the majority of contemporary British Muslims, and a 
considerable number of Weimar era Jews whose accounts I analysed, respond to 
prejudice in a manner that allows them to negotiate the various aspects of their multi-
faceted identities; in other words, they choose the coping strategy of accommodation. 
For instance, out of the 90 interviews that I conducted with British Muslims, 58 (64%) 
of them illustrated accommodationist responses. In this way, my findings challenge 
the commonly held misconception embedded within dominant discourses on 
Islamophobia that frames Muslim responses as locked into a perpetual binary of either 
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of the two main ‘extreme’ categories: ‘assimilation’ (i.e. completely immersing 
themselves into wider society), or ‘withdrawal’ (i.e. disengaging entirely from wider 
society) (Taras 2012); (Malik 2015).  
 In contrast, my findings suggest that coping strategies employed by British Muslims, 
and indeed Weimar German Jews, are much more complex than a reductive binary, 
and so we need to engage with a more nuanced means to categorise responses of 
targets towards these religious prejudices. At present, when trying to interpret the 
reactions of those in the ‘middle,’ we often hear the term ‘integration,’ which is 
consistently conflated with assimilation by critics in both policy and civil society 
circles, who believe that the term connotes a state-enforced form of community 
cohesion. In light of this dilemma, my thesis findings are incredibly important because 
they emphasise a ‘third way’ response of accommodation, which involves negotiating 
between being both British and Muslim, or German and Jewish, respectively. It is a 
two-way street; it entails action on part of both the targeted group, through 
engagement with wider society, and reciprocally from society i.e. both state and 
civilians must accept – not just tolerate – one another.  
 
2.2. Youth & Supposed ‘Extremist’ Responses  
My findings also highlight the potential influence of moderating factors, such as age 
and gender, upon the target’s choice of coping strategy. For instance, the majority of 
accommodationists in both case studies of Antisemitism and Islamophobia happen to 
be young people, of which many are young women. In addition, specifically with the 
case of Islamophobia, there is an equal number of men and women (29 each) who are 
accommodationists and almost all of the young women whom I spoke with (aged 20-
34 years-old) adopt this coping strategy. Intriguingly, none of the young women who 
participated in my study are assimilationists, and only two young women and three 
young men are withdrawn in terms of their responses towards Islamophobia.  
While these findings are specific to my study and difficult to generalize, they pose a 
direct challenge to particular misconceptions portrayed in the media and perpetuated 
by state-enforced counter-extremism policies that ‘vilify young Muslims’ that there 
is a youth in revolt (Massoumi et al. 2017). Some right-wing writers, political pundits 
and scholars argue that the majority of young British Muslims are becoming more 
extreme, anti-state and ‘radical,’ and thus easy prey to being withdrawn and perching 
on the fringes of wider society (see (Elshayal 2017); (Sayyid & Vakil 2011)). This 
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way they equate being politically active, vocal and unafraid to hold the state 
accountable, with becoming isolated and ‘ghettoized’ from wider society. My findings 
illustrate that the responses of young British Muslims are far more nuanced and 
complex, and it is reductive to suggest that knowledge of the state’s misdemeanors 
makes an individual rouge and prone to rebelling from the established social norms 
and political system. From my findings I can see that, if anything, the acute awareness 
and articulation of political issues and social injustices possessed by the British 
Muslim youth has been beneficial in that it has encouraged them to participate more 
widely in the established political frameworks of society. As a response towards 
Islamophobic prejudices apparent within state and society, such coping measures are 
less about withdrawal from wider society and more akin to certain expressions of 
political accommodation. Through active engagement with political processes, 
especially at grassroots levels, the British Muslim youth have voiced their critique of 
certain state apparatus from within the system, shifting public discourse towards 
issues they regard as most important, and simultaneously holding the state and its 
agents accountable for their actions (Massoumi 2015).  
Similarly, my findings for the Antisemitism case show much overlap between the 
responses of contemporary British Muslim youth and young Weimar German Jews. 
German Jewish youth of the Weimar were not as fervent, ‘hot-blooded’ and anti-state 
as they were often portrayed to be by the news outlets and media of the time (Meyer 
1998). While some youngsters joined the second wave of Zionism that advocated 
disbanding from established political practices, a considerable number of young Jews 
were still active members of political parties such as the Socialist Democratic Party 
of Germany, youth groups such as the Blau Weiss, inter-faith programs and voluntary 
social engagement projects like the Jewish Frontline Veterans (Reichsbund jüdischer 
Frontsoldate) (Aschheim 1982); (Meyer 1998). Thus, from the archival accounts I 
explored, many young Weimar German Jews responded to experiences of 
Antisemitism in diverse, interactive and novel ways, rather than simply withdrawing 
and revolting.  
 
2.3. Emotional Coping & Banal Coping Strategies  
Another commonly held misconception that my thesis findings dispute involves the 
mislabelling of targets of Antisemitism and Islamophobia as withdrawn for being 
either meek and docile, or retaliatory and extreme. For instance, those who appear 
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‘silent’ or quieter are often all grouped in the withdrawn category, ‘ghettoised’ and 
isolated from wider society. This is not always the case, as my findings show, there 
are numerous less expressive or active individual targets of prejudice, however, their 
‘inaction’ does not automatically accrue indifference. Thus, it would be reductive to 
group them all as withdrawn as some could be accommodating, albeit banally. With 
the help of the Prejudice Coping Model, I was able to make sense of the intricate ways 
targets of Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices cope, particularly those whose 
responses are not as ‘action-driven’. This, is often the case because such individuals 
lack the resources, social access and mobility in order to respond in a more active, 
‘problem-focused’ manner. My findings suggest that this pattern of thinking is most 
apparent amongst the banal withdrawn targets of Antisemitism and Islamophobia, 
respectively. In such cases, the target responds by denying the prejudice, re-
appropriating the resulting stigma attached to them, or believing that the negative 
treatment that they face is a ‘test’ from God, and that they must remain dutifully 
patient in the face of it all. Perhaps if these individuals were given better access to 
resources and social mobility was made easier for them, they would not withdraw 
when faced with prejudice, and instead challenge it head-on.  
Another misconception my findings dispel entails how a subgroup of withdrawn 
individuals is accused of being retaliatory, angry, and extreme in their response to 
prejudice. In contrast, my findings show that sometimes those who withdraw are not 
as overt or reactionary. Often such individuals are working within the system of 
established social and political norms. Thus, these individuals are politically 
accommodative as opposed to withdrawn from wider society. They navigate their 
responses to prejudice with resilience, as opposed to retaliation, highlighting the 
complexity of responses that my thesis has managed to uncover.  
 
2.4. Religious Prejudice & Racialized Collective Identities  
Although, in my initial thought process, both the case studies of contemporary 
Islamophobia and historic Antisemitism were temporally and spatially distinct, I 
found some noteworthy points of coalescence between the responses of targets 
towards both forms of prejudice. One such noteworthy observation is that, not only 
do the coping strategies of my contemporary study participants match those of the 
historical case, but quite remarkably, targets in both cases often express themselves 
in similar ways. For instance, in some cases the very wording they use to convey and 
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articulate their responses is the same. In order to illustrate this, I give certain examples, 
below. 
 
‘I am a German, and I am a Jew, one as intensely and as completely as the other, 
inextricably bound together.’  
- Jakob Wassermann 1921.  
 
“I feel I am a ‘good’ Briton only when I am a ‘good’ Muslim. For me, the values 
intrinsic to my Britishness are inseparable from those of my Muslim heritage.”  
- Waseem, 37. London 2014.238 
 
The first quote belongs to a Jewish German man from 1921, during the Weimar era. 
He is what Max Naumann would classify as a ‘Zwischenschichtler’ (in-betweener), 
someone who is as equally passionate about upholding their Germanness as their 
Jewishness. The second quote is from one of my interviewees, Waseem in present-
day London. Both quotes stress the incredible importance of balancing their ‘two-
ness’ of identity; being both German and Jewish, and British and Muslim, 
respectively. The similarity here is between two accommodationist accounts, 
however, throughout this thesis, I have also encountered and documented such 
strikingly similar accounts from the other two coping strategies.  
In the case of assimilationist responses towards both Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic 
prejudices, I find two quotes that can acutely depict the similarities between Weimar 
Jewish and contemporary British Muslim responses: 
 
‘We reject every Jewish nationalism. We together with the overwhelming majority of 
German Jews, consider ourselves to be part of the German, not Jewish, Volk [people]. 
We see in the establishment of a Jewish national homeland a misstep that cannot fail 
to endanger the emancipatory work of the pioneers of German Jewry and the religious 
and moral tasks of Judaism.’  
- Action Committee of German Jews 1929 (anti-Jewish Agency appeal 1930).239 (Niewyk 
1982: 161). 
 
We are in this country, we are living here, we are benefiting…and our lives and 
everything is dependent on this country…We need to assimilate; we have to identify 
as members of this country. Our loyalty should be to the country, not loyalty to the 
faith. Instead, faith comes to us first and then comes our loyalty to the country.’ 
- Umar, 83. Gloucester 2015.240 
                                                
238 I conducted an interview with Waseem on October 18th 2014 in London. 
239 Translation found in Niewyk, D., L. The Jews in Weimar Germany. Transaction Publishers, 1982, 
161. 
240 I conducted an interview with Umar on April 20th 2015 in Gloucester. 
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The first quote is from a speech delivered by members of the Action Committee for 
German Jews at their inaugural meeting in Berlin on September 19, 1929. These 
assimilationist individuals were staunchly opposed to any form of Jewish national 
identity, and instead they strove to uphold a strong sense of German identity above all 
else. This resonates with the second quote that is from my interviewee, Umar, a retired 
engineer from Gloucester, who believes that his ‘loyalty’ to being British must 
supersede his Muslim identity. Both quotes show how the responses of assimilationist 
towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia are similar in that they both choose their 
Germanness over their Jewishness and Britishness over their Muslimness, 
respectively.  
With regards to withdrawn responses towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia, here 
are two final quotes to highlight the fact that similarities between Weimar Jewish and 
contemporary British Muslim responses are common to all three coping strategies:  
 
‘Why did Jews have to be patriotic?... What did we know about bombs? Then after 
the war [WWI] was lost, came the British occupation. [We are] much too decent for 
these German people.’  
- Klara Caro. Memoir 1976.241 
 
‘I’m not British [sniggers]. What has this place ever given me? Talk to any white British person- 
they’re too full of privilege. Their whole narrative is warped… We [Muslims] will never be 
treated as equals, so why do we even bother deluding ourselves?’242  
- Zulfikar, 35. London, 2014. 
 
The first quote is from a memoir excerpt belonging to Klara Caro, who was a young 
women living in Berlin during the Weimar Republic. She recalls how she was very 
cynical regarding the position of Jews in German and questioned the importance of 
German national identity. This echoes the second quote from my interviewee, Zulfikar 
from London, who denies being British and – much like his Jewish counterpart – is 
cynical of the treatment of Muslims in his country. Both quotes show how the 
responses of withdrawn individuals towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia are 
                                                
241 Caro, K. (1976). A Seder Night to Remember. Leo Baeck Institute. Center for Jewish History. New 
York, New York, p.13 
242 I conducted an interview with Zulfikar on November 10th 2014 in London. 
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similar in that they both reject their Germanness in favour of their Jewishness and 
Britishness in favour of their Muslimness, respectively.  
The above juxtaposition of quotes from the two case studies shows that despite the 
contingencies in temporal and spatial settings, there can be some universal aspect in 
both cases that would explain the substantial similarities in responses towards 
Antisemitism and Islamophobia. In light of this, one can argue that religious collective 
identity is being targeted, profiled and racialised, which might explain the similarity 
of responses in both cases. Perhaps one way to understand this phenomenon is by 
engaging with both forms of prejudice through the lens of racialization. Carr (2015: 
40) argues for the use of racism as a discursive tool in understanding the ways in 
which a group of people not necessarily all belonging to the same ethnicity are racially 
profiled by a specific racial ‘phenotype.’ The racialization of religion is likely to be 
the common point for both cases of Antisemitism and Islamophobia. According to 
Zopf the racialization of religion causes the: 
 
“conflation of race and religion such that religion is seen as an immutable, essential, 
and ultimately ‘unmeltable’ or unassimilable (Joshi 2006) aspect of identity, rather 
than defined as a system of chosen beliefs” (Zopf 2015). 
 
The above analysis pertains specifically to my study, and further research and 
exploration of racialization of religious collective identities is required.  
 
3. Academic Implications 
I now show the implications of my research to academic practice; what this would 
mean for the study of the concepts of prejudice, collective self-esteem and coping 
strategies, as well as future studies that can take my research further. 
 
3.1. Prejudice & Coping: Interdisciplinary Approach  
My research findings show that there are definite benefits to exploring the concept of 
prejudice through the targets’ lens using an interdisciplinary approach. Understanding 
prejudice and its various emotion and problem-focused coping responses in this 
manner has allowed me to see the nuances in the responses towards prejudice, which 
has been an understudied area of work. Examining prejudice in this light gives agency 
back to the targeted individual (Appiah 2005: 56, 60). Firstly, it is not just cultures 
that are being targeted, but the actual people, with all their nuances and intersections, 
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which in turn influence their responses, and these must be given due appreciation. 
Leading from this point, the self-appraisal of targeted individuals are not mere 
reflections of wider society’s thoughts and opinions; there is difference in the ways 
people perceive, appraise and cope with prejudice, and this is reflected in the 
individuals’ way of coping. 
Exploring the responses of prejudice in this way has also enabled me to add to the 
study of self-esteem; especially when researching socialisation processes, we must 
move beyond the concept of personal self-esteem, and understand how targeted 
individuals feel about, appraise and evaluate their in-group and collective identity. 
From the moment that I delved into this research, I figured out that collective self-
esteem is in itself a majorly under-developed topic of study. My research findings 
show there is definitely some weight in exploring Crocker et al.’s (1994) work on 
collective self-esteem and prejudice in-depth. Essentially, from my thesis study, it is 
evident that an interdisciplinary approach is fruitful to understanding the concept of 
prejudice; it allowed me to develop a Prejudice Coping Model which puts targets’ 
agency and collective self-esteem at the core of analysis. Thus, academics engaging 
with the study of religious prejudices can benefit from such an approach.  
 
3.2. Acknowledging Accommodation  
I began this thesis with a desire to understand the complexity of responses towards 
prejudices, in particular Islamophobia and Antisemitism. I found it quite reductive 
how most of the time responses are portrayed in a seemingly binary form with regard 
to their relationship between their in-group and out-group (wider society). According 
to prominent scholarship into responses towards prejudice, targets are categorised into 
two main groups: those who blame their in-group (‘intropunitive’), or the out-group 
(‘extrapunitive’) (Allport 1954). I showed that there are many people who do not 
comply with this binary logic; the majority of my study sample, in fact, slot 
somewhere in the middle, whereby they do not blame society entirely, nor do they 
accuse their faith in-group for being the cause of prejudice. My results suggest that 
when engaging with responses towards Antisemitism and Islamophobia, we must take 
into account the existence of this third-way response (accommodation), which entails 
negotiating and balancing two aspects of their identity.  
An accommodated Weimar Jew was different from an assimilated or withdrawn 
Weimar Jew. At the heart of Weimar Jewish accommodation strategies was a desire 
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to balance their sense of individuality and collective identity. It was a conscious 
decision to abide within the normative, judicial and social underpinnings of wider 
German society, all the while remaining true to being a Jew, whichever way one might 
wish to define and fashion this identity. German Judaism in the eyes of the 
accommodationist Weimar Jew was not a daunting chore, but something they felt was 
logical and pragmatic, and they attempted change internally (within the individual and 
faith in-group) and externally (wider society).  
Similar points can be made regarding accommodationist British Muslims in 
contemporary England. In the eyes of the accommodationists, British Muslim 
communities are ever-evolving and are continually shaped by day-to-day interactions 
within wider society. For them, living in Britain is not supposed to be a burdensome 
or reactionary chore, but something organic and a logical progression from 
interactions, both negative and positive, within wider society.  
In my research, accommodation discourses move away from the idea of simply 
blaming other agents and instead the primary aim in this strategy is to maintain a 
balance of the ‘two-ness’ of identity; balancing Jewishness with Germanness in the 
Weimar Antisemitism case, and Muslimness with Britishness in the case of 
Islamophobia in contemporary England.  
In sum, I contributed to the study of Antisemitic and Islamophobic prejudices by 
devising a typology of coping strategies that gives due space to understanding the 
‘third way’ of accommodation. Considering that the majority of participants in my 
study responded to prejudice in this manner, I suggest that academics should expand 
their work in ways that incorporate the expressions of such responses.  
 
3.3. Conceptualising Racialization 
In light of my peripheral research findings, and thus specific to my thesis, I have put 
forward the idea of exploring both Antisemitism and Islamophobia using the concept 
of racialization of identities in order to better understand responses towards these 
forms of prejudice. We, as academics, must try to move beyond explanations of 
religious hatred when discussing Antisemitism and Islamophobia. Instead, we need 
create a space to further this area of study, recognising that both entail racialization of 




3.4. Methodological Changes & Potential Future Project 
Although my study was a first step in understanding the complexities of responses 
towards prejudices, there are some methodological changes that I would like to 
address. If time, methodological tools and monetary restrictions permitted, I would 
have liked to expand my study to include the rest of the UK, including Wales and 
Scotland. I would also have liked to interview Muslims in more rural areas and 
Muslim majority areas, which were the scene of race riots, such as Oldham and 
Bradford (2001). This would allow access to a more representative sample of British 
Muslims.  
One way that I would like to carry this study forward is by conducting the same study 
with younger generations of British Muslims, specifically those born post-9/11 to see 
how they cope with Islamophobia, and how this compares with those aged 20+ years-
old who participated in my study. This is because my findings show a trend that the 
majority of younger people tend to be accommodationists and I want to explore this 
further. Also, I would like to see how those who have no recollection of a pre-9/11 
world feel about anti-Muslim sentiments, and whether or not this factors into their 
responses towards Islamophobia and impacts their collective self-esteem. 
  
4. Policy Suggestions 
Although my research project has taken a non-normative stance throughout, and I am 
not experienced to give policy advice, however, my findings indicate some practical 
suggestions that might be of relevance to social activists and policy-makers.  
 
4.1. Social Awareness & Education  
Acknowledging the diversity in responses towards prejudice is not lacking in 
academia alone, it is also something that needs to be implemented in practice by 
spreading awareness in wider society. With regards to responses towards 
Islamophobia, those who accommodate are often wrongly grouped as withdrawn in 
the eyes wider society. As such, there is a need to create awareness and educate wider 
society about accommodationists who tread a middle-path, and are ready to negotiate 
between wider society’s norms and their own in-group’s values in order to balance 
both identities.  
Speaking to British Muslims, the majority feel that the best way to tackle 
Islamophobia is through education. Almost all replied with the same answer, when 
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asked how to prevent Islamophobia. When prodded to explain what they mean by 
education the replies were as follows. Most accommodationists, both young and old, 
feel that the most successful way to challenge Islamophobia is to educate people they 
interact with on a daily basis. As Shaheen, a 30-something lawyer from London says:  
 
‘we are stewards, representatives of our faith and part of duty is to undo the tarnished 
image that extremists have created for us, and that the media has exacerbated. It may 
sound simple, but we just need to actively make contact with non-Muslims and 
educate [them].’243 
 
Shaheen, says a way to educate people is by joining the scheme of the Human Library, 
which allows ordinary people to speak to strangers of different background and read 
them like a book, by asking them anything. Shaheen sees it as a way for ordinary 
people to communicate with someone they might not have had a chance and ‘feared.’  
 
Halima, a 21-year-old interfaith activist, says education can be achieved by: 
 
“Asserting my presence as a Muslim woman of colour, just normalise it…I should be 
accepted and often I’d invite my friends to observe so that they don’t think all Muslims 
are to be feared because we pray just like people of other faiths.”244  
 
This resonates with 22-year-old political activist student Mahmood from Birmingham 
who says that wider society can be educated through: 
 
‘Simply existing in predominantly white spaces. Asserting my presence as a person 
of colour and speaking to people.’245 
 
As we have seen in the historical case, an implicit point in the memoirs of many 
Weimar Jews is that they felt frustrated at the ignorance of the Anti-Semites. For many 
of the accommodationist Jews, educating the masses on a grand scale was a means to 
dispel the negative stereotypes made against Jews. There were numerous inter-faith 
and community groups in the Weimar era, such as the Jewish Frontline Veterans 
(Reichsbund jüdischer Frontsoldate), Die Kreatur (‘The Creature’, interfaith 
magazine), and the Frankfurt Circle, an interfaith group established by Jewish, 
                                                
243 I conducted an interview with Shaheen on October 20th 2014 in London. 
244 I conducted an interview with Halima on October 19th 2014 in London. 
245 I conducted an interview with Mahmood on February 2nd 2015 in Birmingham. 
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Protestant, Catholic and Quaker thinkers and academics, to dispel misconceptions 
about Jews in wider society. Similarly, in post-9/11 Britain, there has been an 
accumulation of community and interfaith groups to counter Islamophobia, such as 
the Three Faiths Forum (youth-focus interfaith activism), Nisa-Nashim (Jewish and 
Muslim women’s group) and Near Neighbours, amongst others.  
Many of these organisations seeking to tackle religious prejudices have made it their 
mission to lobby civil society and prominent political parties to support their cause. 
However, a common drawback of such efforts is that it is difficult to effectively plan 
and implement goal-oriented campaigns. For instance, during the initial stages of 
social awareness campaigns in general, it is necessary to determine concrete 
outcomes, i.e. who would the campaign propose to educate? Moreover, it is important 
to establish goals and measures of success for campaign work when assessing the full 
impact of such projects.  
 
4.2. Accommodation: Active State-Led Promotion  
One way to achieve set targets and campaign goals is with the help of government 
support in terms of advocacy and outreach work. With governmental support, anti-
Islamophobia campaigners can better foster initiatives between different community 
groups to enable successful dialogue to occur. This perhaps could be done through 
policy initiatives that tackle misrepresentation of Muslims and minorities on a societal 
level, in order to help those trying to balance all aspects of their identities to become 
productive members of their wider community.  
Looking at the unfolding of history evident in the Weimar era case, it is apparent that 
neglecting and stifling the third-way voices and increasing hostility against them 
within wider society forced many of them to succumb to withdraw from wider society. 
In fact, near the end of the Weimar Republic, the overwhelming majority of Jews had 
withdrawn from wider society, with many of them emigrating to Palestine or the 
United States to escape the severe Antisemitism in Germany at the time (Richman 
2008).  
In contrast, the state of Islamophobia in contemporary England is not as dire for the 
moment. However, seeking out accommodationist British Muslim voices, one can feel 
a sense of foreboding amongst them. Many young accommodationist British Muslims 
are beginning to think how rising Islamophobia in their country might affect future 
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generations. Such feelings were present in the quote from Nadiya Hussain, winner of 
the Great British Bake-Off 2015, that I presented in the beginning of this thesis:  
 
‘I love being British and I love living here, this is my home and it always will be 
regardless of all the other things that define me…I want my kids to be proud of that 
and I don't want them to grow up with a chip on their shoulder, so I live as positively 
as I can,’ (Guardian 2016a).  
 
Nadiya’s desire to ensure that her kids do not ‘grow up with a chip on their shoulder’ 
reflects the quintessential accommodationist resolve. For Nadiya, like most British 
Muslim accommodationists, Islamophobia is appropriately challenged through 
balancing the ‘two-ness’ of their identity. It is about persevering both as a Muslim and 
a Briton, despite the stigma attached to their Muslimness.  
However, the role of the accommodationist is only one side of the coin. In order to be 
effective, accommodation requires wider society to recognise and accept these 
individuals for who they are, in all aspects of their identity. This is where the 
government’s role in encouraging accommodation is crucial. But the reality of the 
current climate is such that even prominent accommodationist British Muslims are 
airing their concerns regarding the governments’ failure to promote 
accommodationist voices. According to one-time British Foreign Minister, Sayeeda 
Warsi, leading government officials and cabinet ministers whom she worked with, 
believe that many Muslims subscribe to ‘non-violent extremism’ that is a ‘swamp 
within which extremists feed’ and requires ‘draining’ (Middle East Eye 2017). 
Furthermore, Warsi herself feels that at one point in her career when she was the 
minister for Faith at the Department of for Communities and Local Government in 
2012, such was the level of suspicion that her special advisor was told by her fellow 
Conservative party members to ‘effectively spy’ on her (Middle East Eye 2017). 
Accommodationist British Muslims, like Warsi, are often misrepresented by 
government: 
 
‘Muslims who engage with politics or any other… institutions are to be viewed as 
suspicious…and Muslims who don’t engage are to be treated as suspicious for being 
separatist,’ (Warsi 2017: 25).  
  
Such circumstances, when even British Muslims in the corridors of power do not feel 
safe and are distrusted, paint a rather bleak outlook. Despite being well accommodated 
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and serving in one of the most senior roles of government, Warsi is still left 
questioning about the future of British Muslims faced with Islamophobia: 
 
‘[it] leads me to wonder whether the country that both my grandfathers fought for, a 
country I had the privilege of serving at the highest table in the land, is a country that 
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2. Interview Questions  
1. Could you please tell me a little about yourself? (Follow up areas of interest: 
family, friends and community).  
 
2. Partly why you were asked to participate in this research was because you self-
identified as ‘Muslim’. Could you please elaborate a little on what being a ‘Muslim’ 
means to you? (Follow up: Do family and friends hold similar views, would you 
say?).  
 
3. Do you associate with a wider ‘Muslim’ society? How active a participant in your 
local Muslim community would you say you are? Is your level of community 
involvement important to you? How important? (Follow up).  
 
4. Within mainstream society, what do you think other people’s (acquaintances and 
strangers) perceptions of you as an individual are? (Perceptions of Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike). Do their opinions [of you] matter to you? Why do you think 
this might be?  
 
5. Do you think other people see you as ‘Muslim’? (Follow up: Do you think other 
people’s understanding of ‘Muslim’ is similar to what you would describe yourself 
as being?) Why do you think this might be?  
 
6. Do you think other people’s perceptions of you have a bearing on your 
interactions with them? How important do you think this is? (Follow up).  
 
7. Have you ever felt that you have been subjected to physical or verbal abuse 
because you are Muslim?  
 
8. Could you please elaborate and perhaps cite some examples of prejudice if you 
feel you/someone you have been a target of it? (Here they might give anecdotes of 
personal experiences or of others). 
 
 290 
9. (Follow up question to 8.) If you do have some examples, what was your/their 
immediate response to being abused? Could you perhaps say why you think 
you/they might have reacted in this way?  
 
10. How have the experiences of such incidences affected your interactions with 
wider society (particularly non-Muslims)? How do you cope, is it different from 
before?  
 





3. Questionnaire  
  
QUESTIONNARE FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
REC Reference Number: SSHL/13/14-41 
 
Social Attitudes of British Muslims Towards Their Experiences within British 
Society 
 
Gender    M  F                     Age:  
 
 









High School:  
 
Parent(s)’s occupation(s):  
 




INSTRUCTIONS: We are all members of different social groups or social 
categories. We would like you to consider your Muslim identity in responding to the 
following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; 
we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement 
carefully, and respond by using the following questions: 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 












1. I am a worthy 
member of my faith 
group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I often regret that I 
belong to my faith 
group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Overall, my faith 
group is considered 
good by others. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Overall, my Muslim 
identity has very little 
to do with how I feel 
about myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I feel I don't have 
much to offer to my 
faith group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. In general, I'm glad to 
be a member of my 
faith group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Most people consider 
my faith group, on the 
average, to be more 
ineffective than other 
groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The faith group I 
belong to is an 
important reflection 
of who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am a cooperative 
participant in the 
activities of my faith 
group. 













10. Overall, I often feel 
that my faith group is 
not worthwhile. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. In general, others 
respect my faith 
group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. My Muslim identity 
is unimportant to my 
sense of what kind of 
a person I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I often feel I'm a 
useless member of 
my faith group. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I feel good about the 
faith group I belong 
to. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. In general, others 
think that my faith 
group is unworthy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. In general, belonging 
to my faith group is 
an important part of 
my self-image. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4. Collective Self-Esteem Scale Measurements  
 
The following instructions are taken from Crocker, J.’s Self and Social Motivation 
Lab (http://faculty.psy.ohio-state.edu/crocker/lab/cse.php)  
The four subscales are as follows: 
• Items 1, 5, 9 and 13 = Membership Self-Esteem. 
• Items 2, 6, 10 and 14 = Private Collective Self-Esteem. 
• Items 3, 7, 11, and 15 = Public Collective self-Esteem. 
• Items 4, 8, 12, and 16 = Importance to Identity.   
Calculating Results: First, reverse-score answers to items 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, and 
15, such that (1 = 7), (2 = 6), (3 = 5), (4 = 4), (5 = 3), (6 = 2), (7 = 1). 
Then sum the answers to the four items for each respective subscale score, and divide 
each by 4. 
 
 
